Ilan Gur-Ze’ev and Education: Pedagogies of Transformation and Peace critically analyses and introduces the main ideas of Ilan Gur-Ze’ev, reflecting on his continuing theoretical and practical relevance to the field of education. This book offers an accessible, higher-level critical discussion on the thought of Ilan Gur-Ze’ev with an impressive breadth and contemporary focus.

The book focuses on Gur-Ze’ev’s ‘counter-pedagogy’ project, which brought him much attention and attempts to establish an alternative and non-dogmatic form of education. Gur Ze’ev’s views go against ‘critical pedagogy’ and ‘neoliberalism’, because while the former advocates achieving a utopia in which there is no oppression, the latter defends the idea that ‘wants and desires’ need to be satisfied through a process of ‘marketisation’. This book brings to notice Gur-Ze’ev’s concepts of ‘counter-education’ and ‘diasporic education’ which seek to pursue the truth in everyday life, rather than achieving a utopian goal, or the promised land.

This unique and up-to-date monograph will be of great interest for researchers, academics, and postgraduate students in the fields of philosophy of education, theory of education, peace education, Jewish education, neoliberalism, and sociology of education.

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This book series is devoted to the exploration of new directions in the philosophy of education. After the linguistic turn, the cultural turn, and the historical turn, where might we go? Does the future promise a digital turn with a greater return to connectionism, biology, and biopolitics based on new understandings of system theory and knowledge ecologies? Does it foreshadow a genuinely alternative radical global turn based on a new openness and interconnectedness? Does it leave humanism behind or will it reengage with the question of the human in new and unprecedented ways? How should philosophy of education reflect new forces of globalization? How can it become less Anglo-centric and develop a greater sensitivity to other traditions, languages, and forms of thinking and writing, including those that are not rooted in the canon of Western philosophy but in other traditions that share the ‘love of wisdom’ that characterizes the wide diversity within Western philosophy itself. Can this be done through a turn to intercultural philosophy? To indigenous forms of philosophy and philosophizing? Does it need a post-Wittgensteinian philosophy of education? A postpostmodern philosophy? Or should it perhaps leave the whole construction of ‘post’-positions behind?

In addition to the question of the intellectual resources for the future of philosophy of education, what are the issues and concerns that philosophers of education should engage with? How should they position themselves? What is their specific contribution? What kind of intellectual and strategic alliances should they pursue? Should philosophy of education become more global, and if so, what would the shape of that be? Should it become more cosmopolitan or perhaps more decentred? Perhaps most importantly in the digital age, the time of the global knowledge economy that reprofiles education as privatized human capital and simultaneously in terms of an historic openness, is there a philosophy of education that grows out of education itself, out of the concerns for new forms of teaching, studying, learning and speaking that can provide comment on ethical and epistemological configurations of economics and politics of knowledge? Can and should this imply a reconnection with questions of democracy and justice?
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Ilan Gur-Ze’ev and Education

Pedagogies of Transformation and Peace

Alexandre Guilherme
To the people and the city of Edinburgh, Scotland. Bonnie Edinburgh, my beautiful and happy home for 21 years.

Thank you to Alex Anderson and Arie Kizel for the very stimulating conversations about Ilan Gur-Ze’ev.
Contents

List of figures x

Introduction 1

PART I
Gur-Ze’ev and the Frankfurt School 5
1 Gur-Ze’ev’s philosophical influences: The Frankfurt School 7
2 Ilan Gur-Ze’ev’s understanding of Critical Theory 32

PART II
Gur-Ze’ev and education 69
3 Diasporic Philosophy and Counter-Education Project 71
4 The improviser-teacher 108
5 Peace education: A critique 141

Conclusion 178
Bibliography 179
Index 198
Figures

2.1 From utopia to utopia 39
2.2 Paul Klee’s *Angelus Novus* 44
2.3 Circularity problem of theories based on positive utopias 46
There are three sorts of people:
those who are alive,
those who are dead,
and those who are at sea.

Anacharsis (6th Century BC Scythian philosopher)
I did not have the fortunate pleasure of meeting Ilan Gur-Ze’ev (1955–2012). However, we do share some common friends and colleagues, and through them I feel that I was able to get a glimpse of Gur-Ze’ev the friend and Gur-Ze’ev the scholar. These friends and colleagues speak very highly of him, they miss their friend, and continue to admire the scholar. I became acquainted with his work when he was still alive, and became keenly interested in his Counter-Education Project, his critique of critical pedagogy and of peace education. It took me some time to start to understand his ideas, and I confess that I still have much to learn. I believe that in a way, and through his critique, Gur-Ze’ev was setting up philosophical trends which are yet to be completely understood by the academic community. This book is the first solely dedicated to Gur-Ze’ev’s work, and as any first commentary it remains incomplete, dealing with some particular aspects of Gur-Ze’ev’s large body of work and philosophical ideas. That said, I hope that readers will find it stimulating and encourage others to peruse and study Gur-Ze’ev’s philosophy.

Ilan Gur-Ze’ev was born Ilan Vilcek. Just before his 16th birthday he decided to change his family name, translating Vilcek (i.e. ‘little wolf’ or ‘wolf cub’ in Slovak) into the Hebrew Gur-Ze’ev (i.e. גור Gur meaning a Lion Cub; and זאב Ze’ev meaning Wolf). In connection with this, Gur-Ze’ev writes in the foreword to his book *Diasporic Education and Counter-Education* that when he implemented the change to his family name he had “in mind the charismatic ‘wolf’ Ze’ev Jabotinsky, the legendary Zionist leader. In so doing I established within myself and in the family identity an enduring painful tension between homecoming and Diasporic existence” (Gur-Ze’ev 2010: 8). I believe that this affirmation was very much part of his existence, of his life, seeking inexhaustibly for answers, but never entirely accepting them, always developing a powerful critique of everything, including of himself. Gur-Ze’ev, as I gather from reading about him and studying his work, was one of those unique individuals who lived his philosophy. He seems to have been a child prodigy, not attending school from the age of six-seven and reading two books a day, some of which were very advanced, like the philosophy of Nietzsche. At the age of 17, he went travelling and became a diamond
dealer in South America, returning at the age of 23 to Israel. He had no formal qualifications, but through an access programme was accepted to study at the University of Haifa (Kizel 2015a). Gur-Ze’ev built his whole academic career at the Faculty of Education, University of Haifa (Gur-Ze’ev 2012), which is considered by many to be the best education department in Israel.

Gur-Ze’ev was the child of a survivor from the troubles in Europe during the Second World War. His father was “one of the living corpses from Mauthausen Concentration Camp” (Gur-Ze’ev 2012). In connection with this, in 2009, Gur-Ze’ev “accompanied his father back to Slovakia for the first time ‘since his neighbors took the family to the woods and killed them with kitchen knives and sticks only in light of the information that the Nazi army [was] under way …’ and Gur-Ze’ev stated that ‘we found the family estates, locations of childhood memories, and so much more. It was so important for the two of us as father and son’ (…Gur-Ze’ev’s own words from a letter sent to Richard Kahn; personal communication)” (McLaren 2012: 126). Also telling is the fact that Gur-Ze’ev (2010: 8) finished the foreword to his book Diasporic Philosophy and Counter-Education by stating that “[t]his book is dedicated to the two survivors of the Vilcek family, Robert and Jan; to the many who did not survive the slaughters inflicted on them by their own neighbors and the Nazis, and to the larger family of Diasporic humans who all around the globe devote their lives and love to the bettering of this world”.

The family history marked his life, and I believe, was the source for his concern with the re-emergence of Anti-Semitism during the early 2000s – and in a way, Gur-Ze’ev seems to have been a visionary about this, as he saw Anti-Semitism re-emerging at a time when no one envisaged it, when people thought he was seeing something excruciatingly unreal. The 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict, also known as Operation Protective Edge, was perhaps the culmination of this, with battles being fought on the ground and in the international media. And I noted elsewhere that “[i]f one were to take a bird’s eye view of this battle in the media and social media, it would perhaps resemble a Lernaean Hydra with its many heads, uncontrollable, quickly reproducing itself and taking control of many quarters. In some instances, Old and New Anti-Semitism emerged with impetus and great visibility, connecting those technological, political, economic and theological spheres mentioned a few years earlier by Gur-Zeev (2009). The result of this was that it affected relations with the Other and made no distinction between being critical of Israel and Israelis, and being judgmental of Jews and Jewish communities, for instance, the Pro-Palestinian Protests and the attack of synagogues and Jewish business in France” (Guilherme 2017: 2).

Ilan Gur-Ze’ev died of cancer on 5 January 2012 at the Italian Hospital in Haifa. On the day before, Gur-Ze’ev went by ambulance to the Faculty of Education, University of Haifa, to deliver his final lecture. “In a voiced weakened by fatigue and aided by oxygen, he addressed in words animated by a love of humanity his family members, friends and colleagues who had
assembled to honor one of Israel’s greatest educational thinkers and one of the world’s leading critical theorists” (McLaren 2012: 125). He left behind three children, Keyla, Hadas, and Nimrod. He was buried at the Garden of Eden Cemetery of Kibbutz Ein Carmel (cf. McLaren 2012: 125).

Gur-Ze’ev’s philosophical development can be divided into two phases. The first phase is centred around his work on the history of pessimism and the Frankfurt School. This phase is also centred around a critique of education, around the issue of normalising education, of education being used as a violent force against the individual, against its freedom, its subjectification processes, and that uses the individual as an object to perpetuate a system that is oppressive. The second phase continues to criticise normalising education, but offers a more developed discourse around the idea of Diasporic Philosophy and education. This phase discusses an alternative way-of-being in education, in the world, based on developing a critical attitude towards oneself and all things. This is what Gur-Ze’ev termed as living in Galut (i.e. גלות, Diaspora) within oneself. One must never be so comfortable with an idea, an ideology, a condition, so to lose one’s sense of critique – and critique here does not mean having a negative attitude towards everything; rather, it means perusing positions so to ascertain that they are still valid. Ilan Gur-Ze’ev was very radical at the time; he provided us with a radical and complex way of thinking about education (Kizel 2015b).

This critical way-of-being in the world was embodied by Gur-Ze’ev. Various colleagues and friends in common, working on philosophy of education have asserted in informal conversations that Ilan Gur-Ze’ev was always one of those individuals who questioned their positions, as one who encouraged them to consider and reconsider the implications of their arguments – and his critique and criticisms were always most welcomed. Ilan Gur-Ze’ev sometimes seems to have foreseen that which nobody else was seeing, and for this very reason his presence in philosophy of education events was always most welcomed. However, it is also true that Gur-Ze’ev had sometimes a difficult relationships with some members of the Israeli and Palestinian academic communities, who did not accept his harsh criticisms. He worried about normalising education on both sides, he questioned Israeli and Palestinian governmental decisions, he criticised both the left and right, and he worried about individuals and communities’ attitudes towards the Other side. I am certain that his criticisms were the result of much love for humanity, for Israel – the kind of tough love that is present in the Torah. Proverbs 13, 1; 24 reads: A wise son heareth his father’s instruction; but a scorner heareth not rebuke. He that spareth his rod hateth his son; but he that loveth him chasteneth him betimes. That is, the loving parent is not the one who does everything that the child wants and who continues to support her, even when she is engaged in wrongdoings; rather, the loving parent is the one who is restrictive and tough when needed (King James Bible). Rabbi Frand (2012) comments: “That ‘tough love’ means the parents who have such a child must
at times act in ways that seem insensitive and cruel to the child. The parents
cannot just keep providing the child with money to feed his habit. If it means
that the child will be arrested for stealing money from others or that he will
have to spend time in jail as a result of his crimes, so be it. The eventuality
and the inevitability of a person who has an addiction problem is that the
only way it is going to be ultimately dealt with is if it is to be cured once and
for all. When the Torah records the Parsha of the Wayward and Rebellious
son, it is informing us of the principle of ‘tough love’”. Likewise, Gur-Ze’ev
criticised Israel and Palestine because he loved, he cared; his criticisms were
a warning against taking the wrong and unethical pathway. His critical atti-
ditude and way-of-being enabled him to foresee and say things that others were
unable to see because of their ‘normalised way-of-being in the world’. When
one does not love any more, when one does not care any more, one does not
try to get involved any more, one does not try to control. Thus, when one
loves, when one cares, the opposite takes place. As I heard these commen-
taries by our colleagues and friends in common, and studied his works, I
was reminded of Hannah Arendt, another Jewish philosopher who lived her
philosophy, who was sharp, intelligent, and strong minded, and who also said
things during her life time that were ahead of her time, that were not taken
lightly by colleagues and friends in the Jewish community (cf. Guilherme
and Morgan 2017).

This book is divided into two parts. Part I comprises two chapters and it
focuses on providing a framework for interpreting Gur-Ze’ev’s ideas. Chapter
1 provides a mainstream reading of the Frankfurt School, focusing on the
main ideas and critically analysing them, so to provide the reader with an
analytical overview of this school of thought. In the next chapter, Chapter 2,
this enables me to demonstrate how these ideas were interpreted and further
developed by Gur-Ze’ev, and subsequently, how they influenced his philo-
sophical thinking.

Part II develops from Part I and it comprises three chapters. Chapter 3
considers Gur-Ze’ev’s Diasporic Philosophy, and his Counter-Education
Project, focusing on his rejection of ultimate ideals, of dogmas, and a favour-
ing of critical attitudes towards everything, including oneself. Chapter 4
focuses on the role of the teacher within the Counter-Education Project, the
‘improviser’ (i.e. improviser-teacher), a term coined by Gur-Ze’ev and that
appears frequently in his works; it contrasts the improviser-teacher to Freire’s
political-teacher and Buber’s builder-teacher, trying to make a synthesis of
all three perspectives. The final chapter, Chapter 5, discusses Gur-Ze’ev’s
critique of peace education; it applies his Counter-Education Project to the
field of peace education, criticising its current developments as forms of nor-
malising education. In the second part of this chapter, I connect Gur-Ze’ev’s
views on peace education to a scenario that was close to his heart, namely the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
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Notes

1. As mentioned, his doctoral thesis, “Pessimism and utopia in the thought of Herbert Marcuse and Max Horkheimer” (in Hebrew), was awarded in 1993 and supervised by Professor Amos Funkenstein and Paul Mendes-Flohr. It was later revised and published as *The Frankfurt School and the History of Pessimism*, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1996.

2. Jay (1973:4–5) notes that the intellectual impact of the Frankfurt School was not felt immediately in Germany and elsewhere, but that it was crucial in revitalising the Marxist movement in the aftermath of the Second World War. He says, “Although without much impact in Weimar, and with even less during the period of exile that followed, the Frankfurt School was to become a major force in the revitalisation of Western European Marxism in the post-war years. In addition, through the sudden popularity of Herbert Marcuse in America of the late 1960’s, the Frankfurt School’s Critical Theory (*Kritische Theorie*) has also had a significant influence on the New Left in this country”.

3. Karl Korsch (1886–1961) is considered to be, alongside György Lukás and Antonio Gramsci, an important figure of Marxist theory, being responsible for preparing the ground for the rise of Western Marxism in the 1920s (cf. Anderson 1979). Kellner (1977: 167) comments that, “Korsch was continuously applying the historical materialist method to Marxism itself. Whereas in *Marxism and Philosophy*, he saw Marxism entering a new revolutionary phase that promised a renewal of Marxist theory and practice, now, after the clear failure of the German revolution, Korsch was not so optimistic as to the possibility of restoring Marxism to an efficacious revolutionary force in the working-class movement. There was no longer a movement that really embodied revolutionary Marxism, Korsch concluded, and Marxism’s actual function was to legitimise reformist practice with revolutionary rhetoric, hence creating a rupture between theory and practice. Korsch now began to ponder whether there was even any sense in trying to restore Marxist theory which, after all, was the product of the nineteenth century” (cf. Korsch 1972).

4. In connection with this, Wiggershaus (1995: 12; 13) notes that “the phrase ‘Back to the free market or forwards to socialism’ had a special meaning to Felix Weil (1898–1975), and he ‘became neither a genuine businessman nor a genuine scholar nor a genuine artist’; rather, he became a ‘patron of the left … and a part-time scholar. He was one of those young people who had been politicized by the war… who were convinced of the … superiority of socialism as a more advanced form of economic organization … [still], he kept himself [at] a certain distance … [he was] a ‘salon Bolshevik’”.

5. Regarding this theoretical split, Gur-Ze’ev (1998a:144–145) notes that “[e]ven in his latter days Marcuse adhered to an optimism regarding the possibilities of revolutionary liberation, and he continued his identification with enlightenment’s traditional concept of progress. In the late 1960s he became involved in a confrontation with Horkheimer and Adorno on this issue, and he accused them of not being faithful to Critical Theory’s basic principles, on which they had agreed in the 1930s”.

6. Between 1939 and 1940 it was published as *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* in New York, when the Frankfurt School moved to Columbia University.

7. E.J. Lowe (Jonathan Lowe) (1950–2014) was Professor of Philosophy at Durham University, England. I had the privilege of being acquainted with Jonathan whilst reading for my PhD in Philosophy at the University of Durham, United Kingdom, and of having him as the internal examiner for my PhD viva.
8. Regarding the point about establishing the boundaries of knowledge, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant says, “Thus I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith; and the dogmatism of metaphysics, i.e., the prejudice that without criticism reason can make progress in metaphysics, it the true sources of all unbelief conflicting with morality, which unbelief is always very dogmatic” (p. Bxx). 

9. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant says, “It is the land of truth (a charming name), surrounded by a broad and stormy ocean, the true seat of illusion, where many a fog bank and rapidly melting iceberg pretend to be new lands and, ceaselessly deceiving with empty hopes the voyager looking around for new discoveries, entwine him in adventures from which he can never escape and yet also never bring to an end. But before we venture out on this sea, to search through all its breadth and become certain of whether there is anything to hope for in it, it will be useful first to cast yet another glance at the map of the land that we would now leave, and to ask, first, whether we could not be satisfied with what it contains, or even must be satisfied with it out of necessity, if there is no other ground on which we could build; and second, by what title we occupy even this land, and can hold it securely against all hostile claims” (B295/A236). Despite the use of allegoric language, it is clear that Kant is stating that the use of reason knows no boundaries and that it applies just as much to things-in-the-world as to oneself. 

10. Hans Cornelius (1863–1947) was a full professor of philosophy at the University of Frankfurt and had gained a reputation for being one of the prominent figures in developing Gestalt psychology and neo-Kantianism. Theodore Adorno, another central figure of the Frankfurt School, also studied under Cornelius, obtaining his doctorate at the University of Frankfurt in 1924, which was entitled *The Transcendence of the Material and the Noematic in Husserl’s Phenomenology* (cf. Wiggershaus 1995: 45, 70). In connection to this, Jay (1973: 45) comments that “[w]hen Horkheimer became his student, Cornelius was at the height of his career, a “passionate teacher … in many ways the opposite of the current image of a German university professor, and in strong opposition to most of his colleagues”. 

11. There are three formulations of Kant’s *Categorical Imperative*. The first formulation of the CI states that one is to “act in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become an universal law”, and some commentators, such as O’Neill (1975, 1989) and Rawls (1989, 2000), understand that this formulation summarises a decision procedure for moral reasoning. The second formulation states that we must “act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end”, and this is the one to which I refer in this chapter. The third formulation states that we must “act in accordance with the maxims of a member giving universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of ends”; it has attracted much attention in recent years, and some commentators such as Hill (1992) favour it. However, it must be noted that there is a philosophical debate as to whether these formulations are equivalent, and that Kant was only trying to emphasise the same point when restating or whether they are in fact different, if complementary, formulations. The latter case means that we can only find moral maxims for ethical behaviour through a three-tier test, encompassing all three formulations (i.e. we try to universalise actions, check that we are using people, and relate this to the community for agreement – only then it becomes a maxim) (cf. Morgan and Guilherme 2014: 103). 

12. Nb. The first Nazi concentration camps were built in February 1933 and were used to hold and torture political opponents. By the end of 1933, they held some 45,000 prisoners and the network of camps was augmented year after year reaching the figure of more than 300 in 1942. The extermination or death camps were
established after 1942 to implement the Final Solution, the total annihilation of the Jewish people – the Holocaust; the main ones are Auschwitz II, Chelmno, Belzec, Majdanek, Sobibor, and Treblinka; smaller ones, such as Maly Trostenez and Sajmiste appeared towards the end of the Second World War (cf. Morgan and Guilherme 2014: 88–89). It is interesting to quote the historian Yehuda Bauer who, in my view, best characterises the Holocaust when he says that, “The conclusion to draw is that one ought to differentiate between the intent to destroy a group in a context of selective mass murder and the intent to annihilate every person of that group. To make this as simple as possible, I would suggest retaining the term genocide for murder and the term Holocaust for total destruction … [the term] Holocaust can be used in two ways: to describe what happened to the Jews at Nazi hands and to describe what might happen to others if the Holocaust of the Jewish people becomes a precedent to similar actions” (Bauer, 2002: 9) [my brackets].

13. During the Second World War, the Nazis conducted unethical medical experimentation on human beings, namely Jews, homosexuals, and Gypsies, in the concentration camps, and these experiments can be divided into three categories: (i) experiments that aimed at facilitating the survival of Axis military personnel (e.g. freezing experiments to discover effective treatments for hypothermia); (ii) experiments using new medicines and treatments for injuries (e.g. testing compounds for the prevention and treatment of contagious diseases such as typhus and tuberculosis); (iii) experiments in support of the Nazi’s racial and ideological worldview (e.g. Jewish racial inferiority; racial differences in dealing with contagious diseases) (cf. USHMM 2018). Also, psychological experiments conducted after the Second World War demonstrate how easily relations between individuals can degenerate when one group is ‘objectified’ by another group; for instance, it is notable here, the Zimbardo Prison Experiment conducted at Stanford University (cf. Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo 1973), which had to be stopped because relations between ‘police-participants’ and ‘prisoner-participants’ had degenerated to an extreme degree.

14. Further, it is interesting to note here that the classical interpretation of Kant’s views is that moral actions are rational actions. More recently, however, some commentators have put forward a more sympathetic interpretation of Kant. For instance, Herman (1981) and Henson (1979) put forward the view that Kant did not break the connection between what the individual will and what the individual feels or desires. They argue that Kant was only arguing that the primary motivator for a moral action ought to be self-imposed, that I ought to act on those duties, those maxims that are given to me by the categorical imperative test; however, this does not mean that other motivators, such as emotions and inclinations, may not accompany or match the primary motivator; for instance: (i) I do not lie and I do not like lying (primary and secondary motivator match); which is different from (ii) I do not lie, despite the fact that I like lying (primary and secondary motivator do not match, but the primary motivator remains as the driving force for action).

15. Horkheimer was a member of the Board of Directors of the Frankfurt Psychoanalytic Institute, which was established in 1929. After the Second World War, when the Frankfurt School returned to Germany, Horkheimer and Adorno gave their full support to Alexander Mitscherlich to re-establish the institute, which was renamed Sigmund Freud Institute. Horkheimer was invited to join the Board of Directors of this new psychoanalytical institute (cf. Whitebook 2004:75; Wiggershauser 1995: 41).

16. In the case of girls this is called the Electra Complex, which was conceived by Carl Jung (1875–1961) (cf. Jung 1913).
17. With regards to Erich Fromm, Bottomore (2002) notes that he “became a close collaborator in the early 1930s, but his increasingly critical view of Freudian theory, and his attempt to give psychoanalysis a more sociological dimension, led to disagreements, and he severed his connection with the Institute in 1939” (p. 14; cf. Fromm 1942, 1970). Fromm's philosophy relied both on Freud's psychological insights and on Marx's work (cf. Jay 1973: 90–92). Jay (1973: 92) says, "Marx's psychological premises were few … [m]an to Marx has certain basic drives (hunger, love, and so forth), which seek gratification … Marxism was … in need of additional psychological insights … Psychoanalysis could provide the missing link between ideological superstructure and socio-economic base. In short, it could flesh out materialism's notion of man's essential nature". However, Fromm's estrangement demonstrates that the Frankfurt School was far from being a homogenous group, and that its members merely subscribed to a set of core ideas, which served as the foundations for the development of versions of 'Critical Theory' (cf. Rush 2004).

18. Perhaps, one of the best works on the mass is Elias Canetti, *Crowds and Power*, published in 1960, where he analyses the relations between the masses and its obedience to the power of rulers (cf. Canetti 1960/1984).

19. Hannah Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951) and *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (1963) are perhaps the best philosophical texts on the nature of authoritarianism and on 'incapacity to think' (critically). This suggests a strong overlap between Arendt's work and that of the first generations of Critical Theorists (cf. Arendt 1951, 1963).


21. Freud proposes that the human psyche is divided into three distinct but interconnected parts, the id, ego, and super-ego. The id is the instinct part, the ego the reality part, and the super-ego the morality part; that is, the individual tries to fulfil (ego) his desires (id), and this is checked against morality (super-ego), which sometimes creates conflicts between the urge of fulfilling the desire and what is dictated by morality (cf. Freud 1923/1927).

22. The original reads, “Il s’agit de saisir … le pouvoir à ses extrémités, dans ses derniers linéaments, là où il devient capillaire; c’est-à-dire: prende le pouvoir dans ses formes et ses intitutins les plus régionalés, les plus locales, là surtout où ce pouvoir, débordant les règles de droit qui l’organisent et le délimitent, se prolonge par conséquent au-delà de ces règles, s’investit dans dens institutions, prend corps dans des techniques et se donne des instruments d’intervention matériels, éventualment même violents” (Foucault 1997: 23).

23. *Pragmatism* is a philosophical tradition that started in the United States around 1870, and is centred around the works of William James, John Dewey, and Charles Sanders Peirce. Pierce’s famous maxim, “Consider the practical effect of the objects of your conception. Then, your conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object”, is a guiding principle of the pragmatist movement (cf. Peirce 1878: 293).

1. Franz Rosenzweig (1886–1929) was an important German Jewish theologian and philosopher. He is most famous for his collaborative work with Martin Buber translating the Torah into German, and for conceiving the Frankfurt *Lehrerhaus* in the 1920s, a House of Jewish Learning. He is also the author of the important book, *The Star of Redemption*, a theological work contemplating the relationship between God, Humanity, and the World (cf. Rosenzweig 1971).

2. A more recent event, which could serve as a prime example for us here was the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 in China. Protesters demanded democratic reforms, freedom of press, freedom of speech, and more accountability and an end
to political corruption in the Chinese Communist Party. The results, as we know, were the declaration of martial law, a violent crackdown which was condemned throughout the world, and an still unestablished number of victims (cf. The National Security Archive 1999).

3. Rabbi Isaac Luria (1534–1572) is one of the most important rabbis and Jewish mystics of the community of Safed in the Galilee region, current north Israel. He is considered the father of modern contemporary Kabbalah.


5. See https://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/movie_script.php?movie=a-tale-of-love-and-darkness; See also Oz and Oz-Salzberger (2013:134)

6. William Blake (1757–1827), poet and painter, largely recognised as a seminal figure of the Romantic Age.

7. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) is, perhaps, the most famous philosopher to subscribe to a cyclical understanding of history. The idea of ‘eternal recurrence’ is a key thesis of his philosophy, as he understands that events will occur again and again ad infinitum. This is beautifully presented by Nietzsche when he speaks to his readers. Nietzsche says: "Whoever thou mayest be, beloved stranger, whom I meet here for the first time, avail thyself of this happy hour and of the stillness around us, and above us, and let me tell thee something of the thought which has suddenly risen before me like a star which would fain shed down its rays upon thee and every one, as befits the nature of light. – Fellow man! Your whole life, like a sandglass, will always be reversed and will ever run out again – a long minute of time will elapse until all those conditions out of which you were evolved return in the wheel of the cosmic process. And then you will find every pain and every pleasure, every friend and every enemy, every hope and every error, every blade of grass and every ray of sunshine once more, and the whole fabric of things which make up your life. This ring in which you are but a grain will glitter afresh forever. And in every one of these cycles of human life there will be one hour where, for the first time one man, and then many, will perceive the mighty thought of the eternal recurrence of all things; and for mankind this is always the hour of Noon" (Palladino 2016: 197).

8. Yom Kippur or Day of Atonement is the holiest day in the Jewish Year, and it is marked by the theme of repentance.

9. The original reads: “Dans nos sociétés modernes, cette valeur religieuse du temps, matérialisée par les rythmes calendaires imposés aux fidèles, ne se joue pas sans induire certaines tensions entre le temps des rôles sociaux et celui du groupe d’appartenance religieuse de l’individu. Ce faisant, elle impose à l’acteur de se situer à part. La vie sociale est en effet découppée et organisée selon une multiplicité de temps, toujours divergents, parfois contradictoires. À cette disparité première, marquée par l’opposition fondamentale entre le temps des rôles sociaux d’une société laïque et celui des symboles et valeurs collectifs, se surimposent, au niveau macro-sociologique, les variations temporelles propres à chaque groupe social, qui se meut lui-même dans un temps spécifique, si bien que Gurvitch estime impossible
d’analyser un cadre social ou une société globale quelconque sans les avoir, préalablement, replacés dans les multiples échelles de temps de leur action (Gurvitch 1958: 1–2)” (Gauthier 2013: 123).

10. Martin Buber (1878–1965), important Jewish philosopher, theologian, and educationist, is most famous for this philosophy of dialogue, and for conceiving human relations in terms of I-Thou, dialogical, and I-It, instrumental, relations (cf. Morgan and Guilherme 2014). Hannah Arendt (2007: 31), writing in Le Journal Juif on 16 April 1935, said of him: “Martin Buber is German Judaism’s incontestable guide. He is the official and actual head of all educational and cultural institutions. His personality is recognized by all parties and all groups. And furthermore he is the true leader of the youth” (Guilherme and Morgan, 2009: 566).

11. Paul Klee (1879–1940), Swiss-German artist influenced by Surrealism, Cubism, and Expressionism, was a friend of Wassily Kandisky and taught at the Bauhaus School of Art.

12. On 26 September 1940, Walter Benjamin committed suicide in Spain after attempting to cross the border between France and Spain, fleeing the Nazi regime. On the day he tried to cross the border, the Spanish closed it to those with ‘a Spanish transit visa, but no French exit visa’, and ‘in despair, he killed himself. Had he tried to cross it the previous day, he would have got through’. Benjamin gave Hannah Arendt some important manuscripts to be delivered to his colleagues of the Frankfurt School who had moved to New York. She delivered them to their destination (cf. May 1986: 50–51; Guilherme and Morgan 2017: 85).

13. Gershom Scholem (1897–1982), German-Israeli scholar, considered one of the founders of modern academic research on the Kabbalah, and Jewish mysticism. Martin Buber once said: “all of us have students, schools, but only Gershom Scholem has created a whole academic discipline!” (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2013).

14. In connection with this, Handelman (1991: 347) notes some of Benjamin’s personal experiences: “In some fragments written in 1933 … Benjamin had also written of the new angel, calling it ‘Agesilaus Santander’. Scholem decodes this name as an anagram of Der Angelus Satanas, ‘The Angel Satan’, who represents a combination of angelic and satanic elements”. Another part of Benjamin’s vision of this angel was taken from a Jewish tradition he had discussed with Scholem, a tradition “about the personal angel of each human being who represents the latter’s secret self, and whose name nevertheless remains hidden from him” (Scholem 1981: 213). Benjamin writes in ‘Agesilaus Santander’ that his own personal angel was interrupted in his moment of praise to God and “made me pay for having disturbed him at his work” (Scholem 1976: 205) and that the angel “resembles all from which I have had to part … In the things I no longer have, he resides. He makes them transparent, and behind all of them there appears to me the one for whom they are intended” (Scholem 1976:207). The angel tries to “pull him along with himself on that way into the future from which he came … He wants happiness: the conflict in which lies the ecstasy of the unique, new, as yet unlived with that bliss of the ‘once more’, the having again, the lived. This is why he can hope for the new on no other way except on the way of the return home, when he takes a new human being along with him” (Scholem 1976: 207–208).

15. Jean Paul Sartre (1905–1980) was a French philosopher, novelist, and literary critic, and one of the key-figures in the philosophical movement of Existentialism. He had an open relationship with another important key-figure of the movement, Simone de Beauvoir (1908–1986). Being and Nothingness is one of his most important texts.
16. The original reads: “Il semble ainsi pertinent d’envisager cette expérience de l’angoisse en une perspective de philosophie de l’action. Dès lors que la liberté n’est pas une faculté, que l’existant est compris comme néantissant, alors cette théorie de l’action ne peut pas reprendre le schéma aristotélisien qui divise le processus de l’action entre «savoir», «décider» et «vouloir». L’angoisse semble au contraire être l’épreuve de ce qui sépare l’agent de ce qu’il connaît et de ce qu’il peut décider. Elle est l’expérience ontologique à partir de laquelle on doit comprendre l’agentivité comme ne relevant pas de la volonté mais d’un projet à la fois plus global et plus riche. Cependant, elle est aussi le nœud d’une difficulté: comment l’agent peut-il dépasser cette angoisse et agir? L’expérience de l’angoisse est donc un paradoxe : elle est à la fois l’expérience de la liberté, pourtant elle est aussi celle de l’inaction. À quoi bon être libre si cette liberté n’est pas mise en œuvre ? Si l’agent est séparé de ce qu’il est, s’il est également séparé des choses du monde par le néant qu’il est, comment l’agent peut-il se déterminer à agir ? Si l’on part du postulat que les actions humaines ont un sens, qu’elles s’inscrivent dans le monde pour en modifier la trame, sont-ce les choses du monde qui sont porteuses d’une valeur, d’un sens et qui deviennent par elles-mêmes les motifs de l’action ? Ou bien, est-ce l’agent seul qui constitue les motifs de son action? L’expérience de l’angoisse répond à ce problème tout en reportant la difficulté de savoir comment le motif de l’action apparaît”.

17. The original reads: “Si Sartre réduit l’inconscient à la mauvaise foi, c’est sans doute parce qu’il s’inscrit dans une tradition philosophique qui remonte à Descartes. Dans un texte de 1938, Esquisse d’une théorie des émotions 18, il condamnait déjà l’inconscient au nom du cogito. s’agit-il d’un préjugé philosophique ou bien y a-t-il un lien entre cette position théorique et la position subjective propre de Sartre? C’est là qu’il est intéressant de sauter de L'être et le néant, publié en 1943, aux Mots 19, ouvrage de 1964 où Sartre nous propose une sorte d’auto-analyse et où, comme nous allons le voir, il se décrit comme un imposteur, soit la figure même de la mauvaise foi”.

18. This is reflected in the following quote by Neusner (1987: 78) who comments that: “The pattern laid out here obviously does not conform to the actualities of the Christianization of the Roman Empire. From the viewpoint of Eusebius and Chrysostom alike, the matter had come suddenly, miraculously. Sages saw things differently. We may regard the emphasis upon the slow but steady advent of the Messiah’s day as entirely consonant with the notion that the Messiah will come when Israel’s condition warrants it. The improvement in standards of observing the Torah, therefore, to be effected by the nation’s obedience of the clerks, will serve as a guidepost on the road to redemption. The moral condition of the nation ultimately guarantees salvation. God will respond to Israel’s regeneration, planning all the while to save the saved, that is, those who save themselves”.

19. Lurianic Kabbalah is directly connected to the teachings of Rabbi Isaac Luria (1534–1472), commonly known as Ha’Ari (the Lion). He was born in Jerusalem and is considered a major figure of modern Kabbalah, and in the establishment of the Kabbalistic School of Safed (i.e. Safed is a town in Northern Israel).

20. The idea of the vessels is part of Jewish mysticism, and consequently of the Kabbalistic understanding of creation. Wodehouse (1945, p. 29) writes: The glory of God, said the Chassists, was poured out in the beginning over weak vessels that broke and could not hold it; but every fragment still retains a spark of that divinity, and the Presence of God goes into exile with these sparks, and man cooperates with it to bring them back into manifestation and into reunion with the one Light from which they came.
21. It is perhaps important to state here that the concept of Messiah and Messianic time was not necessarily important to ancient Judaism. However, it may have assumed a more central role with the rise and challenge of Christianity. Neusner (1987: 65) corroborates with this when maintaining that the concept of Messiah was not central to Jewish Oral Tradition (i.e. Mishnah), but it becomes so by the time the Jerusalem Talmud was compiled; I quote: “In my view the Christian challenge is what stimulated sage’s thought to focus upon the messiah theme. The Mishnaic system had come to full expression without an elaborate doctrine of the Messiah, or even an eschatological theory of the purpose and goal of matters. The Mishnah had put forth (in tractate Avot) a teleology without any eschatological dimension. By the closing of the Talmud of the Land of Israel, in contrast, the purpose and end of everything centred upon the coming of the Messiah, in sage’s terms and definition, to be sure”.


23. Paul Tillich (1886–1965), German-American philosopher and theologian, considered to be one of the most influential thinkers of the 20th century.

24. The Zohar is written in Aramaic, the language of Israel during the Second Temple period (539 BCE- 70CE) cryptic and mystic way. It first appeared in Spain in the 13th century and it is authorship has been ascribed to Shimon bar Yochai, i.e. Rabban Shimon bar Yohai a 2nd century CE sage, who lived in Israel during the period of the destruction of the Second Temple.

25. Simone Weil (1909–1943) was born to a non-religious Jewish family in Paris, and is considered an important French philosopher, mystic and political activist of the first-half of the 20th century. She is most famous for her books Awaiting God (cf. Weil 1972) and Gravity and Grace (cf. Weil 1952). I note that Simone Weil would probably be critical of Horkheimer’s standing on hope and redemption if we follow her reflections in La Condition Ouvrière (cf. Weil 1951), in which she reports on her sojourn as a factory worker, considers politics, labour, and industry. In an interesting passage of this work, Weil concluded “that the hope for an eventual liberation from labor and necessity is both the only utopian element of Marxism and, at the same time, the actual motor of all Marx-inspired revolutionary movements. It is the ‘opium of the people’ which Marx had believed religion to be” (cf. also White 1981: 171). That is, Weil understands that it is hope that hinders redemption because it stops people from mobilising and bringing about real and meaningful transformations to society, putting an end to suffering and injustice. Weil’s views are in direct contrast to Horkheimer’s, and if we expand into the field of education, to Paulo Freire’s, who as we know followed on the steps of the Frankfurt School and Critical Theory; Freire (2006: 2–3) states in the Pedagogy of Hope that “[t]he idea that hope alone will transform the world, and that action undertaken in that kind of naïveté, is an excellent route for hopelessness, pessimism, and fatalism. But the attempt to do without hope, in the struggle to improve the world, as if the struggle could be reduced to calculated acts alone, or a purely scientific approach, is a frivolous illusion …. Hopelessness and despair are both the consequence and the cause of inaction or immobilism”.

26. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) is notoriously critical of any morality based on Judaic-Christian values. Without going into the merits of his position because this would be lengthy and beyond the scope of this chapter, it is interesting to note that in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche argues against the Judeo-Christian moral tradition; he says: “...the Jews achieved that miracle of inversion of values thanks to which life on earth has for a couple millennia acquired a new and dangerous fascination – their prophets fused ‘rich’, ‘godless’, ‘evil’, ‘violent’, ‘sensual’ into one,
and were the first to coin the word ‘world’ as a term of infamy. It is this inversion of values (with which is involved the employment of the word for ‘poor’ as a synonym for ‘holy’ and ‘friend’) that the significance of the Jewish people resides: With them, there begins the *slave revolt in morals*” (cf. Nietzsche 1886/1973: 118).

1. This focus on process rather than final product seems to have connections with Eastern philosophies and religions. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1940: 21), the Indian philosopher and one of the 20th century most important scholars on comparative religion, comments that there are two types of religion: “The religions of the world can be distinguished into those which emphasize the object and those which insist on experience. For the first class religion is an attitude of faith and conduct directed to a power without. For the second it is an experience to which the individual attaches supreme value. The Hindu and the Buddhist religions are of this class. For them religion is salvation. It is more a transforming experience than a notion of God. Real religion can exist without a definite conception of the deity but not without a distinction between the spiritual and the profane, the sacred and the secular. Even in primitive religion, with its characteristic phenomena of magic, we have religion, though not a belief in God. In theistic systems the essential thing is not the existence of the deity, but its power to transform man”. That is to say, Eastern philosophies and religions focus on the spiritual and religious experiencing, on the process, rather than on a deity, a God, within whom we will join at the end, on the product.

2. Abraham Joshua Heschel (1907–1972) was a Polish-born American rabbi, and one of the leading Jewish theologians of the 20th century. He was the delegate for the American Jewish community to the Second Vatican Council, being a key-figure in persuading the Catholic Church to eliminate liturgical passages in its liturgical works that were either prejudiced towards Jews or that advocated in favour of their conversion to Christianity (cf. Gillman 1993: 163).

3. Sisyphus is the king of Ephyra (supposedly the original name of Corinth), who was very devious and deceitful. As a punishment for his actions, he was condemned to push an enormous boulder up a steep hill, but before he managed to reach the top, the boulder would roll down the hill. Zeus had put a spell on the boulder so that it would never reach the top, which turned Sisyphus’ task and punishment into an eternal endeavour.

4. Cf. [https://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/Job-Chapter-6/](https://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/Job-Chapter-6/)

5. There are two compilations: the Babylonian Talmud (i.e. Talmud Bavli; תלמוד בבלי) and an earlier one, the Jerusalem Talmud (i.e. Talmud Yerushalmi; תלמוד ירושלמי).

6. Haredi (i.e. חֲרֵדִי) Judaism, a term that broadly applies to various groups within ultraorthodox Judaism. It is characterised by a rejection of secular life and culture and its members often consider themselves as the most authentic group within Judaism. Shahar (2012) writes in the Israeli newspaper *Haaretz*: “One of the main sources of power enabling Haredi Jews’ extreme behavior is the Israeli public’s widely held view that their way of life represents traditional Judaism, and that when it comes to Judaism, more radical means more authentic. This is among the most strongly held and unfounded myths in Israel society”.

7. Abba Ahimeir (1897–1962) was a journalist and political activist, who regarded Zionism as a secular phenomenon. One of the founders of Brit HaBirionim (ברית הבריונים, i.e. Union of Rebels/Strongmen), he was the first to speak against the British Mandate in Palestine, and inciting a revolt (Schindler 2006: 154–175).

8. It is interesting to note that the already mentioned, Haredi, ultraorthodox Jews, are able under the Torato Unamuto (i.e. תורתו אומנותו) agreement, not to serve in the IDF, which means that they do not benefit from those experiences of questioning authority, and Absolute truths.
9. It must be said here that this is a rather delicate discussion within the Brazilian context as there are some far-right and right-wing groups who want Freire’s ideas banned from Brazilian educational contexts, and the Movement School without Party is a prime example of this vicious challenge against Freire’s ideas and legacy (cf. Guilherme and Picoli 2018; Penna 2017) – and I should like to make it clear that I am in utter disagreement with these groups. Another classical example that comes to mind is the standing of some French intellectuals from the Left in the 1950s and 1960s. For instance, Guilherme and Morgan (2017: 108) note that: “The friendship between Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir with Maurice Merleau-Ponty became quite strained, erupting publicly when, in 1955, he published Les aventures de la dialectique (Adventures of the Dialectic 1973), distancing himself from Sartre’s revolutionary Marxism, criticising Sartre’s position as an ‘ultrabolshevism’. In reply, Beauvoir wrote ‘Merleau-Ponty and Pseudo-Sartreanism’ for Les Temps Modernes, in which she responded viciously to Merleau-Ponty” (Toadvine 2007: 448, 2016). That is to say, thinkers like Sartre and Beauvoir were not prepared to be criticised on their standing and support of Marxism and the USSR, choosing as many at the time to overlook the very dark side of the Soviet regime.

10. It is important to note that Gur-Ze’ev is also critical of Feminist Critical Pedagogy. In his chapter “Beyond Postmodern Feminist Critical Pedagogy – Toward a Diasporic Philosophy of Counter-Education” (cf. Gur-Ze’ev 2005b), he says: “As a sophisticated version of normalizing education, postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy cannot present an alternative to normalizing education” (p. 160); “Within the framework of cyberfeminism we are faced with a promising development of the post-colonial feminist critique: a post-feminist messianic project. Its positive utopian educational vision demands our attention, since it offers a serious philosophical, existential, and political challenge to the critical concepts of violence, subject, drives, agency, meaning, creation and emancipation”. The positive utopian element is obviously a problematic issue for Gur-Ze’ev. However, and in spite of acknowledging the important contributions of postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy, Gur-Ze’ev is very incisive in his critique: “While paying tribute to the experience and the knowledge of the oppressed reassures the supremacy of the (feminist) intellectual as an educator, ‘feminist educators like Fischer and Bunch accept their authority as intellectuals and theorists, but they consciously attempt to construct their pedagogy to recognize and encourage the capacity of their students to theorize and to recognize their own power’ [Weiler 1991: 462]. In this sense there is no difference between the ‘paternalistic’/‘authoritative’ dimensions of Freire’s Critical Pedagogy and those of a feminist Critical Pedagogy. The foundation of the authority claimed here is the good intentions of the feminist intellectual. What a problematic justification!” (pp. 176–177). In this text, Gur-Ze’ev mentions bell hooks, Carmen Luke, Jennifer Gore, Patti Lather, Seyla Benhabib, and Elizabeth Ellsworth, amongst other prominent feminist critical pedagogists.


2. Certainly, there are those who hold more radical views, such as Ivan Illich in his Deschooling Society (Illich 1971) and more recently Gustavo Esteva (cf. Esteva, Prakash, and Stuchul 2005), arguing for the eradication of teachers because they act as forces that normalise individuals helping to maintain socio-economic inequalities. These extreme views would require a complete overhaul of educational systems, and the eradication of formal education.
3. It is important to note that Buber uses the word *Baumeister*, builder, and not *Führer*, leader to describe the community builder. “‘The leader’ contrasts with ‘the builder’, because he is incapable of establishing I-Thou relations with Others. ‘The leader’ is able to galvanise support and unite individuals but he does not ‘listen’ or ‘dialogue’ with Others, using and objectifying them to achieve his own goals. This is the reason Buber refers to ‘the leader’ as a demonic Thou, a disguised Thou trapped in a monological existence; he lacks the spiritual dimension necessary to be a ‘builder’” (Guilherme 2015: 836). Hitler is a good example of this demonic thou, of the leader.

4. Certainly, Freire never used the term ‘political-teacher’; however, it is arguable that this is a direct implication of his affirmation that all education is political.

5. For instance, Freire (1970: 61) says: “Through dialogue, the teacher is no longer merely the-one-who-teaches, but one who is himself taught in dialogue with the students, who in turn while being taught also teach. They become jointly responsible for a process in which all grow … Here, no one teaches another, nor is anyone self-taught. People teach each other, mediated by the world, by the cognizable objects …”.

6. Michael Apple, in his seminal *Ideology and Curriculum*, would expand this notion of the political in education even further, and in a more elegant way than Freire did, by discussing the idea that the choices that are made with regard to the curriculum are also political choices. Apple (1979/1990: 63–64) says: “Social and economic control occurs in schools not merely in the forms of discipline schools have or in the dispositions they teach – the rules and routines to keep order, the hidden curriculum that reinforces norms of work, obedience, punctuality, and so on. Control is exercised as well through the forms of meaning the school distributes. That is, the ‘forma corpus of school knowledge’ can become a form of social and economic control. Schools do not only control people; they also help control meaning. Since they preserve and distribute what is perceived to be ‘legitimate knowledge’ – the knowledge that ‘we all must have’, schools confer cultural legitimacy on the knowledge of specific groups. But this is not all, for the ability of a group to make its knowledge into ‘knowledge for all’ is related to that group’s power in the larger political and economic arena. Power and culture, then, need to be seen, not as static entities with no connection to each other, but as attributes of existing economic … power and control is interconnected with cultural power and control”.

7. The charge of propagandism is a serious one, and it might have given important ammunition to right-wing groups, both extremists and moderates, in their efforts to control schools and education. Recent right-wing movements, such as the Movement School without Party in Brazil, have tried to implement legislation forbidding schools and teachers to discuss topics such as racism, gender issues, and wider political issues, that might go against the principles and values of a conservative and ‘traditional’ view of the family. Much of their discourse is based on the claim that teachers have become propagandists and indoctrinators. Guilherme and Picoli (2018: 14) in their article “Escola sem Partido/School Without Party – totalitarian elements in a modern democracy: some reflextions based on Arendt”, at the *Revista Brasileira de Educação*, note that “[p]roponents believe, or want to believe, that Brazil is on the way to a ‘Marxist-oriented gay dictatorship.’ In that sense, in April 2013, a federal parliamentarian, then chairman of the Chamber of Deputies’ Human Rights and Minorities Commission, said in an interview to reporters from a news portal available on the web that ‘the [lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender] LGBT movement stands with a national indoctrination. They stand up in our country as a dictatorship, a gay dictatorship’”. This kind of discourse is also
present in other countries such as Germany where the AfD party (i.e. Alternative für Deutschland, a far-right party, demanded for a so-called Aktion Neutrale Schulen (i.e. Action Neutral Schools), encouraging students to record and denounce their teachers (cf. Hamburg: https://afd-fraktion-hamburg.de/aktion-neutrale-schulen-hamburg/; Brandenburg: https://neutrale-schulen-brandenburg.de/; Berlin: https://www.afd-fraktion.berlin/neutrale-schule). Guilherme and Picoli (2018: 9) commented on this situation and stated that “[i]n eliminating, for students and teachers, opportunities to discuss controversial issues and individual family values, the intention becomes an attempt at giving more credence to family beliefs (which may be radically opposed to the democratic defence of plurality) and make their set of values, formed through religious choice, to be understood as universal and unquestionable values. There will therefore be an indoctrination”. Cleverly, these groups use a discourse against indoctrination and propagandism to implement these very things, indoctrination and propagandism.

8. In their recent book Towards an Ontology of Teaching: Thing-centred Pedagogy, Affirmation and Love for the World, Vlieghe and Zamojski (2019), comment on Leonard Bernstein’s notion of education, which is very pertinent here. It discusses one’s love for the subject, development to become ‘self-round’, implying an eternal journey of learning from others and teaching others. Vlieghe and Zamojski (2019: 132-133) write that “in his earliest article considering education, The Essence of Music Study, Bernstein (1947) attempts to answer the question ‘how to educate a worthy musician?’…To begin with, when Bernstein takes sides against ‘theoretical’ and ‘virtuosic’ education, he does this because they are forms of educational practices in which ‘the immense and vital matter of music gets lost (Bernstein 1947, p. 204). Hence, his call for the ‘self-development’ of musicians seems to stem from his care for the subject matter itself: young musicians have to ‘self-round’ in relation to their subject matter. They should never lose sight of the matter of music in their studies, i.e. in their exercises, rehearsals, and performance….Further], Bernstein emphasises that it concerns a permanent effort of study. He says: ‘I love learning, I’m an eternal student, and that’s maybe why I’m a pretty good teacher”.

9. Steve Lacy (1934–2004), born Steven Norman Lackritz in New York City, recognised as an important saxophone player, worked continuously with experimental jazz and improvisation.


11. Another classic example is Modus tollens, which is expressed negatively: P→Q; Q; P. If it is sunny, then the sky is clear; the sky is not clear; thus, it is not sunny.

1. I acknowledge the contributions of Hilary Cremin in this part of this chapter; cf. Cremin and Guilherme (2018).

2. For instance, and in connection to the idea that “Perpetual Peace” is a foundational text of the EU, Kant (1795/2017: 10) says: “This idea of federation that is gradually to spread to all states and thus lead to perpetual peace—is it practicable? Yes, and this can be shown. If it so happens that a powerful and enlightened people can make a republic for itself, which by its nature must be inclined to perpetual peace, this provides a centre from which other states can be drawn into the federal union, thus securing freedom in accordance with the law of nations. By more and more such associations, the federation can be gradually extended”.

3. Another good example is Donald Trump’s recent attacks, criticising Black, Hispanic, and Muslim American politicians, which implies that there is only way of being ‘American’, and only one way ‘of loving the USA’ (cf. NY TIMES 2019).
4. On the Israeli side of the conflict, it is important to note the work of the organization Zochrot (i.e. memories), an Israeli NGO, which has some interesting projects, the most notable in my opinion is the Nakbah Map. Nakbah, which means Catastrophe or Cataclysm in Arabic, and is a term used by Palestinians to denote the exodus of 700,000 Palestinian Arabs during the Israeli War of Independence/Palestinian War. This map attempts to rescue the memories of all Palestinian localities that were destroyed or disappeared after the establishment of the State of Israel (cf. Zochrot 2019). Many of these localities have disappeared from memory, from historical records showing gaps of Arab presence, and this is an attempt to annihilate the memory of the Other, of its presence in the disputed territory so to weaken its claim.

Another good example of trying to destroy the other’s collective memory is the case of China and the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, in Beijing, which has been successfully supressed in China; the memory of events have been corrupted and those who participated in the protest in favour of democracy have been forgotten in mainland China. However, the world remembers, and perhaps even more interesting is the fact that Hong Kong remembers; in a recent article, Tai (2019: 64) writes: “These are the collective memories burned into the minds of most Hong Kong people over forty. Those who are younger can learn about what happened thirty years ago in the capital of China if they wish, as there is still a free flow of information in Hong Kong. The June 4 vigil to commemorate those who died in the Tiananmen Massacre is still being held every year, as it has been since 1989. The souls of Tiananmen Square never leave Hong Kong”.

5. Leibowitz (1980: 39–40; cf. Gur-Ze’ev 2000: 378) comments on this change, from victim to hero, when he says: “The violence, the admiration for combat bravery, the rudeness and disrespect for human beings – all of these are mutually connected. However, there is one more thing to be mentioned as a manifestation of our barbarization and the infiltration of the spirit of violence to the core of the Jewish psyche. There has been a fundamental shift in consciousness. The version of the memorial prayer that is being said in the funeral of each Jew is, “bema’alot kedoshim uteorim, among the holy and pure”. However, people who speak on behalf of Jewish faith and who are accepted as representing Judaism dared to add one word to this prayer when it is recited for our brothers and sons who were killed in the last generation’s wars: “bema’a lot kedoshim uteorim vegiborim, among the holy, pure, and heroic …” Why did they add “giborim, heroic”? Because they meant bravery in battle. But does this bravery represent any form of human virtue? Since when is being a war hero to be praised? I do not mean to say that every war hero is inhuman; some war heroes are zadikim, saints, and others evil, some pure and others defiled. Therefore, this adding to the memorial prayer is nothing less than an additional manifestation of the spirit of violence that has penetrated even into today’s Judaism.

6. In his article “The Philosophical Revolution in the Israeli Army”, Gur-Ze’ev (2003b) argues that the IDF, Israel Defense Forces, works very effectively as a form of normalising education. In a very informative and insightful passage, Gur-Ze’ev (2003b: 252) says: “In Ben-Gurion’s farewell letter to the IDF (7 November 1953), the educational duties of the army are declared ‘to be a melting pot for the Jews coming from all the Diaspora, gathering together at the homeland from all the world’s corners, being the formative force for a united nation, rooted in her rich heritage from her past and the vision of her prophetic future’ …. Implicitly, here we are confronted with the conception of the realization of the idea of the Sabra and the production of the new Jewish subject as an anti-militaristic pioneer-warrior who applies his power to master and fertilize the space that will become Eretz Israel, the land of Israel. This creative aggression will constitute the new reality
while creating the new Jew as a *halutz* in such a strength that will enable him to be purified of any remnants of the Diaspora mentality”. This normalising aspect of the Israeli Army seems to work at a macro level, normalising individuals to fit in and realise the utopic ideal of the new Jew; however, as we have argued in Chapter 3, at the more micro level, the IDF seems to encourage the kind of education that encourages critical attitudes.