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The Siege of Mosul and
Ottoman-Persian Relations, 1718-1743
The Siege of Mosul and Ottoman-Persian Relations 1718-1743

A Study of Rebellion in the Capital and War in the Provinces of the Ottoman Empire

Published by

INDIANA UNIVERSITY, BLOOMINGTON
To my parents who took away more than they could ever understand and also gave more than they could ever realize, and to Judith who understands nearly all.
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FOREWORD

The siege of Mosul by Nadir Shah in 1743 is one of the most important events in eighteenth-century Middle Eastern history. It was the only reverse suffered by the great Persian conqueror at the hands of his Ottoman adversaries and one of the few setbacks in a long and brilliant military career. This defeat, for such it was, was not inflicted by an Ottoman imperial army commanded by an Ottoman general, but by Ottoman provincial forces, raised, organized, and led by a local ruler, Haj Husayn al-Jalili, the Pasha of Mosul.

In the autumn of 1743, Nadir Shah assembled a great army of 200,000 men in preparation for a general assault on the city of Mosul. Prior to the event, Nadir Shah had completed the investment of the city after having ravaged the surrounding countryside. These atrocities added a large number of embittered men to the defenders of Mosul. The attack, which was launched on 14 September, lasted for forty days.

His adversary, Haj Husayn al-Jalili, was a man of great courage, strong resolve, and remarkable organizational abilities. He was a model prince, who combined loyalty to his sovereign with concern and compassion for his own subjects. Haj Husayn was capable of firing the imagination of his followers and inspiring them with the spirit of heroism and sacrifice.

The heavy losses sustained by Nadir Shah’s army at Mosul militated against further progress. As his dreams foundered on the walls of the embattled city, he was forced to sue for peace and to call off what might have developed into a full-scale invasion of Anatolia.

Dr. Olson unfolds the story of the siege of Mosul against a rich and variegated historical background. In order to discover the real causes of the conflict, he carefully examines the concatenation of events which culminated in the siege, the spirit that animated the various contending forces, as well as the initial impulse that set them in motion. With this end in mind, he follows the elusive meanderings of the chain of cause and effect through a large segment of time and space.

The study begins with a comprehensive discussion of the geographical, commercial, and strategic importance of Mosul, the Persian silk trade, the influx of gold and silver into the Middle East and its impact on the structure of prices throughout the area, and finally the Ottoman conquest of Baghdad.
The author's detailed account of the troubled decades preceding the siege of Mosul places the principal men and events encountered in this study in their proper perspective. His patient and revealing researches in the prehistory of the siege enable him to present a clear and penetrating study of this event. Consequently, much of what might seem at first glance to be inexplicable about the siege becomes clear and comprehensible.

The writer demonstrates convincingly that the failure of the Ottoman government to send sorely needed aid to the beleagured city was due to their inability to do so, rather than to apathy, indifference, or corruption. Dr. Olson makes it abundantly clear that the deterioration and decline of the social, economic, and political institutions of the empire, coupled with the costly and ruinous wars against Russia and Persia, were responsible for the ferment and violent upheaval and the resulting dislocation and distress. The bloody Patrona Halil rebellion of 1730, which shook the empire to its very foundations, weakened the fabric of the Ottoman state and brought about the deposition of Sultan Ahmed III. A decade of smouldering restlessness, which followed in the wake of this rebellion, was responsible for kindling the insurrection of 1740 and other subsequent outbreaks.

The spontaneity and unanimity of the response of the defenders of Mosul to the challenge of Nadir Shah's attack on their city bears striking resemblance to the response of the Spanish and Russian peoples to the challenge of Napoleon's aggression against their homelands more than half a century later. For the defense of Mosul was, in a real sense, a people's war. Haj Husayn al-Jalili, the chief architect of the successful defense of Mosul, called the war against Nadir Shah a jihad, a holy war. It was, indeed, a patriotic war, which the people of the city of Mosul and all those living in its shadow fought with determination and zeal. Everyone within the confines of the city showed an inflexible resolve to fight to the bitter end. Among them were many Christians and Yazidis and some Jews. In addition to the native urban population of Mosul, the defenders included a large number of peasants and villagers from the surrounding countryside, who had escaped the senseless depredations of Nadir's army.

Bloomington, Indiana
December 1974

WADIE JWAIDEH
Other than the remarks in the Introduction and the Foreword, I hope that this book will demonstrate that the price revolution of the sixteenth century had a continuing effect on the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As Professor Fernand Braudel has pointed out in his monumental *The Mediterranean World*..., spices “still dominated world trade in the seventeenth if not the eighteenth century.” When considering the Ottoman Empire and Persia, we may include silk as well as spices.

Between the height of the price revolution in the mid-sixteenth century and the first half of the eighteenth century, which is the topic of this book, monumental changes had taken place in Europe. As Professor Braudel put it, a “new sharp toothed capitalism” had come into being with all of its accompanying manifestations: from internal capitalistic developments to the expansion of Europe into other lands. This was not true of the Ottoman Empire. When the effects of the price revolution began to abate in Europe around 1650, the shattered economy of the Ottoman Empire could not withstand the onslaught of European capitalism, which hindered its abilities to industrialize and undermined the indigenous crafts and native industry which existed. The “underdevelopment” of the Ottoman Empire and of the Middle East had begun. In these circumstances the silk and spice trade became all the more important as well as a competitive source of revenue for the Ottomans and the Persians whose economies were increasingly in the backwater of world trade and commerce. Yet in the first half of the eighteenth century, both countries were sustaining huge empires; while the Ottoman Empire had been reduced as a result of treaties with Europe, the Persian Empire was experiencing an expansion.

The Ottomans and the Persians did not, however, reconcile their imperial ambitions with their medieval economies. Despite their inability to confront the Europeans successfully, the Ottomans did not lower their imperial gaze in the East after 1699, 1700, or 1739; they sought aggrandizement at the expense of the Persians. Nadir Shah also pursued a policy of imperial expansion at great cost to his subjects. The quarter of a century of wars (1723-1748) between the Ottomans and the Persians demonstrated not only the inability of the two Muslim Empires to confront the Christian West, but their inability to make war
on one another without the fear and apprehension of raising yet another specter of declining economies—internal rebellion, ample proof of which was experienced in 1730, 1740, and 1743.

It is somewhat ironical that the most comprehensive "price revolution" since the sixteenth century which so negatively affected the Ottoman Empire, the revolution which is occurring in the last half of the twentieth century, has its focus in the former lands of the Ottoman Empire—the Arab states of the Middle East. Whether the direct and indirect consequences of the twentieth-century "energy crisis" will be as long-term as those of the sixteenth-century "price revolution" remains to be seen. It can be said with certitude, however, that the changes in the political, economic, social, and diplomatic structures of the world, even if they are accompanied by the calamitous effects of war, will be immense. The sixteenth-century "price revolution" and its effects may pale in comparison to the twentieth-century "energy crisis" and its consequences.

Lexington
15 January 1975
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

When I think of thanking those who made this book possible or who contributed to the writing of it, Professor Charles Jelavich and Professor Barbara Jelavich immediately come to mind. The kindness, advice, and interest which they showed in my work made the long years of research worth enduring. I would also like to thank Professor Gustav Bayerle for his enthusiasm and compassion in teaching Ottoman Turkish and for consenting to undertake the arduous task of reading the first draft of this book. I am grateful to my colleagues Dr. William Tucker, Dr. Paul Forand, and Dr. John Scarborough who somehow found time among their own busy schedules to read the galleys and proofs. Lastly and most fondly, I wish to thank Professor Wadie Jwaideh for inspiring in me a love for the Middle East—its peoples, its religions, and its cultures. The insights into Middle Eastern History which Professor Jwaideh supplied me as well as his lectures, conversations, and “talks” shall always remain among the most memorable events of my life. The topic of this book was first suggested by him and his suggestions improved the work immensely. I will be proud if this book meets his own high standards of scholarship.

The chief editor, Professor John Krueger, and the editor of the book, Ms. Carol Hale Harm, were patient in answering all the, perhaps too many, inquiries of a first-time author. I never knew so much work could be transacted so efficiently and so pleasantly by correspondence. Thank you, Carol. The University of Kentucky Research Foundation kindly aided the publication by grants which paid for the typing of the manuscript and which partially defrayed the costs of publication.

I am indebted to the following publishers for giving me permission to use graphs and maps from works they have published. Harper and Row allowed me to use graphs 1 and 3 from Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, vol. 1, pp. 518, 528. With Professor Ömer Barkan’s consent, graph 2 was adapted from his “XVI. Asrin İkinci Yarsında Türkiyede Fiyat Hareketleri,” *Belleten*, vol. 34 (1970), p. 570. Oxford University Press made available the map of the topography of North Iraq on page 4 of David Oates’s, *Studies in the Ancient History of Northern Iraq*. The Clarendon Press gave me permission to use the map of Mosul on page 151 of
Stephen Longrigg’s, *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq*. The Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt of Graz, Austria, permitted me to use the map of Mosul indicated as Table XLVI between pages 361-62 from Carsten Niebuhr, *Reisebeschreibung nach Arabien und den umliegenden Landern*.

I also wish to express my thanks to Professor Claude Cahen for granting permission to use portions of two articles which will appear in the *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient* 17 under the titles, “The Patrona Halil Rebellion of 1730: A Realignment in Ottoman Politics?,” part 3: 229-344, and “Jew, Janissaries, Esnaf and the Revolt of 1740 in Istanbul: Social Upheaval and Political Realignment in the Ottoman Empire,” 19, part 1 (Spring, 1976). Material from these two articles have been incorporated into chapters three and five of the present work.

My research in Turkey was facilitated greatly when I was granted permission by the Turkish government to work in the Başbakanlık Arşivi. The staffs of the Başbakanlık Arşivi as well as the staffs at Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Üniversite Kütüphanesi, and at Robert College were helpful in locating materials. Mákbole Hanım at the Üniversite Kütüphanesi was especially helpful.

As is evident throughout the text, my work was made possible only because of the extensive research conducted by Turkish scholars. Foremost among these are İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, Münir Aktepe, Halil İnalcık, Ömer Barkan, and Halil Sahilliöğlu. I am especially appreciative of Professors Aktepe and Sahilliöğlu for their aid which enabled me to understand better some of the problems of eighteenth-century Ottoman history.
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATIONS AND SPELLING

For the transliteration of Ottoman Turkish, I have followed the system of the Redhouse Dictionary (Redhouse Sözluğu), Istanbul, 1968. This system has a two-fold advantage: it is close to modern Turkish orthography, and it gives both the Ottoman spelling in Arabic and Latin scripts. Words which are familiar to readers of English have been left in their English renderings, e.g., Mosul, Baghdad, Iraq, shah, etc. When proper names, place names, or geographical expressions are more familiar to English readers in Arabic or Persian, I have used the Arabic and put the Turkish in parenthesis; if the opposite is true, the reverse procedure was followed. Because the geographical scope of my study encompasses areas in which Persian, Arabic, and Turkish was/is spoken, in the text I have deviated from the Redhouse transliteration system when an Arabic or Persian rendering is more appropriate and familiar to the English reader, e.g., shaykh rather than geyh when it refers to a leader of an Arab tribe, Khoy rather than Hoy, Khan rather than Han, Azerbaijan rather than Azerbaycan, haj rather than hac, Ja'far rather than Cafer. I have left Mosul place names in their Arabic transliteration, e.g., Bash Tabya rather than Bas Tabiya, Qadikent rather than Kazikent, Yarimja rather than Yarmaca.

In some instances, I have used the Turkish · "e" rather than the transliterated "a," e.g., Hemedan, Tebriz, Nejef, Sehend, and Mameluk so that these words will be equally comprehensible to readers of Turkish as well as Arabic, Persian, and English.

The Library of Congress system has been used for the transliteration of Arabic and Persian. In the text Arab names such as Hasan, Husayn, and Muhammad have transliterated without the diacritical marks to facilitate and ease the preparation for publication as well as the reading for the non-specialist. The specialist will be able to readily supply them. I have transliterated the name of Husayn Jalili in the Arabic fashion rather than the Turkish, Hüseyn, because of the close identification of that family with Iraqi and Arabic history. The sum and substance of short footnotes in Turkish, Ottoman, or Arabic have been given in the text; in longer footnotes the English version is given in full.

In the text the Turkish letters ç and ş represent the English consonants ch and sh as in “church” and “shell.” The Turkish c is pronounced like the j as in “John.” The Turkish undotted ı is pronounced like the o in “atom”; the umlauted ö and ü are like the German or like the French eu as in “peau” and “tu.” The vowel before the soft slightly guttural Turkish ş is lengthened.
ABBREVIATIONS OF JOURNALS AND REFERENCE WORKS

The abbreviation MD is for Mühimme Defterleri and SP for State Papers located in the Public Record Office in London; IA is for İslâm Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul, 1941); EI¹ is for The Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden, 1913-38), and EI² is for The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition (Leiden and London, 1960).

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<tr>
<td>AHR</td>
<td>American Historical Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>AÜDTCFD</td>
<td>Ankara Universitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgeler</td>
<td>Türk Tarih Kurumu Belgeler</td>
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<td>BTTD</td>
<td>Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belleten</td>
<td>Türk Tarih Kurumu Belleten</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSOAS</td>
<td>Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEH</td>
<td>Cambridge Economic History of Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHI</td>
<td>Cambridge History of Islam</td>
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<tr>
<td>EI¹</td>
<td>Encyclopaedia of Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EI²</td>
<td>Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition.</td>
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<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>İslâm Ansiklopedesi</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFM</td>
<td>İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası-Revue de la Faculté des Sciences Économiques de l'Université d'Istanbul</td>
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<td>IJMES</td>
<td>International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies</td>
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<td>JAOS</td>
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<td>Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient</td>
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<td>JNAS</td>
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<td>IRCAS</td>
<td>Journal of the Royal Central Asiatic Society</td>
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<td>MES</td>
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<td>Revue des études islamiques</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZDMG</td>
<td>Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Relations between the Ottoman and Persian Empires may be divided into five periods:

1. The first period was one of formation for the two empires. The Ottomans' rise to power along the borders of the Byzantine Empire took place during the latter fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. During the same period Persia was expanding under the rule of the descendants of Timur (1370-1506).

2. The second period (1500-1639) was one of consolidation for both empires. In Persia the beginning of this epoch saw the rise of Shah Ismail, the founder of the Safavid state. For nearly a century and a half each empire fought to secure and establish the widest possible base for their hegemony. In 1639 faced with other problems the two empires signed a treaty at Zuhab, which was to endure for more than three quarters of a century.

3. An accelerated period of decline began after 1639 in both empires and increased rapidly after the turn of the eighteenth century. The Ottomans were involved in a series of disastrous wars in Europe while Persia was assailed by Russia in the north and by the Uzbeks and Afghans in the east and torn by internal dissension. This period continued to 1723 and ended with the collapse of the Safavid dynasty.

4. From 1723 to 1746 the two empires, now mere shadows of their former selves, engaged in nearly continuous conflict for twenty years. The Ottoman-Persian wars of this period mark the beginning of the denouement of both empires and the commencement of the period of decline. Neither of the two empires was to regain its former greatness. Nadir Shah's empire was to disintegrate ushering in Persia's "time of troubles," while the continued weakening of the Ottomans was to render them progressively powerless not only vis-a-vis their external enemies, but also within their own house. Henceforth, the ascendancy of Britain and Russia was the paramount issue and remained so to the twentieth century.

5. The modern period which commenced after World War I marked the beginning of a new era for both countries. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Riza Shah Pahlavi, the modern nations of Turkey and Iran emerged.

The fourth period of Ottoman-Persian relations concerning the years 1723-1746 and particularly the years embracing the crucial events which form the
main subject of this study is the period most in need of greater clarification. This period has been the subject of two books, *The Fall of the Safavi Synasty*¹ and *Nadir Shah*² by the British orientalist, Laurence Lockhart. The first book concludes at 1730, and the second is a biography of Nadir Shah and only mentions the siege of Mosul as a brief episode in the Shah’s life. Stephen Longrigg’s *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq*³ devotes several pages to the events surrounding the siege of Mosul, however; he, as Lockhart, considers the siege of Mosul as just another battle in an era of battles between the Porte and Persia. Mohammad Ali Hekmat’s *Essai sur l’histoire des relations politiques irano-ottomans de 1722 à 1747*⁴ provides the best survey of the period which is the subject of this study. Dr. Hekmat’s work is marred, however, by his belief that Nadir Shah’s attacks on the Ottoman dominions were motivated solely by his desire to unite the two Muslim empires. The legal means for bringing about such a union was to be the recognition by the Sunni Turks of the Twelver Shi’i school of jurisprudence, the Ja’fari, founded by the Imam, Ja’far as-Sadiq, as a fifth orthodox school. Like Lockhart and Longrigg, Hekmat considers the siege of Mosul important only insofar as it reopened hostilities in 1743—hostilities, which in his opinion, were based on religious rivalry.

In 1743 the powerful forces of Nadir Shah of Persia were threatening the Ottoman army at Mosul, the strategic gateway to the Ottoman heartland of Asia Minor and an avenue to the Atlantic. The geographical position of Mosul placed it in the pivot of the trade routes radiating from Persia. The armies of Nadir Shah failed to take Mosul. Shortly thereafter they were forced to abandon Arab Iraq, the largest portion of Mesopotamia, and the Arabic-speaking core of the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire which the Persians had been threatening for twenty years. The defeat and departure of the Persians and the absence of effective support from the Porte for the besieged city was to have significant consequences on each empire.

Mosul, even in medieval times, had been a crossroads of commerce and trade between India, Persia, Russia, Istanbul, and the towns of the Levant from which goods were carried to Europe. After its conquest by the Turks in the early sixteenth century, it became an important garrison town for the Ottoman army. Its geographical position provided a defense for Anatolia as well as an offensive base for forays into the lower reaches of Mesopotamia.

To understand why Mosul was able to resist the Persian onslaught, it was necessary to investigate and consider the changes taking place in Ottoman administration in the eighteenth century, especially in their eastern provinces which contained a majority of Arabs and Kurds. The capital and center of administration and power, Istanbul, was torn by revolt. The Patrona Halil rebellion in 1730 resulted in the deposition of Sultan Ahmet III (1703-1730) and the death of many prominent government officials, the foremost of whom was
the Grand Vezir, Ibrahim. The death toll during the Patrona rebellion reached the tens of thousands and the entire Ottoman administrative system was on the verge of collapse. The Patrona rebellion initiated a period of political and religious rebellions, accompanied by financial crises, which was to keep the Ottoman Empire in a state of acute instability for the next decade and a half. Domestic and foreign borrowing were instigated to replenish a depleted treasury. The financial straits induced by the thirty-three year cycle of the SIVIS year crises proved consistent precipitants of rebellion. The impotence of the Porte increased the autonomy and the power of the provinces. The constant turmoil at the capital enabled the provincial notables of local extraction to become the real rulers of the provinces. Husayn Jalili, the governor of Mosul, was one such notable. As the grandson of Abduljalil, the founder of the Jalili dynasty in Mosul, Husayn Jalili was able to play the major role in turning back the Persian menace and not the “victorious armies of the Ottoman Empire” as the Ottoman sources relate. The successful assembling of local Muslim and Christian populations into cohesive fighting units is one of the most important and stirring episodes of eighteenth-century Middle Eastern history.

The siege of Mosul had consequences far beyond the increased autonomy of the Ottoman provinces and an enhanced position for a provincial family. While the decentralized administration of the Porte worked superbly when threatened by an external force such as Persia in 1743, the passing of the crisis resulted in increased independence for the Kurds and strengthened the proclivity of the Arab tribes to confederate. Both groups were to be in the forefront of Middle Eastern politics after 1743. The conflict between Sultan and Shah also strengthened Ahmet Paşa, the governor of Baghdad. Six years after the siege of Mosul the Mameluks were established in Baghdad as an independent dynasty free of the Porte.

The increased power of the provincial governors in the remote parts of the empire grew in proportion to that of the Porte. The drawn out wars depleted the last resources of the Ottoman Empire, and Nadir Shah exhausted both the people and the land of Persia. The peasants of Persia were destitute and their ravaged land was unwilling to yield bare subsistence, let alone the increased taxes demanded by Nadir Shah. The constant wars of the Safavids and Nadir Shah reduced the Persian Empire to a state of chaos for the next half century.

The prostrate state of both empires allowed the European nations to force increased favored nation trade capitulations. Both Persia and the Porte acquiesced, opening the door for the first stage of imperialism by European powers. Before the walls of Mosul were repaired Russia was entrenched on the Caspian, and Britain was ensconced in Iraq. The route to India was assured. Less than a decade after the clash of two Muslim empires for hegemony of the Middle East, they had been replaced by two Christian empires. Such was the legacy of 1743.
Professor Lockhart and Professor Hekmat's works survey the first half of eighteenth-century Persian history but neither fully utilized available Ottoman and Turkish sources, especially monographs written during the past twenty-five years. Stephen Longrigg's *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq*, P. M. Holt's *The Fertile Crescent, 1516-1922* and Clement Huart's *Histoire de Bagdad dans les temps moderns* survey the first half of eighteenth-century history in Iraq and the Fertile Crescent, but these surveys are imbedded in larger studies which cover a span of four hundred years. The above three books are not as specialized as Lockhart's and Hekmat's and all have little information on the internal history of the Ottoman Empire. In the first half of the eighteenth century the Ottoman Empire underwent some of the most disruptive economic, social, and religious changes in its entire history. Most of these have gone unnoticed in the above works, and as a result the total perspective of eighteenth-century Middle Eastern history has suffered. While it is true that the eighteenth century witnessed the greatest acceleration of decline in the history of the empire, it is also true that the Porte still controlled the Fertile Crescent. The eighteenth century also witnessed the greatest clash between the Porte and Persia since the days of Shah Ismail. To understand Ottoman activities in Iraq, eastern Anatolia and its relations with Persia, it is necessary to understand the events taking place at Istanbul. For this reason it is particularly important for the student of eighteenth-century Ottoman history to grasp the full significance of the Patrona rebellion in 1730. This rebellion, which made a great impact upon eighteenth-century Ottoman society, has left such lasting effects upon the trend and configuration of Turkish history that it is still felt in contemporary Turkey. Studying eighteenth-century Ottoman history without an awareness of the importance of the Patrona rebellion and its repercussions on the history of the empire as well as the republic is not unlike studying the history of the Directory and the age of Napoleon without studying the French Revolution. This book is an attempt to partially fill that gap.

Moreover, I hope my work will clarify the point that Mosul was not captured by Nadir Shah in 1743, an error still made by contemporary authors. One such example is found in Rouhollah K. Ramazani's *The Foreign Policy of Iran* where it is stated that the irredentist object of Nadir in 1743 was to take Baghdad and that the war of 1743 produced no gains except that Nadir "captured Kirkuk and Mosul." In such a fashion is the victory in one of the more important battles in Middle Eastern history assigned to the defeated! It is my hope that such claims will once and for all be laid to rest.

In conclusion, I hope that this study will establish the importance of the quarter of a century represented in this book and especially of the years 1730-1743, not only for Ottoman-Persian relations and the Porte's relations with its provinces but also for the evolving pattern of internal "center-periphery"
politics involving rebellion and reform, which plays such a significant role in
Ottoman society. The role of the esnaf and the support of some of the guilds of
Istanbul for Sultan Mahmut I (1730-1754) after the deposition of Ahmet III
(1703-1730) in the wake of the Patrona Halil rebellion is an event on which pivots
much of subsequent Ottoman history. The quarter of a century under survey
in this study will, I believe, add to our knowledge of the Ottoman provinces,
especially the Arab provinces, while keeping in mind and perspective the pivotal
events taking place in Istanbul.

NOTES

4. Mohammad Ali Hekmat, Essai sur l'histoire des relations politiques irano-
ottomanes de 1722 à 1747 (Paris, 1937).
8. Şerif S. Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?”
9. Esmaf is the Turkish term for guilds, and it refers to artisans, craftsmen,
artisan-merchants and merchants proper.
10. Robert W. Olson, “The Esmaf and the Patrona Halil Rebellion of 1730: A
11. While concentrating on a later period than is the subject of this book, see the two
articles by Albert Hourani, “The Changing Face of the Fertile Crescent in the XVIIIth
Century,” SI 7-9 (1957-58): 89-123, and “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables,”
Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East, ed. William R. Polk and Richard L.
Chambers, (Chicago, 1968), pp. 41-68.
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Mümmute Defterleri, numbers 130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 138, 140, and 142. These are registers in which are recorded the correspondence of the Porte with the provinces; they include hatt-i hâfiyuns, hatt-i hâfs, fermans, and other dispatches from the Sultan, Grand Vezir, and Eyüpîlîam to provincial, military, and religious officials outside Istanbul; they are located in the Bağkânlik Arâbî (prime Ministers' archives) in Istanbul.

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State Papers 97, volumes 24 to 32. These record the correspondence between the British Resident in Istanbul and the Foreign Office in London; State Papers 91, volumes 1 to 10, record the correspondence between the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg and the Foreign Office in London between the years 1728-1736.

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Mü'melevârî, number 5144, is a history which covers the first part of the eighteenth century. It was written by Sâ'yînâm Ênênîzade and is located in Bayezit Public Library (Bayezit Umumî Kütüphanesi) in Istanbul.

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