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Note on the Transliteration

The standard system of transliteration, as used in the Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies and other works was kept in this work. Except for the underdots of \( \beta (\zeta) \), \( \beta (t) \), \( \varepsilon (d) \) and \( \varepsilon (s) \) which were omitted. Arab and Islamic terms were underlined.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AC    Aden Chronicle
AW    Arab World
DT    The Daily Telegraph
IDS   Itim Daily Summary
M.E.J. The Middle East Journal
MEM   Middle East Mirror
MER   Middle East Record
M.E.S. Middle Eastern Studies
N.O.  The New Outlook
R     (preceding a name of a town – Cairo, Beyrouth, etc.) Local radio broadcasting station.
R.C.A.J. Royal Central Asian Journal
SWB   B.B.C. Summary of World Broadcast: The Middle East and Africa.
TNY   New York Times
U.A.  Al-Usbu’ al-Arabī
W.T.  The World Today
South Yemen: Aden and the Protectorate under British Rule

MAIN ROADS

ABU DURAYCHI

KATHIR

YEMEN

RED SEA

GULF

SAUDI ARABIA

YEMEN

ADEN

OTHER UNMARKED FRONTIERS

UNMARKED FRONTIERS

15th BOUNDARY LINE

1934 TRENDY LINE

OTHER UNMARKED FRONTIERS
INTRODUCTION

For the last few centuries, the history of South Yemen has been shaped by the interaction of two conflicting forces. Its highly conservative and rigidly stratified society together with its quasi-tribal, decentralized and unstable government was a strong inhibitor to change. But the country has a unique geo-political position abutting the straits of Bāb al-Mandab, the shores of the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, the important port of Aden located at this junction and the presence of the British there from 1839, exercised a countervailing pressure for innovation and change. The stability of South Yemeni politics was related to the current interaction between these two conflicting forces -- the conservative and the innovative -- and the degree of balance between them.

The violence in the 1960s resulted from changes which South Yemeni society underwent after the 1930s. Till then the pressure to preserve the traditional pattern of society had won. However, due to a rather effective process of modernisation, the balance shifted towards new values shaped by novel political and social structures, which ultimately precipitated a conflict. To trace the origins of this conflict it is necessary to examine the traditional South Yemeni polity and the phenomena which altered it.

Prior to the 1930s, South Yemen was barely cultivated, devoid of natural resources and difficult to reach, beyond the great Rubā'ī al-Khālij Desert. Except in Aden, the great powers had hardly developed any interests there and consequently, the area was unaffected by major Middle Eastern reform processes such as the Tanzīmāt. These conditions resulted in South Yemen having no effective central rule; authority was divided amongst small state-like units, nominally known as "Emirates", "Sultanates" or "Princedoms" (the difference among the titles was quite meaningless) which were actually semi-institutionalised tribal alliances. Each unit was headed by a Sūlṭān, Nāʾib or Amlīr. A continuous state of fighting prevailed both between the Beduin tribes and the urban population and among the tribes themselves, who, in the 1920s, amounted
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to 60 percent of the 1.2 million inhabitants.\(^2\)

In the absence of alternative social or political frameworks, social strata, to which one was affiliated according to the "estate" norms,\(^3\) namely, by descent and lineage and not by economic standards,\(^4\) functioned as the major framework for human activity. Referring to Ḥadramawt, South Yemen's eastern area where this system was particularly prominent, A.S. Bujra noted that the basic principle of local society was stratification.\(^4\) The bottom level comprised military and administrative slaves ("Abīd) whose African descent rendered them the lowest of the ṭow. Above them was the urban population, merchants and craftsmen of uncertain descent who were therefore regarded as "weaklings" (duʿafāʾ). They were preceded by the tribes (Qabāʾil) and the leaders of the Sultanates who held the real power. They had prestigious descent, their mythological ancestor being Qaṭṭan, the forefather of a large part of southern Arabia's population.\(^5\) In first place stood the Sayyids (Ṣādāt or Sādah, sing: Sayyid), descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad's family, who first emigrated from Basrah to the Ḥadramawt after 952 B.C. Their religious descent, enabled the Sayyids to become the local ʿUlamāʾ, who functioned as teachers, judges and political mediators. They were particularly famous for this last activity: In an area where fighting was a constant feature, their residential territory became a neutral, holy ground (Hawtah) where bloodshed was forbidden, which also functioned as a common ground for markets and religious festivals. In return for their services, the Sayyids became trustees of properties (mainly land) and were treated as holy ones, with special respect. They protected their status by applying special adaptations of the Muslim principle of equality in marriage (Kafāʾah) to prevent what they regarded as retrogressive marriages.\(^6\) Being the top stratum, the Sayyids set the example for other lower levels, which thus formed a rigid stratification.

The opportunity for exposure to other social systems through contacts with foreign populations existed but this did not alter the traditional social and political structures. One common way to make such contacts was emigration. Over the centuries the continuous fighting and economic stagnation, which worsened with the decline in transit trade with the Far East, encouraged local inhabitants to emigrate, which the relatively easy access to sea routes facilitated. By the early twentieth century there were about 100,000 South Yemenis, mainly from the Ḥadramawt, in overseas communities; about 76,000 stayed in the Dutch East Indies (notably Java), Singapore, Sumatra and Borneo; others went to East Africa, notably Zanzibar, the Qomoro Islands, Kenya and Somali. Small communities were also formed in Arab states. The migrants usually succeeded in their enterprises in their new countries and particularly the Sayyids whose religious qualities were

\(^2\)
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most highly regarded among the local relatively under-developed population. Apart from being "Ulama", they became successful businessmen and were integrated into local political dynasties in several places.8

The migrants kept continuous contacts with their homeland. They often visited and re-immigrated to South Yemen after years abroad. Many of them sent their sons to study in the renowned centres of Īn and Sayʿūn in Ḥadramawt. In the 1930s financial remittances sent by the migrants from the East Indies to South Yemen amounted to £ 600,000.9 By settling in ascriptive formations, the migrants preserved the traditional social frameworks of their homeland in their new communities; thus Ḥadramis from the Kathīrī Sultanate settled mainly in Java, while emigrants from Fadlī or Laḥaj in western South Yemen, mainly settled in Somali and Zanzibar. South Yemeni values and stratification, as manifested in the Sayyid's continued superiority, were prolonged in these overseas communities whose inhabitants strove, in fact, to strengthen South Yemen's existing position. Emigration might have been a means to ease the tensions inherent in South Yemeni society, but it only served to entrench the traditional patterns.

Other types of contact with foreigners had a similar effect. From the 19th century, contacts between South Yemenis and the Yemeni Mutawwakilite kingdom to the north, were mostly short lived and violent. The attempts by the Yemeni Imams to claim and conquer areas in the South, alienated local tribes from the Imams' intentions; North Yemen's activities culminated in 1915, in a short-lived conquest of Laḥaj.10 The fact that a large part of North Yemen's population was Shiʿī-Zaydi, while South Yemen was predominantly Sunni-Shafiʿī widened and fixed the differences between the two countries.

Contacts with the British also had little effect. In 1839, an attempt to reinforce their control over the important route from the Red Sea to India, the British conquered Aden. However, following the principles laid down by Aden's conqueror and first Political Agent, Captain S. B. Haines (1839-1854), the British kept "The Fortress of Aden" isolated from the rest of the Protectorate. Contact with the Princedoms was minimal, sporadic and limited to signing "defense treaties" with some of the Sultāns.11

The character of South Yemeni Society began to change, only after the 1930s, when the British started to introduce reforms. From the end of the First World War, Britain's attitude towards the Protectorate gradually changed. The Ottoman Empire's dissolution and Britain's victory reduced Aden's strategic importance as an "imperial outpost" on the way to India. Policy makers in London thought that British control of the Indian Ocean would suffice and that Aden could, at best, serve as a coaling station.12 It seems that the interest in Aden increased because of the town's position in
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relation to the Protectorate beyond, a position about which local British officials' concern steadily grew. The original cause for that concern was military; North Yemen's brief conquest of Laḥaj in 1915, which British troops from India recovered, was prolonged in repeated attempts by the Imam Yahya of North Yemen to stir up tribes and to capture villages in the frontier areas of Dāli and Upper Yaḥći. The British fought the Yemeni attempts and conducted continuous negotiations with the Imam, which culminated only in 1934 in an agreement to delineate the frontier between North and South Yemen. The Protectorate area was thus recognised as a vital "Hinterland" for Aden, which Britain wanted within its sphere of influence.

Consequently, Britain's relations with Protectorate tribes and rulers expanded, particularly in places where there was a visible North Yemeni threat or where a dispute could influence the local attitude towards the British. In 1919, British officials assisted the Sultan of Laḥaj, ǦAbd al-Karīm Fadl, who was regarded as "a friend" and who had been awarded a knighthood, against a rival for his throne. In 1929, they suppressed a revolt by the Subayḥi tribes in Laḥaj and initiated a truce between them and the Sultan. In Bayḥān, Dāli, upper and lower Ḥawlaq and Yaḥći they established outposts and started recruiting Ḥawlaq tribesmen to the newly established Protectorate levies (see below). In return for the Hadrami Sayyids' and Sultāns' [of the Kathiri and Quaytī Princedoms] resistance to the Imam's temptations, British officials stressed the importance of the Hadrami Princedoms in the British air routes to Oman and the Persian Gulf, and supported these Sultāns and Sayyids against their opponents, the Irshād movement (also see below).

As R.J. Gavin explained, a local "Arabophile Personnel" emerged in Aden. Having a high regard for the Arabs they stressed Aden's importance, not in the context of the route to India but rather as a centre of and gate to the Arab territories behind it. The most renowned representatives of this viewpoint were Colonel H.F. Jacob and Sir B. Reilly, who was Aden's Chief Commissioner between 1932 and 1937. Reilly feared that Aden's development would be curbed because the Indian Government (within whose political jurisdiction it fell) attributed little importance to it. So Reilly demanded that Aden be transferred to a different, more sympathetic authority. In the 1930s their efforts were rewarded; officials in the Foreign and Colonial offices adopted fervently the concept "Aden is an Arab city" whose "future rests in Arabia and not in India." In 1932 Aden was removed from the Indian government's authority and placed under the direct rule of the Viceroy in Delhi; in 1936 it became a Crown Colony under the authority of the Colonial Office. It was during Reilly's period in office that the British took various initiatives to change South Yemen's polity and
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society. The changes at the administrative-constitutional level, namely, in the authority, structure and practice of local government were of major importance.

In the Protectorate, the British institutionalised their position with a form of indirect rule. Commencing in 1937, "Advisory Treaties" were signed with the rulers of the Qa'ayti and Kathiri Princedoms, in 1944 with the Sharif of Bayha\dn and after 1947, with the rulers of Lahaj, Fadhil, the two Awlaqi Princedoms, Lower Yafi, Awdha\i, Dali\ and Shucaybi. By the mid-1950s, such treaties had been signed with most of the Protectorate rulers. These treaties provided that every group of several princedoms should have a local British "Resident Adviser" who functioned both as an adviser to the local rulers and as the chief implementor of British Policy in the area. He was responsible for local security and for relations between Princedoms and between tribes. When a more decisive form of intervention was necessary the British used the Royal Air Force. In the 1920s aeroplanes were used to scatter infiltrating North Yemeni forces and to disengage hopelessly quarrelling tribes. The use of bombers, chosen because it was cheaper than deploying infantry and was more effective, demonstrates Britain's intention to rely on a cheap, flexible instrument which suited their concept of indirect rule.

Within this framework, the judicial, educational and local administrative systems in the Princedoms remained quite autonomous. In the 1940s, five to ten member executive councils were established to assist the Sultan, who alone could use them or dismiss them. Bigger councils, composed of 20 members, some of whom were elected, functioned as quasi-legislative bodies, which could propose and recommend laws for the Sultan's approval. In addition, a system of Shar\ courts based on the Shafi\i persuasion was operating.

In contrast to their indirect rule in the Protectorate, the British ruled Aden directly and firmly. Being a Crown Colony (according to The King's Order in Council of 28 September 1936) Aden was governed by British officials and run according to British administrative and judicial methods. A veteran British official or army officer functioned as the colony's Governor (or High or Chief Commissioner). He was assisted by a five member executive council, the majority of whom (for example the Attorney General, and the Chief Secretary) were British. In 1947 a sixteen member Legislative Council, half of whom were British officials and the rest nominated town's people, was established. This Council could initiate laws, which the Governor had a right to veto, except for tax matters and the abolition of existing laws. Aden also had a Supreme Court over which a single British judge presided. In Aden's various quarters, there were lower ranking courts and municipal councils which again were dominated by the British.
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The distinction made between Aden and the Protectorate Princedoms derived from the basic principles of British policy in the area. While Aden was considered to be both a legally based British territory and a pivotal point for British strategy in the Indian Ocean and in the Peninsula as a whole, the Protectorate was viewed only as Aden's defensive hinterland. The British were, therefore, reluctant to impose direct rule over the Protectorate. Moreover, they were irritated by the endemic disputes among tribes and Princedoms, were unwilling to tamper with the deeply rooted local judicial and administrative systems and feared that if their involvement became any deeper it might incite the Imam to overreact. This combination of strategic considerations and administrative convenience was fostered by the romantic concept British officials had regarding the "Arab Character" of the Protectorate. Harold Ingrams, one of the major British policy makers in the Protectorate commented in regard to Hadramawt:

The Hadhramaut is an Arab country and Arab it must remain. It should never be necessary for any large number of aliens to be in it either for administrative or other reasons... We [British Officials] did not set ourselves up as the rulers of the country, but merely tried to pass onto them any experience or knowledge we had which might be of value.26

Thus, after the 1920s, British policy in South Yemen was aimed at administrative and constitutional development. However, in an attempt to preserve traditional structures in the Princedoms and a firm British grip over Aden, this policy was exercised in the form of indirect rule in the Protectorate and in an interventionary direct rule in Aden. Hence, British officials intended to develop Aden differently and more rapidly than the Protectorate.

In the late 1930s and particularly after the Second World War new circumstances enabled Britain to institutionalise a more uniform and more definite policy in South Yemen. The new considerations influencing British policy were somewhat conflicting. On one hand strategic demands influenced Britain to entrench and strengthen its hold over South Yemen. On the other hand, British officials were under pressure to grant the South Yemenis greater self government. Aden's strategic importance grew in the late 1940s: first, despite the fact that India became independent in 1947, Aden remained a crucial link in Britain's communication lines to other areas of influence in the Far East like Singapore, Burma and Ceylon. Secondly, in the light of the emerging Cold War, Britain's bases in Aden made it a vital outpost for western control over the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, Bab al-Mandab and East Africa. According to a concept set out in a 1957 Defence White Paper, both Britain and the United States would enlarge their
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military presence in the Indian Ocean, notably by increasing the numbers of aircraft and infantry carriers. The paper emphasised that these fleets would depend on a number of vital land bases, such as Aden and Singapore. Thirdly, Aden's importance increased significantly after Britain had evacuated Suez in 1954 and Cyprus in 1958. Aden was then Britain's major outpost in the region and in 1959 it became the headquarters of British forces in the Middle East. In 1961 British forces were despatched from Aden to help Kuwait to deal with an invasion by Iraqi forces. Consequently Aden's regional military significance as a major base from which Britain could defend the conservative, pro-western, Arab states, grew further. Since some of these states were also oil producers, Britain, by defending them from attacks by radical Arab states, could to some extent, secure the stability of friendly Arab regimes and the vital flow of oil.

The local situation also contributed to Britain's mounting interest in Aden and the Protectorate. The area was chronically unstable because of protracted disputes among tribes and Princedoms. The differing levels of development among various Princedoms, a fact which becomes most evident when comparing the more developed Princedoms of Hadramawt with the lesser developed Princedoms of the Western Protectorate (except for Lahaj), caused further tension. Therefore British officials felt driven to undertake new projects which were intended to ease tensions and to narrow development gaps. This process, when compared to their earlier policy, inevitably led to increased British intervention in the Protectorate and to a wide range of contacts among the Princedoms.

However, Britain had to balance its perceived need to intervene in the Protectorate against the local population's demand for greater participation in their country's political affairs. This demand was a response to the spreading ideas of Arab nationalism as well as to the post-war popularity of the idea of democracy. Sir Tom Hickinbotham, one of the architects of the future Federation explained, that following the growing war-time contacts between South Yemen and the west, the wish to eliminate tyranny and to implement democracy markedly expanded. "These people [the Adenese] have become accustomed to a democratic system of government, not only in Aden, but also in countries in the West to which many of them travel" wrote T. Hickinbotham. In fact their attempts to regulate relations in the Protectorate, made British officials even more aware of the necessity to widen the legitimacy of local Sultans by introducing elections and other means of increasing the local population's political participation.

It was, therefore, clear that Britain would extend its rule over South Yemen and even entrench it. As E. Monroe noted, the fact that South Yemeni affairs were conducted by two authorities such as the Defence and Colonial Offices (the latter's influence was already declining) which were
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insensitive to nationalist-political changes reinforced this tendency.31 But British officials in Aden actually expressed an opposite inclination, pressing for greater constitutional rights for the local population. Already in May 1956, on a visit to Aden, the Minister of State at the Colonial Office, Lord Lloyd, contrived to combine both viewpoints:

...The degree of constitutional development and the pace at which it can be realised must depend on the sense of responsibility which is displayed by the people of the Colony and their leaders. There is no reason why you should not expect to achieve further constitutional development in due course.... But I should like you to understand that for the foreseeable future it would not be reasonable or sensible, or indeed in the interests of the Colony's inhabitants, for them to aspire to any aim beyond that of a considerable degree of internal self-government.... Her Majesty's Government wish to make it clear that the importance of Aden both strategically and economically within the commonwealth is such that they cannot foresee the possibility of any fundamental relaxation of their responsibilities for the colony.32

In practice, a regime based on such a combining of policies could only be established on administrative and constitutional innovations. The differences between Princedoms and tribes had therefore to be taken into account. All this led to the idea of a federation. Britain thought that the introduction of such a scheme would not only foster its hold over South Yemen and at the same time bestow constitutional rights on the local population, but would also facilitate the development of the Princedoms without wrecking the diverse traditions inherent in the Protectorate. According to Hickinbotham the initial ideas for a federal scheme developed in the 1940s. In 1954 these ideas ripened; the chief British adviser to the Western Protectorate, G.K.N. Trevaskis, then proposed that two federations should be established, in Hadramawt and in the Western Protectorate. Each would be run by a supreme committee composed of the Sultans of each region and a permanent committee composed of their assistants. Aden's Governor would be the High Commissioner of both federations, in charge of customs, communications, planning, budgeting, education and public health. All other relevant matters would be left to the Sultans, among whom the High Commissioner would serve as an "Honest Broker".33 The scheme was thus intended to contain all the components of British policy in the area: British domination, authority given to local rulers, development and maintenance of the separate existence of the Princedoms, Aden itself was not included in the federal scheme. Several Sultans initially gave their consent to the scheme but
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intractable disputes were revealed which rendered the plan fruitless. In addition, the wider the gap between Aden's constitutional development and that of the Princedoms, the more difficult it became to integrate Aden within the federal planning. This became evident in 1955 when for the first time, four of Aden's Constitutional Assembly members were elected and again in 1958 when it was decided that the majority of Assembly members would be elected. No similar development occurred in the Protectorate.

Nevertheless, in the 1950s there were several processes which hastened the establishment of a federation, notably the growing influence of Nāṣirism. A corollary to this process was North Yemen's joining the United Arab Republic, composed of Egypt and Syria. This act worried not only the British but also some of the Sultāns, whose Princedoms had for a long time been exposed to North Yemeni ventures. These were the Sharīf Ḥusayn of Bayḥān, the Sultān Ābdullāh Ibn Aḥamad from Fadīlī and the Sultān Ḥusayn from ʿAwddalī. They became advocates for the Federation among both their fellow rulers, and the British. On 11 February 1959 the establishment of the Federation of South Arabia was announced. The six founding Princedoms were: Bayḥān, ʿAwddalī, Fadīlī, Lower ʿYāfīḥ, Dālīc and Upper ʿAwlaqī. In late 1959 Lahaj joined, in 1960 ʿAqrabī and Dathīnah, in 1963 Hawshābī and Shūqayb, and in 1965 ʿAlawī Mufallaqī and lower ʿAwlaqī followed suit. By 1966, the Federation comprised all South Yemeni Princedoms, with the exception of the three Princedoms of Ḥadramawt (Quṣaytī, Kathīrī and Mahrah) and Upper ʿYāfīḥī.

The principle of self-government was most evident in the Federal Constitution. Six members from each Princedom formed a Legislative Council accordingly. The right to endorse their proposed laws and all executive rights rested with an executive council (known as "The Supreme Federal Council") which comprised all the Sultān members. The post of Chairman of the Council rotated among its members. The Federal Government was made responsible for foreign relations, federal security, customs public works, coinage, public health, educational planning and transport. A Federal Court to arbitrate inter-Princedom disputes was also founded. The Federal balance was secured by authorising the Sultāns, as heads of their Princedoms, to deal with companies and contracts engaged in economic development, criminal matters, education, health, employment, local taxation and control over units of local guards. The Sultāns were also authorised to appoint ministers to serve on executive councils in the Princedoms. By relying on elements like the Sayyids, merchants, tribal chieftains and indeed on the Sultāns to fill these posts, another principle of British policy was carried out; namely, the preservation of traditional groups known as "dola" [dawlah]).

However, the British were careful to secure for themselves over-all control in the Federation. The British Governor of
Aden carrying the title of High Commissioner, became head of state. According to the Treaty of Friendship signed between Britain and the Federation on 11 February 1959, the British remained responsible for the Federation's foreign affairs, its budgeting, administrative and security planning and for the training and command of the Federal Army. Any change in the Federation's frontiers also required British approval. Furthermore, the High Commissioner had the right to declare "a state of emergency" in the Federation (according to Paragraph 15 of the first part of the constitution) in which case he could suspend any institution or political body.37

Aden joined the Federation only in January 1963. The reasons for this delay were indicative of the problems prevalent in South Yemen. In the 1960s there were more constitutional developments. On 2 October 1962 a constitution for Aden was introduced. Civil rights, including freedoms of expression, and political organisation; the prohibition of racial discrimination and the obligation to abide by the law, were officially granted. A new Executive Assembly was set up, five of whose ten members were appointed by the Governor and the other five elected. Its members were titled "ministers". Hence, despite being a British colony, Aden enjoyed constitutional development to an extent unknown in the Princedoms which created an even greater discrepancy between the city and the Protectorate. Unlike the Protectorate Princedoms, Aden enjoyed an expanding economy, a growing population and a dynamic life style. In the 1950s, political organisations, trade unions, new educational institutions and several newspapers were founded (see below). Aden's elite, a part of which was non-Arab, consisted of rich businessmen, who, in spite of being a minority, practically ran the city and were favoured by the British. Electoral franchise in the city was based on property ownership and wealth, consequently the members of this elite also constituted Aden's electorate and executives. It was this group which argued against Aden joining the Federation. They did not want to become involved in the inter-Princedom rivalries, nor to contribute to the Princedom's under-developed economy nor to support or to absorb their poor and unskilled manpower. Having been under British occupation for over 170 years, an occupation which had recently introduced a type of constitutional regime, these people were also opposed to falling under the "destructive influence" of the Protectorate "Kings".38

For over three years British officials tried to persuade Aden's notables to drop their opposition. They promised Aden a senior position in the Federation and further measures of autonomy. But the strongest arguments employed by British officials were couched in economic and strategic terms: a semi-independent polity would flourish only if it was based on the unity and co-operation of all surrounding forces. This was an argument which appealed to the British Parliament as
well as to the notables in Aden's legislature. "Events all over the world [relating to Malaysia, the European Common Market and others] show that isolation is madness" declared Ḥasan Ālī Bayūmī, one of these notables. 39

Since summer 1961, negotiations about Aden's joining the Federation had been held in London and Aden. Eventually in August 1962 an agreement to include Aden in the Federation was signed. Aden would join the Federation in January 1963 and in this framework would gradually achieve full autonomy, which would ultimately lead to independence. If after seven years, two-thirds of Aden's legislature would decide that Aden had suffered from being within the Federation and that this condition could not be improved, then the city would be able to leave the Federation. Aden joined the Federation on the due date, having resolved the customs and transport problems between the city and the princedoms and the difficulties which had arisen over Aden's political representation in the federation. Being the most populated unit in the Federation, Aden received 24 seats in the Federal legislature, more than any other unit. However, Aden remained a British colony and kept its separate constitution. 40

The administrative and constitutional changes which culminated in the establishment of The Federation of South Arabia were the foundations for additional reforms, which were designed to develop a social and economic infrastructure. These reforms received the term "forward policy". Already in the 1920s, in conjunction with the RAF's activities in the Protectorate, air routes from Aden to al-Mukallah and Shihr in Hadramawt were established. Later, numerous roads, both in the Hadramawt and the Western Protectorate were paved, notably the "al-Kāf" road, opened in 1958, linking Say'ūn to al-Mukallah on the Hadrami shore. An additional road from Aden to al-Mukallah was built, to link both parts of South Yemen. In 1963, about 9,000 lorries and 19,000 passengers passed through Aden and along the Protectorates' roads.

Road building precipitated the problem of protecting the traffic. In the 1930s, the British expanded their actions against tribes who had been engaged in caravan looting and inter-tribal fighting. Commencing in 1934 in the Western Protectorate and in 1937 in Hadramawt, an all-out operation of "peace on the roads" was carried out which, in fact, was aimed at pacifying the incorrigible tribes. Local British resident advisers, R.A.B. Hamilton in the Western Protectorate and Ingrams in Hadramawt, conducted this operation; Ingrams who up to 1945 had gradually brought about a measure of tranquility among the chronically warring tribes of Hadramawt, concluding advisory and peace treaties with them, carried out his assignment in a particularly impressive manner. 41 Occasionally the RAF was used to maintain road security and to subdue especially rebellious tribes. However, the regular means to ensure road and political security were para-military, tribal guard units.
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Already in 1928 a "Hadrani Legion" was established on the lines of the Trans-Jordanian "Arab Legion"; in 1934, "Tribal Guards", composed of members of the Hawshabi and CAdhalî tribes and in 1937 "Government Guards" were formed and put at the disposal of the Protectorate Sultans. The most impressive body was the "Aden Protectorate Levies" which had been established in 1928 as a quasi-regular army for the Western Protectorate. These levies were composed of members of various tribes, notably the CAwlaqi, under the command of British and Arab officers. In 1962, the "Levies" and the "Tribal Guards" were united and became the Federal Regular Army (henceforth: FA). 42

In the 1940s the British started to assist the local economy. Until then South Yemen's main economic activity, agriculture, had suffered from lack of planning, financing and irrigation. At first, British officials limited their involvement to granting loans and providing seed, to owners of land and water pumps. 43 From 1944, special attention was given to areas such as Dathînah (west of Wâhidî), CAdhalî and Abyan, bordering Fadli and Lower Yâfî, which were particularly fertile. Till 1954, utilising a £270 million loan given by the development fund of the British Colonial Office, about 45,000 acres in Abyan were ploughed for the cultivation of cotton. Ten years later the Abyan project brought in about £1.5 million profit. For this reason, as well as for its co-operative and successful conduct (the Abyan Board included both British officials in Aden and local entrepreneurs) the Abyan project became an example, which was copied fairly successfully in Dathînah and Lahaj. 44 In 1947, development projects started in Wadî Hadramawt, Bayhân, CAdhalî and other places. 45

Thus several economic branches were developed. In 1962, cotton fields extended to 55,000 acres, which comprised thirty percent of the cultivated land, whereas in 1952 they extended only to 10,000 acres. In 1962, solgum fields expanded to 70,000 acres and cornfields to 8,500. In 1963, the cotton yield was 44,000 tons, solgum 26,500 tons and corn 4,700 tons. Substantial improvements were made in the systems of irrigation, seed supply, ploughing, fertilizing and above all, in the mechanization of agriculture; by 1960 there were about 500 tractors in South Yemen. 46 In the 1960s, fishing yielded between 60,000 and 70,000 tons; for the first time factories for processing fish were built in Dathînah and Quayti, which became the cornerstone of industry in South Yemen. In 1963 the income from the new aluminium industry was £140,000 per annum, from cigarettes £10,000, linen £41,500, red bricks £92,000, cement bricks £35,000, salt £78,000 and from weaving £90,000. 47 In the 1960s, the Pan American Oil Company prospected unsuccessfully for oil in Hadramawt. 48

Aden port itself expanded impressively. The port served as a vital link between Africa and Asia and more so on the
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Suez Canal- Red Sea route, between Europe and Africa, Asia and Australia. After the Second World War, apart from a brief period following the Suez War in October 1956, activity in the port was constantly increasing. Between 1952 and 1954, the port's management, the "Port Trust", invested about £3.5 million and in 1962 another £900,000 to deepen and enlarge the port and to improve the facilities of the old pier. Consequently, the port (mainly at its new extension near "Little Aden") could handle large tankers and ships of 42,000 tons and 900 feet length. It also served smaller ships for internal and local trade. In the early 1960s, about 6,000 vessels per annum anchored in Aden. 49 The port then employed over 10,000 workers. The port facilitated transit trade, coal and oil shipping. After the war, the British Petroleum Company decided that it would be cheaper to refine Kuwaiti crude oil in Aden than anywhere else. So in 1952 it invested £45 million for the building of refineries near Aden's port. In the following years, over 5,000,000 tons of oil per annum were refined in Aden. About 4,500 tankers called at Aden every year to transport the oil. In the early 1960s, the refineries and the depot employed about 2,500 workers. 50 Aden thus emerged as an uniquely located oil refining and trade centre. This was the foundation for the city's becoming a major business centre: banks, maritime insurance, oil corporations, finance houses and airlines from both the Far East and the West established offices in Aden and attracted local and foreign entrepreneurs. 51 Aden was also the site for large British military bases, in which 20,000 local workers were employed. 52

This survey of South Yemen's development would be incomplete without describing changes in education. From the early 1950s, efforts were made both to encourage urban youths to study and to bring education to the Beduins. Skilled teaching staff was recruited from among the Sayyids, administrators and graduates of local schools. In 1963, there were about 161 primary schools in the Federation, 34 preparatory schools for higher education, 15 secondary schools and three teacher-training colleges. These schools were attended by 36,000 male pupils and 7,500 girls, who were taught by over 1,000 teachers. 230 students attended the teachers' colleges. In the same years, 47 students studied in Britain and another 15 in Arab countries. 53 In 1963 23 newspapers appeared in South Yemen, of which six were dailies; four appeared in Aden and two in the Protectorate. 54

So it seems that after the 1930s, the balance between the competing forces of conservatism and innovation, which characterised South Yemen's modern history, tilted towards the latter. It was the British who had the initiative and the means to embark on a large scale process of modernisation. This process had a two-fold significance. First, the administrative, economic and educational fabrics of South Yemeni society were altered; however, as happened in many other cases,
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these innovations had a conflicting and irritant effect on South Yemeni society. As E. Kedourie has pointed out, European ideas of progress and democracy intruded into Third World societies, have often aroused an anti-European reaction. In South Yemen too, British efforts precipitated such a reaction. Moreover, the effects of the reforms and the British policy which loomed behind them were analogous to what C.H. Moore, in regard to French policy in North Africa, called "Colonial Dialectics". The administrative, economic and educational fabrics of South Yemeni society were altered; however, as had happened in many other cases, these innovations did not amount to a coherent, complete and acceptable new order. Various groups lost their traditional social and political position and had great difficulties in adapting to the reforms. Consequently they searched for new social and political bases. Secondly, the British introduced the reforms according to their own priorities. Therefore, the reforms did not spread equally and symmetrically through South Yemeni society. Sometimes in some places intervention was direct and massive, while elsewhere it was indirect and restrained. Occasionally the reforms fitted well into the old order, but often they produced rapid change. Simultaneously the reforms eased specific problems in some places, but escalated old conflicts in others.

The conflicts which precipitated the events which occurred between 1963 and 1967 rose out of situations in which the British inspired reforms either caused new problems or exacerbated old ones. The leading groups in the conflagration crystallised around the following premises: first, the actual consequences of British rule in South Yemen -- the reforms resulted in an entrenched British presence, but also gave birth to relatively educated and frustrated local groups who longed for independence. These constituted the main nationalist group. Secondly, the reforms either exacerbated or generated social divisions all over South Yemen. Various groups who regarded themselves socially deprived and offended thus emerged against the newly founded ruling establishment. Thirdly, the reforms applied differently in the various South Yemeni Princedoms, thus sharpening the administrative divisions and different levels of development among these Princedoms and notably between them and Aden town, a fact which further fuelled the opposition.

Notes

1. The area intended here borders on the Indian Ocean to the South, ÒUmân to the East, Saudi Arabia and North Yemen to the West and the Red Sea to the West. According to the enclosed map, the area included the colony of Aden and the Eastern and Western Protectorates. Henceforth, this area will be referred to as South Yemen, or by a geographic-historical
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name -- "the Protectorate" or "Aden".


8. See Martin, H. Ingrams, Report, in pages specified in previous note.

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12. See Gavin, chapters three, four and five. Thus the British intervened in the dispute between the Qu'aytî and the Kathirî in Hadramawt in the 1860s.
13. Ibid., p. 252.
15. Ibid., pp. 255-257.
16. Ibid., pp. 280-287.
17. Ibid., pp. 301-305.
20. Ibid., pp. 256-257.
25. Ibid., p. 385.
32. Little, pp. 34-35.
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33. Gavin, p. 332. For details see also Hickinbotham, 164-170.
34. Loc cit. See also Brinton, pp. 4-5.
35. Ibid., pp. 2-4. Halliday criticizes from a leftist point of view, as these ideas were based on the support of the wealthy merchants. See Halliday, pp. 169-177.
36. Reilly, p. 52, Brinton, pp. 4, 8-9, Sir K. Trevaskis, The Shades of Amber (London: Hutchinson, 1968), p. 146, henceforth: Trevaskis. This subject will also be discussed further in this work.
43. See H. Ingrams, Arabia.
44. Al-Habashi, pp. 222-234, Little, pp. 129-130. The profits from cotton per Fedan amounted to £192 after the deduction of expenses, see: al-Habashi, p. 254.
45. Ibid., pp. 215-217.
50. King, p. 44.
51. Ibid., p. 46. It is worth noting that in the port of Aden goods could be purchased duty-free.
52. The Times of November 29, 1963, estimated that salaries paid to the workers at the base alone amounted to £107,500. See also: King, p. 45.


54. Ibid., pp. 181-183.


PART ONE

EARLY NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS:

CRISIS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR
Chapter 1

THE MAKING OF CONFLICTS

The nature of the reforms in the Protectorate contributed significantly to the conflicts which were pursued in the political sphere. The British intended to strengthen the governments which already existed in the Princedoms. Apparently, they did this because local governments were in themselves the most obvious target for reform as well as the most likely channel through which to introduce further reforms. The Resident Adviser's primary concern was to find a loyal group to absorb and further the reforms.

They found the local existing notables; Sultans, Sayyids, tribal chieftains, merchants and others to be suitable. Such people became the operators and the beneficiaries of the reforms. It seems that the "Dola" were not only the first reliable group that British officials encountered in Aden and the Protectorate but were also individuals who conformed to their image of "oriental leaders". Trevaskis commented that:

"... in setting out to construct a federal government, we had to build on the only element of stability offered by an endemically unstable society: the clans' capricious and invariably qualified acceptance of the Dola's leadership."

The notables, in their turn, became the main beneficiaries of the reforms, because they knew how to adopt and then to exploit the possibilities inherent in the reforms, in a way that would best serve their economic and political interests. R.J. Gavin noted that "there was inevitably a bias toward those families which had by custom provided candidates for the Sultanate". The changes in the Protectorate's governmental system did bring about constitutional development but they also served to strengthen the Sultan's own and his government's position. The Sultans were granted the right to appoint and to dismiss ministers from local executive councils through these councils, the Sultans controlled education, health, public works and the security of their Princedoms, as well as
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the budgets for these activities. In various Princedoms improvements were introduced in the functioning of the Sultans' bureaucracies: e.g., in the collection of taxes, the control of expenditure, in government officials' aptitude and in the organisation and training of the Sultans' private guards. British assistance, invested either in the political authority of the Resident Advisers or in the military levies, brought benefits to those who held power. Bujra commented that: "Ultimate power had been . . . vested in the state, which in turn delegated its authority to its agents, the administrators and the judges at various levels". But there were people for whom the strengthening of these notables was disadvantageous. These were tribesmen, lower ranking administrators, newly educated teachers, peasants and others. There were various reasons for their antagonism to the government notables. Tribesmen suffered from the introduction of roads, lorries and the levies which guarded them, because such things prevented them from exercising their traditional occupations: acting as guides and leaders for caravans, looting and levying protection money on them. Such tribesmen viewed the Sultans and other notables as pretenders, who, in terms of power had previously been their inferiors, but had become "heads of state" thanks to an "imposed British order". In 1928 the Subayji tribe revolted in Dali after a road crossing the Princedom had been paved. Between 1934 and 1938, after the construction of roads, tribal flare ups broke out in Fadli, Lower Yafi and Awdhal, which were stilled only after extensive R.A.F. bombing. In the early 1950s, when increased trade between Aden and the Princedoms justified the building of a road from upper Awlaqi to the beach, the Rabizi tribes' immediate response was to rebel. "Shame on your government for robbing us of our rights", one of the rebels told Trevaskis.

Lower-ranking administrators and teachers did not feel deprived of traditional rights but resented being obstructed from asserting what they considered to be their present and potential rights. This derived from the fact that the reforms also opened up new avenues of advancement for officials, teachers, officers and others. Within the ambit of the "forward policy", such people acquired new professional and intellectual skills and were in greater demand as tools to hasten the Princedoms' development. This being so, these groups complained of low salaries, slow professional advancement, and bad management by the notables of the new economic enterprises. The new administrators demanded a share in the ownership and management of these enterprises. It should be stressed that such complaints were also often voiced by certain members of the notability because of what they regarded as discrimination in management and profit sharing by the British, in favour of other members of this group. To prevent nepotism and to impose proper management norms, Trevaskis
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occasionally had to stop members of leading families from sharing the profits of a certain enterprise, which often triggered an angry backlash. The situation of peasants deteriorated because of the unequal distribution of land ownership and from mounting difficulties of renting land. Traditionally, almost the whole of South Yemen's land was owned by Sultans, Sayids (who controlled vast religiously donated wakf lands) and tribal chiefs who owned land which had originally been their tribes' grazing zones. After the new enterprises in Abyan, Laḥaj and other places had proved successful, several city-based businessmen also acquired fiefs. Even under the "forward policy" the principles of heritage and leasing were governed by Islamic law and local traditions. Cultivation was practically in the hands of peasants who leased the land from its owner; theoretically, profit was supposed to be shared between the lessor and lessee according to the proportional investment by each party. In practice, the peasants, who should have had the lion's share of the profits, earned considerably less than the owners.

The success of the new agricultural projects prompted a growing demand for land, which in its turn, led to a considerable increase in rents. Even though the notable landowners then invested no more than 20 percent of the amounts needed for cultivation, they contrived to make a profit of over 50 percent, by manipulating the market of tenants and by selling the crops for high prices. This situation led to constant tension between peasants and notables and to several tribal-peasants' uprisings.

In places like Laḥaj, Dathīnah, Abyan and in Ghayl Ba-Wazīr in Ḥadramawt, co-operative systems developed around the new enterprises which helped peasants in as much as a part of the profit was diverted to social works such as hospital building, development and savings funds, piped water and electricity in the villages. However, since these co-operative enterprises had been particularly profitable, they mostly attracted notables who had the means to purchase land and only a few peasants became landowners incorporated in the co-operatives, able fully to enjoy the economic boom in these areas. Moreover, in the late 1950s South Yemeni cotton export prices declined due to the competition of American long fibre-cotton companies, and local landowners lost considerable sums. As a result, they off-set their losses by selling elsewhere at inflated prices the cotton which was intended for local markets. This too had an adverse effect on the local population. Only after 1961, when local cotton growers established a common cotton reservoir for internal needs, to be sold at fixed prices, did this crisis ease somewhat.

How did these various tensions crystallise and erupt into open conflicts? In Ḥadramawt, where social stratification was particularly rigid, the conflict evolved around the
positions of the Sayyids. Sayyid families such as the al-Kāf, al-Attās, al-Aydarūs and others were among the staunchest collaborators with the British in developing Hadramawt. The Sayyid Abū Bakr al-Kāf accompanied Ingrams on his inter-tribal mediation visits and contributed £50,000 to the building of the road that bore his name. R.B. Sergeant viewed him as a "political genius" and as "the true leader of Hadramawt."

A Sayyid of the al-Attās family became the Wazīr (chief minister) of the Quaytī Sultan and other members of this family constituted the majority of Huraydah's town council. Sayyids also became teachers and judges in the newly established apparatuses of the Princedoms. The common denominator of these and other Sayyid families was their links with the East Indies; it was there where the Sayyids had ventured and succeeded in politics and business and where they learnt to appreciate the benefits of an organised European administration, which they tried to establish in Hadramawt.

However, another phenomenon which occurred in the East Indies greatly influenced Hadramawt. Common Hadramis were exposed to a European administration, to possibilities of social and economic progress and to different cultures and peoples. For the first time in the 20th century these conditions seemed to have overwhelmed the Ḥadramī's traditional inclination towards the values of their homeland and as a result the rigid stratification of Hadrami society was shaken. In 1913, in Surabaya, a group called Jamīyāt al-Irshād ("The Society of Learning") was founded, whose members opposed the Sayyids' position and role in society. Influenced by Muhammad ʿAbduh's and Rashīd Ridā's ideas of Islamic Modernism, they declared the Sayyids to be people who had unlawfully and against the Islamic spirit of equality, arrogated to themselves a position of seniority in Ḥadrami society. To maintain their position, so the Irshādīs claimed, the Sayyids exploited their roles as spiritual sages, to instill prejudice (Khurafāt) and stagnation (jumūd) among the Hadrami people. Originally, the dispute between the two groups was confined to the East Indies and the Sayyids, who governed religious life in Hadramawt managed to stifle the Irshādī religiously-modernist propaganda; however from the 1930s, the spirit of anti-Sayyid opposition had imbued Hadramawt with a more secular character, which brought about a deeply rooted and widespread division in Ḥadrami society.

This must have been the background to the Sayyids' cooperation with the British. Deeply worried by the activities of the Irshādīs (with whom they were familiar both from the East Indies and from Ḥadramawt itself), the Sayyids viewed the new British inspired regime as an appropriate orbit in which firmly to secure their position and so they chose to integrate themselves within the new system. The Sayyids' situation symbolised the crisis which gripped Ḥadramī society. On one hand, their economic and political ventures, both in the East Indies
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and in the Hadramawt, drastically dented their image as "holy ones" and put them on a more mundane and vulnerable plane. Moreover, due to the decline in their prestige, the Sayyids lost their traditional place in the social stratification of Hadramawt and ceased to be the object of veneration by others, lower strata. In fact, the new groups of teachers and administrators, and the "non-Sayyid" landowners and businessmen, who had previously been overshadowed by the Sayyids, developed new aspirations and expectations for social and professional advancement. On the other hand, the Sayyids adapted better than other groups to the new structure of the state and its members became the main functionaries of the new regime. Consequently, a sharp division was created between "an establishment" composed of Sultans, Sayyids, large landowners and administrators who all benefited from the new regime and an opposition composed of peasants, teachers and other administrators who opposed the "establishment."

Tribal groups, who lost their income because of the new al-Kaf road and the imposition of "Ingram's peace" in the area, and who had had continuous disputes over landownership with the Sayyids, became further entangled with them. When new possibilities of advancement were offered within the Hadrami Legion, groups of young officers also organised in opposition to their superiors. Even groups of dissatisfied notables followed suit; Bujra described how the leader of the "non-Sayyids" in Huraydah, Shaykh CUmarr Bashal became more actively antagonistic to the Sayyids. Like the latter, he had connections in the East Indies, claimed to have a respectable descent (though not of a Sayyid) through his wife, traded in coffee and sugar, was friendly with the Qadi and the regional state prosecutor and was a member in Huraydah's town council. He led the local opposition to the Sayyids.

The most blatant case of opposition to the Sayyids was the revolt by Shaykh CUbayd Bin Salihi bin CAbdat, which reached its peak between 1941 and 1944 during the days of CUbayd Bin Salih's successor, CUmarr CUbayd. He resisted the very idea of pacification propagated and supported by the British, the Sultans and the Sayyids. The Bin CAbdat inflicted a long and difficult fight on the British and the leaders of the Quayti Princedom; they captured the town of al-Ghurfah and stirred up the surrounding tribes. Only in 1945, after extensive air raids, was CUmarr CUbayd subdued. Interestingly, the Bin CAbdat revolt is singled out by South Yemeni historians as a nationalistic revolt and not as a tribal flare up. A deeper look into this revolt reveals that Bin CAbdat conquered al-Ghurfah in particular precisely because the town's previous rulers were Sayyids who, in practising their traditional peacekeeping role among tribes, had thereby offended the Bin CAbdat tribal shaykhs. Moreover, the Bin CAbdat had a running dispute with the al-Kaf family, which, for its part, enjoyed the support of the British
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authorities. It also became evident that the Bin ČAbdāts had considerable wealth in Singapore; their lawyers there demanded that the British acknowledge the family members in al-Gurfaḥ as "independent Rajahs". All that leads to the conclusion supported by Gavin, that the Bin ČAbdāts were, in fact, representatives of the Irshadīs in Ḣadramawt who, for the first time, led a "quasi-nationalistic" revolt, against the local establishment and the British as a whole.19

In the 1950s this pattern of revolt was occasionally repeated. The QuCayfī government tried to stop tribal migratory movements and outbreaks of violence in those places earmarked for economic development. As a result in 1955 and again in 1957 the KhāmiCah, AwBīthah and āIl-KhuJeūr tribes indulged in limited revolts. In 1960, due to large-scale oil explorations, the government forbid the carrying of arms and made several areas out-of-bounds. The tribes appealed against this decision and the government conceded their right in the Shuhūrah agree-to use firearms only for hunting and for joyful demonstrations at feasts. However, these limitations proved to be intolerable for the tribes; to go without arms, they claimed, offended their traditions and exposed them to bandits and beasts.

Moreover, the prohibition to enter certain areas, which had mostly been traditional tribal grazing zones, was the last straw. In July 1960 they launched a rebellion in Wādīs DuCān and āIl-Aysar in Ḣadramawt. They also attacked convoys on the al-Kāf road. Only in August 1961 after extensive air raids and after the Hadrami legion had cut their supply routes, did the KhāmiCah tribes surrender. Six of their leaders were executed and eleven were imprisoned.20 The large numbers of tribesmen who took part in the fighting, the fact that they revolted against their leader who had signed the Shuhūrah agreement and that they killed a Sayyid during the fighting21 indicate the intensity of this revolt.

Similar revolts, rising out of social grievances, also erupted in the western Protectorate. However, the larger number of Princedoms there, the new opportunities in government posts and the new economic enterprises attracted many notable families, which in itself precipitated various rivalries and disputes among their members. Several of them led these revolts. Furthermore, since western Princedoms which bordered North Yemen maintained relatively close contacts both with this state and with other Arab states, the revolts which flared up there involved crossing the border into North Yemen and the consequent adoption of "fashionable" Arab nationalist banners.

In 1953, the Rabiţī and DamCān tribes revolted in Upper ČAwlaqī and ČAwdhali.22 However, a more serious problem broke out in 1955; Ahl Ābū-Bakr, a notable family from Upper ČAwlaqī which claimed more powerful positions revolted against their kinsmen, the leaders of this princedom, the al-Jifri Sayyids. Members of the Ābū-Bakr family recruited tribesmen from Dathīnah and Abyan and led attacks on new agricultural projects in these
areas. After considerable efforts the British managed to suppress this revolt. However, the uprising was prolonged in two successive waves. After the Suez campaign one of the sons of the Amīr of Dālī, Haydarrah, who had been ousted from government, organised additional tribesmen both from his own Princedom and from Fadīlī, Ālāwī and Mufallāḥī and tried to hit the same targets; this revolt was suppressed in early 1957.

In April 1959, with a similar tribal base, Muḥammad Ābu-Bakr revolted again and for six months attacked convoys and army units in the area. In a joint effort by the R.A.F. and the FA his revolt was stopped. In June 1960 Muḥammad Ābu-Bakr was killed by sniper's fire in Muqrās. It should be noted that both the Ābū- Bakrs and Ḥaydarrah established their headquarters in Baydā in North Yemen from where they operated.

The revolt which most seriously affected South Yemen in the 1950s was led by the Nāʿīb of Lower Yāfī, who also controlled Abyan, Muḥammad Ibn al-ʿAydarūs al-ʿAffī. He demanded that local entrepreneurs should participate more in the Abyan board, that the landowners and peasants who participated in the co-operative project should receive a larger share of the profit and that British control over the project should be reduced. Ibn al-ʿAydarūs argued that the comparable project in Laḥj was more profitable than the one in Abyan because the British were less involved in it. His claims might have reflected a personal ambition to obtain a larger share of the Abyan Board's profits; nevertheless, they also reflected the growing ambition of those who considered themselves to be deprived -- notables, administrators and teachers -- to obtain a leading role in the running of the Protectorate.

In early 1957, Ibn al-ʿAydarūs started to recruit tribesmen in Dālī, Fadīlī and Lower Yafī. According to Trevaskis, the actual rebellion broke out after the British authorities had refused to comply with Ibn al-ʿAydarūs' demand to bomb a certain disobedient tribe. He then moved off to the mountains and on his way made the officers of the Abyan project and the local guards join him; this was an outstanding expression of anti-British feelings and for a while the project was paralysed. Ibn al-ʿAydarūs based himself in al-Qārah, in the Upper Yafī-Fadīlī mountains, close to the North Yemeni frontier: arms flowed to him from Baydā and tribesmen from all over the protectorate. Ibn al-ʿAydarūs' forces regularly launched attacks both on convoys and on military and economic installations in the neighbouring Princedoms.

During 1958 these forces proclaimed themselves more and more frequently to be "anti-colonialist" fighters and called themselves "Fadīlī Tribal Commando". In February 1959 the old Sultan of Lower Yafī, Āydarūs Ibn Muḥsin, died; a younger brother of Muḥammad Ibn al-ʿAydarūs was appointed his successor. As the majority of the population supported Muḥammad, an all-out rebellion in this Princedom and in others was anticipated. It was only later that the British decisively intervened. In
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November and December 1960 Ibn al-\(\text{\textsuperscript{\textregistered}}\)Aydarūs' camp was bombed; an FA column managed to scatter his forces and the political supporters of the revolt were detained and expelled (see below). Ibn al-\(\text{\textsuperscript{\textregistered}}\)Aydarūs was driven to take refuge in North Yemen.\(^{30}\) Both Ibn al-\(\text{\textsuperscript{\textregistered}}\)Aydarūs' uprising and the earlier mentioned Āhl Abū Bakr revolt contributed to the emergence of an opposition which cut across the boundaries of the previously rigid stratification; notables, administrators, teachers and landowners, in co-operation with tribesmen, against the leading establishment in the Protectorate.

Centres of acute conflicts evolved in Aden too; they also rose out of social divisions but, unlike the conflicts in the Protectorate, those in Aden also had a very distinct political-nationalist flavour. Changes in Aden's economic and demographic structures during the years following the Second World War were the primary cause of these conflicts. A demographic problem developed on the following lines. Aden's facilities had traditionally attracted immigrant labour from various places. Before the war, it was mainly European and Euro-Asian businessmen (see below) who had established themselves in Aden, while unskilled Arab workers, from the Protectorate and North Yemen, usually only settled there temporarily to make a certain amount of money. Then they would return to their families whom they had left behind. The traditional values and rigid strata thus usually remained in tact.\(^{31}\) However, after the war the development of Aden's port, its oil refineries and booming business, sharply increased the town's attraction. Moreover, in the light of the relatively poorer conditions in the Protectorate, North Yemen and in the overseas African and Asian countries which South Yemenis had traditionally been in contact with, Aden's opportunities became particularly appealing. The 1950s were years of mass immigration from North Yemen and the Protectorate to Aden; in Trevaskis' words, "The Yemenis who were now flowing down ... were taking possession of Aden far more effectively than the Zeidi troops could ever have done".\(^{32}\) However, Indians, Pakistanis and West Europeans; mostly businessmen and employees of business companies, also kept coming. One group of people whose immigration had considerable significance were returning South Yemenis. After East African and East Indies states had become independent, conditions for South Yemeni migrants became more difficult there. It seems that about 10,000 to 15,000 of them came back to al-Mukallah and Aden.\(^{33}\) Albeit a small group, these returning migrants had experienced a different socialisation process in alien social, cultural and economic conditions. On their return they tried to practise in South Yemen what they had learned abroad.

According to a census made in 1955, Aden had 138,141 people. There were about 55,000 Arabs, mostly from old established Adenese families. Members of the wealthiest among these families were exposed to European customs and
education, they supported the British inspired reforms, ran the major private business enterprises in Aden and staffed the governmental bodies and the state bureaucracy. In addition there were about 48,000 Yemeni Arabs, both from North Yemen and from the Protectorate. Unlike their predecessors, many came to Aden to settle down. They became the blue collar employees in the port and the refineries, as well as filling unskilled jobs in construction, garages, hotels and other businesses. About 10,000 Somalians worked in similar occupations and kept close contacts with their Arab counterparts. There were about 16,000 Asians, mostly Hindus, Catholics and Muslims. Each religious group preserved its distinctiveness; the non-Muslims maintained their Indian language and culture. Most of the Indians were traders, shop owners and officials. There were about 4,500 Europeans, mostly British, but also Greek, French and Italians who were prominent in the administration, ran the port and the main oil, cotton, sugar, airline and financial enterprises. According to the same census 831 Jews, mostly businessmen and jewellers were still living in Aden. 

This demographic composition generated conflicts on national lines. In Aden, various Arab groups opposed their European and Asian counterparts. Although the rich Arab businessmen probably worried less about non-Arab competitors, Arab officials, teachers and the unskilled workers were quite concerned and resentful about the Indians and Europeans who, albeit a minority in the city, occupied major posts which could have otherwise been in Arab hands. The fact that the number of educated Arabs steadily increased (see below) only sharpened the problem. A book published in Hadramawt stressed that while the local people lack "a piece of bread to survive" (Luqmāt al-Āysh), are forced to emigrate, though hardly welcomed in their destinations, foreigners infiltrate "by illegal means... compete over the limited goods still left in the country... [and] prevent employment for the local population". The attitude towards Asian countries, once a favoured destination for South Yemeni emigrants, had thus changed in the 1950s, immigrants from these countries in South Yemen became hated competitors and the British, who allowed this to happen, even more so.

The problem was highlighted in 1959 when a new law of citizenship was introduced. It allowed anybody who was either born in Aden or who had been living there for over ten years to vote for Aden's Legislative Assembly. Aden's Arabs, particularly the newcomers from North Yemen and the Protectorate, who had not lived in Aden for ten years, did not benefit from the new law and felt unfairly discriminated against in comparison to the veteran Europeans and Asians. The law, which had been initiated by the British and had passed through Aden's Legislative Assembly, which had several veteran Arab members, seemed to be particularly offensive to
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the Protectorate and North Yemeni Arabs.37

These rival groups also featured in a second conflict which developed along socio-economic lines. Aden's post-war boom signalled a change in the city's economic infrastructure. In the earlier period Aden had served mainly as a coaling station and as an intermediary market for the transit trade between Asia and Europe. A relaxed, business-like atmosphere usually pervaded the city: After the war, Aden's economy depended more on permanent locally based projects, namely, the enlarged port, the oil refineries, the military bases and the major business companies. The demand for temporary seasonal labour shifted to a demand for a permanent work-force which would be capable of running the new projects reliably and systematically. Much of the new work was mechanised and technical; cranes, rough carts and garages as well as banks and insurance companies spread all over the city. There was a growing need for skilled labour. Governmental and British initiatives were primarily concentrated on expanding education. In 1950 the Aden Technical College was opened. In 1952, thousands of teachers were brought from India to satisfy the growing demand for education.39

In these circumstances industrial relations in Aden changed drastically. A man was now employed on a long term basis, in a very large framework with thousands of other competing employees. His employer was either a government official or a representative of a large, sometimes a multi-national, company, who treated his workers impersonally, according to regulations. Workers' interests thus became focused on their hierarchical, professional and social position. The traditional ascriptive worker's identity declined. "Those who worked for the same employer began to think in terms of their interests as workers rather than in the context of their different origin," wrote Trevaskis.40 At the same time, the Saranij and the Mugaddams, the local traditional "job brokers", who recruited and deployed workers according to their origins, also lost power.41 Employees turned into a distinct class which confronted its government, Arab, European or Indian employers.

Among the employees the unskilled Arab workers again constituted the biggest problem. Gavin noted that in 1961 there were 49,600 registered employees in Aden out of which 3,550 were officials, 6,360 were classified as industrial workers and the rest were unskilled. In the 1950s, as more and more workers flocked into Aden, it soon became apparent that they faced acute difficulties in housing, education, and wages, in a city lacking the necessary infrastructure to support an immigrant work force recruited for a rapidly expanding modern economy.42 However, even Aden's more educated workers were active in employment issues such as working conditions, and the criteria for promotion, etc. Both skilled and unskilled workers were concerned with workers' rights for better housing,
clothing, children's education, conditions of migration to and from Aden, and others.43

In fact, in negotiating such issues, Aden's workers had evolved the rudiments of industrial relations in the city; lack of experience on the part of the employers and the workers and the difficult conditions of Aden's workers affected the situation. Since the late 1940s the workers had resorted to two types of action. First, they occasionally started violent strikes. The first was in 1948 after several large private companies had refused to raise workers' salaries, after an inquiry commission had recommended increases. The strike ended in November 1948 after the commission's recommendations had been implemented.44 In 1956, another long and serious strike broke out; about 7,000 workers, mainly from the port and the British Petroleum Oil depot, struck for a period equal to 130,000 working days. They demanded the improvement of their social conditions (i.e., payment for holidays and illnesses, the reduction of the working week to 48 hours and other benefits). Another commission of inquiry into these matters concluded that the workers had a "deep grievance".45

Secondly, not surprisingly, Aden's workers were among the first in the Middle East to start to form unions. In 1953, the first three unions registered in Aden's government's employment department. Contemporary observers noted that the unions' members had very little experience in organizing workers and in "collective bargaining".46 But in late 1956, 25 unions, of over 4,000 workers, were already registered. It was then decided to form an umbrella organisation for the unions, to include an executive committee and to hold an annual members' congress. The unified body was named the Aden Trade Union Congress, generally known as the ATUC. In 1959 there were 15,000 members in the ATUC and in 1963 22,000 members, which constituted one third of Aden's officially registered workers.

In its early stages, the ATUC was heavily influenced by the British Trade Union Congress, a fact which was evident even in the ATUC's name. Adenese workers who were employed in Cardiff established contacts with their British counterparts; the British TUC often sent representatives to guide Aden Unions and to mediate in their industrial disputes. As D.C. Watt asserted the strengthening of local trade unions was seen by the British authorities as another means of "self rule" and the labour advisers in the Colonial Office were particularly encouraging. Most of these officials were Labour Party members, even though Conservative governments were in power until 1964. Inspired by the British unionists, Aden workers first learnt to harness their unions to political activity and to cultivate political awareness among their working class members. In the late 1950s, the ATUC became increasingly influenced by trade unions in third world states. They encountered the leaders of these trade unions at the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions meetings and thereafter the
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ATUC adopted a more radical line, of which anti-colonialism was the major component. The people responsible for this development were the ATUC's relatively young, educated and politically aware leaders. Unlike the lower ranking workers, who used most of their energies to feed their families and to cope with life in Aden, the leaders were from immigrant families which already were more established in the city. They were not manual workers but rather middle class white collar employees, teachers or administrators.

They created two active roles for themselves. They saw themselves as the champions of workers' rights, an activity which brought them workers' admiration and with it the title of "enlighteners." Their second role was champions of Arab nationalism; their relatively high level of education and active concern for Yemeni and Protectorate Arabs motivated the ATUC's young leaders to cling to Pan-Arab ideas and particularly to its dominant ideology, Nāṣirism. "Their interest in the promised land of a new revolutionary Arab world was fully aroused", wrote Trevaskis. By combining a Pan-Arab nationalist ideology with socio-economic goals, the ATUC leadership managed to articulate both the socio-economic and the nationalistic grievances, which overwhelmed Aden's workers. They thus created a vehicle to express, sometimes violently, and possibly to solve these grievances. As M. Halpern explained, in the absence of fully organised widely supported and functioning political parties, trade unions, which fulfill professional, educational, co-operative and social needs, often become a central agency of modernisation and nationalistic crystallisation, and a political asset for anybody whom the unions would support.

The foundations for the conflicts which ensued both in Aden and in the Protectorate were essentially socio-economic and socio-political. However, whenever the inherent tensions between the different social strata became more acute or even erupted into open revolt, they revealed a second, more conspicuous motive, of Arab nationalism. Slogans of Arab nationalism, contacts with Arab states and inclination to Pan-Arab ideas seemed to have accompanied the activities of the opposition. In fact, by embracing the cause of Arab nationalism, opposition groups crystallised more vigorously and with greater political sophistication. Hence opposition groups first evolved around socio-economic problems, then underwent a process of nationalistic socialisation which finally shaped them. Ideas of Arab nationalism and the echoes of various ideologically inspired activities in the Middle East were a source of inspiration and encouragement to nationalistic activity. Furthermore, centres of Arab nationalist activity sprang up in South Yemen as a result of both foreign and local initiatives. The ideas and aspirations inherent in nationalism reached South Yemen as part of the widespread post-Second World War movement towards liberalism and democracy. At the time such aspirations
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were frequently over-simplified and unrealistic. Ingrams wrote that in 1945, in Singapore, a certain Sayyid approached him and demanded that his tiny village in Hadramawt (named Jāhiz) be granted independence.53 In the late 1940s the ideological slogans of the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine spread quickly and generated pro-Arab centres of identification. In Aden, the problem had a very real echo as most of the local Jewish population emigrated to Israel; in 1947 the traveller D. Van Der Muellen reported the great interest that the Arab-Jewish problem had generated in Hadramawt.54

In the 1950s Naṣirism had attracted an extraordinarily wide-spread and devout following. Naṣirist influence was exerted in three forms: first, by the tremendous appeal of its actions: The Suez War in 1956, the union with Syria in early 1958, etc. Secondly, the enormous ambition implicit in its slogans: anti-Imperialism, anti-Zionism, pan-Arabism and, in the 1960s, Arab Socialism. Thirdly, ǦAbd al-Nāṣir's ability to convey his message "over the heads of governments" directly to the masses and to incite them.55 Foreigners who visited South Yemen during the high point of Naṣirism were deeply impressed by the children who shouted at them everywhere "Naṣir".56 Aden's British rulers noticed with anxiety how the radio receiver had become an agent for Naṣirist propaganda broadcasts from the Cairo based "Voice of the Arabs" (Sawt al-ǦArab).57 Arab capitals, notably Cairo, became centres for nationalist socialisation of Yemeni students. One of them, Dr. ǦAbd al-ǦAziz al-ǦAddālī said :"[In Cairo] We started contact with students from other countries. We started knowing much about the outside world. Then we organized ourselves ... We immediately gravitated to political activities."58

South Yemenis were further inspired by the September 1962 revolution in North Yemen. Its close proximity to South Yemen, the increased contacts between the two countries (particularly through migration to Aden) coupled with the fact that the ousted Imam's rule had been very similar to that of the Protectorate's Sultāns, made the North Yemeni revolution an example in the South. It proved that there was a practical example on which events in South Yemen could be modelled.59 Bujra noted that during the period following the revolution, the 200 radio sets of Huraydah were all tuned to the "Voice of the Arabs" and that the existence of "Nationalistic masses" had become a problem all over Hadramawt.60 "[The] Language of nationalism" he wrote "is now the prevailing idiom throughout the country."61

The inspiration and ideas of Arab nationalism were more deeply entrenched by the actual development of Arab nationalist centres of activity in South Yemen. Apparently, the paucity of nationalist activity in pre-war South Yemen, provoked a strong urge to fill that ideological void in later years. In 1953, a Communist party, "The Democratic Nationalist Union"
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started to operate in Aden and in 1957, its members also formed a branch in North Yemen. Returning South Yemenis from Zanzibar and Indonesia supported this party. The Ba'th party, which during the 1950s had formed branches in various Arab states, opened a branch in Aden in 1956. The Qawmiyyûn al-ÇArab ("The Arab Nationalist Movement") opened branches in North and South Yemen in 1956; in 1959 the South Yemeni branch spread further into several Princedoms in South Yemen. The fact that these groups penetrated South Yemen in conditions of mutual rivalry, characteristic of the Arab world in the 1960s (see below), became marked in South Yemeni society. Youth and social clubs emerged in Aden, al-Mukallah, Say'ûn, Hawta, Muṣīrâs and other towns, which either subscribed directly to these parties or simply adopted the slogans of Arab nationalism. Moreover the opposition groups were quite clearly enriched by the ideas and activities of Arab nationalism. First, the adoption of national and socialistist terms enabled them to define their goals more precisely. The various grievances inherent in South Yemeni society thus acquired a common focus. Secondly, in the light of the declining acceptance of the old social stratification and of the existing "colonially-supported" establishment, the opposition groups were able to offer the South Yemeni masses a new and most appealing mode of legitimacy in the shape of Arab unity, anti-Imperialism, etc. True, its centre in Cairo or Damascus was remote geographically, but to most of the Arab world it looked cohesive, admirable and politically most promising. Consequently these opposition groups became populist; they spoke in the name of "the people" and held out the promise of a solution for their problems.

Notes

1. Trevaskis, p. 145.
2. Gavin, p. 316.
3. For a detailed discussion see Gavin, pp. 303-310, 312-314, 316.
5. Gavin, p. 301.
6. Ibid., pp. 299-301.
9. Trevaskis, p. 75, al-Çarâshî, p. 245. Johnston writes: "... It was true, unfortunately that, so far, much of the financial benefits seemed to have got stuck in the pockets of the merchants." Johnston, p. 206.
10. Al-Çarâshî, pp. 181-182.
12. Al-Çarâshî, pp. 188-190, Gavin, p. 301. The system most commonly used in land leasing was the murâba'ah, known also in other Middle Eastern countries. According to it, the
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owner was supposed to get 1/4 of the harvest, in return for a proportional investment. As mentioned earlier, the owners found ways of by-passing such regulations.

Changes which effect the institutional and the social spheres simultaneously, usually create serious conflicts.
21. H. Ingams, Arabia, p. 44.
23. Ibid., pp. 61-62, 78.
24. Ibid., pp. 104-110.
26. Trevaskis, pp. 117-120.
27. Ibid., pp. 122, 124-125, MER, 1960, p. 311.
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32. Trevaskis, p. 39.
36. Kostiner, op. cit., Jibril, Hadramawt, p. 41. The 'illegality' here is purely poetical, reflecting the views of the author and the opposition in general.
37. MER, 1960, p. 388.
38. Gavin, p. 323.
40. Trevaskis, p. 40.
42. Gavin, pp. 324-325.
43. Hickinbotham, pp. 183-186, states that during his tenure of office, the construction of thousands of housing-units was started.
44. Ibid., pp. 186-191, Gavin, p. 336.
46. Watt, op. cit.
49. Parry, op. cit.
51. Trevaskis, p. 96.
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59. Loc.cit.
61. Ibid., p. 178.
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