Electoral Politics and Hindu Nationalism in India

This book analyzes the rise and growth of the Hindu nationalist party, Bharatiya Jana Sangh, in post-independent India, tracking the electoral journey of the party from 1951 to 1971.

Offering a comprehensive analysis of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh party – its origin, ideas and electoral performances in the first two decades of its journey – the book provides an overview of the state-wide electoral record of the party mobilizing Hindu support and managing factional disputes. It surveys the issues of conflicts between the intraparty factions dominated by the recruits from the Rastriya Swayamsevak Sangh and the others. The author also presents a critique of the Hindutva politics of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh on account of its somewhat imperfect appeal among the masses and its problems in raising real issues of socio-economic concern. With a special emphasis on the states situated outside the Hindi language belt of Northern India, the electoral outcome of the Jana Sangh during each national and state legislative election is analyzed. Based on the dialectics of ideology and exigency, this book makes a thorough investigation of the leadership-succession crises in the party, patterns of vote sharing at the regional level and trends of coalition with the non-Congress parties in the states.

Providing a nuanced understanding of the process leading to the strengthening of right-wing political parties in India, the book will be of interest to academics working in the fields of nationalism, party politics and South Asian politics.

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Electoral Politics and Hindu Nationalism in India
The Bharatiya Jana Sangh, 1951–1971

Koushiki Dasgupta
To Ma and Baba
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This book was written as part of a research project funded by the Indian Council of Historical Research, New Delhi, from 2016–2017. I was nudged into investigating the extensive terrain of Hindu nationalist politics when I found that the ideology of Hindu nationalism had appeared to be an intellectual challenge to the left-liberal ideology that had occupied an important place in the political landscape of post-independent India. The rise of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh presented one of the most glaring examples of translating that ideology into practise by making all Hindus a homogeneous whole. The coming of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh in 1951 was much more than an average political phenomenon based on some petty number games; rather it brought to the front a unique brand of nationhood which kept on receiving inspirations from different sources. With the expansion of its influence over the electoral domain, the party attracted various caste groups and caste parties which had so far remained tangential in the mainstream political agenda. Despite having a visible presence in the electoral arenas, the party was confronted with the Nehruvian visions of a ‘secular-socialist’ accord over the political discourse in India. Jana Sangh’s close association with the RSS often charged the party with engaging in communal politics in the name of Hindu nationalism. Apart from struggling with the hostilities of the Congress elite and a section of the English language media, the party registered some amount of success in bringing a host of non-Congress parties close to the boundaries of a majoritarian politics in later years. In its attempts to get away with the fault lines of political untouchability, the Jana Sangh developed its own brand of intellectual assets and institutional networks by carving out a small but powerful niche for itself. Despite being stigmatised for their supposed propagation of Hindutva, chanting Hindi chauvinist mantras and promoting urban-upper caste values, the Jana Sangh leaders came out with an alternative vision of parliamentary politics in independent India.

My interest on the subject grew mostly out of the curiosity of what attracts people to the ideology of Hindu nationalism and to its subsequent political expressions. The Modi waves in the recent years also fetched me enough scopes and possibilities to closely scrutinize the ideology and its political character. I also found it quite misleading to tag the so-called Hindu rightist parties loosely with the vexed connotations of Hindutva, especially when a plethora of popular perceptions were
invested in invoking different degrees of alternative readings. I owe an immense debt of gratitude to all of the staff at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in New Delhi for providing me access to their archival resources, especially to the private paper collections. I thank the staff at the National Library, Kolkata; the National Archives, New Delhi, the Asian and African section of the British Library, London; and the office workers of the RSS, Hindu Mahasabha and the Bharatiya Janata Party in New Delhi. I am extremely grateful to Swami Mokshananda, Swami Ganeshananda, and Swami Barunananda of the Bharat Sevashram Sangha for their kindness and blessings. I wish to express my heartiest thanks to the political leaders and journalists, those who have helped me by providing valuable information and materials essential for my research. I want to thank all of my ex-colleagues and students at the University of Gour Banga, Malda, at the Diamond Harbour Women’s University, South 24 Parganas and the Honourable Vice Chancellor of Vidyasagar University, Midnapore. I am also thankful to Dr. Subodh Sarkar, Dr. Sudhir Singh, and my beloved brother Virendra Singh for extending unconditional support and encouragement over the years.

It may not be out of place to acknowledge my gratitude to the anonymous reviewers and the team at Routledge for encouraging me with thoughtful insights on the subject. I also express my sincere gratitude to Baba for keeping faith in all my endeavours. It is his sacrifices that made the book possible. Last but not the least, I want to recall the love and blessings of my beloved mother who left me a few years back.
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABVP</td>
<td>Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad</td>
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<td>BJP</td>
<td>Bharatiya Janata Party</td>
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<td>BJS</td>
<td>Bharatiya Jana Sangh</td>
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<tr>
<td>BKD</td>
<td>Bharatiya Kranti Dal</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMS</td>
<td>Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>Communist Party of India</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMK</td>
<td>Dravida Munetra Kazahagam</td>
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<tr>
<td>KMPP</td>
<td>Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEPSU</td>
<td>Partyala and East Punjab States Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>Praja Socialist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSS</td>
<td>Rastriya Swayamseyak Sangh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>Samyukta Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVD</td>
<td>Samyukta Vidhyak Dal</td>
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<tr>
<td>VHP</td>
<td>Viswa Hindu Parishad</td>
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The democratic experiences in India have been an enigma for various reasons. Having been rooted in the visions of parliamentary politics, India offered an interesting opportunity to translate the democratic experiences of the people in the discourse of identity formations by involving them in the electoral domain, not simply as an individual enjoying his/her citizenry rights, but as a conscious member of a particular religion or community. Almost all of the political parties in India had fostered the functioning of identity politics through electoral manoeuvrings. The rise and growth of Bharatiya Jana Sangh too reflected the political process that had cemented a unique brand of identity politics with successive elections. At a convention in New Delhi on 21 October 1951, the Jana Sangh was formed under the leadership of Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee with the help of the leaders and workers from the Rastriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Hindu Mahasabha. During its short career, the party was attracted to many political elements, rejected by a few and ultimately emerged as the most vigorous of the first generation of Hindu nationalist parties in independent India. The party had generated immense interest among the scholars and researchers, especially when treated as the predecessor of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Unfortunately, not many titles are available so far on the nature and evolution of the electoral fortune earned by the party in the general elections from 1951 onwards. Keeping in mind the thematic gaps in the range of literature produced on the history of the Jana Sangh, this study intends to explore the evolution of the party in terms of its ideology, social base and organizational support at both the national and regional level, examines the patterns of intra-party factions and make an assessment on the policy options available to the party for electoral success, even in the years of its political stagnation.

The mix of the traditional Hindu nationalist narratives with modern democratic experiences introduced new political trends in the changing socio-economic profile of electoral politics after independence. The rise of a parliamentary democratic party in close association with the RSS endorsed a politics of adjustment by redefining the importance of a homogeneous monolithic Hindu identity in politics. In the formative period, the party did not evolve as the political affiliate of the RSS, rather it maintained a political status quo between different non-Congress elements. It was only after the demise of Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee
that the party started depending largely on the RSS. The actual structure of the party reflected that of the RSS and so did its support system. The RSS connection of the Jana Sangh drew criticism that the party was ardently communal, and its opponents from the Congress raised serious allegations against the party for damaging the multicultural fabric of India through the project of Hindutva. During the election campaigns, the Congress ruthlessly attacked the Jana Sangh because of its association with the RSS, which had been banned only three years earlier on the charge of disseminating communal abhorrence. Having outlined the popular policies of the Jana Sangh similar to a camouflage over its conservative party line, its early critics had opened fresh approaches to the study of its electoral character. Inclusive to the understanding which locates Jana Sangh as the champion of communal politics, there is the problem of exploring its contribution to the edifice of a democratic polity in India. Exploiting the fault lines of the Congress, the Jana Sangh leaders accused the Congress of doing vote bank politics with Muslims, while the Jana Sangh applied the same tactic to the Hindu voters. It seemed that the Congress policy of indulging the vote bank politics was conditioned mostly by the influence of Hindu nationalism on the electorate. In addition, the Congress also expected to balance Hindu nationalism with the counter responsive ideas of caste cohesion and class solidarity, which contributed to the division of a Hindu block likely to transform into a majority electorate in the near future.

Despite being committed to a strong Hindu nationalist ideology, the Jana Sangh had to reach the non-Hindu voters for electoral success and therefore attempted to focus more on Bharatiyatva than on Hindutva. Now it is difficult to determine the actual context produced by the Jana Sangh for the working of the Hindu nationalist ideology as an instrument of electoral craft making in democratic India. Any perceptive which locates Hindu nationalism in the matrix of state politics is pre-occupied with the notions of a ‘superior’ politics, lacking the true understanding of the patterns by which the ideology could have entered into the world of everyday politics. The modes by which the Jana Sangh addressed the notions of Bharatiyatva had a link with this everyday world of politics where the shibboleths of Hindu nationalism were constructed for electoral gains. Opening up these approaches permits one to go deep into the patterns of electoral policy making by the Jana Sangh, which had deployed the ideology of Hindu nationalism as an instrument of ethno-religious mobilization.

Given the proliferation of anti-Jana Sangh propaganda by its opponents, the Jana Sangh tried its best to make a distinct identity of its own by promoting a powerful anti-Congress, anti-Western nationalist agenda. However, in matters of reflecting such an agenda in the electoral domain, the party fell short of its own expectations. Conducting elections with millions of poor, illiterate, caste-ridden voters appeared to be a challenge for a party like Jana Sangh who brought to the face one homogenizing model of Hindu identity formation over the conflicting terrains of Indian nationhood. Capturing power, however, by any means did not ever become an objective of the party.
Introduction

In the words of Dr. Mookerjee,

Whatever may be the result of the elections, our party must, however, continue to faction thereafter carrying a message of hope and goodwill to all class of people. . . . The Bharatiya Jana Sangh therefore emerges today as an All India political party which will function as the principal party in opposition. It does not mean that it will hesitate to take upon itself the reins of administration should it succeed in winning the confidence of the majority of the electorate, but where this is not possible, it will remain in opposition, whether inside or outside the legislature.²

Staying in opposition might have been a solution for any party new to the game of number politics. It hardly bears any relevance to the realities of everyday politics where the capacity of a political party to influence the decision-making process largely depends on the extent to which it shares the power of the state and the authority of the government. Rubbing shoulders with the power elites never became an objective of the Jana Sangh, at least in the formative phase, because in every sense the party was meant to be appearing as an intellectual challenge to the left-liberal ideology and an alternative to the Congress. Dr. Mookerjee retained that the failure of the Congress government in eradicating all evils of the society had expedited the establishment of a new party soon after independence. Being disillusioned with the Congress’s politics as early as the 1930s, Dr. Mookerjee parted ways with the Congress and opted for a different mode of politics. His association with the Hindu Mahasabha and gradual prominence to the highest level of the party proved to be a real journey for him towards national politics; however, his ideas and thoughts remained confined mainly on Hindu middle-class interests. From 1951 onwards, he entered into the arena of so-called electoral politics and chalked out the modules of that politics within a legislative framework. The formation of the Jana Sangh in 1951 and his subsequent efforts to unite all anti-Congress forces initiated a new brand of opposition politics in India. Besides cultivating the questions surrounding the feasibility of a united opposition against the Congress, the Jana Sangh opened up the questions of safeguarding one’s identity exclusively on national lines. Promoting national unity through engaging with the word Bharatiyatva (e.g. used in the sense of Indianans) as a circumlocution for the word ‘Hindutva’ (used in the sense of Hindu-ness), however, dragged the party into the middle of some raged controversies all through its political journey. Additionally, Jana Sangh’s most popular slogan of ‘one country, one culture, one nation’ went on to capture different interpretations and was mostly viewed as if rejecting the socio-cultural diversity of the country. Important than this charge of denying diversity was the assertion of engaging in Hindu sectarian politics in the name of national identity formation. Contrary to these popular allegations, Dr. Mookerjee declared in his presidential address that,

We have thrown open our party to all citizens of India irrespective of caste, creed or community. While we recognise that in matters of custom, habits
religion and language, India represents a unique diversity, the people must be united by a bond of fellowship and understanding inspired by deep devotion and loyalty to the spirit of common motherland. Our party will strive to work for that unity in diversity which has been the key note of India’s culture and civilization. This task of making the foundation of Indian nationhood deeper and stronger is not an easy one.3

In the general perceptions of the Jana Sangh, the formulation of a European type of nation state for the sake of underlining a real balance between unity and diversity was quite alarming since it was artificial for the growth of a historical society in India. Dr. Mookerjee was intelligent enough to realize this fallacy of diversity in India. He did not prefer the homogenising model of the European nation state since it was likely to assimilate the minorities by one way or other; rather he addressed the idea of a ‘common motherland’ and the very syncretistic traditions in Indian civilization which flourished over centuries. Promoting national unity through skilful representation of ‘non-communal’ democratic slogans might have been proved to be an intelligent escape for the Jana Sangh, which had claimed to be working for the Bharatiya Rastra – defined as standing for a Hindu Rastra in the cultural vocabulary of the party. Interestingly, the Jana Sangh never showed any hesitation in admitting Muslims as members, however, it had never withdrawn from the cause of the Hindu refugees in India and Hindu minorities in Pakistan. No political party, not even the Congress, had shown any sincere attempt to take the Hindu refugee question at the national platform, mostly on the assumption that it could have a boomerang effect on their secular image. Dr. Mookerjee gave similar attention to Kashmir, that one-third of this state, then under the control of Pakistan, must be freed from the clutches of Pakistan.

All through its political expeditions, the Jana Sangh had witnessed additions and alterations in its core principles according to the situational necessities. The party itself had gone for massive transformations either at the ideological level or at the level of framing electoral strategies in a given situation. Right from the beginning Dr. Mookerjee welcomed likeminded parties for a joint front against the Congress and tried to consolidate minor fractions of the opposition both inside and outside the legislature. Unfortunately, other than Dr. Mookerjee, there was not a single leader of repute in early Jana Sangh who could contribute to making the opposition a united block against the Congress. The new party was conceived to be a response of the ‘abuses’ of the Congress, and its immediate goal was to expose the ‘fascist’ face of Mr. Nehru and his party. Depending on the goodwill of the likeminded people and by taking a huge risk in the formative phase, the party went on fighting the election at its own cost. In spite of lacking proper election machineries, the party performed well and managed to occupy some seats in the parliament and the state legislatures. The much-awaited electoral understanding among the principal opposition parties was conceptualised on the basis of selecting the best possible candidates enjoying popularity among the
voters; no detailed mechanism was applied to tie them together for long. Furthermore, almost all of these parties were somewhat at odds with the Jana Sangh ideology. The Hindu Mahasabha in Bengal, the Praja Party in Uttar Pradesh and the Zamindari Mazdoor Party in Punjab – all were more or less working in favour of the landed interests. Even Dr. Mookerjee was quite aware of the fact that the election might not be free and fair because money and power would speak in favour of the ruling party. Jana Sangh was not in a position to employ any extra machinery for winning over the electorate and was even less fearful about the outcomes. Putting a note of caution before his followers, Dr. Mookerjee mentioned,

Let our workers constantly remember that only through service and sacrifice will they be able to win the confidence of the masses of the people. The great task of re-vitalising and re-constructing [a] free India await[s] us. . . . However dark the present cloud may be, India has a great destiny to fulfil in the years to come. May our party whose symbol in the forthcoming elections is a humble earthen pradip try to carry this light of hope and unity, faith and courage to dispel the darkness that surrounds the country. The journey has just begun.4

In his first presidential address, Dr. Mookerjee had provided a detailed blueprint of the party. The partition related problems like refugee rehabilitation, minority issues, boundary issues and the Kashmir issue had received much attention from Mookerjee and his associates. It was something expected from Dr. Mookerjee since he was one of those leaders who had realized and suffered the dreadful impact of partition. In addition to addressing the issues coming out of the catastrophe of 1947, the Jana Sangh continued to accuse Congress of betraying the nation with the plan of partition.

It is true that some of us supported the partition of Bengal and Punjab in 1947, but be it recorded that we were forced to do so when India’s division was imminent. We always wanted to keep these and other Provinces within United India. When we found that this was not possible due to the betrayal of the Congress and the pact between itself and [the] Muslim League supported by an astute British policy, we were anxious to have as much of these provinces as possible and keep them within free India. Otherwise they would have been lost to India in their entirety.5

Very obviously, Dr. Mookerjee received considerable support on the issues of partition from different corners of the country. Bunches of letters were entertained at the Calcutta and Delhi office of the party every day, applauding the efforts of Dr. Mookerjee and his followers. Despite having a strong base of emotional support from a section of the electorate, the party kept on facing severe factional disputes, especially in between the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS cadres working inside the organizations at different levels. A thorough interrogation of the ‘S.P Mookerjee Papers’ could have been convenient enough to show how at different levels
personal conflicts were transformed into factional conflicts and how the party was maligned on the charge of engaging in foul politics before the election. Even Dr. Mookerjee was charged with being ‘communal’ on several grounds. His recurrent speeches on the Hindu refugee question, as well as on the Kashmir dispute, not only unlocked the pitfalls of Congress politics but also put Dr. Mookerjee at the border line of conjectures. Jana Sangh was soon to fall into the whirlpools of communalism, and the charge of being ‘communal’ became the single most powerful accusation made against the party so far. Gradually the entire structure of opposition politics fell into the so-called binaries of communalism/nationalism; however, in its actual place the political matrix was too critical to draw a solid conclusion in this respect. Associating itself with the RSS might have had positive implications for the party, but it was proved to be damaging to a certain extent.

Dr. Mookerjee’s untimely death in 1953 in Kashmir completely changed the existing scenario of opposition politics in India. The RSS workers were not in a position to keep on fighting the Congress from the Jana Sangh platform and rather wished to get support from the Hindu Mahasabha leaders. Interestingly, V.D. Savarkar, the most prominent leader of the Hindu Mahasabha, never approved of the Mahasabha leaders taking over the charge of Jana Sangh. It was the time when the RSS was slowly taking control of the Jana Sangh, and the successors of Dr. Mookerjee came into a serious tussle with the RSS leaders on the question of leadership inside the party. The emergence of Pt. Deendayal Upadhyay – one of the most enterprising leaders from the RSS faction as the General Secretary (1954–1967) and the sole command of the party – had altered the hitherto existing equations of party control. The influence of the RSS on Jana Sangh, however, should be read as an example of authority without hegemony, because in no case did the RSS appear to be orchestrating their workers in the Jana Sangh, rather it preferred to stay within the decision-making structure of the party. There is no such evidence that the RSS was running the party affairs during Upadhyay’s tenure; however, the changing political situations as well the experiences gathered from the subsequent elections gradually revised the ideological and organizational nomenclature of the party.

In their efforts to make the party more approachable to the people, four zonal divisions were created by the party bosses in 1958. The northern zone included Punjab, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir. In the eastern zone, the core state was Uttar Pradesh, and the other states were Bihar, West Bengal, Assam, Manipur and Tripura. The western zone extended from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal and included Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh as core states with Gujarat and Orissa. Attempts to extend the Jana Sangh to the south led to the formation of the southern zone which included Maharashtra, Mysore, Goa and Pondicherry. In spite of its consecutive efforts to become a national party in every sense, the Jana Sangh emerged not more than a party of exclusive interests in reality. The party might have reached out to the socio-cultural expectations of the urban Hindu bourgeoisie, but in absence of any hardcore economic agenda, the socio-political needs of the middle classes were hardly addressed. Its support for a mixed economic model of development based on regularizing
the large-scale industries, nationalization of the principle industries, abolition of zamindari, promoting cooperatives in the rural sectors – all had an impact on creating a nationalist-socialist image for the Jana Sangh but failed to address caste-specific and issue-specific demands of a growing economy. Closely related to this was its lacking the sense of issue identification or the making of what becomes a real issue and how these issues are to be addressed during electoral campaigns.

The party network did not work well in those states where the RSS lacked real political strength. In some of the states, the party also depended on the local notables as well as on Hindu traditionalists who helped the Jana Sangh during the elections just for their own self-interest. But the party was not very sure about the Hindu traditional forces who merely claimed that the Hindu majority should influence the policy and programmes of the government. It was also undecided as to what extent the Jana Sangh leaders would enjoy their freedom in framing and executing policies when most of the luminaries of the party were hard-boiled RSS men. In its election manifestos, the party did not miss any opportunity to incorporate the grand themes of Hindu nationalism along with socio-economic and foreign policies. The party was busy in a unique play of meeting different expectations. On one side it tried to make itself comfortable with the parliamentary power politics and on the other side tried to convert the existing framework of politics into a struggle for greater Hindu revival. The tension between these two streams of thoughts seemed to be palpable in the party conferences held after regular intervals.

Apart from ideological shifting, one question becomes very much pertinent here. How could a national party sustain and evolve Hindu nationalistic spirits when the ideal of Hindu nationalism was itself in jeopardy in major parts of post-independent India. In Tamilandu some people wanted to join the Jana Sangh because of Dr. Mookerjee’s close connection with south Indian businessmen, while some appreciated the relief works by Jana Sangh and RSS leaders in the districts of Tumkur, Kolar and Chitradurga after a devastating famine, and the others found the Kashmir issue more encouraging among the whole of the Jana Sangh programmes. The Jana Sangh was slowly marching towards the remotest regions of the country from 1960s, but the extent of its popularity remained undecided. Even though the Jana Sangh started its journey in view of its being less exclusive and more modern than the Hindu Mahasabha, its overexposed sympathy for Hindu traditionalist ideas in the early 1950s put the party into the centre of criticism in liberal and secular circles on the grounds of practicing conservatism and spoiling the multi-ethnic fabric of Indian society. Nevertheless, neither the critics nor even the sympathizers ever pointed out that the Jana Sangh had celebrated two divergent patterns of thoughts in its attempts to become a national party from inception. Its politics of hyper nationalism based on ethno-religious mobilization often clashed with the line of consensus made around the model of popular choice on an issue-specific agenda. Interestingly, one never shattered the spirit of the other. Its journey had been as much one of disappointments as of hopes; however, it always remained reliably committed to the objective of promoting the Hindutva agenda.
Depending on a whole gamut of rich archival sources, this study presents an inclusive analysis of a few basic themes discussed above. Centering round the spirit and essence of Hindu nationalism, this study makes a thorough enquiry of the i) leadership succession crisis in the party ii) ideological rifts between the leaders iii) patterns of vote sharing at the regional level in each successive election iv) patterns of coalition with other non-Congress parties in the states and v) its limitation, success and failure in the long run. Based on these principle issues, this study attempts to explore how the association of the Jana Sangh with the RSS influenced its political destiny and in what respect the ideological and political standpoint of Dr. Mookerjee differed with the group controlled by Pt. Deendayal Upadhyay in later years. After the death of Dr. Mookerjee, the organizational power rested with the more enthusiastic workers under the leadership of Upadhyay, and thus the ardent form of Hindu nationalism became the principle ideological force behind the party. Despite its claim to be the true representative of the masses, the party was severely attacked by its opponents for not promoting secular ideas and values in a true sense of the term. On the contrary, the Jana Sangh kept accusing the Congress and the left parties of appeasement of Muslims without fail. The party was charged with being preoccupied with the issues related to the Hindi heartland and ignored other regional affairs. Within a few years of its arrival, the party was pushed to a point of political isolation; however, it strived to keep its political relevance intact through raising a few selected issues like cow slaughter, promotion of Hindi, refugee rehabilitation and anti-Pakistan propagandas. This study opens a fresh debate on why the majority of Hindus, even in the Hindi-speaking states of Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, continued to see Congress as their principal defender despite its declared commitment to minority interests. Having become embroiled between the liberal and conservative factions, the Jana Sangh wasted much of its energy in mere ideological battles which spoiled its credibility to become a democratic front of the common Hindu electorate. From the late 1960s, when the party entered into alliances with Socialist parties, its previous position of political isolation had changed. Jana Sangh’s electoral alliance with the Socialist parties had a tremendous impact on the urban political scenario, including on the agrarian social strata, but the major ideological differences between these parties did not go well with the possibilities of a long-lasting relationship. Jana Sangh’s coalition experiments might have been viewed something like a departure from its previous ideology-oriented politics to a more pragmatic power-oriented politics; however, a thorough study of the state-wide breakup of the vote share might have been helpful in understanding the real nature of Hindu politics in the wide spectrum of coalition designs. In the 1967 election, the vote share of the party increased, and in comparison to 1967, the party had done well in the 1971–1972 elections. Throughout the 1970s, coalition experiments took place at various instances while a new era of unconventional politics had begun.

Making sense to the basic arguments of the study, the third objective of this book is to see each of the working zones of the party as a case study in the elections, out of which a fundamental hypothesis has been drawn on why the eastern
Indian states, especially West Bengal, had remained mostly indifferent to the politics of Jana Sangh in the long run. Furthermore, this book intends to unveil the fluctuating patterns of coalition politics adopted by the Jana Sangh in the late 1960s and how the shifting status of the party appeared to be a departure from its previous positions.

This work looks into the ideology of Hindu nationalism as the primary strength behind the growth of a democratic political party in the electoral arena. Keeping pace with the principle theme of the subject, this book has been divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 explores the events leading up to the birth of the Jana Sangh in 1951. This chapter makes a fresh attempt to understand Dr. Mookerjee’s ideas on Hindutva in regard to the policies and programmes of the Jana Sangh in the initial years. A very pertinent question has been raised in this chapter as to whether the Hindutva ideology of Mookerjee should be discussed in the light of the existing explanations on the ideology of Hindu nationalism from earlier decades. If not, then in what respect has Dr. Mookerjee introduced some new interpretations of Hindutva differently from Savarkar, Golwalkar and others? This chapter brings out the contradictions and paradoxes present in the visions of Dr. Mookerjee and looks for the patterns in the RSS’s involvement with the Jana Sangh. Chapter 2 focuses on the structure of party organization at the central and regional level and its relation with other Hindu nationalist organizations like the Hindu Mahasabha, Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad, Mazdoor Sangh, Viswa Hindu Parishad, Ram Rajya Parishad and others. The first part of the chapter gives a detailed account of the policies and programmes of the party, instruments of fund control and the nature of the support base with a brief introduction on the first generation of leaders who started working with Dr. Mookerjee. The second part of the chapter examines the party’s initial strategy on the general elections and how the party handled all of its political challenges. The third part of the chapter presents the post-Mookerjee developments in the Jana Sangh. The rise of the RSS faction under Upadhyay opened up an era of regimented party control with regular rifts and conflicts between leaders like Balraj Madhok, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and others. Considering the evolution of the party’s leadership and organization, this chapter attempts to record the achievements of the party in the inter-election period. Chapter 3 makes a thorough enquiry on the confusions within its ranks over what would be the actual objective for which the party should work; was it to nourish the ideology of Hindu nationalism or should it concentrate on the immediate aspirations and grievances of the masses for the sake of electoral victory only? This chapter pays attention to the language policy of the party and its subsequent outcome in the Indian states, especially in the south. It discusses the political prospects of the party after the election of 1957 when the leaders were looking for the possibilities of alliance and cooperation. The political chemistry between the Communists and Jana Sangh came out as one of the most striking affairs in this period, while the Swatantra Party too opened its doors to the Jana Sangh. Chapter 4 is based on the observations made in the elections of 1957 and 1962. This chapter examines why the Congress got too much political mileage even when the Congress was going out of hegemony on a national scale.
This chapter begins with a note on the anti-Congress political environment in the country before the fourth general election in 1967. This chapter makes a detailed study on the election results in different states, especially in areas where the party had scored well in the past. It also looks for the different possibilities of intra-party negotiations, especially when a higher share of seats placed the party in an authoritative position in the process of forming the non-Congress coalition. The concluding part of the book presents my reflections on the way the Bharatiya Jana Sangh lifted up the discourse of Hindu nationalism in a democratic setup. It shows why the party failed to travel around the ‘alternatives’ in Indian politics but rather continued to envisage Hindutva as similar to the idea of Bharatiyatva, which brought together the indigenous roots of Indian modernity, just as it offered a kind of psychological relief to the whole generation of Hindu nationalists in independent India.

In the last few decades, there has been an upsurge of events and movements motivated by the factors of Hindu nationalism in India. The landslide victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the parliament elections of 2014 reflected the resurgence of pro-Hindu politics under the auspices of the Sangh parivar. BJP’s ascendency to power resulted in an overload of literature on the Hindutva movement. This study does not fit into the patterns of understanding the trajectories of a political party through the prisms of Hindutva, rather investigates the prospects and predicaments of an ideology when explored in some hitherto unfamiliar domains of power politics.

Notes

1 There is a dearth of reading materials on the history of the Jana Sangh in general. The party had generated interest among the scholars and researchers only when treated as the forerunner of the Bharatiya Janata Party. Not many titles are available so far on the history of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. Only a few of them looked for the electoral fortune of the party in a comprehensive manner. Bruce Graham’s book is written for the purpose of higher academic research on the subject. Almost all of the chapters in Graham’s book are produced in a thematic fashion, while Craig Baxter’s work is more like a recording of political events related to the history of the Jana Sangh. Both of these works are good examples of scholarly passion and thematic extravaganza; however, the spirit of an academic textbook is very much missing. Christophe Jaffrelot wrote extensively on some aspects of the Jana Sangh in terms of religion, politics, caste and Hindu nationalism but hardly discussed the ideological and electoral conflicts the Jana Sangh had experienced in the late 50s and 60s. T.B. Hansen’s work is dealing with the contours of saffron/Hindu politics in India in general; it doesn’t have any particular in-depth analysis of the Jana Sangh. Putting higher emphasis on the RSS as the core organization of the Hindutva camp, W.K. Anderson’s book treats Jana Sangh simply as a point of reference to later political developments. Most of these studies have viewed Jana Sangh as a part of the discourse called Hindu communalism and presented a critique of the Hindu Rightist forces in independent India. Paradoxically, meta-narratives of Hindu communalism often compelled the reader to look at a political party through the lens of some predetermined assumptions without venturing to engage in a detailed analysis of its historical transformations.

For details see, Bruce Graham, Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics: The Origins and Development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (New Delhi: Cambridge University

2 Presidential Address of Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee at the first convention of the All India Bharatiya Jana Sangh held in Delhi on 21 October, 1951. Syama Prasad. Mookerjee Papers, II-IV Inst. File No 170, pp. 121–122 (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, NMML).

3 Ibid., p. 123.

4 Ibid., p. 130.

5 Ibid.

1 In a judgement of 1955, the Supreme Court of India ruled that ‘Ordinarily, Hindutva is understood as a way of life or a state of mind and is not to be equated with or understood as religious Hindu fundamentalism . . . it is a fallacy and an error of law to proceed on the assumption . . . that the use of the words Hindutva or Hinduism per se depicts an attitude hostile to all persons practising any religion other than the Hindu religion. . . . It may well be that these words are used in a speech to promote secularism or to emphasise the way of life of the Indian people and the Indian culture or ethos, or to criticise. The policy of any political party as discriminatory or intolerant’. Referred in Ram Jethmalani, *Hindutva Is a Secular Way of Life* (New Delhi: The Sunday Guardian, 5 March 2015).


9 The growing popularity of the word ‘Hinduism’ in the late 19th century might be taken as a linguistic extravaganza of the English educated elites who started using this word on a pan-Indian scale. The neo Hindu movement of late 19th century put forward the ethos of humanism and universalism; however, this movement promoted numerous ventures to popularise one collective spirit of Hindu identity consciousness. For details see, R.C. Nath, *New Hindu Movement, 1866–1911* (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers & Co., 2011).

10 The idea of ascetic masculinity contested the Orientalist visions of an otherworldly passive Hindu and emphasised a unique combination of manliness and celibacy essential for nation building in India. It challenged the colonial understanding of wandering ascetic Hindu mendicancy producing indolent parasitic subjects linked to a lack of vigour, strength and consciousness. The 19th century ideal of ascetic nationalist masculinity altered the colonial construction of Hindus being indifferent to his social responsibilities, instead conceived the new ascetic Hindu as someone who is self-controlled, disciplined, strong and dedicated to the service of the nation.
The creed of the Hindu sangathan or organization was articulated as the way of consolidating the Hindus mainly by the Hindu reform movements like the Arya Samaj. The Hindu Mahasabha too popularised the Hindu sangathan movement on a political level in the 20th century. It was established as one of the key elements of Hindu nationalist ideology. See, Heinrich Von Sietencron, Religious Configurations in Pre-Muslim India and the Modern Concept of Hinduism, in Vasudha Dalmia and Heinrich Von Sietencron (eds.), Representing Hinduism: The Construction of Religious Traditions and National Identity (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997), p. 79; see also D. Gold, Organised Hinduisms: From Vedic Truth to Hindu Nation, in M. Marty and R. Appleby (eds.), Fundamentalisms Observed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 531–593.


For detailed discussions on Tilak, see Stanley Wolpert, Tilak and Gokhale, op. cit. pp. 135–136.


The Organizer, a mouthpiece of the RSS, published articles claiming that Hedgewar fulfilled the man-making aspiration of Swami Vivekananda by establishing the RSS. It also claimed M.S. Golwalkar to be a disciple of the Ramakrishna Order and, following him, the RSS too ‘is leading a life of sacrifice for the society’. See Organizer, 27 August 2006, p. 5; Panchjanya, 1 July 2001, p. 11. For details on the link and connection of Golwalkar with the Ramakrishna Mission, see, Walter K. Andersen and Shridhar D. Damle, The Brotherhood in Saffron: The Rastriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu Revivalism (Boulder: Westview, 1987), p. 113.

Pradip Dutta, Carving Blocks, op. cit. pp. 39–44.

The spirit of exclusive homogenous Hinduism was best nurtured by the ideal of a ‘threatening other’ under changed political situations from the early 20th century. Its political connotations became more visible after the publication of the pamphlet, ‘Hindus – A Dying Race’ by Colonel U.N Mukherjee in 1909. Colonel U.N Mukherjee first published his observations on the possibility of Hindu extinction and the disparity in the rate of growth of the Hindus and the Muslims in a series of articles in the Bengalese, edited by Surendranath Banerjee. Mukherjee’s vision of the Hindus being a dying race might have added extra fuel to the preparations for the first Punjab Hindu Conference. (See, U.N. Mukherjee, A Dying Race, 2nd edition [Calcutta, 1910]). By 1909, a section of the politically aware Hindus (I must acknowledge here that most of these people were from the upper castes, as the lower caste Hindus were yet to enter into the scene) realized the importance of numerical and organizational unity of the Hindu society, especially when constitutional reforms, census reports and the development of separatist politics imparted a sense of unity in the Hindu society. The book ‘Hindus – A Dying Race’ first consolidated the idea of demographic decline and inquired the causes of discrepancy in the rate of growth of the Hindus and the Muslims. The census reports had played a definite role in it. The main propositions of Mukherjee were published in the Bengali in 1909. In 1910 it was published as a book. In this
publication deep concern had been shown for the future of the Hindu race threatened by the proselytizing ventures of the other religious communities. For details see, Dutta, Carving Blocks, pp. 26–47.

21 In the book, ‘The Meaning and End of Religion’, (1962) W.C. Smith first proposed the very core of this idea that, “Hinduism refers not to an entity; it is a name that the west has given to a prodigiously variegated series of facts. It is a notion in men’s minds . . . and a notion that cannot but be inadequate. To use this term in all is inescapably a gross oversimplification”. A few of these scholars who followed more or less similar arguments are: Christopher J. Fuller, The Camphor Flame: Popular Hinduism and Society in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); John Stratton Hawley, Naming Hinduism, Wilson Quarterly (Summer 1991), pp. 20–34; Gerald Larson, India’s Agony Over Religion (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995); Heinrich Von. Stietencron, Hinduism: On the Proper Use of a Deceptive Term, in G-D. Sontheimer and H. Kulke (eds.), Hinduism Reconsidered (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1989), p. 11.


23 One of the strong proponents of this theory, Swami Dayananda, envisioned that these Aryas would have migrated from Tibet towards the Aryavartha. It was the homeland of the Vedic civilisation, around the Ganga basin. From this territory the Aryas would have dominated the whole world till the war of the Mahabharata. These Aryas, according to Dayananda, were elect people to whom the Veda had been revealed by the God and they used to speak in the sacred Sanskrit – perhaps the ‘mother of all languages’. For details see, J.F.T. Jordens, Dayananda Sarasvati: His Life and Ideas (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 116.


25 This message of 19th century mystic Ramakrishna Paramahamsa puts emphasis on the usefulness of all religious beliefs and advises not to consider one’s own path as the only true path. This idea in fact challenged the concept of conversion which believes in the effectiveness of only one religious path. Ramakrishna also asked to worship the God in human being and showed the true solution of eradicating caste/class prejudices through the ideal of universal humanism. For details on the concept see, Mahendranath Gupta, Sri Sri Ramakrishna Kathamrita, English translation by Dharm Pal Gupta (Kolkata: Sri Ma Trust, date unknown), p. 41.

26 Many Indian and Western social scientists have discussed Hindu revivalism in India as something politically motivated or religiously intentional. While talking on the Hindu communal trends in the 20th century they often put 19th-century Hindu resurgence as something similar to the ‘syndicated Hinduism’ (a term used by Prof Romila Thapar to narrate the RSS-BJP brand of Hindutva in the 20th century, see, Romila Thapar, Syndicated Moksa, Seminar, 313, September, 1985, pp. 14–22. It would be a complete misinterpretation if 19th-century Hindu resurgence is judged from the prisms of fundamentalism as in the case of Prof Ashis Nandy who used flat descriptions while discussing fundamentalism and revivalism. For him the Westernised/semi-modernized native or the ‘zealot’ internalised the Western ideals to modernise our own culture and religion: ‘if such a zealot is Muslim or Sikh we call him fundamentalist, if he is a Hindu we call him revivalist’. It seems that for him both fundamentalism and revivalism are interchangeable connotations and could be applied in every concerned moment! See Ashis Nandy, Traditions, Tyranny and Utopias: Essays in the Politics of Awareness (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 14.


28 Ibid., p. 3.

29 ‘Presidential Address at the 19th Session of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha, Karnavati, 1937’, in Hindu Rashtra Darsham, p. 10.
31 Ibid., pp. 42–43.
34 Kalidas Basu and Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee, http://spmrf.org/site/article13.html, official website, New Delhi: Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee Research Foundation.
36 Speech delivered at the Bombay University Convocation on 17 August 1937. ‘Speeches and Statements by him, 1st Inst. Subject Files’, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), New Delhi.
43 *Exodus of Hindu: Political Situation, Economic Situation* issued by the *Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha*, printed at Navchetan Press, Delhi (date unknown); Syama Prasad Mookerjee Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), New Delhi.
44 Syama Prasad Mookerjee Papers, ‘Speeches and Statements by Him, 1st Inst. Subject Files’, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), New Delhi.
49 Presidential address by Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee at the inaugural meeting of the People’s Party in Calcutta on 9 June 1951. Syama Prasad Mookerjee Papers, ‘Speeches and Statements by him, 1st Inst. Subject Files’ Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), New Delhi.

Deendayal Upadhyay, *Organiser*, vol. XII, no. 19 (1959), p. 3. Deendayal Upadhyay also mentioned that in a country where the capital labour ratio leaves no alternative but to introduce intense cultivation, large-scale collective firms will not maximize production. The party also is opposed to the lowering of the ceiling on agricultural land because the country did not have enough land to give to all. The available land was either wasteland or barren land, and a mere distribution of this land would not solve the problem. In order to reduce the pressure on land, the Jana Sangh stressed intensive cultivation and development of agro industries.

‘[T]he foreign races in Hindustan must either adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and hold in reverence (sic) Hindu religion, must entertain no idea but those of the glorification of the Hindu race and culture, i.e. the Hindu nation and must lose their separate existence to merge in the Hindu race, or may in the country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential treatment . . . no[t] even citizen’s rights. . . . We are an old nation; let us deal, as old ought to and to deal, with the foreign races, who have chosen to live in our country. M.S. Golwalkar, *We or Our Nationhood Defined* (Nagpur: Bharat Publications, 1939), pp. 47–54.

*Organiser*, 23 October 1948.

M.S. Golwalkar, *Bunch of Thoughts* (Bangalore: Sahitya Sindhu Prakashana, 1980).

Manifesto of the All-India Bharatiya Jana Sangh, New Delhi, 1951.

Ibid., p. 2.

Ibid.

Ibid., pp. 2–3.

Ibid.

For details, see Bruce Graham, *Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics: The Origins and Development of Bharatiya Jana Sangh* (New Delhi, 2008), pp. 48–52.


Ibid.

Ibid.


Atal Bihari Vajpayee, one of the close associates of Dr. Mookerjee and former prime minister of India, had recalled in an article that ‘I have had long association with Thengdiji. I was present in the Bhopal meeting in which the decision to form the BMS was taken. During the discussion to decide the name of the new organisation, Thengdiji had suggested the name Shramjivi Sangathan. The name Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh...
was coined keeping in view the fact that the name should be simple and meaningful. I feel trade unionism is facing a crisis today. We have before us two paths; one of these is on the way out. There is a need to find out the third one. Workers’ interests should be protected but at the same time, the nation’s interest too must be borne in mind. The workers’ movement is in a crisis and how to balance things in a changing scenario should be considered using the third way out, which was what Thengdi had been attempting. Whatever Thengdiji has written should be read by all of us. I feel it will guide us for long’. See, Organiser, ‘His Writings Will Guide Us’, New Delhi, 31 October 2004, p. 13.


22 The Times of India, New Delhi, 22 October 1951.

23 The Jana Sangh unit in the state of Karnataka was growing fast. In a letter dated 15 September 1952, Sri J.K. Sonmithri Sharma, the president of the Jana Sangh in Karnataka, informed Dr. Mookerjee, ‘I feel it joyous to state that in spite of difficulties we are progressing steadily though a bit slowly in our province. Mandal Samities are being formed and membership recruitment is taken up’. For details, see the letter from J.K. Sonmithri Sharma to Syama Prasad Mookerjee on 15 September 1952 and the letter from Syama Prasad Mookerjee to Sharma on 17 September 1952 in Syama Prasad Mookerjee Papers, ‘II – IV Inst. Subject File no. 174’, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), New Delhi.


25 The Bengali identity is a result of the 19th-century cultural waves by virtue of Bengal renaissance, social reformations and the steady growth of Western liberal education. The idea of regenerating the Hindu golden past did not ever become very fashionable in the cultural milieu of intellectual Bengal; instead modern Western thoughts were being discussed more in nation-building projects. Even though Bengal was considered to be the most politically advanced region in 19th century India, the Bengalis were hardly being acknowledged as ‘martial’ and competent like the Marathas, the Rajputs or the Sikhs. However, the literary and cultural skills of the Bengalis were identical in terms of espousing self-esteem and a sense of superiority among the Bengalis vis-à-vis the other races. Interestingly, the Hindu high caste bhadralok identity was conceived as one that would be sophisticated, cultured, moderately affluent and creating the binaries of ‘other’ in respect to social origin, racial origin and local origin as well. In this sense, the North Indian immigrants too were considered to be ‘low’ in comparison to the ‘high’ identity of the bhadraloks. For a study of the bhadraloks see, J.H. Broomfield, Elite Conflict in a Plural Society: Twentieth Century Bengal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).
The Jana Sangh asked for i) suitable compensation for Pakistan in respect of properties left by Hindus and others who have migrated to India. ii) Refugees who had settled and would settle in India would be given citizenship rights, including the right to vote. iii) Refugees from West Bengal would have to be settled in West Bengal and the adjoining areas so as to preserve the cultural traditions of the Bengali people.

One faction in the Mahasabha was under the control of Ashutosh Lahiry, who tried to wield his influence over the Bengal provincial Mahasabha from Delhi. The other faction was controlled by N.C. Chatterjee and Debendranath Mookerjee. All India Hindu Mahasabha Papers, P-107/1947, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML).

Syama Prasad Mookerjee’s speech at a mass meeting in Calcutta on 2 December 1951. Syama Prasad Mookerjee Papers, ‘Inst. II – IV, Subject File no. 173’, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), New Delhi.


Report by a Jana Sangh worker just prior to the election. He informed, ‘Our 25 candidates in the districts of Midnapore have been working fairly well under the leadership of Mammatha Nath Das. . . . The work in Calcutta south east constituency is proceeding fairly well. Organizations have been set up in the Bhawanipur, Kalighat, South Tollygunj and north Tollygunj areas. The same will be completed in the Taltola and Beniapukur areas by Sunday. The difficulty is that our candidates are not taking any initiative to organise public meetings in Their constituency . . . most of Them are unwilling to spend any money for arranging public meetings in Their area. . . . Dr B C Ghosh of Kharagpur has just seen me and informed me that Pt Nehru will address a public meeting at Kharagpur on The 31st of December. His election will be held on 3rd of Jana . . . so he is anxious for your presence in Kharagpur on The 1st of Jana so that Pt Nehru’s speech on The 31st may be counteracted, particularly because non
Bengali people may under the influence of Pt Nehru vote for Congress candidates by Pt Nehru’s speech’. Syama Prasad Mookerjee Papers, ‘Inst. II – IV, Subject File no. 173’, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), New Delhi.

Congress Success in The Assembly elections (1952).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of votes cast for winning candidate</th>
<th>Number of constituencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15–19.9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–24.9</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>25–29.9</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>30–34.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>35–39.9</td>
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<td>40–44.9</td>
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<td>45–49.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>50–54.9</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>55–59.9</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>60–64.9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 and above</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 149


The Jana Sangh had contested for 85 seats, won nine seats with 5.58 per cent of the votes polled. The Congress won 150 seats out of 236 seats, pulling 38.82 per cent of the votes in their favour. The independent parties won 19 seats out of 614 seats, pulling 22.21 per cent of the votes. See, ‘Statistical Report on General Election, 1951 to the Legislative Assembly of West Bengal’, Election Commission of India.


Lok Sabha Results, 1951–2, Election Commission of India (Official Website of the EC).


See N. Bhattacharjee, Muslim Politics and the Partition of Assam, The Daily Star, Dhaka, March 2013; M. Kar, Muslims in Assam Politics (New Delhi, 1990); Syama Prasad Mookerjee Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), New Delhi.

Malini Bhattacharjee, Tracing the Emergence and Consolidation of Hindutva in Assam, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 51, no. 16 (16 April 2016).


The correspondences between I.P. Barua and the Calcutta Jana Sangh were regular in nature. Being the author of a few party booklets, I.P. Barua informed the editor of Jana Sangh Weekly in Calcutta on 14 April 1952 ‘I am sending herewith, a complimentary copy of the booklet – “Why Bharatiya Culture” for favour of review and giving publicity in your esteemed journal . . . all profits shall inure to the Reserve Fund of The Assam Bharatiya Jana Sangh being dedicated to “God and Country.”’ In reply, Dr. Mookerjee mentioned on 22 April 1952, ‘Thank you for your letter and a copy of your booklet which I have glanced through with great interest. We are having a Bharatiya Jana Sangh conference at Garbeta, Midnapur I shall be glad if it is possible for you
and a few of your friends to attend the conference. We will then discuss about our future programme of India and Provincial’. Quoted from Syama Prasad Mookerjee Papers, ‘Inst. II – IV, Subject File no. 174’, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), New Delhi.

51 In absence of any clarity on the Jana Sangh situation in Tripura, Khagendra Chandra Roychoudhury, a follower of Mookerjee from Tripura, wrote to Dr. Mookerjee, ‘Is there any electoral candidate here in Tripura recommended by you? Please let me know as early as possible’. The letter is dated 28 December 1951. See, Syama Prasad Mookerjee Papers, ‘Inst. II – IV, Subject File no. 169’, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), New Delhi.

52 Brajmohan Bhattacharya, the representative of the United Press of India from Siliguri informed Dr. Mookerjee on 28 December 1951, ‘I had explained in detail the present election position of Sri S. N. Chakrabarty, The Jana Sangh candidate from Siliguri and Kurseong constituency. S.N. Chakrabarty is sure to lose the game in spite of prevalence of Jana Sangh feeling, mentality among the local electors. The forces at present acting against Sri Chakrabarty are his late appearance in the election arena and want of adequate funds at his disposal to carry on effective election propaganda works even within the municipal areas. The present position is bound to change in four of Sri Chakrabarty if you can over here for a few hours only. Jana Sangh could sweep both the Siliguri-cum-Kurseong general seat and the North Bengal parliamentary general seat if Jana Sangh had adopted Sri Nagen Mahalanabis, a pleader from Jalpaiguri as its candidate for the North Bengal parliamentary seat. In that case, we could form an effective election alliance with Sri Mahalanabis to our mutual advantage. We could conveniently set up a Jana Sangh candidate for the scheduled caste parliamentary seat which is now being contested by only two candidates, viz Sri Upendranath Barman (Congress) and Sri Upendranath Das (Subhasite Forward Bloc). Want of proper Jana Sangh organization in North Bengal on the eve of election is wholly responsible for this tragedy. See, Syama Prasad Mookerjee Papers, ‘Inst. II – IV, Subject File no. 169’, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), New Delhi.


54 The landholders in Gujarat were keen to have property rights. The land reform measures of the Bombay Government, especially the Bombay Tenancy Act of 1948, irritated the landholders to a great extent and numbers of groups were organized against the land policy of the Congress government. However, these forces did not show any actual influence on the election results, but their emergence as spontaneous regional forces added new dimensions to politics. For details, see K.D. Desai, The Swatantra Party in Gujarat Politics, in Iqbal Narain (ed.), State Politics of India (Meerut: Menakshi Prakashan, 1967), p. 433.

55 D.N. Pathak et al., The Three General Elections in Gujarat (Ahmedabad: Gujarat University, 1966).

56 The son of Bhai Parmanand, the leader of the Arya Hindu Sabha, was a member of the first branch of RSS in Punjab.

57 Hindu leader Lala Balraj Bhatta was selected as the first president of the Jana Sangh in Punjab and Balraj Madhok, the leading RSS activist, became the general secretary. Organizer, 25 June 1951.


60 The party-wise distribution of seats in the first Lok Sabha was as follows:

- Congress – 364
- Communist and allies – 26
- Socialist Party – 12
Krisak Mazdoor Praja Party – 12
Jana Sangh – 3
Hindu Mahasabha – 4
Scheduled Caste Federation – 2
Ram Rajya Parishad – 3
Krishikar Lok Prakash and Khedut Sangh Lok Prakash – 1
Independents – 36
Peasants and Workers Party – 2
Revolutionary Socialist Party – 2
Jharkhand Party – 3
Ganatantra Parishad – 3
Akali Dal – 4
Forward Bloc (Marxist) – 1
Lok Sewak Sangh – 2
Tamil Nadu Toilers Party – 4
Commonwealth Party – 3
Madras Muslim League – 1
Travancore Tamil And Congress – 1


63 The status of the independents was conspicuous. He can be just a local man of influence and status. In the first election, as many as 851 candidates contacted as independents but only 41 won. Out of them, 5 joined political parties.

64 Syama Prasad Mookerjee Papers, ‘Inst. II – IV, Subject File no. 259’, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), New Delhi.

65 National Democratic Party:

Syama Prasad Mookerjee – Bharatiya Jana Sangh (West Bengal)
Bezwada Ramchandra Reddy – Ind (Madras)
R.N. Singh Deo – GP (Orissa)
V.G. Despande – HMS (Madhya Bharat)
V. Mannu Swami – TNTP (Madras)
Bahdur Singh – Akali (Punjab)
U.M. Trivedi – Jana Sangh (Rajasthan)
N.C. Chatterjee – HMS (West Bengal)
Hukum Singh – Akali (Punjab)
A.K. Mudadior – Cwl (Madras)
N. R. M. Swamy – Cwl (Madras)
D.P. Ramachandra – Cwl (Madras)
A. Jaya Raman – TNTP (Madras)
V. Veeraswamy – Ind (Madras)
V.B. Padayachi – TNTP (Madras)
N.D. Govindaswamy – TNTP (Madras)
S.K. Kandaswamy – DK (Madras)
N. Sathinathan – Ind (Madras)
E.P. Mathuram – Ind (Madras)
N. Ramasheshiah – Ind (Madras)
B. Rajagopalal Rao – Ind (Madras)
S.M. Swami – LSS (Hyderabad)
LalSingh – Akali (Punjab)
Nathbar Pandey – GP (Orissa)
D.C. Banerjee – Jana Sangh (West Bengal)
Shakuntala Nayar – GP (Orissa)
P. Subba Rao – GP (Orissa)
A.S. Sarhadi – Akali (PEPSU)
Lakshmidhar Jana – GP (Orissa)
Giridhar Bhai – GP (Orissa)
C.S. Rao – HMS (Madhya Bharat)
P.C. Bhanj Deo – GP (Orissa)
Surendra Mohanty – GP (Orissa)
Guraj Singh Dhillon – Akali (PEPSU)
Devaprasad Ghosh – Jana Sangh (West Bengal)
T.V. Kamalaswamy – TNTP (Madras)


67 Letter from S. Thever, the President of the Hindu Mahasabha in Tamil Nadu to Syama Prasad Mookerjee on 8 July 1952. Syama Prasad Mookerjee Papers, ‘Inst. II – IV, Subject File no. 174’, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), New Delhi.
68 Ibid.
69 This political party was formed by the former rulers of the princely states and wealthy landlords. This party had a strong hold in the tribal areas of the former princely states where the feudal appeal of the rajas remained strong. It became widely popular and forceful not only in the ex-state areas, but also in some of the old districts of British Orissa. A meeting of some important political elites from all parts of Orissa was convened at Sambalpur on October 1948, whereas the regional party, such as Koshalotkala Praja Parishad, was formed and R.N. Singh Deo was requested to be its principal advisor. This party was renamed as the Ganatantra Parishad in 1950, and Rajendra Narayan Singh Deo became its president. In 1962, this political party was merged with the Orissa unit of the Swatantra Party. The roots of this party can be traced to the Koshal Utkal Praja Parishad, founded in October 1948, with its headquarters at Sambalpur. The first meeting of the Praja Parishad was held on 8, 9 and 10 October 1948 at Balibandha in Sambalpur. In the annual meeting of the Praja Parishad at Bolangir in October 1950, it was transformed into a political party, the Ganatantra Parishad. See, Sadhna Sharma, State Politics in India (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1995), pp. 276–277; Statistical Report on General Election, 1951 to the Legislative Assembly of Orissa, Election Commission of India Website, p. 8.
70 In 1952, there were four assembly constituencies – three double and one single constituency in which the Congress won single constituencies in the Lok Sabha election of 1957, 1962, 1967 and 1971; Ganatantra Parishad performed very well under the strong leadership of the Maharaja of Kala handi; however, it merged with the Swatantra Party in 1962. In the general election of 1952, the Ganatantra Parishad, in the Orissa Legislative Assembly, won 31 seats of the Orissa Legislative Assembly and emerged as principal opposition when the Congress government was formed. See for details,

71 For details, see, Pralay Kanungo, *Hindutva’s Entry into a “Hindu Province”: Early Years of RSS in Orissa*, *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 38, no. 31 (2–8 August 2003), pp. 3293–3303.

72 *The Statesman*, Delhi, 5 June 1952.


74 Ibid.

75 *Organizer*, 6, no. 20, 5 January 1953.


77 *Hindustan Times*, 27 August 1953.

78 *Organizer* 9, no. 20, 5 January 1956.


81 Ibid., pp. 55–56.

82 Ibid., pp. 54–55.

83 Ibid.


86 Balraj Madhok was assigned the responsibilities of the northern zone having Delhi, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir. Nana Deshmukh was entrusted with the eastern zone having Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, Assam, Manipur and Tripura. Jagannathrao Joshi was placed in the southern zone having Maharashtra region of Bombay state, Mysore, Kerala, Madras, Andhra Pradesh and the former French territories, while Sundar Singh Bhandari was placed in charge of the western zone having Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and the Gujarat region of the Bombay state. All these territorial arrangements were made according to the recommendations of the 1956 boundary commission. See Baxter, *The Jana Sangh*, pp. 182–186.


Thirty-one per cent of these refugees were involved in trade and commerce, 16 per cent in manufacturing, processing, servicing and repairs, 11 per cent in transport, storage and communication. *Census of India*, Office of the Registrar General & *Census Commissioner*, *India*, New Delhi, 1971, p. 96.


See Bharatiya Jana Sangh Party documents, principles and policies, Bharatiya Jana Sangh, New Delhi, 1973, p. 29.

In order to understand the profiles of the Jana Sangh candidates, Uttar Pradesh might have been taken as a case study because of its multi-caste fabric. Out of its total MLAs in 1962 state legislature in Uttar Pradesh, Brahmans were of 16.6 per cent, Thakur 21.7 per cent, Banias 12.5 per cent, Kayasth 4.2 per cent, Bhumihar 2.1 per cent with backward castes like Kurmi 4.2 per cent, Yadav 6.2 per cent, and Lodhi 4.2 per cent representation. V.B. Singh, *Jana Sangh in Uttar Pradesh: Fluctuating Fortunes and Uncertain Future*, *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 6, no. 3/5, Annual Number, January 1971, pp. 307–316.


In 1954, the governments of Madhya Pradesh and Madhya Bharat appointed official committees to investigate the activities of the Christian missionaries. The reports were published in 1956, called ‘The Christian Missionaries Activities Inquiry Committee’. It was headed by M. Bhawani Shankar Niyogi, a retired Chief Justice of the High Court of Judicature, Nagpur. For details see, Sita Ram Goel, *Vindicated by time the Niyogi Committee Report on Christian Missionary Activities*, *Voice of India*, New Delhi, 1998.

1 *Organizer*, X, 28, 18 March 1897.
2 Presidential Address of Principal Deva Prasad Ghosh, Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Seventh Annual Session, 26–28 December 1958, Bangalore.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Manifesto of All India Bharatiya Jana Sangh, New Delhi, 1951, p. 11.
6 Article 354 of the Constitution stipulated that Hindi in the Devanagri script would remain the official language of the Union, but it also emphasized that English should continue to be used for all official purposes of the Union for a period of 15 years, i.e. up to 26 January 1965.
8 *Organizer*, 26 April 1965, p. 15.
9 On 2nd June 1965, the Congress proposed the three-language formula; three languages, the mother tongue or the regional language, English or a modern European language and Hindi for non-Hindi areas, or another modern Indian language for non-Hindi areas. Additionally, English was to continue as the official language for the Union for the time being; the position of Indian languages other than Hindi was to be strengthened, and Hindi’s status as a future link language was to be retained. *The Statesman*, New Delhi, 2 June 1965.
10 *Kesari* (Weekly), Calicut, 7 April 1957.

12 NSS here stands for Nair Service Society. NSS is an organization created for the social advancement and welfare of The Nair community that is found primarily in the state of Kerala in South India. It was established under the leadership of Mannathu Padmanabha Pillai. The SNDP (Sree Dharma Paripalana Yogam is a charitable society working for the spiritual and educational advancement of the Ezhava community in Kerala. Jeffrey, Robin (1974). 'The social origins of a caste association, 1875–1905: The founding of The S.N.D.P. Yogam’, in South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies. 1. 4 (1): 39–59.


14 Kesari, 3 January 1954.


18 *Growth of the Jana Sangh in Kerala Assembly Elections* (Collected from Kerala Election Reportages, Department of Public Relations, Government of Kerala), See, Jayaprasad, *RSS and Hindu Nationalism*, op.cit. p. 268.


21 As early as in 1950, the *Times of India* expressed, ‘Congressmen belonging to this school of thought want to see the end of the policy of appeasement of Pakistan by Congress, which, they say, has continued even partition of the country . . . they feel that it is not a question of supporting communalism or opposing secularism as the Prime Minister would like to interpret it, but one of showing grit and strength towards Pakistan who, they say, is determined to be anti-Hindu in her policies and aggressive towards India as a whole’. *Times of India*, 17 August 1950, p. 6.


26 See, the *Election Manifesto of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh*, 1962.


30 Deva Prasad Ghosh, op.cit. p. 20.


34 *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 24 March 1958.


38 In January 1959 at Nagpur the Congress declared that, ‘the future agrarian pattern should be that of cooperative joint farming in which the land shall be pooled for joint cultivation, the farmers continuing to retain their property rights and getting a share from the common produce in proportion to their land. Whether they own the land or not, [they] will get a share in proportion to the work put by them on [the] joint farm’.


39 Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Party Documents, Manifesto, 1958, p. 112.


46 ‘The word Hindu’, Madhok described ‘has no religious connotation. Every Indian whatever his religion may be is Hindu. I will refer you to the book ‘Seven Pillars of Wisdom’ by Lawrence of Arabia. There while describing the population of Mecca, he says [the] population of Mecca is made up of Turks, Arabs and Hindus. . . Indian Muslims are called Hindus. Throughout the world every Indian was known as Hindu whatever his region may be. Therefore the word Hindu really means India. So in that broad sense we are a Hindu body. But if you take it in the narrow sense, then we are not a Hindu body. We like being called Hindu in the broader sense, not in the narrower sense.’ Madhok, Ibid., pp. 42–43.


50 By the ‘leftist’ periodical *Link*, 20 March 1960.


52 *Swarajya* (“unofficial” Swatantra organ), 18 April 1959, p. 1.


55 *Hindustan Times*, 5 February 1964.


59 Ibid.


61 In Rajasthan the Swatantra Party performed well because of the support it received from the traditional elites. A good number of Rajputs entered the party under the leadership of Maharawal Laxran Singh of Dungarpur, a prominent leader of the Kshatriya Mahasabha. The rise of Maharani Gayatri Devi as a Swatantra candidate in the election also added glamour and prestige to the party. See, K.L. Kamal, *Party Politics in an Indian State – A Case Study of Main Political Parties in Rajasthan* (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1971), p. 46; C.P. Bhandari, Rightist and Traditional Society in Rajasthan: A View Point, in *The Political Science Review* (Raipur: Department of Political Science, University of Rajasthan, 1963), p. 34.


65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.


71 Ibid.


74 *The Sampradayika Virodhi Committee* report also provided the same justification for the Jana Sangh’s presence in the Jama Masjid area. “Mr Anwar Dehlvi, Mr Atiqur Rehman Kidwai and Mr Ajaml, Mr Peshwari told us that none of them had any following among The Muslims. Mr Dehlvi who succeeded in capturing a seat of the Metropolitan Council on Jana Sangh ticket was really put up from a Punjabi dominated area. The number of Muslim voters was almost negligible. So to assume that the success of Mr Dehlvi indicated a positive change in Muslim voters in favour of the Jana Sangh is sheer naiveté. The fact is that the Muslims still take Jana Sangh as anathema, a sacrilege. Otherwise Mr Ajmal and Master Nuruddin who contested the last elections to the Metropolitan Council and the Municipal Corporation on Sangh ticket from Muslim would not have lost their deposits. About Mr Tatar, Mr Peshwari said that he has been a turncoat since the beginning of his political career. Before independence and even some years after that he was a Congress worker. Then he joined the Socialist Party of Dr. Lohia. But all through that period he was found struggling hard to reach the pinnacle of glory. In the Congress his position was that of an ordinary worker whereas in the Socialist Party he achieved some position only through his marked ability in creating pandemonium. Then all of a sudden in 1967 he defeated to the Jana Sangh and in no time got his thirst quenched. He was offered the joint secretary ship of the UP unit. The Jana Sangh was for a long time in search of a Muslim figure, simply to bamboozled its detractors that it was not at all anti Muslim. Thus their mutual understanding benefitted each other”. See, Nafis Ahmed, *The Jana Sangh and the Muslims*, op.cit.


The conservative economic policies of the Jana Sangh attracted mainly the ex-
zamindars and talukdars. Out of the 49 members elected to the assembly in 1962 from Uttar Pradesh, 49% were former zamindars and talukdars. The Raja of Jaunpur renamed as the leader of the Jana Sangh in the Assembly and was elected as the President of the UP Jana Sangh in 1963. Organizer, vol. XVI, no. 26, 4 February 1963, p. 14.

82 Election Manifesto, Bharatiya Jana Sangh, p. 25.
83 Ibid., pp. 2, 5.
84 The Statesman, New Delhi, 30 July 1967.
85 Organizer, XVI, 1962.
87 Resolutions of The Bharatiya Kriya Samity of the Jana Sangh passed at Patna, 4–6 December 1964.
88 The document was mainly the reflection of Jana Sangh’s policies, to which was pre-
fixed a philosophical understanding of democracy related to Hindu traditions. The ideal of Dharmaraja once again evolved as a rule of law pertaining to the features of ‘lokadhikar’ and promoting ‘lokkartavya’. See Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Principles and Policy (New Delhi, 1965).
89 In Search of an Ideology, editorial, The Hindustan Times, 1 February 1965.
92 Organizer, 22 March 1965, p. 2.
93 The RSS-Jana Sangh proximity was proved again in the case of the Banaras Hindu University agitation in 1965. When the university authority decided to drop the word ‘Hindu’ from its name by the BHU Amendment Bill of 1965, both the rises and the Jana Sangh took it as an interference with Hindu religion and culture. The RSS declared this move as a sacrilege while the Jana Sangh announced that ‘the word Hindu did not denote communalism but nationalism. Secularism was a gift of Hinduism and Hinduism was the very basis of Indian nationalism. So we would never toler-
ate an insult to Hinduism in India’. Organizer, 2 January 1966, p. 11.
96 The Statesman, 17 August 1965.
101 It is very difficult to count the percentage of RSS and non-RSS members in the Jana Sangh because the party did not want to make its RSS connection official and public.
102 Madhok wrote Bhandari, ‘You non-cooperated with me for the two years I was Presi-
dent of The party and continued to behave as my personal enemy since Then’. Letter from Madhok to Bhandari, 22 November 1972 in Manga Ram Varshney, Jana Sangh, RSS and Balraj Madhok, Aligarh, pp. 102–111.
103 Balraj Madhok, What Jana Sangh Stands For, (Full Text including questions and answers of the speech), Ahmadabad, August 7, 1966 as part of the project ‘Towards Better Political Understanding’.

104 Ibid.

105 Ibid.


107 Organizer, 17 February 1964.

1 The Statesman, 11 January 1965.


3 The Statesman, 3 January 1965.

4 Organizer, 30 April 1967.


7 Organizer, 30 April 1967, p. 4.


9 Organizer, 23 April 1967, p. 8.

10 The Hindustan Times, 25 December 1965; Deendayal Upadhyay, Political Diary, Organizer, vol. 18, no. 21 (4 January 1965).

11 The Statesman, New Delhi, 15 February 1968.

12 Ibid., 2 February 1968.

13 Ibid., 15 February 1968.


16 Sunday Standard, New Delhi, 12 March 1967.


18 Indian Nation, 24 April 1967.


20 Organizer, 30 April 1967, p. 4; Times of India, New Delhi, 23 April 1967, pp. 1, 9.

21 Indian Nation, 4 March 1967.

22 Paul R. Brass, Uttar Pradesh, op.cit. p. 1180.

23 Link, 9 April 1967, p. 13, vol. 9, no. 3.

24 M.S. Verma, Coalition Government: U.P.’s First Experiment (Lucknow: Department of Public Administration, Lucknow University, 1971), p. 44.


28 RSS, Harijans and Jana Sangh, pamphlet published by Subhadra Joshi on behalf of the Sampradayikata Virodhi Committee, 1968, New Delhi.

29 Ibid., pp. 4–5.


31 For details see, Joseph R. Gutsfield, Political Community and Group Interests in Modern India, Pacific Affairs, vol. 38 (Summer 1965), pp. 136–139.

32 Organizer, 31 December 1951, p. 5.

33 Quoted in Swarajya, 6 April 1968.
36 *The Tribune*, 17 February 1967.
37 *Organizer*, 30 April 1967.
42 *Congress Defeat Is Nearly Certain in MP, Times of India*, 26 December 1966 (Tenth of the series, ‘1967 General Election’).
44 A columnist in the *Statesman* argued that ‘a great many of the man catapulted into legislative office of the Jana Sangh ticket are fair weather friends without any deep commitment to the party. One estimate suggests that a good 50% were men in search of tickets whom the party conveniently adopted – rather than chose on its own’. *The Statesman*, 30 December 1967, p. 2.
45 In 1969, there was a sharp split in the Congress. The Congress ® was represented by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the Congress (O) was represented by the old guards.
49 Ibid., pp. 139–140.
50 Ibid.
51 *The Statesman*, New Delhi, 3 September 1969.
53 In defying the situation in UP, Atal Bihari Vajpayee referred that, ‘even though the Jana Sangh was the largest single group in the opposition in UP, it had suggested Sheri Chara. Singh that he might form his Government without the Jana Sangh. The Jana Sangh had assured him full support from outside. Sheri Char ann. Singh point-blank refused to accept the suggestion and said that he could not contemplate a non-Congress Government in UP without the Jana Sangh. Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s statement in *The Times of India*, 23 April 1967; *Hindustan Times*, 23 April 1967.
54 Balraj Madhok analyzed the effects of coalition in clear-cut terms. ‘It is wrong to think that the inevitable result of the withdrawal or expulsion of Communist and their fellow travelers from the coalition governments. Would be the return of the Congress to power. The Congress itself is a composite grouping of as diverse elements as the composite ministers of the opposition parties. Ideologically and emotionally some of them are nearer to the Communists and S.S.P., while many other should find themselves
more at home with the Jana Sangh. In fact many of them have no ideology at all. They have remained perched on the Congress bandwagon because that alone could take them to seats of power. But the situating has radically changed since the fourth general elections. With the opening of other roads to power, some of them have been changing parties without any qualms of conscience or ideological inhibitions. That explains the politics of defections which has become a glaring feature of the post election politics in India’. Balraj Madhok, Future of Democracy in India and Jana Sangh, *Jana Deep Souvenir*, Calicut, December 1967, p. 17.


56 *The Hindustan Times*, 14 February 1968.


58 *The Hindustan Times*, Editorial, 15 February 1968.


60 *The Hindustan Times*, 29 February 1968.

61 Madhok remained critical of the Communists all through his arguments. ‘The way the Communist elements in the strategic states of West Bengal and Jammu Kashmir have been found hobnobbing with Communist China and Pakistan has indicated the limit to which they can go. Open and virulent attacks on their coalition partners and the politics of crisis, The latest example of which was provided by the Communist-S.S.P. manship on the question of abolition of land revenue in U.P. has made it clear that coalitions with Communists will not last long’. Balraj Madhok, *Future of Democracy in India and Jana Sangh*, op. cit.


63 Ibid., p. 3.

64 In the 1967 municipal election in Delhi the Jana Sangh got a massive victory and captured 52 seats out of 100 seats. For the first time it attracted a good number of scheduled caste voters. A section of the scheduled castes identified themselves with the Jana Sangh for achieving higher social status because the party was considered to be an organization of the high caste Hindus. The party captured three scheduled caste-dominated seats Other than this; the Jana Sangh also attracted many Muslims in the 1967 municipal election. However, the Muslim candidates lost the election. For details, Geeta Puri, *Delhi Pradesh Jana Sangh: A Study of Ideology and Organization*, unpublished Ph.D thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru university, 1976, New Delhi, pp. 261–267.


68 Ibid., p. 34.


72 Madhok dreaded those Muslims as dangerous that have not owned this land and its culture. He said the ‘only way to check those tendencies is to educate the Bharatiya Muslims and to disabuse their minds of the Islamic exclusiveness which was exploited by the British and the Muslim League for their selfish ends . . . that is the only way that can make Muslims a part and parcel of the Bharatiya nation’. *Organizer*, 10 December 1951.

73 Secular principles of the Congress were characterised as communalism by the Jana Sangh and the Congress was accused of keeping the Muslims always in the forefront.

74 Pralay Kanungo, RSS's Tryst with Politics (New Delhi, 2002), pp. 119–120.
79 Bruce Graham, Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics: The Origin and Development of Bharatiya Jana Sangh (New Delhi, 1990), p. 157.
81 Reported in the Indian Express, Delhi, 14 March 1973.
84 The Statesman, New Delhi, 4 May 1968.
85 According to Madhok, ‘Congress is a communal organization. It lives on communalism. Actually if you go into the results of the last three elections, you will find that it is the communal votes, Muslim votes or Christian votes, which have been the mainstay of the Congress’. See, Jana Sangh’s Role in Ranchi, Kashmir Riots Assailed, The Statesman, New Delhi, 27 September 1967.
86 The Statesman, New Delhi, 29–30 April 1968.
87 Premnath Dogra, Presidential Address at the 3rd Annual Session of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Jodhpur, 30 December 1954.
1 The Statesman, New Delhi, 6 December 1966.
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