In the past 20 years, a wave of right-wing populist movements has swept over Europe, changing the face of European politics. The Netherlands has been one of the more iconic countries to partake in this shift. Known internationally as an emblem of progressivism and tolerance, the country soon became a frontrunner in the revival of nationalist and anti-immigrant sentiment. This is the first study to offer an extensive engagement with the ideas behind the Dutch swing to the right.

The emergence of Dutch populism, this book shows, formed an integral part of a broader conservative tendency, identified as the Dutch New Right. In the US and the UK, the term New Right has been used to describe conservative backlash movements that arose in opposition to the progressive movements of the 1960s. The Dutch swing to the right, this book argues, formed a belated iteration of the New Right backlash that occurred overseas.

This text will be essential reading for students and scholars in the fields of European Studies and Political Science, and Dutch politics and society more specifically.

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The Rise of the Dutch New Right
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In the 1950 essay *The Dutch Author and the World Crisis*, the writer W.F. Hermans noted that the world didn’t really care what the Dutch had to say, since the Dutch never dealt with crises that ‘exceeded a fire in an ashtray’. Hermans admonished Dutch authors to stop trying to copy foreign examples and to become fully provincial. Writing this book often felt like following Hermans along that path, since this study departs from an insistence on the particularity of the Dutch political tradition, even if it does so through international comparisons. At conferences abroad, I sometimes felt I had become fully provincial, and somehow blamed Hermans for it. I have dug myself deep into the Dutch context, in the hope that I can escape the dilemma, and that the Dutch case is indeed more compelling than a fire in an ashtray.

At the same time, this thesis has been the work of a relative outsider. Someone with no obvious belonging to a single academic discipline in the Netherlands. A relative outsider, too, when it comes to the Dutch political culture of consensus and moderation. Prominent inspirations such as Stuart Hall and Edward Said have written on the scholarly merits of being a relative outsider. Arguably, it allows one to develop a critical vision of the things that insiders generally take for granted. Stuart Hall’s saying that ‘fish have no concept of water’, is something that stuck with me with respect to Dutch consensus culture. You need to be located outside of that political culture, banging your head against it so to say, to be able to trace its contours.

Let me thank those who have helped me along on my path to completing this manuscript. First my PhD supervisors, Odile Heynders and Piia Varis, who have pushed me to make the most of it, at a moment when I was ready to submit ‘the damned thing’ in suboptimal condition. Paul Mepschen and Sinan Cankaya have been an important source of feedback and moral support. Bram Mellink has been a great co-conspirator on the neoliberalism project that I’m currently working on. Bram has read almost everything there is to read and he serves as an endless source of the finest quality academic gossip. Ido de Haan and Ewald Engelen have been a much-needed source of encouragement and emotional blackmail to get me to finish this book. Thanks also to Naomi Woltring and again Bram, for all the bizarre jokes on our pilgrimage to Mont Pèlerin and the many more that are to come. Finally, my parents, Cilia and Dick, have been a
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Abbreviations

CDA Christen-Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democratic Appeal)
LPF Lijst Pim Fortuyn (List Pim Fortuyn)
PvdA Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party)
PVV Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom)
VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy)

Newspapers and magazines mentioned

*De Volkskrant* Former Catholic newspaper, centrist orientation with social democrat affinity
*NRC Handelsblad* Former liberal newspaper, centrist orientation with progressive-liberal affinity
*Trouw* Former Protestant newspaper, centrist orientation with Christian affinity
*Elsevier Weekblad* Secular right-wing weekly
A wave of right-wing anti-establishment movements has swept over Europe in the past 20 years, changing the face of European politics. The Netherlands has been one of the more iconic countries to partake in this right-wing upsurge. Known internationally as an emblem of progressivism and tolerance, the country soon became a frontrunner in the European revival of nationalist and anti-immigrant sentiment.

The turning point occurred around the turn of the century, with the meteoric rise and dramatic assassination of the right-wing populist Pim Fortuyn in May 2002. In the elections that followed, his party List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) went on to score a stunning victory. With 17 per cent of the vote, it became the second largest party out of the blue, in what is commonly called ‘the Fortuyn revolt’. It set the stage for a Dutch culture war that made national identity, immigration and law and order into the dominant themes of Dutch public debate. In the ensuing decade, the entire political landscape shifted to the right, while the Party for Freedom, led by Geert Wilders continued Fortuyn’s legacy.

The central question of this book is how to make sense of this shift in ideological terms. So far, the European right-wing surge of the past decades has generally been analysed through the lens of (radical right-wing) populism. It is a focus that foregrounds style and rhetoric, but undervalues ideas. Populist leaders have been portrayed above all, as savvy political entrepreneurs expressing the repressed sentiments of a marginalized electorate, but have less frequently been analysed in terms of their political ideas, as part of a larger ideological constellation. Not the head but the underbelly, not ideas but the attitudes of ‘the man on the street’ were presumed to be the decisive factors, reinforced by the newfound power of the media and the personal charisma of the populist leader.

The prevailing focus on populism has produced a large and rich literature. But to analyse the profound political changes in the Netherlands, populism can only be part of the story. How to explain that a political current that never managed to capture more than a fraction of the vote, has been able to exercise such an outsized influence on the Dutch political climate? After the rapid demise of Fortuyn’s LPF party in 2003, Dutch populism remained an electorally marginal phenomenon for the rest of the decade. The right-wing populist Geert Wilders, who successfully positioned his Party for Freedom (PVV) as the heir of
Fortuyn’s legacy, could count on only nine out of 150 seats until 2010. Yet there was no let-up in the Dutch culture war on national identity, immigration and integration.

As this book will show, the rise of radical right-wing populism in the Netherlands formed part of a broader conservative backlash against the ‘permissiveness’ of the 1960s and the ‘relativism’ of progressive baby boomers. A new conservative sentiment emerged in the 1990s, voiced by a loose and eclectic coalition of journalists, politicians and intellectuals. It blamed the anti-authoritarian ethos of the 1960s for the rising crime rates, the stalling integration of immigrants, the erosion of national identity and wide-ranging moral decline. This new cultural controversy cut straight across party lines, and resonated in the conservative wings of the three major Dutch political parties (the right-wing liberal VVD, the Christian democratic CDA, and the social democratic PvdA). After failing to win over the mainstream parties, Dutch conservatives established an influential conservative think tank in December 2000, the Edmund Burke Foundation. It formed part of a long-lasting intellectual offensive. Through a series of polemical interventions, conservatives helped prepare the ideological ground for the Fortuyn revolt. In the years after 9/11, they remained at the centre of Dutch public debate, pleading for the defence of Dutch culture against the threat of radical Islam.4 This eclectic conservative current was highly influential in shaping the Dutch debate and formed a crucial inspiration for the right-wing populist leaders Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders.

Vice versa, the breakthrough of right-wing populism was seen as a windfall for Dutch conservatism. For the motley alliance that made up the conservative current, ‘the Fortuyn revolt’ was first and foremost a conservative uprising. The conservatives grouped around the Edmund Burke Foundation described Pim Fortuyn as the ‘originator of the conservative moment’ and awarded him the prize ‘conservative of the year’ in 2002.5 H.J. Schoo, the conservative editor of the largest Dutch weekly Elsevier, approvingly observed that the Fortuyn revolt ‘could be compared with American neoconservatism’.6 Both in the United States and in the Netherlands, Schoo observed a modernized conservatism that promoted a moral restoration, opposed the ideals of the 1960s and stressed the capacity of ordinary citizens to shape their own destiny without the welfare state. Jos de Beus, a leading professor of political theory and a conservative social democrat, proclaimed an ‘implosion of the progressive consensus from the 1960s’ after the breakthrough of Fortuyn and prophesized a conservative ‘paradigm-shift’, a change towards a ‘neoconservative consensus’.7

As a result of the dominant focus on populism, this broader conservative current has generally been ignored. The ideology behind the Dutch revolt has never been taken very seriously. Prominent politicians and opinion makers qualified the ideas of Fortuyn as ‘twaddle written out’, ‘political postmodernism’, or ‘political kitsch, a potpourri of blather and folk wisdoms’.8 In the process of writing this book, I received similar responses. When I explained my ambition to explore the political ideas behind the Fortuyn revolt at the proverbial birthday parties, the prevailing reaction was one of amused scepticism: ‘Are there any?’
As a result, in the public imagination the Dutch revolt has been reduced to the triumph of style over content. Due to this common underappreciation of the role of ideas, the change in the Dutch opinion climate has often elicited a sense of bafflement from observers. As the late law professor and social democrat senator Willem Witteveen remarked in 2005: ‘The Netherlands has become more conservative. Sometimes it seems like the entire political discourse after the murder of Fortuyn has been picked up by an invisible hand, and brusquely put down again several meters to the right’.9

A series of studies have sought to question this view by pointing to the debates on immigration and national identity that formed the long run-up to the voter rebellion.10 Yet, there is still a common conception that Fortuyn appeared like a *deus ex machina* on the stage of Dutch politics, boldly picking up political discourse and bluntly hurling it to the right. This book aims to further dispel that *idée recue*, by exploring the ideological origins of the Dutch revolt, drawing on intellectual history and ideology studies.11 Rather than looking at individual actors or parties, the aim is to trace the contours of a conservative ‘movement of ideas’ that transcends parties, by examining the writings of leading Dutch politicians, journalists and academics in the 1990s and 2000s. The focus in this book, then, is on the intellectual dimension of the political turnabout; the revolt of the mind rather than that of the underbelly.

## From New Left to New Right

An important stepping-stone in my analysis of the swing to the right is that other seismic shift in Dutch political culture, the ‘cultural revolution’ of the 1960s. The analysis developed in this book draws on the influential interpretation of that period developed by the American-Dutch historian James Kennedy and builds on his suggestion that there are important parallels between the two instances of political metamorphosis.12

In the US and the UK, the 1960s and 1970s were a period of polarization that gave rise to both the progressive movements of the New Left and their conservative counterparts, the New Right. To echo one of the book titles on this period, the baby-boomer generation was in a very real sense ‘a generation divided’.13 Especially in the US, the conservative response to the 1960s took hold at an early stage, when Nixon assumed power in 1969 and administered a devastating defeat in 1972 to McGovern, the candidate of the New Politics and the New Left. In that same year, the writer and ‘gonzo’ journalist Hunter S. Thompson famously chronicled the turning point:

San Francisco in the middle sixties was a very special time and place to be a part of. [...] There was a fantastic universal sense that whatever we were doing was right, that we were winning. And that, I think, was the handle. That sense of inevitable victory over the forces of Old and Evil. [...] We had all the momentum, we were riding the crest of a high and beautiful wave. So, now, less than five years later, you can go on a steep hill in Las Vegas and look
west. And with the right kind of eyes you can almost see the High-Water Mark. That place where the wave finally broke and rolled back.\textsuperscript{14}

In the Netherlands, the image of this historical period is strikingly different. The 1960s and 1970s had an almost singularly progressive character. The country changed in a short period of time from a conservative, conventional and overwhelmingly Christian society, to a progressive, critical and secular one. The breadth, speed and depth of this transformation were exceptional from an international point of view. In a matter of years, the country became susceptible to progressive politics; it embraced a hedonistic attitude to life and criticism of the constraints of Christian morality developed into a new, established tradition. Meanwhile, a convincing conservative countertendency failed to emerge. Not for nothing, a classic work on the period describes it as ‘the endless 1960s’, with a life span lasting till at least 1977.\textsuperscript{15} The wave met no resistance and kept on rolling until its momentum dissipated of its own accord, until its mercurial fluids were fully absorbed in the Dutch mud.

The predominant narrative of the Dutch 1960s identifies the baby-boomer generation as the primary engine of that transformation. The innovative contribution of the American-Dutch historian James Kennedy was to point to the crucial role of traditional Dutch elites. Kennedy attributed the profundity of the changes to a peculiar dialectic between the romantic radicalism of the youth and the old-fashioned views of Dutch elites. It was not the boisterous political activism of the baby-boomer generation that set the Netherlands apart. What stood out internationally were the ideas and behaviour of Dutch elites who chose to embrace the changes, rather than digging in their heels. Kennedy attributed this to Dutch elites’ ‘dread of conflict and violence – coupled with a belief that the inevitable tide of modernity was better channelled than blocked’.\textsuperscript{16}

Instead of resisting, mobilizing a Gaullist majority or Nixon’s silent minority in defence of the moral order, Dutch elites focused on restoring equilibrium by organizing a new consensus, accommodating and depoliticizing protests from below by means of a passive revolution from above. As Kennedy observed, ‘an effective “reactionary” rhetoric, that either advocated maintenance of the status quo or a return to a previous glorious age’, was absent among Dutch elites.\textsuperscript{17} The belief of Dutch elites in the inevitability of historical change and modernization led them to facilitate and stimulate behaviour that was met with elite hostility in other countries. This response to the progressive wave functioned as a double-edged sword. The traditional Dutch elites let their hair down (sometimes literally) and rapidly became more progressive.

The baby boomers, in their long march through the institutions, soon repudiated their youthful belief in social engineering and adopted the moderate, consensual and historicist views of their previous adversaries. In proper Hegelian fashion, the dialectic of the 1960s evolved into a ‘prudently progressive’ synthesis. It was a term used in 1989 by the Christian Democrat Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers to qualify the sentiments of the Dutch population: ‘Before, people wanted to be progressive, even if they were conservative. Nowadays there is a
trend to be *prudently progressive*.\(^{18}\) Intellectually, the dominant sentiment was expressed in a ‘Burkean progressivism’ articulated by baby-boomer intellectuals such as Dick Pels, Bas van Stokkom and Hans Achterhuis.\(^{19}\)

In the 1990s and 2000s, however, a New Right countertendency emerged that took aim against the legacy of the 1960s and 1970s and strove to undo the ‘prudent progressive’ consensus. In an essay from 2010 on the Fortuyn revolt, Kennedy pondered on the remarkable similarities between the transformation of the 1960s and that of the 2000s. In this latter period, Kennedy observed another sweeping change, this time in the opposite direction: a swing to the right. It reached its full momentum after the brutal political assassinations of Pim Fortuyn (by an animal rights activist) in 2002 and the filmmaker and columnist Theo van Gogh (by a Dutch-Moroccan Muslim Extremist) in 2004. Where conservatism was repudiated in the 1960s, now it was at least partially embraced: law and order, Dutch national identity, immigration and moral restoration were at the centre of the debate. In a short period of time, criticism of the 1960s and the baby-boomer generation, associated with permissiveness, moral relativism, political correctness and multiculturalism, became the omnipresent tune that all contenders on the public stage had to tailor their steps to.\(^{20}\)

When Fortuyn launched an election campaign centred on immigration and Islam in the autumn of 2001, initially the attempt was to marginalize him in the same way as the Dutch far-right had historically been contained. Leading up to the 2002 municipal elections that preceded the national elections by only two months, politicians and journalists tried to disqualify Pim Fortuyn by comparing him with far-right leaders, such as Jean-Marie Le Pen (FN), Filip de Winter (VB), Jörg Haider (FPÖ) or even Benito Mussolini. Fortuyn, whose main ideological inspirations derived from Anglo-American (neo)conservatism rather than the European far-right, managed to effectively distance himself from the far-right. The marginalization strategy backfired when Fortuyn won the local elections in March 2002, leading to a rapid shift in strategy from marginalization to accommodation, here described by Dutch political scientists in one of the most convincing analyses of the Fortuyn revolt to date:

After the electoral success of Fortuyn in the local elections of March 2002 – especially his triumph in Rotterdam, the second largest city in the Netherlands – the main parties used a different strategy in their attempt to block him: they followed his lead. The PvdA, CDA and VVD changed their draft versions of the election programmes of 2002 and copied Fortuyn’s proposals. This bandwagon behaviour of the main parties further legitimized Fortuyn’s programme. The change of strategy also implied that the established parties could no longer present their own campaign with their own items and issues. They now had to explain what their position was on the immigration question in comparison to the views of Fortuyn.\(^{21}\)

The assassination of Pim Fortuyn on 6 May 2002 proved to be the final straw for the marginalization strategy. The politicians and journalists that had associated
Fortuyn with the far-right were publicly blamed for creating the polarized climate that led to his assassination. They were accused of ‘demonization’, a watchword frequently employed by right-wing populist politicians and opinion makers in the following years to invoke the haunting memory of the death of Fortuyn. The LPF was politically accommodated and included in the new first Balkenende cabinet (2002–2003) led by the Christian Democrats, described by many as the only realistic option after the dramatic elections.\(^{22}\) The accommodating approach of Dutch elites in the 2000s came to resemble the attitude described by James Kennedy in the 1960s and 1970s.

Not the content of these two political shifts, but their consensual nature fascinated Kennedy the most. To him the remarkable aspect was that the whole of Dutch society seemed to shift in unison to the right, as it had collectively swerved to the left in the 1960s and 1970s. In both periods, he observed a ‘decisive collective break with the past, in which confident defenders of the ancien régime are difficult to find and new dogmas are proclaimed with missionary zeal’.\(^{23}\) Perhaps, Kennedy suggested, ‘sudden, radical and massive conversions and huge paradigm shifts are the more or less predictable result of a political culture in which the desire for consensus hinders the continuous debate’.\(^{24}\) In such a context, opposing visions do not clash but succeed one another in time. In contrast to the US and the UK, where the progressive New Left and the conservative New Right confronted each other head-on, in the Netherlands the two movements seemed to follow each other in time. The Netherlands experienced a New Left tendency in the 1960s and 1970s and a New Right countertendency in the 1990s and 2000s.

Kennedy attributed the collective nature of both shifts to the importance attached to consensus in the Netherlands. In ordinary times, the aversion to political disagreement and ideological conflict restricts Dutch public debate to a limited spectrum of opinion. Eventually, the dominant consensus erodes, due to societal changes and contestation. At first, the gatekeepers of the existing consensus resist outside critique. But soon, the dominant narrative collapses, and work starts on negotiating a new consensus. As the sociologist and senior public official Paul Schnabel observed in relation to the Dutch swing to the right, change in the Netherlands generally occurs in shockwaves across the entire political spectrum: ‘For long periods, there is consensus and understanding, until things don’t work any longer, and then there is a radical impulse. The undercurrent becomes the mainstream’.\(^{25}\)

### The conservative undercurrent

The conservative undercurrent, referred to by Schnabel, started to emerge in the beginning of the 1990s. In his first book published in 1990, Frits Bolkestein, who had just been appointed as leader of the centre-right liberal party (VVD), proclaimed the beginning of a sustained battle of ideas to contest the legacy of 1968 and what he described as a progressive pensée unique. Bolkestein expressed his astonishment about the ease with which the ‘hare-brained
schemes’ of the soixante huitards had found their way into Dutch government policy. He blamed Dutch elites, who ‘had surrendered without firing a shot’. In his view, the Dutch political culture of consensus and the lack of civil courage among Dutch elites to confront the protest generation had deepened the hubris of the 1960s. ‘The tidal wave of the New Left has swept the country and flowed away again’, Bolkestein wrote. ‘Here and there it has left residues: corroded cans, stained pieces of wood’. Now was the time for a conservative countercurrent to clear away the mess.\(^2^6\)

The 1990s saw a build-up of critiques of the anti-authoritarian ethos of the 1960s and the baby boomers, and a pervasive nostalgia for Dutch national identity, depicted as lost or in a state of prolonged (progressive) neglect. A series of publications gave testimony to this rising undercurrent. In an essay titled The Conservative Offensive, the journalist Marcel ten Hooven observed that ‘the unrestrained tolerance of the permissive society had awakened a conservative temperament’. He cited pleas from Christian Democrats (CDA) and right-wing Liberals (VVD) for a ‘conservative alliance’, focused on moral restoration and a concerted campaign against ‘the legacy of the 1960s’.\(^2^7\) In his book The Conservative Wave, the conservative social democrat journalist Hans Wansink announced with much fanfare the rise of a new conservatism in the Netherlands, inspired by Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, John Gray and Francis Fukuyama. ‘Conservative thinkers and politicians reveal themselves as the social critics of the 1990s’, he observed. ‘Leftist illusions are challenged; old-fashioned virtues and traditional forms of community are infused with new life’.\(^2^8\)

Pim Fortuyn joined the conservative wave in 1995, when he published The Orphaned Society. In this book, Fortuyn argued that the anti-authoritarian revolt of the 1960s had ‘orphaned’ the Dutch and deprived them of paternal and maternal authority figures. What was needed was a new moral order that would resolve the crisis of authority. The Orphaned Society received high praise in Dutch conservative circles, ‘as the most conservative Dutch book’ since ‘the beginning of the twentieth century’.\(^2^9\)

Similar observations about the shifting ideological tides were made from the other end of the political spectrum. Left-wing commentators Jos van der Lans and Antoine Verbij noted in surprise how a new conservative cultural critique emerged in the 1990s, ‘borne by what increasingly looks like a right-wing conservative consensus’: ‘The excessive tolerance, social indifference, moral decline, coarsening of society, disdain for authority and erosion of norms and values – all moral shortcomings of contemporary society are supposedly rooted in the 1970s’.\(^3^0\)

Dutch conservatives ascribed the relative late occurrence of the conservative response in the Netherlands to the penchant for consensus among Dutch elites, which became a central target of critique. The figureheads of the New Right undercurrent, in particular Frits Bolkestein and Pim Fortuyn, wrote searing condemnations of consensus politics, now depicted as the reason for elite negligence of societal problems. We live in a ‘consensus society’, Bolkestein noted in 1990, where ‘the ideal is not to cut the Gordian knot, but to strive for political
accommodation’. It frustrated the ability of politics to deal with controversial issues such as immigration and integration. In order to solve a societal problem, Bolkestein argued, ‘it has to be addressed in a frank and incisive manner, but that evokes so much irritation and opposition that it delays a possible solution’. Not much later came the opening salvo of Pim Fortuyn’s career as a right-wing opinion maker, a polemical plea to ‘remove the gloriously warm blanket of consensus from our Dutch little bed’. Similar discontent resounded in the conservative wing of the social democrat party. The most powerful intellectual attack on Dutch consensus politics was provided by the award-winning book Correct, written by the conservative social democrat journalist Herman Vuijsje. His indictment of the political correctness of the baby-boomer generation soon developed into a central reference point for the coming conservative assault on the institutions. The argument of the book echoed existing critiques of the ‘permissive society’ of the 1960s and the ‘crisis of authority’ that had been voiced in the decades before by the New Right in the US and the UK.

According to Vuijsje, the baby-boomer generation had never really challenged the prevailing culture of consensus in the Netherlands. The baby boomers claimed to be self-asserted individualists who had broken with the taboos and conformism of their parents. But the protest generation had simply erected a new series of totems and taboos on terrains such as race relations, migration, government compulsion and privacy. Because the Dutch were not allowed to talk frankly about the problems created by the anti-authoritarian and progressive ideals of the 1960s, problems had festered and struck the most vulnerable: exactly those that the baby boomers had vowed to protect. Consensual conformism had delayed a much-needed conservative correction to the 1960s from arising. Vuijsje employed an arsenal of metaphors to explain this Dutch particularity. In his introduction, he described the situation in the 1970s and 1980s in the Netherlands in terms of a surplace (tactical standstill) in a cycling race:

The moment the cyclists stand motionless on the track, balancing and closely keeping check on one another. No one dares to move first, but as soon as one departs, everyone has to sally forth. Only in the 1990s did it finally happen: a sudden and wild sprint erupted, in which the unassailable dogmas were finally breached.

Naturally, by writing this book, Vuijsje positioned himself at the head of the race, guiding the Dutch to a new, more conservative consensus. True to the transgressive ethos of the 1960s, he proclaimed this new consensus to be free from conformism and taboos. The Dutch were finally liberated. In paradoxical fashion, the transgressive, taboo-breaking imaginary of the 1960s was now mobilized against the baby boomers themselves. Vuijsje presented the first copy of his book to Frits Bolkestein, for having done the most to negate progressive totems and taboos.

At the turn of the century, the conservative undercurrent came to the surface. In December 2000, the aforementioned Edmund Burke Foundation (EBF) was
established, an influential conservative think tank with close links to the centre-right parties. The members of the foundation came out of the closet as conservatives and forcefully presented themselves on the public stage. In a series of controversial opinion pieces, they declared that ‘the conservative moment’ had come, and proclaimed a ‘conservative revolution’ against the baby boomers and the spirit of 1968.\footnote{35} The foundation was modelled on the American Heritage Foundation and funded by large grants from American corporations such as Pfizer and Microsoft. Its immediate aim was to strengthen the conservative wings of the centre-right parties (VVD, CDA) and the small Christian parties (CU, SGP). In the long term, the aspiration was to restructure the Dutch landscape and assemble the fragmented conservative forces in a new fusionist party, inspired by the New Right in the US.\footnote{36}

After 9/11, the EBF became a central node in a broader intellectual network that proposed to bring a ‘neoconservative revolution’ to the Netherlands. The ideas of American neoconservatives inspired a reinvention of Dutch right-wing politics on two fronts. On the one hand, neoconservative ideas were important in articulating opposition to Islam. Especially the clash of civilizations theory, as developed by Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington, became a leitmotif of the Dutch revolt. Frits Bolkestein framed the integration of Muslim immigrants as a civilizational confrontation between the West and Islam, Pim Fortuyn branded himself ‘the Samuel Huntington of Dutch politics’ and publicly called for a cold war against Islam in the week before 9/11, while Geert Wilders’ core issue was countering Islam, which was seen as a civilizational threat.\footnote{37} Similarly, the EBF member Paul Cliteur and Islam critic Ayaan Hirsi used neoconservative inspirations to develop an early Dutch version of New Atheism, the famed international intellectual movement led by Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens and Sam Harris.\footnote{38} On the other hand, neoconservative ideas were important in framing opposition to the legacy of 1968 and progressive baby boomers. Dutch progressives were described as a ‘new class’, a concept used by US neoconservatives to refer to an entrenched progressive intellectual elite dominating the institutions that shape public opinion.\footnote{39}

As mentioned, there is a close relationship between this (neo)conservative intellectual current and the future populist leaders. During his time as a columnist for the Dutch conservative weekly \textit{Elsevier} in the mid-1990s, Pim Fortuyn came under the influence of its editor H.J. Schoo, a self-declared neoconservative, who later became part of the circle around the EBF. In these years, Fortuyn’s politics made a marked shift in conservative direction. Geert Wilders, before becoming the founder of the right-wing populist Party for Freedom in 2006, referred to the publications of the EBF as a guideline for a shift to the right in Dutch politics.\footnote{40} Wilders had contacted Bart Jan Spruyt in 2003 to discuss future cooperation. One year later, Spruyt became the ideologue and second in command of Wilders’ fledgling party. Together they made a weeklong visit to a series of American (neo)conservative think tanks in 2005, before finally falling out with each other in 2006.\footnote{41} Wilders’ ideologue and speech writer after 2006, Martin Bosma, claimed inspiration from US neoconservatism.
In a 2011 book, he described Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom as a Dutch equivalent to the US neoconservative movement, since both were comprised of people who had moved to the right in response to 1968, the New Left and multiculturalism. The rise of right-wing populism in the Netherlands was thus preceded and accompanied by a broader conservative backlash that resonated in the conservative wings of the major Dutch parties. Paraphrasing Hunter S. Thompson, Fortuyn and Wilders were riding the crest of a larger conservative wave. The political success of right-wing populism in the Netherlands cannot be understood in separation from the broader accomplishments of this loose and heterogeneous current of conservative politicians, journalists and intellectuals in gaining acceptability for a series of once marginal and now pervasive ideas.

**Between Anglo-American conservatism and European populism**

What analytical framework can we use to make sense of this broader ideological constellation? The argument in this book straddles two different lines of scholarship that have become oddly disconnected over the decades. On one side there is the literature on the Anglo-American conservative movement, also known as the New Right. In both the UK and the US, this latter term came into use to describe conservative movements that emerged in parallel with – and in response to – the rise of the New Left in the 1960s and 1970s. Most prominently, the politics of Thatcher and Reagan are associated with the term. The newness of the New Right, on the one hand, lies in the combination of a free market strand and a culturally conservative strand. The ideology of the New Right has been described as a complex and often contradictory fusion of neoliberal and (neo)conservative ideas. On the other hand, the New Right is seen as a departure from the more moderate, gradualist politics of the post-war consensus, when liberal and conservative forces participated in the construction of the welfare state. The politics of the New Right was more radical in nature; it sought to contest and replace the existing social contract. The ‘backlash politics’ of the New Right challenged existing elites and institutions, seen as tarnished by the legacy of the 1960s, with the aim of reestablishing the free market and traditional forms of moral authority. In so doing, it accorded an important role to the ‘battle of ideas’ in achieving political change, with a prominent role for conservative and free market think tanks. Not surprisingly, the study of ideas has been central to the scholarship on the New Right, represented by a series of well-known intellectual histories of (neo)conservatism and neoliberalism.

On the European continent, a similar conservative tendency expressed itself in a more diffuse and fragmented manner. On the one hand, it was taken up in a more moderate manner by the established centre-right parties, who shifted to the right in the 1980s and achieved political power in West Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium and Portugal. On the other hand, the counter-tendency manifested itself in a more radical fashion with the rise of populist
radical right and extreme right parties. It is these latter currents, especially radical right-wing populism, that have become the major focus of scholarly study. Typically, these parties are defined in terms of their nativist, populist and authoritarian positions and their radical stance on immigration and ethnic diversity. The predominant object of research is not so much ideas or ideology, but rather the development of populist parties and the empirical analysis of voting behaviour.

Originally, these two strands of scholarship overlapped. The first authoritative studies of the populist radical right in Europe portrayed these parties as a more radical embodiment of the neoliberal and (neo)conservative ideas that had been popularized by the New Right overseas. Herbert Kitschelt, in his comparative overview of the European radical right, famously identified a ‘winning formula’, which consisted of a combination of neoliberal and culturally conservative (or authoritarian) positions. He saw it as part of a larger restructuring of the political landscape, in which an opposition between left-libertarian and right-authoritarian came to increasingly prevail. Similarly, Hans-Georg Betz identified the ‘neoliberal creed’ of Thatcher and Reagan and ‘the neo-conservative turn of the 1980s’ as important reference points for the radical right. With regard to their economic policies most radical right-wing populist parties have been close to the positions advanced by Margaret Thatcher’, he observed.

In an essay entitled The Silent Counterrevolution, Piero Ignazi highlighted the role of neoconservatism in setting the scene for a backlash against the post-material agenda of the New Left. He observed that ‘the new cultural movement of neoconservatism’ had ‘legitimized a series of “right-wing” themes which were previously almost banned from political debate’. Ignazi concluded that this ‘neoconservative cultural mood’ became ‘highly influential all over Western societies in the 1980s’. It occasioned a rightward shift of the established right-wing parties, enlarging the political space, and thus allowing the populist radical right and extreme right parties to get a foot in the door. In Germany, authors such as Claus Offe, Michael Minkenberg and Jürgen Habermas described the popularity of neoconservative ideas in Europe as a countertendency to the post-material agenda of the new social movements. In an influential essay, Jürgen Habermas identified such an intellectual movement on both sides of the Atlantic, represented by the work of Samuel Huntington, Irving Kristol and Daniel Bell in the US, and that of Arnold Gehlen, Helmut Schlesky and Ernst Forsthoff in West Germany.

In short, scholars analysed the emergence of radical right-wing populism on the European continent, in conjunction with a broader ideological transformation of right-wing politics, in which the New Right synthesis of neoliberal and (neo) conservative ideas played an important role. This appreciation of the inherent ideological hybridity of populist politics also resounds in the influential definition by Cas Mudde, which identifies populism as a ‘thin ideology’ that occurs in conjunction with a ‘thick ideology’. In the Dutch press, Mudde pointed to the connection between populism and neoconservatism, suggesting that ‘the ideology and
priorities of Wilders are very similar to those of American neoconservatives’. Similar connections between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ ideology have been made in the case of Fortuyn’s party (LPF), as populism scholar Sarah de Lange argued that ‘the position of the LPF is neoliberal’. These scattered observations, however, haven’t prompted more extensive studies of neoconservatism and neoliberalism. And as the field of populism studies has consolidated itself, this appreciation of populist hybridity has receded. Scholars increasingly treat radical right-wing populism as an independent phenomenon, considered separate from the established right-wing parties and the wider ideological transformation of the right. This is curious, since the defining phenomena of our ‘populist Zeitgeist’ – Brexit and Trump – can hardly be understood in isolation from the Anglo-American conservative parties.

In fact, the disproportionate focus on populism has at times led to a wholesale depoliticization of mainstream politics. In prominent studies on the rise of radical right-wing populism in Europe, populist parties are considered to be the only ideological actors in the game, the only actors with ‘transformative aspirations’ and ‘anti-establishment attitudes’. The mainstream parties, in contrast, are depicted as non-ideological, and ‘committed to the status quo’. As we will see, this framework does not fit the Dutch case very well, where it has been the political and intellectual mainstream that pioneered a conservative anti-establishment discourse. This study seeks to correct this narrowing of scholarly vision, by charting the broader ideological constellation – or ‘thick ideology’ – that informed the Dutch revolt.

A ‘complex’ conservative backlash

This book identifies this broader constellation as the Dutch New Right. My proposition is that the New Right synthesis of free market ideas and cultural conservatism, combined with opposition to the 1960s and a critique of political moderation, provides a useful analytical framework for understanding the politics of figures such as former VVD leader Frits Bolkestein, the right-wing populist Pim Fortuyn, the early Geert Wilders ideologue Bart Jan Spruyt, the conservative New Atheist Paul Cliteur, the conservative social democrat journalist H.J. Schoo, Islam critic Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Geert Wilders himself, the leader of the Freedom Party (PVV). The central thesis of this book is that the swing to the right in the Netherlands can be understood as a belated iteration of the New Right backlash that occurred overseas.

At the same time, the Dutch New Right is not a simple copy of its Anglo-American counterparts. Due to the late birth of the Dutch New Right and the exceptional impact of the progressive wave of the 1960s and 1970s, the Dutch current had to contend with an overwhelming progressive common sense on the so-called ‘social issues’ that were the subject of the culture wars in the US: sexual morality, abortion, euthanasia, drugs. The rise of the Dutch New Right is the result of a messy process of translation of political ideas between very dissimilar contexts.

Crucial is the contradictory character of the conservatism of the New Right. It emerged as a backlash movement, an anti-establishment current challenging
existing elites and institutions. Of course, conservatism is often understood as an ideology that emerged in defence of existing institutions and elites, in opposition to radical challenges to the status quo. When progressives are seen to have taken over the institutions, however, conservatives have little choice but to adopt an anti-establishment position and to vie for popular appeal. The American political scientist Seymour Martin Lipset used the term ‘backlash politics’ to express the contradictory nature of such a conservative anti-establishment politics. With that term, Lipset referred to the paradoxical reality of ‘right-wing groups [that] have to appeal to the populace in a framework of values which are themselves a source of right-wing discontent in the first place: anti-elitism, individualism and egalitarianism’. The reason was simple: these were the ‘supreme American political values’ that no movement could ignore. ‘Commitment to these values is the American ideology’, Lipset proposed.⁵⁹

Such a contradictory logic seems to apply to an even greater extent in the Dutch case. A Dutch conservative backlash needed to frame its appeal within the context of supreme Dutch values. And the depth of the wave of the 1960s meant that commitment to progressive sexual and secular morality had become ‘the Dutch ideology’. Due to its belated occurrence, the conservative countercurrent came to incorporate to a much larger degree the progressive sexual, anti-authoritarian and secular ethos that had become engrained in the Netherlands after the 1960s and 1970s. While right-wing leaders such as Bolkestein still opposed gay marriage and defended Christian morality in the late 1990s, that soon changed.⁶⁰ In the wake of Pim Fortuyn, Dutch New Right intellectuals embraced the Enlightenment and progressive values such as individualism, secularism, women’s equality and gay rights, presenting themselves as the true defenders of the progressive accomplishments of Dutch culture against the ‘backward culture’ of Muslim immigrants.

The sociologist Paul Schnabel called this ‘modern conservatism’:

Wilders wants to hold on to the country’s achievements. He does not want to go back to the time where gays and women were rated inferior. He does not want to restore old values, he wants to maintain new ones.⁶¹

In his acclaimed book on the murder of Theo van Gogh, the essayist Ian Buruma commented extensively on this contradictory conservative politics:

Because secularism has gone too far to bring back the authority of the churches, conservatives and neo-conservatives have latched onto the Enlightenment as a badge of national or cultural identity. The Enlightenment, in other words, has become the name for a new conservative order, and its enemies are the aliens, whose values we can’t share.⁶²

On the one hand, this conservative co-optation of progressive values has an instrumental quality to it. The conservative interest in feminism and gay rights is largely a function of their opposition to Islam and does not seem to have much
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salience on its own. Many have pointed out that women’s rights and gay rights have been instrumentalized for a nationalist and anti-Muslim politics, a development that has been debated by scholars under terms such as sexual nationalism, homonationalism and femonationalism. On the other hand, this paradoxical position expresses a reality on the ground: the aforementioned depth and uncontroversial nature of the sexual revolution of the 1960s has led to a widely shared progressive sexual morality in the Netherlands that could no longer be challenged by a conservative countercurrent. Pim Fortuyn, himself an openly gay baby boomer and a product of the 1960s, described this legacy as an unassailable cultural sediment and advised Dutch conservatives against attempts to overturn it.

The conservatism of the Dutch New Right is therefore a far more ambiguous and contradictory affair than that of its British and American counterparts. Drawing on Angela McRobbie’s notion of a ‘complex’ conservative backlash, I describe the Dutch New Right as a conservative countercurrent that selectively incorporates some of the accomplishments of the 1960s, while successfully challenging the progressive agenda on a broader set of terrains, such as law and order, immigration, social policy, environmental policy, internationalism, cultural policy and development aid. In this way, the Netherlands has served as the laboratory for a new form of right-wing politics, and functions as an ideal type for a broader transformation on the right that is becoming increasingly prominent on the European continent as a whole.

Structure of the book

In line with Karl Mannheim’s thesis that political thought is inherently context-bound, the first chapter is dedicated to a critical exploration of the Dutch political tradition. While this book seeks to explore the ideological dimension of the Dutch revolt, the Netherlands has often been portrayed as a country that has moved beyond ideology altogether. The belief in ‘the end of ideology’ and the feasibility of an ‘objective’ politics has long been a powerful sentiment in Dutch politics. Hans Daalder and Arend Lijphart, the founding fathers of Dutch political science, attributed this to a peculiar political culture of depoliticization among Dutch elites. In a country of political minorities, framing one’s ideas as non-ideological allows one to build coalitions with other parties. Based on the work of Daalder and Lijphart, this chapter shows how this traditional consensus culture became the target of critique of the new social movements in the 1960s. And it explains how in the 1990s, conservative critics such as Bolkestein, Vuijsje and Fortuyn took up the old consensus critique, this time to challenge the protest generation itself.

Chapters 2, 3 and 4 lay out the main thesis of the book: the interpretation of the Dutch swing to the right as a belated and complex pendant of the New Right backlash in the US and the UK. The New Right is introduced as a fusionist project combining free market ideas and cultural conservatism. The transfer of political ideas from the Anglo-American context facilitated
political innovation and inspired the Dutch conservative backlash in the 1990s against existing elites and institutions. The Dutch New Right is the product of a rather messy process of translation of neoliberal and neoconservative ideas. It consists of an eclectic coalition of Christian conservatives, conservative liberals, conservative social democrats and provocative nihilists. In so doing, the analysis takes issue with a still prevalent image of the 1990s as the supposed era of the end of ideology. While this is true to a degree for the leftist spectrum, on the other side of the aisle, the 1990s have been a period of politicization and ideological renewal.

Chapter 5 qualifies the argument of the previous chapter. It deals with the complexity of the Dutch New Right. The crucial difference between the Dutch New Right and its Anglo-American counterparts is that Dutch conservatives have come to incorporate progressive values such as women’s rights and gay rights. The belated occurrence of the New Right backlash in the Netherlands meant that progressive sexual morality was seen as ingrained to such a degree that a conservative countercurrent could no longer hope to overturn it. The ‘social issues’ that became the subject of the culture wars in the US – women’s emancipation, gay rights, abortion, drugs, euthanasia – were not up for discussion in the Netherlands. Instead, Dutch conservatives reinvented themselves as defenders of the progressive accomplishments of Dutch culture against the perceived threat of Muslim immigrants. The Dutch New Right can be seen as a ‘complex backlash’ against the legacy of the 1960s. Put differently, it is a countercurrent that selectively incorporates elements of the tendency that it opposes, while contesting that tendency on a broader set of terrains. The chapter introduces a situational perspective on conservatism that allows us to make sense of these contradictory aspects of the Dutch conservative backlash.

Chapter 6 is dedicated to Islam critic Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and develops a relational analysis of her autobiographical writing. Due to the fact that Hirsi Ali’s views on Islam are often seen as her personal opinions, comparatively little attention has been given to her intellectual development. Hirsi Ali became part of the Islamic fundamentalist movement in her teenage years, and joined an influential circle of neoconservative intellectuals after her arrival in the Netherlands and her study in Leiden. This chapter situates her writing in relation to these two formative intellectual influences. It traces the development of Hirsi Ali’s perspective on Islam, which consists of a paradoxical combination of ideas drawn from Islamic fundamentalism and Western Orientalism and neoconservatism. And it shows how these adopted views are – in important respects – in open contradiction with her personal life story, as told in her biography, Infidel. The work of Olivier Roy on Islamic fundamentalism is used as an interpretive lens to create an alternative interpretation of her life story.

Chapters 7 and 8 delve into Dutch nihilism and the internet. The Fortuyn revolt coincided with the ascendancy of the internet as a major factor in shaping public opinion. After the assassination of Fortuyn and Van Gogh, the nihilist weblog GeenStijl developed into one of the most popular and influential websites in the Netherlands. It became the central node in an online right-wing
social movement. In terms of its style and rhetoric, GeenStijl can be seen as an early pendant of what is known internationally as the alt-right, even though GeenStijl has kept more distance to the extreme right than its famous American counterpart. Using the work of Raymond Williams, the chapter considers the relation between technology and ideological form, and proceeds to trace the intellectual origins of the discourse of GeenStijl. The website has a nihilist orientation that is Nietzschean in inspiration. GeenStijl presents the nihilist breaking of norms and the disregard for etiquette as a progressive movement towards greater transparency. GeenStijl’s ironic and nihilist discourse has its roots in the Dutch literary field, in particular the work of the leading Dutch post-war writers W.F. Hermans and Gerard Reve.

The conclusion sums up the argument and expands on the central themes of this book. It elaborates on the contradictory nature of the conservative backlash against the legacy of the 1960s and 1970s as both a revolt and an echo. And it addresses the common intellectual underestimation of the right, even though the widely shared belief in the power of ideas is arguably the most striking feature of the Dutch New Right.

Notes
4 For a collection of prominent Dutch neoconservative essays, see Jaffé Vink and Chris Rutenfrans, De Terugkeer van de Geschiedenis: Letter & Geest (Amsterdam: Trouw/ Augustus, 2005).
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15 Hans Righart, De Eindeloze Jaren Zestig: Geschiedenis van een Generatieconflict (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006).
17 Kennedy, 21.
19 Lubbers derived the term from a leading empirical study that characterized the value patterns of the Dutch population since the 1970s in terms of a ‘prudently progressive’ consensus: a self-evident progressive morality regarding sexual morality and hierarchical authority, connected with a widespread belief in the necessity of redistribution of wealth. This progressive ‘common sense’ also contains a more prudent – or conservative – stress on the need to restrict government bureaucracy and an endorsement of disciplinary intervention on crime and other socially deviant behaviour. See SCP, Sociaal en Cultureel Rapport 1998: 25 Jaar Sociale Verandering (Rijswijk: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 1998).
20 James Kennedy, Bezielende Verbanden: Gedachten over Religie, Politiek en Maatschappij in het Moderne Nederland (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2009).
23 Kennedy, Bezielende Verbanden, 148–49.
24 Kennedy, 150.
26 Frits Bolkestein, De Engel en Het Beest (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 1990), 238.
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29 Spruyt, Lof van het Conservatisme, 10.
31 Bolkestein, De Engel En Het Beest, 70.
33 Herman Vuijsje, Correct: Weldenkend Nederland sinds de Jaren Zestig (Amsterdam: Contact, 1997); Published in English as: Herman Vuijsje, The Politically Correct Netherlands since the 1960s, trans. Mark T. Hooker (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000).
34 Vuijsje, Correct, 10. My translation. All Dutch-language sources have been translated to English by the author. While the original Dutch text of large quotes has been left out in this book, it is included in the original PhD manuscript, see Merijn Oudenampsen, ‘The Conservative Embrace of Progressive Values: On the Intellectual Origins of the Swing to the Right in Dutch Politics’ (PhD thesis, Tilburg, Tilburg University, 2018).


48 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe; Muis and Immerzeel, ‘Causes and Consequences of the Rise of Populist Radical Right Parties and Movements in Europe’; Akkerman, Lange and Rooduijn, Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Into the Mainstream?

49 Kitschelt and MacGann, The Radical Right, viii.

50 Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism, 89, 109.

51 Betz, 171.


55 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.

56 Cas Mudde, ‘Wilders is de Meest Succesvolle Neocon’, Trouw, 6 November 2009.


58 Akkerman, Lange and Rooduijn, Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties, 7–8.


61 Cited in Sommer, ‘Steeds Harder Lopen’.


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1970s were led politically and intellectually by the so-called silent generation (oorlogsgeneratie) born before the Second World War. Some of the most famous figureheads of the progressive wave of the 1960s and 1970s were people like Joop den Uyl, Harry Mulisch and Henk Hofland, who had the required age to play a leading role.

The political breakthrough of the conservative undercurrent in the 2000s can be interpreted as another period of politicization, like the 1960s and 1970s. A time in which the dominant paradigm enters into crisis, resulting in a breakdown of consensus politics. In the 2000s, the rules of the conflict model as identified by Daalder entered back into operation, this time centred on the ‘unmasking of the multicultural ideology of the establishment’. The climax of this new period of polarization is formed by the two governments that accommodated the right-wing populist surge: the first Balkenende cabinet that was brokered after the 2002 election victory of Fortuyn’s party LPF (2002–2003), and the first Rutte cabinet (2010–2012), formed with the support of Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom.

Both can be seen as the conservative counterparts to the progressive government of Den Uyl in the 1970s. The formation of these right-wing cabinets can fittingly be described as ‘polarization as a means to form an exclusive majority’. In fact, the official promise of the first Rutte cabinet was a policy that those on the right ‘could lick their fingers to’. This in flagrant contradiction with Lijphart’s rules of proportionality and depoliticization. In terms of establishment critique, the revolt of the 2000s contains obvious parallels to the 1960s and 1970s. In both periods, we see a radical critique of consensus politics, a celebration of the breaking of taboos, a challenge to the entire political system, an appeal to referenda and political reforms, and a reliance on new communication technologies (first the television, then the internet) to break open what is perceived as a closed regime.

Notes
1 Frits Bolkestein, Woorden Hebben hun Betekenis (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 1992), 69.
2 Piet de Rooy, A Tiny Spot on the Earth: The Political Culture of the Netherlands in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015), 275.
3 Wim Kok, ‘We Laten Niemand Los’ (Den Uyl-lezing, Amsterdam, 11 December 1995).
6 Daalder, 10.
7 Daalder, 10.
8 Daalder, 12.
9 Daalder, 13.
10 Parts of the argument are present in his chapter in a volume edited by Robert Dahl, see Hans Daalder, ‘The Netherlands: Opposition in a Segmented Society’, in Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, ed. Robert Dahl (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 188–236. Daalder has been criticized for his stress on historical
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continuity and his lack of attention for material factors, such as industrialization. See Siep Stuurman, Verzuiling. Kapitalisme En Patriarchaat: Aspecten van de Ontwikkeling van de Moderne Staat in Nederland (Nijmegen: Sun, 1983), 307–36.

11 Daalder, Politisering en Lijdelijkheid, 18.
12 This harmonious vision of a shared movement towards emancipation has been justifiably criticized by Stuurman. The liberal and Christian currents weren’t merely movements of emancipation, they also acted as conservative bulwarks in opposition to emancipation. Here Von der Dunk’s remark mentioned earlier, concerning the mixed character of Dutch liberalism and Christian conservatism, needs to be considered. Daalder, Politisering en Lijdelijkheid, 22.

13 Daalder, 24.
14 Daalder, 25.
15 Daalder, 27.
16 Daalder, 28.
17 Daalder, 28.
18 Daalder, 28.
19 Daalder, 28.
20 Daalder, 36.


22 Daalder, Politisering en Lijdelijkheid, 36.


25 Daalder, Politiek en Historie, 81.


27 Lijphart, 124.


29 Lijphart, 179.

30 Lijphart, 129.

31 The Dutch translation of The Politics of Accommodation is a little bit more extensive on ‘the rules of the game’, at times I have used that version. See Arend Lijphart, Verzuiling. Pacifcatie en Kentering in de Nederlandse Politiek (Amsterdam: De Bussy, 1976), 135.


36 Rudy Andeweg and Galen A. Irwin, Governance and Politics of the Netherlands, Comparative Government and Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 34.
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38 Andeweg and Irwin, *Governance and Politics of the Netherlands*.
45 Mulisch, *Bericht aan de Rattenkoning*, 90.
46 Arend Lijphart, ‘From the Politics of Accommodation to Adversarial Politics in the Netherlands: A Reassessment’, *West European Politics* 12, no. 1 (1989): 139–54. There is no dominant image or theory of Dutch political reality that has emerged after depillarization. It is difficult to come up with a metaphor as alluring as that of pillari-zation. Perhaps one can argue that instead of the multiple pillars and the roof, the Dutch political system now consists of a single pillar, following the description of the depoliticized Dutch political system of the nineties as a cartel or a one-party state. See: Piet de historicus Rooy, *Republiek van Rivaliteiten: Nederland sinds 1813* (Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt, 2002), 278.
51 Fortuyn, 9.
52 Fortuyn, 9.
53 In that sense, Vuijsje is a principal intellectual exponent of what Gloria Wekker has called ‘white innocence’, the Dutch way of dealing with the postcolonial legacy, in which Dutch culture is described as innocent and inherently non-racist. See Gloria Wekker, *White Innocence: Paradoxes of Colonialism and Race* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016).
54 Herman Vuijsje, *Correct*, 80.
55 Vuijsje’s analysis is fast-paced, well-written and polemical, but his argument often lacks coherence. There is an open contradiction in his core thesis. On the one hand, he indict the baby boomers for failing to break with the passivity and conformism of the old ‘regent mentality’. On the other hand, he blames baby boomers for ‘having annihilated the old elite’ and for refusing to adhere to the old regent mentality and ‘flexibly adapt themselves to the renewals experienced as historically inevitable’. In sum, the baby boomers are simultaneously too radical and not radical enough; too much and not enough in thrall to Dutch regent mentality. See: Herman Vuijsje, *Correct*, xix.
56 Taken as a whole, the political character of Vuijsje’s argument differs markedly from that of Fortuyn. As a conservative social democrat, Vuijsje is no fan of the free market. In fact, in his book *Correct*, he (erroneously) portrays the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s as yet another unwanted outcome of the anti-authoritarian ideals of the 1960s. Despite these differences, Fortuyn and Vuijsje shared a common position due to their critique of the ‘leftist elite’ and their desire to contest the progressive consensus on cultural issues.
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59 Scheffer, Immigrant Nations, 127.
and maintain equilibrium. A similar motivation accounts for the accommodating role of centrist elites. The conundrum of Dutch politics is that it is often difficult to distinguish the active drivers of a trend from those politically accommodating that trend.

As a consequence of the eye-catching role of the populist radical right, the important role of the mainstream parties in achieving the shift to the right has been far less conspicuous. And as a result of a lingering adherence to a pluralist ‘end of ideology’ framework, many studies of populism conceive of populists as the only ideological player in the game. In this way the impression has been able to take hold that the populist radical right is the only historical actor in the arena, while the mainstream parties are merely accommodating and reacting to historical trends.

Using the analytical framework of the New Right allows us to better address the complex political dynamic described above. In the next two chapters, I will address the neoliberal strand within the Dutch New Right, followed by the (neo) conservative strand.

Notes

1 The term has been used in a similar manner by prominent Dutch politicians and intellectuals such as Joop den Uyl, Jos de Beus and Dick Pels, but it is not commonly used in the Netherlands. See Joop den Uyl, ‘Tegen de Stroom In’ (Paradiso, Amsterdam, 3 May 1981); Jos de Beus, ‘Een Derde Eeuw van Nederlands Conservatisme’, in Ruimte Op Rechts? Conservatieve Onderstroom in de Lage Landen, ed. Huib Pellikaan and Sebastiaan van der Lubben (Utrecht: Spectrum, 2006), 221–37; Dick Pels, Een Zwak voor Nederland: Ideeën voor een Nieuwe Politiek (Amsterdam: Anthos, 2005).


4 Bart Tromp, Geschreven van een Intellectuele Glazenwasser: De Draagbare Tromp (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2010), 152–72.

5 Frits Bolkestein, Het Heft in Handen (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 1995), 15–41.

6 Bolkestein, 132.


9 Pim Fortuyn, Uw Baan Staat op de Tocht! De Overlegeconomie Voorbij (Utrecht: Bruna, 1995).


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13 Martin Bosma, De Schijn-Élite van de Valsemunters (Prometheus, 2011).


19 Levitas, The Ideology of the New Right.


21 Gamble, 121.


25 Bosma, De Schijn-Élite van de Valsemunters.

26 For a good example of that perspective, see Tjitske Akkerman, Sarah L. de Lange and Matthijs Rooduijn, Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Into the Mainstream? (London: Routledge, 2016).


31 Betz, 171–2. A similar compensatory strategy has been observed in the US concerning the ‘paradox of blue-collar conservatives’ in the 1980s. See John Fiske, Media Matters: Everyday Culture and Political Change (London: Routledge, 1994), 32.

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42 A recent example of that type of discourse is Paul Scheffer’s 2016 essay on the politics of the border. He argues that the progressive ‘bien-pensants’ foment populism with their calls for hospitality for refugees. When the established parties fail to establish borders, then ‘sooner or later – probably sooner – the moment will come that people with an authoritarian mindset will draw those borders’. Scheffer, cited in: Femke Halsema, *Nergensland: Nieuw Licht op Migratie* (Amsterdam: Ambo Anthos, 2017), 46.

known as ‘responsive corporatism’ or more commonly, the Dutch polder model. Some scholars have described Dutch neoliberalism as a – restructured – continuation of the corporatist model, rather than a departure from it. Such a hybrid reality is not exceptional when we consider the recent literature on neoliberalism. ‘To the extent that neoliberalism has been, since the 1970s, “victorious” in the war of ideas’, Jamie Peck argued in his well-crafted study, ‘its victories have always been Pyrrhic and partial ones’. ‘As a result, it is doomed to coexist with its unloved others, be these the residues of state socialism, developmental statism, authoritarianism, or social democracy’. In the Dutch case, those ‘unloved others’ have been corporatism and consensus politics. The Dutch New Right arose out of dissatisfaction with the emerging synthesis, and tried to take the newly forming paradigm several steps further in the direction of their Anglo-American inspirations.

Neoliberal ideas, however, were not the sole or even main driver of the political breakthrough of the Dutch New Right. Free market thought was accompanied by a new body of conservative ideas, which forms the subject of the following chapter.

Notes
7 Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, 128–9.
8 Hayek, 128–9.
9 Burgin, The Great Persuasion.
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14 Den Uyl, ‘Tegen de Stroom In’.


22 Pim Fortuyn, *Aan het Volk van Nederland: De Contractmaatschappij, Een Politiek-Economische Zedenschets* (Amsterdam: Contact, 1992), 111.


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30 Rutten, 58.


32 Kok, 373.


34 Albeda, 424.


39 Bert De Vries, Overmoed En Onbehagen: Het Hervormingskabinet-Balkende II (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2005), 40.


41 Bolkestein, 159.

42 In his biography, Bolkestein states that he first became interested in politics during his work for Shell in El Salvador. “El Salvador was a polarized society, with big contrasts between rich and poor. You were automatically sucked into politics. I developed more of an eye for the relations between Shell and the trade unions. At Shell, the norm is to not get involved in politics, but that was impossible there.” Significantly, at the time of Bolkestein’s stay, El Salvador was run by the US-backed colonel Rivera Carballo, who organized paramilitary death squads to deal with leftists and trade unionists. In that context, Bolkestein’s comments are intriguing to say the least. Max van Weezel and Leonard Ornstein, Frits Bolkestein: Portret van een Liberale Vrijbuiters (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 1999), 52.

43 Van Weezel and Ornstein, 64.

44 Bolkestein, Het Heft in Handen, 15. See also the opinion piece by Edwin van de Haar, who described Bolkestein as the Dutch exponent of Hayek’s battle of ideas, Edwin van de Haar, ‘De Idecënoorlog van Friedrich Hayek’, Trouw, 12 June 2004. Van de Haar, at that time, was a member of the Edmund Burke Foundation.

45 Bolkestein, Het Heft in Handen, 58.

46 Van Weezel and Ornstein, Frits Bolkestein: (1999), 159.

47 Van Weezel and Ornstein, 14.

48 Frits Bolkestein, De Engel en het Beest (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 1990), 17.


50 Bolkestein, De Engel en het Beest, 69.

51 One of the oft-returning themes of Bolkestein is that he criticized baby boomers for being more interested in intentions than results. He relied on the Weberian distinction between Gesinnungsethik and Verantwortungsethik, proclaiming the superiority of the latter. Daniel Bell had used this Weberian distinction to criticize the American left in his book The End of Ideology. While Gesinnungsethik departs from
the intention of an ethical deed, *Verantwortungsethik* focuses on the estimated results. Originally, Weber argued that politics needed to contain both ethics, but Daniel Bell presented it as a dilemma, a choice between one or the other. Bolkestein here echoed Bell. It allowed Bolkestein to take up the position of the realist, while skilfully masking a more prosaic reality, namely that Bolkestein had markedly different intentions and aspirations than his progressive opponents. Bolkestein, *De Engel en het Beest*, 75.

52 One brief example: central to Bolkestein’s intellectual project, in socio-economic terms, was to locate the ideas on which the Dutch welfare state was based. On the one hand, he argued that the Dutch welfare state departed from an ideology of personal development (*ontplooiingsideologie*) premised on a pessimistic image of man, in need of constant improvement. Bolkestein argued that his own views, in contrast, were founded on a positive image of man as strong and independent. In the very same book, Bolkestein argues that the welfare state arose out of a positive image of man as inherently good and strong, a view that completely dominated Dutch politics. In contrast, his own politics were based on a pessimist vision of man. See: Bolkestein, *Het Heft in Handen* (1995), 20, 59.

53 This voice prevails in Bolkestein’s most accomplished book: Frits Bolkestein, *De Intellectuele Verleiding* (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2012).

54 Bolkestein, *De Engel en het Beest*, 43.

55 In an interview with the magazine of the youth department of the VVD, Bolkestein suggested that the founder of his party, P.J. Oud, was a ‘real intellectual’. He himself was not. ‘I am a pamphleteer and a politician’, Bolkestein said. See JOVD, ‘Frits Bolkestein over Duitsland, P.J. Oud En de Liberale Doorbraak’, *Driemaster*, 1995.


57 Karel Groenveld and Andreas Kinneging, *Liberalisme en Politieke Economie*, Geschrift; 54 (‘s-Gravenhage: Prof. Mr. B.M. Teldersstichting, 1985). While the study used the word neoliberalism for the earlier period of the neoliberal movement, it reverted to ‘classical economic liberalism’ to describe its later offshoots such as the Chicago School, the neo-Austrian school and supply-side economics.


63 The Dutch New Right has an intriguing fondness for Willem Drees. Drees was the Dutch social democrat leader and Prime Minister during the sober period of post-war reconstruction, from 1948 to 1958. New Right politicians admire Drees for his opposition to the expansion of the Dutch welfare state in the 1960s and for his sharp critiques of immigration and the New Left. In a prominent speech in 2013, the Prime Minister Mark Rutte presented Drees as an important inspiration for his ambition to further curtail the Dutch welfare state. Rutte hailed Drees as a ‘realist’ and argued that the realism of Drees ‘resounded in his preference for the guarantor state rather than the welfare state’. See Mark Rutte, ‘Sterke Mensen, Sterk Land: Over het Bezielend Verband in de Samenleving’ (Dreeslezing, Den Haag, 14 October 2013). Martin Bosma, the ideologue of Geert Wilders, presented Drees as a political forefather of
the PVV. Bosma saw Drees as the Dutch equivalent of the first generation of US neconservatives, such as Kristol and Bell. Not wholly without reason, as we shall soon see. Martin Bosma, *De Schijn-Elite van de Valsemunters: Drees, Extreem Rechts, de Sixties, Nuttige Idioten, Groep Wilders en ik* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2011), 205.


70 Van Weezel and Ornstein, *Frits Bolkestein*, 93.


72 Fortuyn, *Aan het Volk van Nederland*, 111.


75 Fortuyn, 31.


87 PVV, ‘Plan Voor Een Nieuwe Gouden Eeuw’.


89 Visser and Hemerijck, ‘A Dutch Miracle’.


limited opportunity to explore the adjustment of these ideas to the Dutch context. The next chapter deals more extensively with the process of adaptation.

Notes


6 On the link between Schmitt and Strauss, see the dissertation by Wout Cornelissen, ‘Politics between Philosophy and Polemics: Political Thinking and Thoughtful Politics in the Writings of Karl Popper, Leo Strauss, and Hannah Arendt’ (Institute for Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Leiden University, 2014).


10 For an earlier collection of Dutch essays on neoconservatism, see Rob Kroes and Marc Chénetier (eds.), *Neo-Conservatism: Its Emergence in the USA and Europe* (Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1984). At the time of its publication, though, the influence of neoconservative ideas was still quite limited.


13 Neoconservative ideas are present in all of his books, but perhaps most explicitly in his 2002 lecture on the Dutch ‘adversary culture’: Frits Bolkestein, *Verzwelgt de Massacultuur der Liberale Democratie?*, Telderslezing; Winter 2001–2002 (Den Haag: Prof. Mr. B.M. Teldersstichting, 2002). See also his aforementioned book *The Intellectual Temptation* (De Intellectuele Verleiding), in which the grand dame of neoconservatism, the historian Gertrude Himmelfarb, has an important role. Finally, there is also his interview with the ‘first age’ neoconservative Nathan Glazer in Seizing Control (*Het Heft in Handen*), where Bolkestein displays an intimate acquaintance with the neoconservative literature of the time. See Frits Bolkestein, *Het Heft in Handen* (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 1995), 135–55.
The neoconservative strand


16 As the British weekly The Economist wrote in reaction to Fukuyama: “Islam he dismisses because it has little appeal, yet the faith may already have more true believers among its followers than communism ever had. The clash of gods and the clash of nations may prove just as destructive, and more enduring, than the clash of communism versus liberalism.” Cited in Dominique Hope, ‘End of History? Not so, Say Critics from Left and Right’, Sydney Morning Herald, 13 December 1989.


20 Frits Bolkestein, De Engel en het Beest (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 1990), 139–40. Significantly, Bolkestein also expressed the hope that a new conservative ideology would arise in the Netherlands: ‘In our restless society, in which freedom can lead to licentiousness, many long for community, spiritual values, social stability, even hierarchy’.


29 Väissä, Neoconservatism, 10.


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35 Cliteur, 121.


37 Bolkestein, Het Heft in Handen, 33–46.


41 Dick Pels, Een Zwak voor Nederland: Ideeën voor een Nieuwe Politiek (Amsterdam: Anthos, 2005), 111.


43 Cliteur, Moderne Papoea’s, 24.


49 Bolkestein, Het Heft in Handen, 132.


52 Karel Groenveld et al., Tussen Vrijblijvendheid en Paternalisme: Bespiegelingen over Communitarisme, Liberalisme en Individualisering, Geschrift/Prof. Mr. B.M. Telderstichting; 82 (‘s-Gravenhage: Teldersstichting, 1995).


54 Ten Hooven.

55 Steinfelds, The Neoconservatives, 120.

56 Vaïsse, Neoconservatism, 77–8.

57 Hendrik Jan Schoo, Republiek van Vrije Burgers: Het Onbehagen in de Democratie (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2008), 41.


59 In the introduction of a posthumous collection of Schoo’s writings, the leading journalist Marc Chavannes describes Schoo as a ‘humane, radical realist’. The label ‘realism’, also used by Bolkestein, Spruyt, Wilders and Rutte, is often used as a euphemism for conservatism in the Netherlands. See Schoo, Republiek van Vrije Burgers, 7.
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See Leo Lucassen and Jan Lucassen: “A crucial element of the Dutch ‘pessimistic turn’ was the belief broadly shared on both left and right that progressive elites were to blame for the rise of illiberal Islam in the Netherlands and for the problems caused by the descendants of immigrants.” Leo Lucassen and Jan Lucassen, ‘The Strange Death of Dutch Tolerance: The Timing and Nature of the Pessimist Turn in the Dutch Migration Debate’, *Journal of Modern History* 87, no. 1 (2015): 76.


Martin Bosma, the ideologue of Geert Wilders, went on to use the neoconservative ‘new class’ theory as the core argument of his 2011 book, see Martin Bosma, *De Schijn-Élite van de Valsemunters: Drees, Extreem Rechts, de Sixties, Nuttige Idioten, Groep Wilders en Ik* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2011).


Scheffer’s bestselling book *Land van Aankomst (Country of Arrival)* is a discussion of Dutch immigration and integration, through the lens of the debate in the US. Often without mentioning their neoconservative affiliations, the book features an impressive array of neoconservative authors such as Nathan Glazer, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Dinesh D’Souza, Bernard Lewis, Niall Ferguson, Thomas Sowell, the early Francis Fukuyama, Hirsi Ali and Samuel Huntington. Scheffer has written the book as a dialogue between two camps, positioning himself in the middle, which makes it difficult to properly identify his views. See Paul Scheffer, *Het Land van Aankomst* (Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 2007). The book was later reworked into a PhD thesis, see Paul Scheffer, ‘The Open Society and Its Immigrants: A Story of Avoidance, Conflict and Accommodation’ (Tilburg, Tilburg University, 2010).


Notes

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22 The authors define neoculturalists by their view of the world as ‘divided into different, inimical cultures’, and by their opposition to ‘cultural relativism’. In practice, neoculturalists are seen to combine a progressive sexual discourse with an anti-Muslim and anti-immigration agenda. See Justus Uitermark, Paul Mepschen and Jan Willem Duyvendak, ‘Populism, Sexual Politics, and the Exclusion of Muslims in the Netherlands’, in *European States and Their Muslim Citizens: The Impact of Institutions on Perceptions and Boundaries*, ed. John R. Bowen et al., Cambridge Studies in Law and Society (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 88–130.

23 Houtman and Duyvendak, ‘Boerka’s, Boerkinis’ En Belastingcenten’, 4


30 Spruyt and Visser.

31 Spruyt and Visser.

32 See, for instance, Kees Schuys’ response to the manifesto, in which he argues that baby boomers were the very opposites of relativists, making them not unlike the ‘conservative hotheads’ who wrote the manifesto. Kees Schuyt, ‘Conservatieve Geschiedvervalsing’, *De Volkskrant*, 22 October 2003.

33 Hendrik Jan Schoo, *De Verwarde Natie: Dwarse Notities over Immigratie in Nederland* (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2000).

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38 More precisely, Wilders referred to a publication of the Edmund Burke Foundation (Spruyt and Visser, 2004), titled The Crisis in the Netherlands and the Conservative Response. The conservative manifesto was a synthesis of that publication. See Bart Jan Spruyt and Michiel Visser, De Crisis in Nederland en het Conservatieve Antwoord (Den Haag: Edmund Burke Stichting, 2004). For Wilders’ reference to this publication see Elaine de Boer and Theo Koelé, ‘Een Rechtse Directe’, De Volkskrant, 20 November 2003.
40 Valk, ‘Het Conservatieve Moment is Voorbij’.
48 Pim Fortuyn, Aan het Volk van Nederland: de Contractmaatschappij, een Politiek-Economische Zedenschets (Amsterdam: Contact, 1992).
49 Karel Groenveld et al., Tussen Vrijblijvendheid en Paternalisme: Bespiegelingen over Community, Liberalisme en Individualisering, Geschrift/Prof. Mr. B.M. Teldersstichting; 82 (‘s-Gravenhage: Teldersstichting, 1995).
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57 Faludi, Backlash: The Undeclared War against American Women, 243.
58 Hermann von der Dunk, Conservatisme (Haarlem: Fibula- Van Dishoeck, 1976), 89.
60 Mannheim and Wolff, 173.
61 Mannheim and Wolff, 147.
63 Huntington, 471
64 Huntington, 472.
65 Huntington, 472.
66 Huntington, 472–3.
67 Huntington, 473.
69 Bart Jan Spruyt, De Toekomst van de Stad: Over Geschiedenis en Politiek. (Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum, 2005), 73.
70 Jos de Beus, ‘Een Derde Eeuw van Nederlands Conservatisme’, 236.
71 Hendrik Jan Schoo, Republiek van vrije burgers: het onbehagen in de democratie, 2e dr. (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2008), 264.
75 Pim Fortuyn, De Islamisering van Onze Cultuur: Nederlandse Identiteit als Fundament (Uithoorn Rotterdam: Karakter Uitgevers, 2001), 9.
77 Leon de Winter, De Vijand: Een Opstel (Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 2004).
80 Servatius W. Couwenberg, ‘Heeft Conservatisme in Nederland Geen Voedingsbodem?’, Civis Mundi Digitaal 19, no. 6 (2011).
84 Fortuyn, 37.
85 Fortuyn, 17.
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86 Fortuyn, 37.
87 Fortuyn, 17.
88 Fortuyn, 85.
89 Fortuyn, 206.
90 Fortuyn, 56.
91 Fortuyn, 56.
94 Spruyt, *De Toekomst van de Stad*, 59.
97 Fortuyn, *De Verweesde Samenleving*, 12.
100 Fortuyn, *Tegen de Islamisering van onze Cultuur*, 32.
101 Fortuyn, 108.
102 Fortuyn, 109.
2010 in an opinion piece in the *Wall Street Journal*.\(^{106}\) ‘It allows us to distinguish friends from enemies’, she added. The friend-enemy distinction employed by Hirsi Ali closely mirrors the worldview of the 9/11 hijackers she had described in *Infidel*: ‘Their world is divided between “Us” and “Them”’.\(^ {107}\)

**Notes**

3. Hirsi Ali, 188.
10. Said, 63.
12. For reasons of brevity, the focus of this chapter is restricted to the Sunnite tradition, which has been central to Hirsi Ali’s development. While the Shiite tradition is of equal political significance in general terms, it occupies a more marginal role in the life and writings of Hirsi Ali.
15. Roy, 3.
26. While all Wahhabists are Salafists, not all Salafists are Wahhabists, which could roughly be described as the Saudi current in Salafism.
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27 Calvert, Sayyid Qutb, 276.
33 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Conservatism as an Ideology’, American Political Science Review 51, no. 2 (1957): 472.
40 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 20. Notable scholars, such as the political theorist Etienne Balibar, have pointed to the similarities between the basic framework of The Clash of Civilizations and the work of Carl Schmitt, in particular Nomos of the Earth. Writing about Huntington’s notion of irreducible civilizational conflict, Balibar concludes: “This idea clearly derives from the geopolitical notions that were theorized around World War II by the German (pro-Nazi) jurist and philosopher Carl Schmitt, who explained that every political institution was based on the absolute primacy of the ‘friend versus foe’ divide and sought to transfer this notion to the new ‘spatial distribution of power’ (Nomos of the Earth) emerging after the Second World War.” See Etienne Balibar, We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship (Princeton University Press, 2009), 231.
41 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 130.
42 See Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds, 60.
43 Kepel, 61.
44 Kepel, 67.
45 Seymour Hersh, ‘Selective Intelligence’, The New Yorker, 4 May 2003.
46 When Wilders was prosecuted in the Netherlands on the grounds of inciting hatred, Daniel Pipes asserted to have raised an amount of six numbers: “Another American support pillar for Wilders, the conservative de Daniel Pipes of the pro-Israel Middle
East Forum, had a year income of 235,000 dollars. Pipes, who is set against a Palestinian state and campaigns for a military attack on Iran, says that in the past year he has collected ‘an amount of six numbers’ for Wilders in the US.” See Tom-Jan Meeus and Guus Valk, ‘De Buitenlandse Vrienden van Geert Wilders’, NRC Handelsblad, 15 May 2010

47 Hirsi Ali, Infidel, 272.
48 Hirsi Ali, 269.
51 Hirsi Ali, 450–551.
53 Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam, 42.
62 Hirsi Ali, 47.
63 Hirsi Ali, 56.
64 Hirsi Ali, 52.
66 Hirsi Ali, 32.
67 Hirsi Ali, 56.
68 Hirsi Ali, 56.
69 Hirsi Ali, Infidel, 450.
70 Hirsi Ali, 272.
71 Hirsi Ali, The Caged Virgin, 44.
73 Kees Driehuis, ‘De Heilige Ayaan’, Zembla, 11 May 2006. The documentary attempted to fact-check the story that Hirsi Ali had told of her flight to the Netherlands, leading to a famous incident around the false name and story that Hirsi Ali invented to enter the Netherlands as a political refugee. When her officially reported name was shown as false in this Dutch documentary, it became the reason for the hard-line Minister of Immigration Rita Verdonk to revoke Hirsi Ali’s Dutch
passport. Since Ayaan Hirsi Ali was at the time MP of the same party as Verdonk, the right-wing liberal party VVD, it led to a political crisis and the fall of the second Balkenende cabinet in 2006. Ayaan Hirsi Ali became a victim of the anti-immigrant agenda of the party she herself had been MP of, prompting her departure to the US. For our purposes here, the political scandal itself is not that significant. Ayaan Hirsi Ali had been quite open about the fact that she had lied about her name and country of provenance in her asylum procedure, and she had understandable reasons to do so.

78 Bosch, ‘Telling Stories’, 143.
82 Hirsi Ali, 220.
83 Hirsi Ali, 108.
87 Hirsi Ali, 104.
89 Hirsi Ali, 105.
90 Hirsi Ali, 108.
91 Hirsi Ali, 51.
92 Hirsi Ali, 268.
93 Hirsi Ali, 268.
94 Hirsi Ali, 269.
95 Hirsi Ali, 675–6. Italics mine.
96 Hirsi Ali, 271.
97 Hirsi Ali, 271.
98 Hirsi Ali, 271.
105 Hirsi Ali, 197.
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Notes

1 Angela Nagle, *Kill All Normies: The Online Culture Wars from Tumblr and 4chan to the Alt-Right and Trump* (Winchester: Zero Books, 2017), 10.


7 Lovink, *Zero Comments*, xvi.

8 Lovink, xvii.


20 Lovink, 17.


22 Pels, ‘Tegen de Verhuftering’.


24 There was also an opposite tendency of ‘workerism’, as some leftist students, under the influence of Maoism, for example, went to work in the factories to meet workers, with the ostensible aim of partaking in their revolutionary consciousness.


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29 Bas van Stokkom, ‘Het Klimaat in Nederland is Wel Degelijk Intoleranter Geworden’, NRC Handelsblad, 14 January 2011.
30 Stokkom, Wat een Hufter!, 14–15.
33 Sitalsing, ‘GeenStijlgeneratie Bedreigt Erop Los’.
35 Williams and Williams, Television, 133.
36 Cited in Storey, Cultural Theory and Popular Culture, 49.
38 In their equally delighted and disdainful responses to journalistic or academic think pieces written about their weblog, the editors of GeenStijl are keen to establish their theoretical credentials, even if the tone is ironic. Responding to the critique of a literature professor that the language of its commenters is the direct stylistic expression of raw, unprocessed emotions, the editors of GeenStijl defend the opposite: “At GeenStijl, a lot of thought is put into comments. Primary emotions are foreign to us. Really, even the biggest banalities are the result of deep philosophical reflection. One on one, Nietzsche is no match for necrosis [the nickname of a GeenStijl commenter, MO]. Kierkegaard is not even close to pious.” Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, the godfathers of nihilism and Romantic irony, could well serve as the philosophical figureheads of the site, if it was in need thereof. See Johnny Quid, ‘Meest Debiele Kritiek Op GeenStijl Ooit’, GeenStijl, 11 August 2013, www.geenstijl.nl/3592341/het_begint_met_tahahaha_hahaha_haha_hahahaha_hahaha/.
40 Bülent Diken, Nihilism, Key Ideas (London: Routledge, 2009).
41 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 155.
42 GeenStijl, ‘Het Hufter Manifest’.
43 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 155.
45 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 174.
50 Heijne, ‘Vieze Vingers’.
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interview in the Dutch weekly *Vrij Nederland*, Brussen explained his motives. ‘The moment I get behind my computer, I immediately enter my own universe. There is no one in front of you. You do not see any facial expressions, if you get angry, there is nothing to temper it’. In everyday reality, Brussen asserts, he is well behaved: ‘In normal human interrelations I have been raised as any other person. If I get emotional, I apply the brakes, I will not start cursing or use big words’. In the digital world, it is different. Brussen compares the expression of opinions to urinating: ‘It is like being toilet trained. In real life you will visit the toilet when peeing, on the internet, you just let it loose; because you know, it does not matter, there are no borders’. The internet is a giant toilet for Bert Brussen, an autonomous domain where one can do everything that is not allowed in everyday life:

It was a subculture of provocation, of saying really intense things, and especially in the beginning there was little consciousness of the outside world. The idea was: the internet, it is ours, it is for the boys who enjoy it. The old media are there for the official, decent stories, on the internet one can let fly, there are no limits.  

But it is not merely an observation of a technological mindset that Brussen describes. It is literary nihilism gone rogue and digital. Brussen talks of his strict Christian upbringing in the provincial town of Bennekom and his discussions with the minister on the existence of God. Nietzsche called the death of God and the absence of moral certainties a ‘metaphysical wound’ that can never be healed. Brussen presents his life, and that of his nihilist circle, as an attempt at coping with that condition:

He lives ‘within a wound’, Brussen says. And that is what he proposes to have in common with the circle he regularly hangs out with. The circle of friends of [comedian] Hans Teeuwen, people such as [columnist] Theodor Holman, [writer] Jonathan van het Reve and [illustrator] Gummbah. They gather in the house of Teeuwen, dubbed ‘the Palace of Freedom’. ‘We often have a lot of fun, we have great nights. An open house. But a certain nihilism, a realization that this life is quite miserable in the end, that is something that binds us’.  

Notes

2 Hofland, 9.
5 Bas Heijne, ‘Vieze Vingers’, *NRC Handelsblad*, 14 May 2011.
7 See the foreword of historian Niek Pas in Hans Righart, *De Eindeloze Jaren Zestig: Geschiedenis van een Generatieconflict* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006).
12 Catho-communism is neutrally defined as the combined commitment to Catholic values and leftist politics. It is often used in a pejorative sense to describe a dangerous combination of two absolutist, dogmatic doctrines. See: Zygmunt G. Barański and Rebecca J. West, ‘The Cambridge Companion to Modern Italian Culture’, *Modern Italy* 8, no. 1 (2003): 109–45.
15 Frits Bolkestein, *De Engel en het Beest* (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 1990), 17, 23, 66, 238.
19 Literary critic Arnold Heumakers once described the worldview of Arnon Grunberg, often considered the single most influential Dutch writer today, as a copy of Hermans or ‘nihilism-on-the-cheap’. See Arnold Heumakers, ‘Nihilisme op een Koopje’, *NRC Handelsblad*, 27 April 2001.
20 It is surprising that (to my knowledge) no studies exist of Dutch nihilism as a current of thought. An academic search query on ‘Dutch nihilism’ returns no results. Perhaps a Romantic tendency in the Dutch literary field to accord each author their own unique and deeply personal worldview has prevented more general accounts of this influential intellectual current. On the post-war reception of the novels of Reve and Hermans, in which they were frequently referred to as nihilists by leading literary critics, see Kamp, *Iedereen zei, dat is pornografie*. For a more general attempt to sociologically situate the pessimist worldview of Hermans and Reve, see Ido Weijers, *Terug naar het Behouden Huis: Romanschrijvers en Wetenschappers in de Jaren Vijftig* (Amsterdam: SUA, 1991).
27 Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 152.
28 Nietzsche, 160.
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33 Willem Frederik Hermans, Mandarijnen op Zwavelzuur (Amsterdam: Thomas Rap, 1973), 60.
34 Hermans interpreted Nietzsche selectively, reducing the meaning of nihilism to negative or religious nihilism. Here I differ in opinion from Kieft, who argues that Hermans’ interpretation of Nietzsche’s nihilism is essentially correct, and who portrays Hermans as giving Ter Braak a ‘beginner’s course’ in nihilism. See Kieft, Oorlogsmythen, 118.
35 Hermans, Mandarijnen op zwavelzuur, 61.
36 Hermans, 63.
37 Kieft, Oorlogsmythen, 96–139.
40 Thinkers such as Bülent Diken connect passive nihilism with the post-political order, the end of ideological conflict since 1989, when politics was increasingly reduced to technocratic management. Of course, there was also an earlier end of ideology debate in the 1960s. The work of Hermans can be seen as an expression of that political reality. See Diken, Nihilism.
41 Willem Frederik Hermans, De Donkere Kamer van Damocles (Amsterdam: Van Oorschot, 1967), 361.
42 At times, Hermans appears to employ Nietzsche’s nihilism to defend a l’art pour l’art position. In the eyes of Hermans, the big problem of the religious nihilists, and the major error of Ter Braak’s appeal to human dignity, is that they ‘were opposed to l’art pour l’art […]’, opposed to entartete kunst, against surrealism’. Hermans, Mandarijnen op Zwavelzuur, 60. But for Nietzsche, the function of art was to beautify life. In this way, it would allow us to cope with the truth of life’s inherent ugliness and meaningless. Hermans does the very opposite in his literary practice. Rather than beautifying life, his novels are an expression of Nietzsche’s bleak vision.
45 Janssen, Scheppend Nihilisme, 177.
46 Janssen, 179.
48 Elders, Filosofie als Science-Fiction, 132.
49 Kieft, Oorlogsmythen, 229–30.
51 Mulisch, Het Ironische van de Ironie.
52 Cited in Van Hasselt, ‘Het Raadsel van Reve’.
53 Mulisch, Het Ironische van de Ironie, 20.
56 Edwin Praat, *Verrek, het is geen Kunstenaar: Gerard Reve en het Schrijverschap* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2014), 175.
57 Praat, 145.
58 Praat, 72–3.
60 Van Gogh, *Er Gebeurt Nooit Iets*, 93. For Van Gogh’s references to Hermans’ ‘Catholic part of the nation’ (Katholieke volksdeel), see Van Gogh, 75, 118.
61 Max Pam, another leading Dutch columnist in the tradition of Hermans and Reve, has written a useful historical overview of the use of the term ‘goatfucker’. See Max Pam, *Het Bijenspook: Over Dier, Mens en God* (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2009).
63 Theo van Gogh, *De Gezonde Roker* (Baarn: De Prom, 2000).
71 Cited in Ligtenberg and Polak, 386.
75 Donkers.
Muslims. Paul Cliteur presented himself as a freethinker, who could dispel religion through the force of his arguments. Theo van Gogh believed in ideas as a means to bring down the politically correct establishment, through shock, provocation and transgression. GeenStijl presented its ideas in a glorified manner as ‘boorish precision bombardments’, ‘verbal and digital cynicism’ aimed at destroying the sacred totems called ‘decency’ and ‘respect’.

This eclectic alliance has been a dominant force in Dutch intellectual life since the 1990s, while Dutch progressives became increasingly intellectually moribund, expressed in Jos de Beus’ critique of ‘the lacuna on the left’. What the New Right philosophy lacked in consistency, it amply made up in its fidelity to the Gramscian ideal of the socialization of political thought:

Creating a new culture does not only mean one’s own individual ‘original’ discoveries. It also, and most particularly, means the diffusion in a critical form of truths already discovered, their ‘socialisation’ as it were. […] For a mass of people to be led to think coherently and in the same coherent fashion about the real present world, is a ‘philosophical’ event far more important and ‘original’ than the discovery by some philosophical ‘genius’ of a truth which remains the property of small groups of intellectuals.

The New Right has consciously sought to fundamentally change Dutch politics through a battle of ideas, contesting the legacy of ‘1968’. Even though its victories have been partial and the battle far from finalized, its impact has been considerable. This study tells the story of that battle.

Notes
3 Servatius W. Couwenberg, Opstand Der Burgers: De Fortuyn-Revolte En Het Demasqué van de Oude Politiek (Damon, 2004), 23.
4 Henk Hofland, Tegels Lichten of Ware Verhalen over Autoriteiten in het Land van de Voldongen Feiten (Amsterdam: Contact, 1973).
6 Herman Vuijsje, Correct: Weldenkend Nederland sinds de Jaren Zestig (Amsterdam: Contact, 1997), 80.
7 Already in 1992, Bolkestein had argued that speaking out on immigration would lead to a dampening of resentment. See Frits Bolkestein, Woorden Hebben Hun Betekenis (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 1992), 199.
Conclusion: Both a revolt and an echo

13 Robin, 20.
19 Fortuyn, *Tegen de Islamisering van Onze Cultuur*.
Postscript: The next generation

inspiration he shares with the American alt-right, the French Front National, the Spanish party VOX, the German AfD and the Italian Lega Nord. Baudet is also more radical than the first-generation Dutch conservatives, flirting openly with fascist ideas and racist conspiracy theories and claiming that the emancipation of Dutch women has made them unhappy and alienated. For some of the first-generation conservatives, like Joshua Livestro, Baudet has gone too far. Others, such as Paul Cliteur and Bart Jan Spruyt, see in Forum for Democracy the long-awaited fulfilment of their desire for a conservative party. Illustrative of that generational connection was an event in the summer of 2019, where Baudet and Spruyt spoke on the relation between conservatism and Christianity. Spruyt revealed that Baudet had once, in an informal personal message, addressed him as John. ‘It took some time before I understood what you meant’, Spruyt said at the event, half-jokingly. ‘But then the penny dropped. I was, like John the Baptist once, in your eyes the trailblazer. And you a messiah of sorts’.

Notes


7 Thierry Baudet, Oikofobie: De Angst Voor Het Eigene (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2013).


9 Thierry Baudet, Conservatieve Vooruitgang (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2012).

10 Thierry Baudet, Revolutionair Verval en Conservatieve Vooruitgang in de 18e En 19e Eeuw (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2012).


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