“This rich book is an act of guardianship. Filled with fascinating and incisive essays, it probes the recrudescence of anti-liberal and non-liberal regimes that often claim to be excellent democracies, better than the liberal variant. For those of us wishing to secure the rule of law and individual and public rights, political liberalism’s hallmarks, there is no more vexing challenge.”

Ira I. Katznelson, Ruggles Professor of Political Science and History, Columbia University

“In presenting a multiplicity of perspectives on the broad and timely issue of illiberal democracy, The Emergence of Illiberalism fills a major gap in current scholarly literature. Examining the rise of illiberal politics from numerous angles, this volume will provide an excellent foundation for readers seeking to understand contemporary political conditions.”

Phillip W. Gray, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Texas A&M University at Qatar
THE EMERGENCE OF ILLIBERALISM

As illiberal and authoritarian trends are on the rise—both in fragile and in seemingly robust democracies—there is growing concern about the longevity of liberalism and democracy. The purpose of this volume is to draw on the analytical resources of various disciplines and public policy approaches to reflect on the current standing of liberal democracy. Leading social scientists from different disciplinary backgrounds aim to examine the ideological and structural roots of the current crisis of liberal democracies, in the West and beyond, conceptually and empirically.

The volume is divided into two main parts:

- Part I explores tensions between liberalism and democracy in a longer-term, historical perspective to explain immanent vulnerabilities of liberal democracy. Authors examine the conceptual foundations of Western liberal democracy that have shaped its standing in the contemporary world. What lies at the core of illiberal tendencies?
- Part II explores case studies from the North Atlantic, Eastern Europe, Turkey, India, Japan, and Brazil, raising questions whether democratic crises, manifested in the rise of populist movements in and beyond the Western context, differ in kind or only in degree. How can we explain the current popular appeal of authoritarian governments and illiberal ideas?

The Emergence of Illiberalism will be of great interest to teachers and students of politics, sociology, political theory, and comparative government.
**Boris Vormann** is Professor of Politics and Director of the Politics Section at Bard College Berlin. His research focuses on the role of the state in globalization and urbanization processes; nations and nationalism; and the crisis of democracy. His most recent books are *Democracy in Crisis: The Neoliberal Roots of Popular Unrest* (with Christian Lammert, 2019) and *Contours of the Illiberal State* (2019).

**Michael D. Weinman** is Professor of Philosophy at Bard College Berlin. He is the author of three books, most recently, *The Parthenon and Liberal Education* (2018, co-authored with Geoff Lehman), and the editor (with Shai Biderman) of *Plato and the Moving Image* (2019). His research focuses on Greek philosophy, political philosophy, and their intersection.
THE EMERGENCE OF ILLIBERALISM

Understanding a Global Phenomenon

Edited by Boris Vormann and Michael D. Weinman
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Political memory seems surprisingly short, given that the current crisis of neoliberalism has predecessors. In the West, market rule has run rampant before—at least twice in the 19th century (before the busts of the 1830s and 1840s, and again leading up to 1872) as well as, once more, in the “Roaring 20s” of the 20th century. In fact, the imbalance between economics and politics that we deem to be an important cause of today’s crisis is a motif that keeps coming back.

It almost seems like, for several decades, belief in the market as an ersatz for politics dominates; then, politics seems to become important again as a way to rein in the markets. Despite this historical experience and these “open secrets,” many (economic) liberals went on arguing time and again that a free market would, of necessity, lead to free societies. And they keep on doing so today. The only difference is that the crisis of conviction, limited at earlier moments to national and continental levels, now has more immediately global cascading effects.

The insight that liberal democracy, both as an idea and as a set of practices, is rooted in striking a balance between economic and political forces was already very much clear to a classical liberal like Adam Smith. Smith has been read, since his death, in a carelessly one-sided way as simply concerned with prosperity and the “invisible hand” of the market. This, despite the fact that the metaphor of an invisible hand was hardly of central importance to Smith and in any case was surely not meant to undermine the moral duty of states to ensure liberty and equality, values of at least as much importance to Smith as prosperity.

His concerns about the destabilizing and demoralizing potential in an unchecked economic liberalism were underscored by reformist liberals such as John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville, who, despite their political and
ideological differences, both articulated a vision of liberalism grounded in values other than those that can be commodified. In short: *homo economicus* is not enough; for liberalism to thrive, the ideal subject would also have to be *homo politicus*! For this political tradition within liberalism, freedom of opinion, religious freedom, and plurality mattered. Social progress, its enthusiasts thought, depended on the openness of societies. Yes, markets were important, but they were not sufficient, by themselves, for democracy to succeed.

This volume seeks to make sense of today’s global crisis of liberal democracy in light of the recurrent amnesia concerning the insufficiency of economic liberalism alone among many liberals in power since World War II. Sometimes more, sometimes less directly, the myopic vision of market rule as an equivalent of democracy seems to underlie many of the critiques made in the theoretical and empirical chapters. Exposing the internal contradictions and shortcomings of liberalism, and how they interact with other causes, the chapters in this book seek to develop a clearer understanding of the parameters and dynamics that define an evolving set of crisis tendencies.

This book is the long-term result of a colloquium on “illiberal democracy” that the editors (and contributor Ewa Atanassow) organized at Bard College Berlin and the Hertie School of Governance in April 2018. We gratefully acknowledge our debt to both institutions and their leadership for making the colloquium possible. We would also like to express our gratitude to our colleagues at Bard College Berlin, Irina Stelea and Bendetta Roux, for their work in organizing and publicizing the Illiberal Democracy colloquium, and our student Simon Kastberg for editorial assistance.

We thank the authors who agreed to rework their colloquium presentations into book chapters. In the meantime, we had the good fortune to meet further scholars willing to contribute to the project. Their chapters were written specifically for this volume and have provided a compelling complement to the presentations that constituted the 2018 meeting. Moreover, three essays in this book are updated versions of texts that have recently appeared in journals. We thank *Foreign Affairs*, the *Journal of Democracy*, and *The New Statesman* for permission to reprint and slightly rework articles by Ivan Krastev, Marc Plattner, and Kristin Surak—and these scholars for their willingness to contribute to this volume.

We are very grateful to all the authors for their trust and enthusiastic work. We are particularly humbled for the opportunity to work with Roger Scruton, who kindly and carefully corresponded with us during months in which his health was failing, and to be able to share his contribution posthumously. Finally, we would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their very careful reading of the entire manuscript and for many helpful comments and suggestions.

The editors

Berlin, February 2020
PART I
Democracy, Contested
Causes of Illiberalism
Introduction

Liberal democracy is in crisis. This much seems undisputed in the literature and media comments that have proliferated since 2016, when the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump ignited new debates about the meaning and limitations of liberal democracy. If anything, this verdict has been consolidated by subsequent electoral successes of populist parties in other European states, such as France, Austria, Italy, and Germany, as well as similar tendencies in Australia and Ontario, Canada’s most populous and globally connected province. The dissatisfaction with the status quo was equally expressed in the initial shift toward the left in Southern European countries such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal—and the rise of right-wing parties that followed. Beyond the West, the election of Jair Bolsonaro as the President of Brazil, turmoil in former Soviet states in Eastern Europe, and an autocratic reinterpretation of democracy under Abe, Erdogan, Modi, and Putin only reinforce the sense that the triumphant era of liberalism is over.

The engines of neoliberal, market-led globalization, which appeared unparalleled in power after the fall of the Berlin Wall, seem to have come to a screeching halt. So, too, has the confidence or at least the hope that democracy, in tandem with markets, was on an inevitable course to expand happily ever after. In the West, what is common across otherwise wildly different cases is a distrust for existing parties, deep inequalities coupled with extreme polarization of the political spectrum, and the desire for anti-establishment politicians to clean up corruption and restore responsiveness to their constituencies. On both sides of the Atlantic, opponents of free trade and critics of globalization are organizing; so are ethnic nationalists, who see an opening
for more authoritarian politics. More often than not, elections turn into tribunals on the establishment, with the judgment turning against the elites and the status quo.

On a global level, liberalism and theories of democratic peace seem to have lost explanatory power and normative appeal. Hopes for global convergence and integration are thwarted as the divide between the global north and the global south deepens further. Humanitarian interventions are being refuted as thinly veiled geostrategic maneuvers and the West seems to have lost its lure—a process accelerating as its core countries seem to be themselves turning away from the liberal creed. National interests are again dominating international relations (IR), while more normative approaches seeking cooperation and integration tend to be rejected as naïve do-goodism. Supranational institutions of the post-World War II era—the United Nations, NATO, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization—are eroding under the pressures of protectionism and neo-mercantilist trade conflicts. In short, Realpolitik is back. And so are great power politics, weapons races, and zero-sum politics.

Illiberal forces quickly seek to fill the ideological vacuum left by a hollowed out liberal idealism. Once in office, however, demagogues not only fail to deliver most of their promises, but also and perhaps more importantly, alter the structures of the state and civil society in ways that are likely to inflict long-term damage. Undoing checks and balances, in particular through intervention in the judiciary, public officials’ conflicts of interest, and the defamation of the media, they put essential pillars of democracy and core ideals of the enlightenment under attack. In the absence of meaningful reform, strongman leaders distract attention from their bankrupt political vision with xenophobic appeals and a politics of indignation, further unraveling prior commitments to liberal democracy. Meanwhile, they revise institutional and procedural pillars of democracy, indicating that illiberal politics—a fear-driven, authoritarian reorganization of the state around exclusive and patriarchal notions of an ethnic demos that seeks to undo the norms and institutions of political liberalism—will not be effaced easily with the next election, impeachment, or vote of no confidence.

We contend that the variegated forms of illiberalism—much like variegated neoliberalization patterns (Brenner et al. 2010)—materialize in otherwise very different contexts at the same historical moment because they have a set of common denominators. Illiberal tendencies seek to partially reshape neoliberal practices and ideas of the past half-century—the politics of no alternative that posited the inevitability of globalization and the superiority of market solutions—at a moment where these practices and ideas no longer seem legitimate in the core countries of the North Atlantic. While progressives have been criticizing neoliberalism for a long time, it is the right-wing critique of neoliberalism that is much more successfully redoing neoliberalism, and, potentially, undoing liberal democracy in the West and beyond.
Unlike the left, which argues for reform through redistribution and de-commodification to address the consequences of welfare state retrenchment and deep inequalities, right-wing critiques operate from the understanding that the demos—defined in exclusive, ethno-nationalist terms—is under attack by overwhelming outside forces, while the state, corrupted by naïve or deluded elites—the much-scolded establishment—is unwilling or unable to protect its citizens. Calls for law and order, stricter security, and a reassertion of popular sovereignty are at the heart of this politics of fear. From that perspective, reform won’t do and the institutional safeguards of democracy, above all the separation of powers and the protection of minority rights, become viewed as hindrances to the defense of the “true” demos. Liberal democracy seems to stand in the way of “true” democracy.

How does this challenge to liberal democracy compare across contexts? How does the perceived failure of liberal policies and institutions in one region impact the global standing of liberal democracy in others? How far has the politics of fear progressed? And has a liberal vision of democracy been unseated? The chapters that follow explore the current crisis of liberal democracies conceptually and empirically, putting into perspective a wide range of country examples in the Western and Non-Western context, to seek answers to these questions and develop a vocabulary to better fathom illiberal tendencies. As they show, democracies around the world are facing a two-pronged crisis. One part of the crisis brought figures such as Trump, Johnson, and Orban into office in the first place. This is very much a crisis emerging from within the neoliberal paradigm. The second part of the crisis is currently unfolding as such political figures capture state power.

Comparing Global Variants of Illiberalism

Integral to the new illiberal international, understood as an internal outgrowth and not simply as an emulation of anti-Western autocrats such as Vladimir Putin, are the antipluralist, often demagogic, politicians who come to wield almost unchecked state power in both longstanding and emerging democracies (see also Galston 2018). Responding to recent electoral successes by non-establishment parties in very different contexts—from Brazil to the US, the UK to Israel—recent literature in the burgeoning field on “populism” is often written for a broad audience and, given the focus on one or another national readership, can lack the comparative scope and empirical depth for which this volume aims. To be sure, political context matters both for outcomes and potential ways of addressing crisis tendencies. Political cultures, institutional path dependencies, the role of a state in the international order as a hegemonic or peripheral power, are crucial for how the crisis dynamics play out in different settings. But because it tends to ignore important parallels that transcend, for instance, the specificities of a given party system—e.g. polarization in the US two-party system—or national context—e.g. Germany’s divided past—existing work undertheorizes commonalities.
There is, of course, a risk of treating all these cases—Brazil and the US, Germany, and India—the same. They are not. And we are not aiming to do that. The danger of such an endeavor would be to misunderstand common developments as though they naturally evolved in tandem developing such internal propulsion as to become almost inevitable—a wave of autocratization. What is the added value of bringing all these developments into one perspective, then? Above all, it enables us to explore the global scope of related phenomena and to stress parallels and potential pathways. This, in turn, helps us to theorize certain patterns that we otherwise would not see because they might appear conjunctural or coincidental in an individual context where they are not. Trump, for instance, is not simply chaotic even though he is often portrayed as such. Viewing him in comparison helps to outline what is actually a rather coherent pattern of policy visions.

While too much of the work on populism focuses only on state-by-state unit-level idiosyncrasies, we also hope to identify a broader context in which all this happens, common preconditions that facilitate the rise of autocrats, and certain strategies that they use to mobilize their voter base, seize state capacities, and act while in office. Although the empirical cases examined in this volume reflect a wide range of political systems, different democratic traditions, and economic contexts, the paths toward autocracy are contiguous. As such, we can sketch out something like an ideal–typical trajectory of de-democratization that we can witness in otherwise very different places—even if the starting point and (therefore) the end results differ in important ways.

_The Problem with the Term Populism_

Before we sketch these broader global patterns, an important terminological caveat is in order. Notwithstanding Chantal Mouffe’s (2018) recent explicit call for a “left populism,” it is difficult to find voices that self-identify as populist within the circle of those hoping to sustain liberal democracy through its current moment of crisis. The term is usually used in a pejorative manner to discredit different movements. This creates a series of problems. Populist critiques might well voice true grievances that should be taken seriously and surely not be rejected out of hand. Worse, knee-jerk reactions against populist movements ignore the democratic potentials of binding recently politicized populations back into actual politics (Eichengreen 2018; see Calhoun in this volume).

As such, the common deployment of the term “populism,” both within social science and by political actors associated with liberalism of the left, right, and center, only aggravates the well-known crisis of legitimacy. As Jan-Werner Müller crucially points out, “[n]ot everyone who criticizes elites is a populist” (Müller 2016, 101). But oftentimes, in practice, this distinction is blurred so that many public discussions do fall into a by–now familiar dichotomy: either you are with the status quo or a populist. The simple derogatory use of the
term populist equates all such movements regardless of political ideology and direction, playing down actual fascist groups and aggrandizing fringe movements, placing anyone skeptical of liberalism into a single category: enemies of democracy. This is hampering an already fraught political discourse. We use different terms to refer to critics of liberalism, (civic or ethnic) nationalists, and fascists, and there are reasons for that.

From an analytical perspective, another crucial problem with the term populism is that, if used uncritically, it ignores the more structural and discursive factors that have given rise to widespread discontent in the first place. This, of course, has far-reaching implications. If one interprets the rise of illiberalism simply as the outbreak of a contagious craze at the populist fringes, the status quo ante, that is, a return to neoliberalism, might suddenly appear quite appealing. But “global Trumpism” (see Hopkin and Blyth in this volume) has its roots precisely in neoliberalization processes. It is not simply the result of an irrational aberrance. This is why simply returning to the politics that paved the way for illiberalism would do little to resolve the more fundamental problems at stake that emanate from an internal crisis of neoliberalism.

Neoliberalism’s Implosion

Deep are the roots of those thinkers who advocate for free market capitalism. But Adam Smith (particularly in his Theory of Moral Sentiments), John Stuart Mill, and Alexis de Tocqueville would all have agreed that homo economicus—as someone who only strives for the maximization of their self-interest in a competitive struggle for survival of all against all—is not enough; for liberalism to thrive, the ideal subject would also have to be someone who can take informed choices and sometimes prioritize the common good: homo politicus! For this political tradition within liberalism, freedom of opinion, minority rights, and plurality mattered. Social progress, its enthusiasts thought, depended on the openness of societies. Yes, markets were important, but they were not sufficient, by themselves, for democracy to succeed. There needed to be associations, free media, and a sensus communis (not just “common sense” but also a sense of community) for democracy to be actually possible (see Atanassow and Scruton in this volume).

Liberalism consists of a set of practices and ideas that since the beginning of the enlightenment era have foregrounded the importance of individual liberty, private property, and the market in organizing societies. Importantly, however, liberalism is a deeply ambivalent term. Two hearts beat in its chest. Whereas economic liberalism emerged as a critique of the absolutist state and an attempt to strengthen the emerging bourgeois classes in 18th-century Europe, what we (along with others; e.g. Brown 2015) call political liberalism of the 19th century foregrounds the need for a minimal, but nonetheless interventionist, state and a strong civil society to hem in the outgrowths of the market and allow certain civic and political rights for the citizenry.
In short, economic liberalism is mostly concerned with market freedoms and assumes that there is an automatic expansion of political rights once markets grow. By contrast, it is political liberalism that develops a more profound understanding of democracy and that asks for certain institutional arrangements (such as elections, the separation of powers, political parties), for individual rights and certain substantive public goods (political freedoms, education, information, etc.) to ensure its existence. In the first half of the 20th century, it was ultimately this political tradition that fostered the rise of modern welfare states, in and beyond the West, to add certain social rights to protect citizens from social risks (such as unemployment, sickness, old age, etc.) and make possible deeper and wider participation in democratic institutions.

Since the late 1970s, however, neoliberalization processes—economic liberalism in practice, not theory—have reversed these achievements of political liberalism, under the pretense that if markets rule, the rest will follow (Brenner et al. 2010; Peck 2010). As we contend, it is this long-term crisis of political liberalism—hollowed out by a notion that economic liberalism would equally sustain and extend democracy—that has prepared the ground for illiberal tendencies. Thus, Smith, Tocqueville, and Mill would probably agree with our view.

At the risk of belaboring the point, it is important to emphasize that this is not an external crisis that has suddenly overcome all liberal democracies. Put differently, this is not simply a wave of autocratization analogous to Samuel Huntington’s notion of waves of democratization (Huntington 1991). At the heart of this immanent crisis is a confusion. Or rather: a slippage. In Western democracies, economic liberalism has hijacked the political project of the enlightenment. It has inverted emancipatory social projects into social division, political apathy, and full-out anger. In economic and social policy, an impoverished understanding of liberal democracy, equaling democratization with the expansion of markets and the protection of individual property rights, has eclipsed the principles of political liberalism. As such, market fundamentalism has left us bereft of a language to think and act politically outside the terms set by economic thinking (Brown 2015).

Karl Polanyi, a central thinker to describe this predicament of market society, has been proven right in many things, but wrong on one key point: laissez-faire was by no means as dead as he thought, even if it might have seemed so in 1944, when he published his seminal book *The Great Transformation*. To be certain, he did write at a moment where it could easily have seemed that way: this moment saw the birth of a Bretton Woods order, through which social policies gradually expanded to ever larger sections of societies in the North Atlantic. In many contexts, the welfare state thus did take off the edges of economic liberalism (while the West became a role model for others to imitate). However, the 1970s resuscitated old beliefs. A bundle of crises—the OPEC oil crisis, stagflation, and fiscal crises at the local government level (as, most prominently, in New York City)—delivered a death blow to the Keynesian-Fordist
compromise and the post-World War II order. The conservative revolution of the early 1980s was successful in developing a narrative that held government interventionism responsible for the crisis, and government leaders (with Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher being just the most often-cited) proceeded to dismantle regulations and privatize public goods in the name of efficiency and under the banner of individual freedom. In most Western democracies, these processes included a period of rolling back Keynesian institutions in the 1980s, and rolling out and deepening neoliberal policy agendas through welfare state retrenchment, labor market deregulation, and free trade agreements in the 1990s and 2000s (see Brenner et al. 2010).

Again, markets took precedence over politics. In the process, Hayek’s “road to serfdom” led instead to a radicalization of the concept of the market. Not only, now, were social progress and the growth of markets supposed to go together, as they did in the works of the classical economists. No, the argument went: without freely competitive markets, democracy would be utterly impossible. The more that social order was left to the market mechanism, the greater the degree of democracy, while the more active the state, the greater the degree of oppression. While market failure might well occur, the risks of government failure would always be worse still. This fanatical orientation of economic liberalism’s market philosophy in the West was amplified after the fall of the Soviet Union, given that the failure of actually existing socialism seemed to spell out the lack of any viable alternative to liberal capitalism. The global expansion of neoliberalism under these preconditions also explains the impact of the crisis today as markets have expanded in every social sphere in and between nation-states.

The blind faith in market rule ignored the risks at stake. The promise of personal fulfillment that it incited in individuals worked so long as there was upward mobility because the belief in one’s own opportunities for success could compensate for some of the retrenchment of the welfare state. In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, however, this belief in individual success no longer seemed appropriate (Hopkin 2020). In the global north, the path of fulfillment through consumption could no longer be maintained with the help of cheap credit and affordable goods from abroad. Meanwhile, given the emphasis on individual responsibility in the unbundling of social systems since the Reagan-Thatcher revolution, the middle class had lost many of its rights to participate in decision-making both in the workplace and, increasingly, in politics. Just as public goods had been disappearing, individuals found themselves increasingly left alone (Honig 2017; Vormann and Lammert 2019), while the fragmentation of the public sphere made it more and more difficult, if not impossible, to articulate and pursue emancipatory political projects (see Milstein in this volume). The promise of prosperity, freedom, and peace, however, as supposedly enabled by market globalization proved to be only unevenly fulfilled, at best. Inequalities had grown by leaps and bounds within and between
countries, and health care and social security systems are today massively underfinanced (see Lammert in this volume).

Not only did the blessings of the market, unanimously heralded after the Cold War, fail to materialize; the market also did harm. Instead of the salutary promise of “trickle-down” and the blooming fields of economic integration, there followed stagnating salaries, exploding living costs, and an ever-widening gap between rich and poor (see Hopkin and Blyth in this volume). In addition, the privatization of public goods made the logic of the highest bidder spread to many areas of life pushing the fragmentation of society to new extremes. As wealth became concentrated in the hands of a smaller and smaller number of individuals, the economization of society and politics began to threaten social cohesion. In numerous countries, the fissure today runs along the divide between urban and rural areas, highly qualified specialists and individuals with less education, self-designated elites and those who have been economically left behind.

As globalization seemed inexorable (and ultimately beneficial to all), increasingly technocratic politics did little to halt the hollowing out of market protections (see Berkowitz in this volume). In the West, the so-called Third Way of the immediate post-Cold War era instead promised many things to many people: the center-right was appeased through cuts in social spending in the name of competitiveness, while the center-left emphasized the cosmopolitan potentials of globalization. Interestingly, the “bloated state” that had been held responsible for the crises of the 1970s ultimately did not become any smaller. Its priorities simply shifted: from redistribution to militarization, from investments in public goods through federal and local governments to the so-called public–private partnerships that mimicked private competition by shifting costs and blame to the public actors—ultimately making these solutions across policy fields neither less expensive nor less exclusive or more democratic, for that matter. As flexible, precarious working conditions grew in number, however, as systems to buffer social risk were left unfunded, and politicians no longer seemed to listen to the citizenry (and sometimes were found to be corrupted), the dissatisfaction with the status quo grew and these politics of no alternative divided society along existing default lines.

Liberal democracy increasingly appeared as an empty shell. Even in those presumably stable democracies of the West, whole segments of the population no longer felt heard by politicians. Influence on the political process—a core element of functioning representative democracies—appeared as a privilege reserved for the lobbyists and water-carriers of business and the super-rich (Gilens 2012). A deep rift therefore opened up between privileged populations and those who feared losing their social status, an unsavory combination that, as Jill Frank (2005, 74–75) notes, Aristotle already identified in Politics (Book 3, Chapters 1–4) as anathema for rule by constitution, i.e. for a politeia, the “healthy regime type” where many share in rule that is aligned with and can
degenerate into *demokratia*, the “popular” regime. As Robert A. Dahl (1989, 18) foregrounds with view to the Athenian city-state, “no state could hope to be a good polis if its citizens were greatly unequal.” If citizens no longer act for the common good, if there is a disconnect between those who govern and the governed, questions of legitimacy arise quickly. The same still holds true for modern, large-scale democracy.

**Cascading Effects: The Global Crisis of Liberalism**

The crisis of liberal democracy is truly global mainly because the politics of no alternatives pursued by economic liberals in the name of market globalization had its origins in a similar premise in Europe and the US (Vormann and Lammert 2019), and by implication through extended networks of market exchange and finance, as well as Bretton Woods institutions and other entities of global governance, it extended beyond these countries of the core. A neo-classical vision of market rule has therefore dominated the politics of the last decades, not only in the settled democracies of the NATO alliance and in the EU but also in the so-called emerging democracies of Latin America and Asia. Within nation-states, it has meant shrinking governments through budget cuts and fiscal conservatism; privatizing public goods; and deregulating labor, financial, and health-care markets, while simultaneously transferring to individuals the responsibility for their social reproduction and employment. In international affairs, it has meant forcibly expanding free trade through the policies of the Washington Consensus, which was then—in a wish that quickly soured—also expected to ensure a democratic peace among rational state actors, thanks to the interdependence and mutual agreements between states that were supposed to accompany such policies.

While around the most recent turn of the century even autocratic leaders felt the need to aspire at least in rhetoric to the ideal of democratic governance—think of Putin’s “sovereign democracy” or, for that matter, Orban’s “illiberal democracy”—the enthusiasm of an American-led expansion of liberal democracy has lost all its momentum. The implosion of neoliberalism as an ideal and a set of practices are central to this. Not only were many cosmopolitan hopes thwarted, liberal democracy has increasingly been seen as a fig leaf for welfare state retrenchment in the West, and structural adjustment in the semi-periphery and the global south. Economic liberalism has failed, but political liberalism is being held responsible. The blame for underfunded social goods was shifted to the open society in an odd but by no means accidental reversal and distortion of causalities.

At the same time that the Washington Consensus hollowed out the hopes for integration and political emancipation, US hegemony entered a crisis which, since the turn of the century, has often been described, particularly with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the expansion of NATO (and EU) into
Eastern Europe, as the fallout from an imperial overstretch. In that context, the self-ascribed moral leadership of the US was fundamentally weakened by the use of torture under George W. Bush, the failure to close Guantanamo under Barack Obama, not to speak of Donald Trump’s pivot from the idealist tradition to neo-realist zero-sum logics and full-on confrontation. Trump’s decision to give up the ideal of American moral leadership altogether hence almost seems consequent. It is certainly consequential for the viability of a liberal vision of inter-state relations.

Unsurprisingly, this reorientation away from the post-Cold War liberal consensus is currently a hot topic in scholarly debates in the political science subfield of IR. The “realist” perspective welcomes it, pointing out how the liberal project had always been a set of high-flying ideals that were bound to fail from the outset and should be given up altogether. Stephen Walt’s book with the telling title *The Hell of Good Intentions* paradigmatically argues that America’s pursuit of liberal hegemony poisoned relations with Russia, led to costly quagmires in Afghanistan, Iraq, and several other countries […] and encouraged both states and non-state actors to resist U.S. efforts or to exploit them for their own benefit.

(Walt 2018, 14)

Like Walt, John J. Mearsheimer highlights the impossibility of the “liberal dream” (Mearsheimer 2018) which had dragged the US into unnecessary and dangerous engagements abroad, and urges policy-makers to balance off-shore rivals through tactics of divide and conquer while redirecting military investments into the rebuilding of public goods at home—interestingly, a traditional claim of the left (for instance, Williams 1959). Even liberal theorists, while they don’t share the prescriptive conclusions, agree that the liberal order is in peril (Ikenberry 2018; Rose 2019). The years of confidence and notions of an inevitable liberal expansion under the moral leadership of the US seem long gone. Against this backdrop of a compromised ideological consensus and the loss of a common compass, in the global south and in the semi-periphery, the hopes of the post–Cold War have abated (Krastev in this volume). The 1990s enthusiasm for marketization, very much at the center of cosmopolitan hopes of global emancipation and integration, now rings hollow.

Less discussed in the IR literature, but nonetheless crucial is the fact that, much in line with Karl Polanyi’s observation, illiberalism springs spontaneously from a legitimate set of concerns and grievances within a multitude of different societies. It is not, at its origins, an “anti-liberal conspiracy” (Polanyi [1944] 2001, 151) concocted and premeditated by a new type of political consciousness. The nearly simultaneous parallels in re-nationalization not only in the US and the UK but clear across the world and encompassing established and new
democracies from Brazil to India indicate something deeper. Namely, that and how the hopes of political emancipation, which still prevailed in the late 20th century, have disappeared precisely alongside the expansion and integration of the market within all spheres of politics.

Progressive Critiques: Liberalism Is Not Rule by Markets

It is not that the left didn’t see it coming. A body of work emerged much before the first so-called populists came to power that voiced a very strong critique of the neoliberal politics of no alternative. Political scientists and economic sociologists, among others, explained the central themes at stake in today’s debates about the crisis of democracy in great breadth and depth (Mouffe 2005; Crouch 2011; Wallerstein et al. 2013; Vogl 2015; Streeck 2017). As such, the downsides of globalization and the dangers that result from inequalities and threaten social stability have been identified, analyzed, and denounced in recent decades by many authors in Europe, North America, and beyond (Stiglitz 2003; Wilkinson 2005; Bartels 2008). Nor was it only academics and readers with specialized interests who began to think more deeply about inequalities and their dangers. The topic veritably exploded following the global financial crisis, and authors like Blyth (2013) and Piketty (2014) became very well-known far beyond the ivory tower.

The critique of neoliberalism included, as one of its elements, a critique of the market that essentially took aim at the negative consequences of the economization of societies—a tendency that, according to these authors, endangered democracy. Not everything, they argued, can be simply treated as a commodity (in other words, not all things can be commodified). Markets have technical, moral, and political limits. Subsumed within the market, societies lose their ability to think and act politically. In that way, technocracy, as it has come to dominate education, the legal system, and political discourse, renders true politics impossible (Crouch 2015). Adding to this, market society’s growing inequalities translate into unequal influence on politics. As such, responsiveness, the extent to which political representatives still attend to the interests of the people, is extremely unequally distributed.

In sum, this progressive critique highlighted, democracy is sometimes at odds with (economic) liberalism, because even though the latter might aim to protect certain individual rights and thereby the constituents of the demos from the tyranny of the majority, its emphasis on individual liberty can contradict the need for public virtue. Put differently, liberalism—even more so in its economic version—gives only a partial vision of democracy that foregrounds individualism at the detriment of other potential understandings and practices of democracy (see Plattner in this volume). However, as innumerable authors have insisted since at least the 18th century—Smith, Tocqueville, and Mill again come to mind—democracy is more than market rule.
This progressive critique did not end with calling into question the current state of affairs. Many critics on the left even pointed to possible ways out of the crisis. Particularly since the 2008 global financial crisis, some authors stressed the role of the state as an important actor, despite globalization, and that, as in the past, government should be called to account on matters that concern the public. Since the government is responsible for constructing infrastructure and investing in science and education, for instance, and since it exerts an often-invisible influence on the distribution of resources, it bears a significant share of responsibility for social welfare (Peck 2010; Mettler 2011; Mazzucato 2015). Especially where there is upward redistribution, the government must act in accordance with the common good, not wealthy special interests—or so went the normative argument. In other words, the state needs to be foregrounded and held accountable.

This could indeed be a starting point for rebuilding the (center) left from its ashes, because recognizing such responsibility means that the state does have room for maneuver and therefore could engage in a politics of redistribution and decommodification—politics, in other words, are not without alternative. But, be that as it may, in practice, after every crisis, exactly the opposite seems to transpire: the costs and indebtedness of private interests have been foisted upon the public many times over, while the state has been regarded either as helpless, wasteful, or inefficient. The global financial crisis is the best example. In many countries, it was renamed a sovereign debt crisis (which it never was) to shift both burden and blame from the private to the public. Mark Blyth, on this subject, talks about the “greatest bait-and-switch operation in modern history” (Blyth 2013, 73). All this was happening before the backdrop of historical economic inequalities and, in many countries, long-term real wage stagnation for the majority of workers (Runciman 2018). Is it surprising that there would be anger against economic and political elites?

Under these conditions of frustration and disillusionment, of deep inequalities and precarious labor, little events can spark turmoil. Think of the fuel hikes in France that unleashed the yellow-vest movement and of the increase in public transportation prices in Santiago that triggered some of the largest protests of Chilean history. Add to this a series of external shocks, such as natural disasters (as in Turkey), terrorist attacks (as in France), foreign interference (as in the US), and an already frail system seems much more vulnerable than the immediate post-Cold War era would have made seem possible. The 20th century’s hopes of equality and freedom, and of global peace and progress have been called off.

However, responses to the global crisis of neoliberalism are not preordained. What progressive voices offered as an alternative was to reject the dangers of market-led economic liberalism and embrace more political visions of society. They reasserted political liberalism to point out the divisiveness of market rule and the responsibility of the state. However, the left, despite movements such as Occupy Wall Street or Blockupy, was much less successful in articulating that political vision and translating it into electoral victories than the right.
The Critique from the Right: Who Belongs?

For the right, the solution to the long-term crisis of neoliberalism was not a salvaging of political liberalism, but its rejection in favor of a narrowly defined reassertion of popular sovereignty. As such, economic liberalism’s (very) myopic vision of market-led democracy has been in the process of being replaced by another, equally partial understanding of the idea of democracy. For all the differences between regimes and actors (self-)identified as illiberal, today they each share a key conviction: popular sovereignty, not the rule of law or protection of minorities, is the *sine qua non* of democracy.

Despite their differences, contributors to this volume—who explore the crisis phenomena at hand from conservative and progressive points of view—share the sense that illiberalism is a symptom rather than a root cause of the crisis of liberal democracy. Both left and right critique an overexposure to globalization and break with the dominant post–Cold War discourse of liberalism. In practice, as we shall argue, illiberalism is mainly a phenomenon of the right and it has given rise to a strange hybrid—in essence, an authoritarian turn and reinvention of neoliberalism (see Peck and Theodore 2019), that holds on to some selected neoliberal traditions and democratic rituals, but rejects liberal democracy as a normative social goal and a guiding principle to govern global economic exchange and political relations.

Such right-wing illiberalism misconstrues the body politic as *Volkskörper*, that is as “an organicist and essentialist entity” in which ‘the people’ comes to be regarded as “a somehow unified organism” (Paul 2019, 128). Globalization in its different forms—financialization, trade, migration—by contrast, is regarded as a threat to that demos which needs to be diverted. Even from a very general point of view, the concept of democracy is always ambivalent because the root of the term—‘rule by the many’ or ‘people’s rule’—neither tells us which people (*demos* in Greek, whence “democracy” derives) it applies to nor by which means such people should rule and be ruled. As such, modern democracies are constantly disputed: who is in and who is not matter. Moreover, the methods of rule are contested. Under which conditions is a representative government legitimate? How and for whom to ensure democracy? (Dahl 1989) Illiberalism is concerned, quite precisely, with the rejection of the political and social claims of political liberalism as they extend to a widely defined demos. Such rights and privileges should only be extended to the “true” citizen (determined by rather arbitrary ethnic approximations defined by the illiberal politician).

This commitment to popular sovereignty around a narrowly defined demos, in short, constitutes the core characterization of illiberalism, traversing the conceptual and terminological fields discussed in different ways and with different assumptions in this book. Interestingly, at the same time, illiberalism, while it rejects tenets of inclusive political liberalism, does not necessarily refute all the precepts of economic liberalism. Domestically, illiberal politicians indeed tend
to even strengthen market rule, while bracketing all democratic protection of individual and minority rights. It remains an open question, then, whether the commitment to popular and/or national sovereignty asserted by those who take up the mantle of “illiberal democracy” only pays lip service to those frustrated with the effects of globalization or whether it ought to be considered worthy of the name “democracy” at all. Even more so since in actual illiberal politics, more often than not, the closing of borders and erecting of (trade) barriers are matched by domestic hyper-deregulation and privatization. This will do little, of course, to address the problems of inequality and irresponsiveness at home—that we claim to be causal for the crisis of liberal democracy.

As discussed in detail in Marc Plattner’s contribution to this volume, Fareed Zakaria’s term *illiberal democracy* (Zakaria 1997), rendered famous in a 2014 speech by Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán, is a misnomer in that sense. Rather, *undemocratic (purely economic) liberalism* would more aptly describe what we see in many contexts where a further rollout of privatization and liberalization of the economy—economic liberalism in its truncated and amplified form—dovetails with a retrenchment of civil liberties, voting rights, and other political freedoms and social rights.

**Not Just Reaction: Illiberalism’s Productive Capacities**

So far, we have argued that, at this specific historical juncture, illiberalism rises as a promise to return to a vague pre-neoliberal era. Right-wing anti-globalization forces are seeking to protect nationals from the outside in a hostile world. But unlike the Keynesian–Fordist welfare state, there is hardly an articulation of an emancipatory political counter-vision—and if there is, it targets only an imagined ethnic core and seeks to restore traditional patriarchal values. Instead, we witness an extreme form of clientelism and the radical slashing of education budgets, a repealing of environmental protections—think of the environmental protection agency in the US, the burning down of rainforests in Brazil, or even the weak climate pact in Germany—and a massive deregulation of the financial sector. This is no longer quite neoliberalism *tout court*, given, for instance, the turn away from free trade or from the lip service to democracy and cosmopolitanism; nor quite fascism, because some democratic institutions persist, even if in an often very truncated way. This in-between phenomenon, described by some as a period of transition, or “interregnum” (Berman 2019), is what we see as the inflection point from which illiberalism emerges.

The illiberal alternative gestures toward a set of ways out of the neoliberal politics of no alternative. In its most extreme variants, essentially, what arises from the ruins of neoliberalism (Brown 2019), from the vacant ideological room left by undemocratic liberalism (Mounk 2018), in the absence of a strong center-left (or center-right) alternative, is a politics of fear. This politics of fear operates on prerational terms. It seeks to drive a wedge between the ‘true demos’ and the outsider. It works from the premise that the state is no longer
performing its basic tasks. That it no longer holds the monopoly of violence and can no longer protect citizens from foreign invasion and inner disintegration, and that the citizen has to take self-defense in their own hands.

No longer, obviously, is this the left critique of inequality and the injustices of globalization that could be faced by addressing the shortcomings of the state in terms of redistribution or deicommodification. It is a critique that shifts the blame from the economic inequalities between the haves and the have-nots, between the nation as a group of citizens and workers below—the 99%—against the 1% at the top (see OWS) to a critique of inside and outside: the ethnic nation that defends its traditional values and is under threat by overwhelming external forces that the state seems unwilling (because of its multicultural politics and openness to trade) or unable (see the critique of reduced state capacities that is shared with the mainstream discourse) to mitigate.

Under these circumstances of perceived emergency and threat to the very core of the populace, the institutions and procedures of liberal democracy no longer seem to hold. Everyone who opposes the ‘will of the people’ is an enemy: the media that spread fakenews to distract us from what is really going on, the foreigner who is taking away resources, the parliament that is dysfunctional and has been doing nothing but talking (‘all talk, no action’). And so the essential pillars of the rational enlightenment, necessary to make democracy possible, are toppled. The checks and balances are unfit to tackle the challenges and are set aside. Government operates by decree and by state of emergency. The politics of fear, such as those we see in the wake of the still-unfolding global pandemic, make pluralistic debate impossible. They pose political problems as life or death questions. Once this threshold is passed, there is simply no place for reason and reasoned argument.

As such, illiberalism is not only a reaction to the inner tensions and contradictions of neoliberalism. It has productive capacities. To attain power, would-be autocrats reinforce the climate of anxiety—by creating fears of an ethnic exchange (a conspiracy theory of the extreme right), instrumentalizing dissatisfaction with migration inflows (such as European political mobilizations against refugees since 2015 and candidate Trump’s call to “Build That Wall!”), and creating an impression of constant threats to physical safety from terrorists and other criminals (as in Duterte’s war on drug dealers). By demonizing others, demagogues can demand a partial reversal of globalization processes, insisting on popular sovereignty, while at the same time reinventing the demos as an ethnic, rather than civic group, united by birth and territory rather than common values and interests.

What is at stake, then, is not just a conservative attempt to address the true grievances (that the political left would accept do exist) by shifting the focus from economic inequalities to outside threats and the blame to political rivals. Rather, it is to impose a different form of society. Illiberal actors seek to replace the multicultural and emancipated vision that was used under neoliberalism to paint economization in humanistic and cosmopolitan colors, by a more nationalistic vision of a new (but really very old) social project.
This restoration of a deeply conservative, imaginary primordial state of affairs (that, of course, never really existed) seeks to also enforce pre-modern patriarchal gender relations. As such, it rejects claims by the LGBTQ community, perceived as postmodern aberrations and extravagances. Feminism and gender studies departments become key targets of attack precisely because they undermine the legitimacy of such unquestioned traditions of patriarchy that autocrats seek to restore. This does not mean that critique of gender studies shouldn’t be allowed or that all arguments in feminist work (as if this were one coherent set of arguments in the first place!) should be blindly accepted. Nor does it mean that concerns about ideological uniformity in academic contexts are inherently illiberal or empirically false. Nevertheless, it is striking that across contexts where illiberal tendencies gain political force, such work is under direct attack and often has to suffer deep budget cuts. Beyond the academe, and immediately relevant to the life worlds of millions of women, illiberal actors push for antiquated, patriarchal gender roles, undermining women’s reproductive rights (as, for instance, in Poland where the Law and Justice party, PiS, seeks to render abortions illegal). In that sense, the productive capacities of illiberalism have a lot to do with the reassertion of paternalistic notions of white masculinity.

Revising the Demos

Unsurprisingly, as illiberal and authoritarian trends are on the rise—both in fragile and seemingly robust democracies—there is growing concern about the longevity of both liberalism and democracy. One source of the growing popularity of illiberal policies, then, is an expression of a crisis of conviction owing to economic, cultural, and institutional distortions of citizens’ self-interest as they understand it. Alongside this, there is a second source that cannot merely be written off as “populist.” Namely, anti-system movements and political parties have been able to exploit the discrepancy between supranational institutions (the EU, the WTO, the UN) and respective national interests, conceived narrowly as those of an ethnic community in need of protection from outside forces. Different actors have used such outside threats to mobilize opponents of globalization and to raise claims for (often rural, majority ethnic) core constituencies. From this vantage point, (supranational) democracy has been viewed as a floodgate for foreign interests willing to exploit an already vulnerable national population whose national public goods (infrastructures, health-care systems, pension and retirement systems) have been destroyed by forces of globalization. These distortions of the constitutional protection of minorities in the service of authoritarian (or authoritarian-like) policies expose real tensions within the practice of constitutionalism and self-understanding of constitutionally elected representatives of “the whole people” who also explicitly identify with ethnically or ideologically defined partisans within that people.
In Western democracies, it is telling that upon closer examination, it is not actually those who have suffered most from globalization who are in uproar: for instance, the minorities exploited in highly precarious jobs along the supply chain, from resource extraction to consumption. Rather, it is a specific type of citizen (often white males in former manufacturing regions) who had previously benefited from the post-War compromise—an irony of history, yes that compromise struck by the forces of political liberalism to build the welfare state!—but now feels and more often than not is “left behind.” If not exclusively—because fear mongering and hate speech do matter—this is a story of relative status decline, accompanied by a number of very real and harsh consequences, such as the opioid drug crisis and the surge in suicides in the US that many link (we think convincingly) to such economic hardship. It has a strong racial and gender component: the breadwinner that no longer can earn a sufficient household and loses a position of relative privilege (Fraser 2016). This motive recurs in the US after the welfare reforms of the 1990s and in Europe in the early 2000s as much as it does, in a curious, reversed scenario in Brazil, where existing middle classes have felt increasingly threatened by the rise of ethnically different working classes (Solano in this volume).

It is important to emphasize that the neoliberal compromise was not just imposed by conservatives, more often criticized for their proximity to the private sector. Rather, in a phenomenon labeled progressive neoliberalism by Nancy Fraser (2017), parties of the (center-) left grew increasingly fond of the so-called New Economy and Silicon Valley during the 1990s, becoming complicit in a market fundamentalism that is now creating a global backlash. This is now being leveraged against the left. In short, depending on context and political culture, tropes of ethno-nationalist nostalgia, fears of ethnic extinction, traditional Christian values, and/or critiques of political correctness are being mobilized to redefine the body politic and exclude minorities, feminists, intellectuals, social democrats, and the broader left. The strategic use of conservative narratives and the remaking of leftist markers has been a successful political tool and has also served as a smokescreen for those parties that actually made it to power: for instance, in Eastern and Central Europe (Krastev in this volume).

Remaking the State

Once in power, autocratic populists seek to weaken established democratic mechanisms that limit their power. The illiberal party undermines the separation of powers, particularly with attacks upon the independence of the judiciary; it assaults the fourth estate and sows doubts about its credibility and curtails the freedom of speech. All forms of contradiction to the strongman leader are rejected. What the leader says (not the ‘corrupted’ media) is supposed to become the truth. Truth, put differently, is not something arrived at through
deliberation in the public sphere but through authority and tradition. Journalists and the free press constantly challenge this authority and therefore become themselves enemies of the people. The same holds, of course, for ivory tower intellectuals; spoilt middle-class students; and children environmentalists, à la Greta Thunberg, who are seen as part of the privileged elites who want to take the last shirt off the hard-working people’s back.

Illiberal politicians seek to stabilize their power by surrounding themselves with loyal nepotists and family in public offices, intimidating and seeking political dirt on their opponents at home and abroad, and changing the rules of the electoral system. Gerrymandering and other political tools are used to reduce the competitiveness of political opponents, and electoral defeats are generally viewed as the result of irregularities—how could the demos not vote their true leader who is clearly the only one defending their interests? Only rarely, so far (as recently in the case of Poland), do illiberals advance (limited) social policy programs for the lower middle classes. What this indicates, nonetheless, is that they cannot act only by submission. This need to sustain their legitimacy leads such decision-makers to also accelerate economic growth through hyper-deregulation and privatization and the sell-off of remaining public goods, while at the same time pacifying economic elites (tending to be part of the majority population and not fearing resentments against minorities) through tax breaks and pro-business legislation. Securing the benevolence of the upper (middle) classes through major tax cuts contradicts earlier critiques of wasteful spending by old elites, but that does not seem to be important any more. Concerns with clientelism and conflicts of interest are equally brushed aside, claiming that everybody would rationally act this way, and that what was more important than focusing on these marginal details were the injuries inflicted on the true demos by others.

We are by no means saying that illiberalism automatically leads to fascism. But illiberal actors create a political climate in which lies, corruption, and violence become acceptable everyday phenomena and where democracy disintegrates to a point where these forces can gain power. In some cases, this process is incremental—Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt warn us that often “[d]emocracy’s erosion is, for many, almost imperceptible” (2018, 6)—in others, it is accelerated by external shocks and systematically used states of emergency, i.e. attempted coups (see Coşkun and Kölemen in this volume), terrorist attacks or when these are absent, the potential for such (see Surak in this volume), and interethnic violence (see Sundar in this volume), inter alia. The suppression of opposition and the creation of a de facto one-party state through changes in the electoral system can be and are being legitimized along the same lines, as much as is the curtailing of political rights and the militarization of society. From that point onward, the distinction between this sort of democracy and a dictatorship, resting on little more than the fact of holding elections, but inciting political violence against political opponents and intimidating oppositional voices, becomes blurred.
Conclusion: Illiberalism Is Not Only Anti-Liberalism

Liberal democracy is at a crossroads. Four decades of market fundamentalism, put into political practice by elites from both the center-left and center-right, have hollowed out the promises of political liberalism, not just in the US or in the European Union and its individual member states (Blyth 2013; Offe 2015), but equally so in other nation-states with different commitments to democratization across the world. The promise of market efficiency has been used to reform labor markets, slash social budgets, and shift all social risks to individuals. All this happened under the pretext that no alternative was possible, simply because globalization—this seemingly overwhelming, external set of dynamics—had forced the hand of politicians on all levels of government in every region of the world, however advanced its economic development and whatever the status of its regime type. Meanwhile, elected officials, often unresponsive to their own constituencies, did in fact legislate in a way very much responsive to the desires of expanding transnational companies. This pattern of revolving doors and lucrative partnerships has led to a serious erosion of trust and a pervasive sense of injustice. As the West loses its faith not just in economic liberalism, but in what has been used as a justification to remake society in its image—liberal democracy—so do nation-states in the global south that are increasingly disappointed by the failed promises of liberalism and even come to see the liberal order as a ruse to extend colonial rule with the means of the market.

The critique of liberalism, and by implication of liberal democracy, is no longer only a progressive critique as it had been in the years immediately after the global financial crisis. Instead, more often than not, it has been rearticulated by reactionary movements into a critique of an aloof elitism. All boils down to a stylized face-off between the cosmopolitan globalists, jetting from global city to global city, and those who truly care for the real, hard-working people. But illiberalism is not just a reaction. Its agents actively seek to remake politics and follow specific interests—illiberalism is not just an irrational change of mood in parts of the population. It is characterized, from an economic perspective, by hyper-liberalization and clientelism at home as well as a neo-mercantilist recalibration on the inter-state level. Illiberal politicians tend to reject and hollow out some of the central institutions and procedures of liberal democracy (court-packing in the judicial branch, undermining the separation of powers, limiting the franchise, attacking free speech and opponents), and recast democracy in partial ways as a protection of sovereignty based on a clearly ethnically demarcated demos.

But this is not simply an autocratic wave: in fact, rather than a sudden surge at the right, we note a crisis of conviction in the center. If our analysis is right, ways out of an illiberal world therefore need to address two crises at once. The first is the protracted crisis of political liberalism itself. That is the root
cause that led to the implosion of neoliberalism, particularly in the core group of Western democracies. Markets alone simply cannot bring social peace and stability domestically; consult Smith, Tocqueville, and Mill on this. Neither can they assure more legitimate and harmonious inter-state relations, as practice shows. Citizens need to be equipped with a modicum of political and social rights if the moniker of liberal democracy is to hold any credibility and describe viable processes. That includes limits on the influence of particular interests on government, the provision of a range of public goods (including health care, education, affordable housing, and mobility), options for social mobility, and the re-regulation of labor markets. Moreover, there needs to be a notion of the common good—an important reason why an integrative civic (not ethnically exclusive) type of nationalism indeed fulfills an important political role that shouldn’t simply be abandoned for the sake of an idealistic cosmopolitanism (Calhoun 2007).

Populists in power offer none of this, but neither or only rarely do establishment parties. In national contexts where autocrats are not yet in office, for center-left parties in particular, this means that a political vision would need to be articulated in opposition not just to would-be autocrats but to almost a half-century of policies that have enriched the few and harmed the many—an alternative to the politics of no alternatives that does not revert to fear. Cosmopolitanism will have to mean something different from a simplistic embrace of open markets. On the center-right, questions of identity and belonging as well as the tradeoff between security and civil liberties will have to be reassessed and renegotiated in earnest to offer alternatives to citizens so-inclined. But these debates will have to be pursued strictly within the space of democratic contestation.

The question of scale is a reasonable and important one that democracies must face squarely, on the basis of a debate grounded in rational deliberation. What would be the most emancipatory way to organize politics, given that the global economy is as yet unmatched by global political institutions? What is the role of the nation and the nation-state in creating true alternatives to neoliberal globalization? Such a debate is best predicated on the observation that democracy thrives on visions of abundance. Such imaginaries make sharing in the common good possible, and don’t limit politics to zero-sum games.

But if the crisis of democracy is older than the Trump presidency, illiberal politicians like him do add a new layer of complexity to the challenges liberal democracy is facing. The second crisis requires a different set of approaches. No doubt, autocratic movements learn from one another across national boundaries. They also have a structural advantage, given the conjuncture of apocalyptic scenarios dominating politics and fueling fear: chronic unemployment, displacement by technology, terrorism, pandemics, and even human extinction. And yet, illiberalism is not self-fulfilling or inexorable. Examples of autocracy elsewhere can also serve as a warning sign to those who want to defend the potentials of democracy and who seek to rearticulate them, not as a return to the market
fundamentalism of the past, but as a set of political ideas and practices in their own right (see Wiesner in this volume for the case of the European Union).

Can the specters of illiberalism and hatred be overcome? It certainly has been done before and we do also see hopeful signs for a democratic revitalization, such as the repoliticization of public discourses, marches against antipluralists and racists, and solidarity between democratic actors in civil society. Even though they have been instrumentalized for the wrong purposes, we believe that there are indeed political values worth salvaging in the liberal tradition (Katznelson 2013). Political liberalism articulates social ideals that help provide mechanisms for (an approximation of) self-rule in modern large-scale society while seeking to protect the rights of individuals and minorities in a pluralistic society. It can bring with it a culture of political liberty and social emancipation that no other regime can. Liberal democracy will need to be reinvented to find a way out of its self-made crisis of legitimacy and an important part of this will be to rethink liberalism as a project in political economy, rather than a merely political or economic policy program. Only thus will it be possible to address the rightful concerns and true economic and ecological grievances that untrammeled market rule has brought with it.

Notes

1 The authors would like to thank Astrid Zimmermann and Christian Lammert for comments on earlier versions of this piece.

2 More often than not, it is the right that emphasizes the importance of sovereignty, but exceptions do exist. Gianpaolo Baiocchi (2018) argues for popular sovereignty because, according to him, it “radicalizes the meaning of democracy, insisting on the idea of the people as an egalitarian collective and the people’s rule as a broad mandate to bring about social transformation” (23). In contradistinction to a right-wing perspective, however, he defines the people not in exclusive, ethno-nationalist terms, but as an open and inclusive “bloc against oppression and for emancipation” (25).

3 Although notable exceptions do exist (such as Judis 2016; Mounk 2018; Snyder 2018), even if most of them limit their comparison to cases in the West.

4 For one thing, there are certain goods we don’t want to be put at the disposal of markets. Child labor, for example, is no longer socially acceptable in many countries. Many societies also consider the sale of human organs morally problematic, and their governments have banned it. These ethical constraints on markets are accompanied by technical limits, which have also been described and explained in much detail. Markets should be regulated, critics argue, because they cannot provide certain goods in sufficient quantities. Even economists, of whatever stripe, talk about market failure when, for example, factories dump their waste products into public waterways, thus shifting their waste management problems to the public (externalization); or when markets don’t function because things like fresh, clean air; national security; and other public goods cannot be vouchsafed by individual private actors (see Satz 2010 as well as Sandel 2012 and Cassidy 2010; for a critical discussion of the concept of market failure, see also Vormann 2018). If everyone in a society simply pursues their own self-interest as a market participant without any regard to others, not much of that society will soon be left. Private vice does not add up to public virtue. Perhaps more importantly for our immediate purpose,
the authors of this longer-standing critique highlighted that the market form can present a political problem of its own. Nancy Fraser (2016), Robert Kuttner (2018), Jamie Peck (2010), Fran Tonkiss, and Don Slater (2001) are only some among a whole list of authors who emphasize that the logic of the market is, after all, fundamentally not consistent with the logic of democracy, or even, to refer to Karl Polanyi’s (2001 [1944]) seminal argument many of these authors build on, corrosive to the survival of society itself.

In the US, by and large, it is only the super-rich and/or the corporations that store and expand their wealth that are still heard in the political process, while the interests of the middle class and lower income groups have become background noise that is barely perceived at all (Gilens 2012). In such a context, elections degenerate into a public spectacle of democracy, while political decisions are made behind closed doors, with the support of influential lobbyists (Bartels 2008).

Indeed, the attempt in this volume to include commentary from across the ideological spectrum alongside analysis that aspires to impartiality evidences that we, as editors, have our own concerns about the insularity of academic discourse.

This chapter is a slightly updated and revised version of an article that originally appeared in the January 2019 issue of the *Journal of Democracy*.


This chapter is a longer version of a speech first given at the 2017 Hannah Arendt Center Conference “Crises of Democracy” and published in HA: The Journal of the Hannah Arendt Center v. 6 (2018).

This chapter was originally published in Foreign Affairs. The Editors gratefully acknowledge the permission of the author and Foreign Affairs to publish a slightly revised version in this volume.


Frequent victims of violence include religious minorities, indigenous people, or what are officially called Scheduled Tribes, former untouchables or Scheduled Castes. The term Scheduled comes from lists or Schedules drawn up by the Government for the purposes of affirmative action.

“To keep up the purity of the Race and its culture, Germany shocked the world by her purging the country of the Semitic Races—the Jews. Race pride at its highest
has been manifested here. Germany has also shown how well nigh impossible it is for Races and cultures, having differences going to the root, to be assimilated into one united whole, a good lesson for us in Hindusthan to learn and profit by” (Golwalkar 1939, 35).

3 In 2018, several well-known civil liberties activists were arrested on accusations that they were out to kill Modi in what is known as the Bhima-Koregaon case.

4 The more prominent ‘scams’ include the allocation of mobile telephone spectrum to cherry-picked companies for an estimated loss of $40 billion to the treasury (the 2G spectrum scam), overpriced contracts for the Commonwealth games favoring associates of the chairman of the organizing committee, the illegal diversion of government land to the Karnataka Chief Minister's sons, which was then resold for a huge profit, the Adarsh housing society scam in Mumbai in which flats meant for war widows were given to influential politicians and senior members of the armed forces; the ‘Coalgate scam’ in which leases for coal mining were handed out practically free to favored companies by governments of both parties acting at both state and central level, and the allegations against the son-in-law of Congress Chief, Robert Vadra, for collusion with a big real estate company.

5 Bhattacharya and Guha Thakurta (2019) note that while India’s position has come down in the Economist’s crony capital index, the contours have perhaps changed rather than disappeared, and media silencing may in fact be keeping scandals from being investigated. Certainly, the Rafael aircraft deal with France in which Anil Ambani’s group was awarded offset contracts without any prior experience and which is the subject of ongoing litigation before the Supreme Court would seem to indicate so.

1 This chapter was originally published in the New Statesman. The editors gratefully acknowledge the permission of the author and the New Statesman to publish a slightly revised version in this volume.

1 Quantitative research with 571 demonstrators. Complete results, https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2015/04/14/politica/1429037495_877092.html Date of last consultation 27-08-2019


1 This text is based on the Thesis Eleven Lecture delivered by Craig Calhoun at La Trobe University, May 16, 2017. The lecture was transcribed by Simon Kastberg with revisions from Alonso Casanueva-Baptista and Raul Sanchez Urribarri. It has been revised to reflect the version which served as a keynote speech to the 25th International Congress of Europeanists, in Chicago, March 28, 2018.

2 See Ober (2008) for a wider view of democracy in Athens, showing limits to the views of the jaundiced philosophers. It needs to be stressed that even at its most democratic, Athens remained a slave society in which the large majority of residents—including women—were without political voice.

3 For this context, see Strathern (2016).

4 See Otto von Gierke’s account of descending and ascending models of political authority in Political Theories of the Middle Ages (1987 [1900]).

5 Poe’s poem that contains the famous phrase, is itself testimony to the classicism that informed the cultural aspirations of 18th and 19th century Europe and North America.

6 For example, Samuel Huntington (1991) dates his account of the ‘first wave’ of modern democracy to Jackson’s election in 1828.

7 Donald Trump has been vocal in his praise for Jackson. They are not similar in all ways, but it is noteworthy the extent to which Trump’s base, like Jackson’s, is animated by the idea that America should be white and traditional gender roles enforced. Jackson’s brutality in displacing or killing Native Americans anticipated
Trump’s attempts to keep America white by blocking immigration and his use of a rhetoric of ‘security’ to support this.

8 The founding of the Democratic Party in 1828 was part of a shift from seeing parties as shifting factions and coalitions to seeing them more as enduring formal organizations. This reflected growing societal scale and complexity, and an early stage in the increasing professionalization and mediatization of politics that has continued into the present day. It did not stop shifts in party composition, appeal, and ideological orientation.

9 In the private sector, neoliberals insisted that projects of ‘corporate social responsibility’ were an illegitimate use of profits that should belong only to the owners of corporations. Other liberals argued for a broader recognition of legitimate stakeholders, including employees, suppliers and customers, and the communities in which businesses were located.

10 For a direct comparison of anti-system politics from both the left and the right across Western democracies, see Hopkin and Blyth in this volume.


12 H.Mance, “Britain has had enough of experts, says Gove,” Financial Times, June 3, 2016. https://www.ft.com/content/3be49734-29cb-11e6-83e4-abc22d5d108c

13 This is a prominent observation of sympathetic studies; see Hochschild (2018).

14 Ibid.

15 See Lawrence Goodwyn (1976), a valuable corrective to many common views of populism.

16 See the Introduction to this volume for a further discussion of the term populism and infelicities surrounding its use in recent debates.

17 Here, there is an echo of Tocqueville’s point that democracy is not simply a political system but a way of life (Tocqueville 2003 [1835/1840]). See Atanassow in this volume for a fuller articulation of a Tocquevillian response to recent illiberal movements.

18 This process did not start with the recent wave of populism, nor with the financial crisis, nor indeed with the 9/11 attacks. It reflects longer-term transformations in citizen experience and public communication (see Meyers 2008).
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