"The Savage Wars of Peace"
“The Savage Wars of Peace”

Toward a New Paradigm of Peace Operations

EDITED BY

John T. Fishel
# Contents

*Preface*  ix  
*Acknowledgments*  xi

**Introduction**

1 War By Other Means? The Paradigm and its Application to Peace Operations, *John T. Fishel*  3

**Traditional Peacekeeping**

2 Peacekeeping in Cyprus, *Murray J.M. Swan*  21


**Wider Peacekeeping**

5 The UN Peace Operations in the Congo: Decolonialism and Superpower Conflict in the Guise of UN Peacekeeping, *J. Matthew Vaccaro*  73

6 United Nations Operations in Cambodia: (A Second "Decent Interval"), *Joseph G.D. Babb and George W. Steuber*  91

7 Piecemeal Peacekeeping: The United Nations Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia, *John A. MacInnis*  113

**Peace Enforcement**

| 9 | Peace Enforcement in Somalia: UNOSOM II,     | 155 |
|   | Thomas J. Daze and John T. Fishel          |
| 10 | The US and the UN in Haiti: The Limits of Intervention, | 175 |
|    | Thomas K. Adams                           |

**Conclusion**

| 11 | Lessons That Should Have Been Learned: Toward a Theory of Engagement for "The Savage Wars of Peace," | 197 |
|    | Max G. Manwaring And Kimbra L. Fishel      |
| 12 | Winning the Savage Wars of Peace:         | 211 |
|    | What the Manwaring Paradigm Tells Us,      |    |
|    | David M. Last                             |

*About the Editor and Contributors*

*About the Book*
Preface

"The savage wars of peace--
Fill full the mouth of Famine
And bid the sickness cease...
The ports ye shall not enter,
The roads ye shall not tread,
Go make them with your living,
And mark them with your dead!"

The words above, quoted from Rudyard Kipling's politically incorrect (for the 1990s) poem, "The White Man's Burden," describe far better than any modern writing, the challenge of post Cold War peace operations. When I reread the entire poem a couple of years ago, I was impressed with how well the "poet of imperialism" had captured both the challenges of this world as well as his own but also the character of the then newly emerging American world power. Today, almost a century later, the United States still has not come to terms with its super power status—as the chapters in this book attest.

Our purpose in the book, however, is not to castigate the Americans or any other national participant in modern peace operations. Rather, it is to apply theory developed from social science research to military doctrine and test it against specific cases of peace operations. These operations run the gamut from situations that developed in the 1960s, at the height of the Cold War, to the present. We have divided our nine cases into "traditional peacekeeping", "wider peacekeeping", and "peace enforcement" categories. Yet, having done so, we found that in retrospect the categories are quite arbitrary. The commonalties run through all the cases. And they are all unique. Nevertheless, our model informs them all and suggests that such fine distinctions are not necessary or even truly helpful.

The authors of this book are a varied group. They range from established scholars and practitioners to very junior scholars and practitioners. Without exception they have some experience in the real world of security; without exception they have some experience in the academic world. In most cases the authors are in some way affiliated with the US Army Command & General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This institution, which has been called the "crossroads of the US Army" is really much more. It is the crossroads of the armies of the world (and to a lesser extent, the navies and air forces as well). More important, it is the intellectual heart of the American army and the
first premier military masters degree granting institution in the world. It is here that many of the authors teach or were educated. And its influence is felt by all of us. And so the book is for its students and graduates among others. Those others include all the civilian governmental and non-governmental agencies that are involved in the "savage wars of peace." Our hope is that the book is useful to them and the soldiers alike.

A last necessary word in this preface, since many of us are either civilian employees of the US government, or serving members of the US and Canadian armies, or retired from one or the other of these categories, and that is: The views expressed in this book are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, Department of State, the US government, the Canadian Department of National Defence, the Canadian government, or any intergovernmental organization.

John T. Fishel, PhD
Acknowledgments

A book like this is the product of many minds, hands and computers and so the editor must proffer his thanks to all of them. First and foremost, without the efforts of the person who did all of the technical editing, none of the work of the authors or the editor would have seen the light of day. All of the technical editing was done by one of the co-authors of the book, my wife, Kimbra L. Fishel. What she did was a labor of love for the project as well as her husband. All of us thank you, Kim, for making our scribblings look professional!

To the authors: I thank each of you for the hard work, solid research, the following of format (even when you were sure you had a better way), and meeting the last--if not the first--deadline. Your expertise makes the book what it is. You are all professionals.

Thanks also to my aunt, Ruth Roman, who reviewed several chapters and suggested improvements in the writing. Thanks to the US Army Command & General Staff College for assembling the group of professionals who form the core of the authors and for the environment which encouraged this kind of effort. Thanks to Max Manwaring whose original research produced the theory that is articulated here as the "Manwaring Paradigm." Finally, thank you to the late General Maxwell R. Thurman whose question started it all.

JTF
Dag Hammarskjold, the late Secretary General of the United Nations, is said to have remarked that peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, yet only a soldier can do it. If he was correct -- and this book is premised on the assumption that he was -- then it is equally necessary for the soldier and the statesman to understand the principles on which peace operations are based and the ways in which they are applied. These "ways" are what the military calls doctrine. This chapter elaborates the relationship between principles and doctrine as well as how these principles were derived from the research that produced what we are calling the "new paradigm of peace operations."

The "new paradigm of peace operations" is hardly new in the sense that this is the first time it has ever been seen. Rather, our paradigm--known elsewhere as the SWORD Model and the Manwaring Paradigm--is new in its application to peace operations.¹ The model, as indicated by the note, was designed for and applied to insurgencies with a great deal of success. It has been used as well to address the problems posed by the "war" on drugs, particularly cocaine, with similar degrees of utility.² Moreover, in its initial development the model was not confined only to insurgencies.
Development of the Model

In 1984, General Maxwell R. Thurman was Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army. Thurman, a veteran of the Vietnam War, saw in the US involvement in the ongoing insurgency in El Salvador a strategic and doctrinal problem that begged for resolution if the US Army was to avoid a quagmire in Central America as divisive as Vietnam had been. So General Thurman queried the Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College in Carlisle Pennsylvania as to the "correlates of success in counterinsurgency." Of all the analysts at the Institute, only the newly arrived Max Manwaring had the particular political science research training to undertake the kind of quantitative study that could answer the General's question. Thus it fell to Manwaring to conduct the study.

Using a "Delphic" technique, Manwaring developed a preliminary study that suggested several correlates of success. When he briefed these preliminary results to General Thurman, it was with the intent to expand the study. Thurman agreed and the original model became known as SSI 1. Manwaring now began work on the expanded study which used a similar Delphic technique to identify key variables and gather data. What was most important was that the number of cases now reached 69, or virtually all the small wars of the post World War II period which involved a Western nation as a participant.

Data analysis involved reducing the 72 identified variables into a more manageable seven dimensions by the technique of factor analysis and the elimination of all cases that could not be somehow treated as insurgencies. This reduction by 26 cases left 43 insurgencies for the full analysis. The seven dimensions then were correlated individually and collectively with success or failure of the counterinsurgency. The results produced a high degree of confidence that the model could explain the outcome of most insurgencies. Interestingly, preliminary analysis involving all 69 cases suggested that the model might be useful in explaining non-insurgency outcomes, as well. This model, originally called SSI 2, has been published as the SWORD Model and the Manwaring Paradigm as noted above.

As a result of an interview with Richard Halloran of the New York Times the nickname used by Manwaring and his associates, "the Max Factors," also became known.

The SSI 1 and 2 studies had taken the better part of two years to conduct. Even though the SSI 2 study was not yet published, Manwaring was recalled to active duty in the US Army as a Colonel to become Deputy Director of the newly formed Small Wars Operations Research Directorate of the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). The directorate, called SWORD, was under the command of Colonel Robert Herrick who had spent the last year at SSI as an Army Fellow where he had worked closely with Manwaring on the
studies and wanted to use the model as the intellectual foundation for what SWORD would be attempting.\textsuperscript{5}

**SWORD**

The Small Wars Operations Research Directorate, first called the SOUTHCOM LIC Cell, was conceived under the watch of SOUTHCOM Commander in Chief (CINC), General Paul F. Gorman. Gorman's central focus was on technological solutions to the problems of insurgency, however, some of the action officers responsible for the LIC Cell expected it to address doctrinal and strategic issues as well. When Gorman was abruptly replaced by General John Galvin in 1985, there was also some change in the thrust of what the LIC Cell was supposed to be. This change was reinforced the next year when Galvin hired Colonel Herrick to head it and approved the name, SWORD.

Herrick, with Galvin's general support, placed emphasis on strategy, doctrine, tactics, and technology respectively. The theoretical principles under which SWORD conducted its assessments were those of the Manwaring Paradigm. Nevertheless, significant elements of the SOUTHCOM staff, as did Gorman, the former CINC, continued to believe that the appropriate answers to the problems of counterinsurgency were to be found in technology, as did Gorman. These substantive disagreements within the staff, supported by influential outsiders and coupled with internal bureaucratic political issues, resulted in the reorganization of SWORD within a year and, after only two years, its demise. In its short life, however, SWORD's impact was considerable.

The organization's accomplishments centered around the use of Manwaring's model to develop a series of assessments of ongoing insurgencies and other low intensity conflicts in SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility. A series of continuing assessments of the war in El Salvador formed the bulk of the effort. These resulted in a countermine project that, for a time, reduced Salvadoran Army casualties, an assessment of the FMLN attack on the 4th Brigade headquarters of March 31, 1987, assessments of the war as a whole, psychological operations and civil military operations. It also resulted in a major effort under the leadership of the SOUTHCOM J-3, Brigadier General Marc Cisneros, in coordination with Salvadoran Armed Forces, to assess the effectiveness of the armed forces, their conduct of the war, and US assistance.\textsuperscript{6} This effort took place from October 1987 until the publication of the classified study on September 1, 1988.

Other assessments addressed Operation Blast Furnace, the first counterdrug operation undertaken in Bolivia in 1986, the Sendero Luminoso insurgency in Peru during 1987 which resulted in the creation of a SOUTHCOM Strategy Implementation Team in 1988, and some small efforts to apply the model to achieve an understanding of the US supported *contra*
insurgency against the Sandinistas of Nicaragua. During its short life, SWORD produced a series of 11 papers that addressed various aspects of the model and several specific cases of insurgency. Many of those papers found their way into publication in Military Review, other journals, and a series of books (of which this is the latest) to be discussed below.

**SWORD and the Development of LIC Doctrine**

If SWORD was SOUTHCOM's response to the need to think about low intensity conflict (LIC), then the Army, the same institution that Vice Chief Max Thurman had moved to produce what became the paradigm, created a LIC proponency office at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. It also signed an agreement with the Air Force to establish the Army/Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC) at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia. Significantly, the CLIC was located in the immediate vicinity of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Monroe, Leavenworth's parent organization.

Together, the proponency office and the CLIC were charged to produce a new version of FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, a document which for the first time would be doctrine for both the Army and Air Force. Since the doctrine writing task came at the same time as the creation of SWORD, which also had an official interest in the creation of doctrine and an organizational link with Fort Leavenworth, it was natural for the CLIC and the proponency office to consider SWORD as their field laboratory. SWORD readily encouraged this perception and soon began providing input to the draft manual. The proponents formally sent out their first draft for comment in early 1987 and SWORD responded by commenting in detail. Indeed, it contributed by rewriting major portions to have the manual conform to the findings of Manwaring's study as supported by SWORD's ongoing assessments.7

After a series of exchanges the new FM included most of SWORD's recommendations with special emphasis on what were then called the "LIC imperatives." In particular, two imperatives directly reflected SWORD's precise understanding and definitions. These were Legitimacy and Unity of Effort, both of which are specifically identified as dimensions in the paradigm.8 Doctrinal development rested in a state of suspended animation for the next two years while senior leaders of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) sat on the publication. Only through the efforts of newly established office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD-SO/LIC) was the manual finally published in January 1990.9

FM 100-20's reflection of SWORD input, while important to this story, is less than the sum of relevant doctrinal development in the manual. Of equal
importance was its division of LIC into several categories including one called "peacekeeping." In so doing, the doctrine writers, for the first time, linked the LIC imperatives to peace operations. Moreover, this link would continue in all subsequent iterations of the doctrine.

The linkage, while it follows an impeccable logic path, importantly, is not supported by any empirical research other than the 26 non-insurgency cases that were dropped from the initial Manwaring research. Moreover, these cases merely suggested that such a link might exist; they provided no confirmation that it did exist. Thus the bureaucratic process that the US military uses to develop doctrine enshrined the LIC imperatives as articles of faith with respect to all categories of LIC including peacekeeping.

One problem with the new manual was its place in the doctrinal hierarchy. As conceived at the time, FM 100-20 was to be co-equal with FM 100-5, Operations, as keystones of Army tactical doctrine. What the drafters failed to realize at the time was that the resistance to publishing the volume that surfaced at TRADOC would also be manifest in the general lack of interest throughout the Army in what the new manual had to say. The few exceptions to this were found in the special operations community and USSOUTHCOM, the unified command whose entire existence over the decade of the eighties was predicated on LIC.

As FM 100-20 was finally being published several events converged to change the nature of the doctrinal equation in the Army. First, Operation Just Cause was undertaken in Panama from December 20, 1989 through January 31, 1990; Operation Promote Liberty began concurrently. A year later Operation Desert Storm concluded with civil military operations to restore the infrastructure of Kuwait that were consciously based on the similar operations undertaken in Panama. Immediately upon completion of Desert Storm US forces were engaged in military operations in northern Iraq to protect the rebellious Kurds from the oppression and repression of their Iraqi masters.

Concurrent with these operations the cyclone that devastated Bangladesh involved a US Joint Task Force in a humanitarian assistance mission called Operation Sea Angel. In 1992 US forces were committed to hurricane relief in Florida (Andrew) and Hawaii (Iniki) and, at the end of the year, to a US led multinational peace enforcement mission in Somalia called Operation Restore Hope. Coupled with the end of the Cold War in 1989, these events raised the visibility of LIC type operations as did the "War on Drugs" which had involved the military since 1986. This increased visibility coincided with a major revision of FM 100-5.

For our purposes the critical decision involved in the 1993 revision of FM 100-5 was that Operations would be the only keystone manual in the Army doctrinal inventory. This meant that FM 100-20 would, instead of being co-equal (and, incidentally, generally unread), become the capstone of a major
branch of doctrine. As a result, its general thrust would have to be captured in FM 100-5.

*Operations* sets its schema in Chapter 2 where it posits a continuum of operations ranging from peace through conflict to war. Then, after addressing the variety of combat operations, it focuses in Chapter 13 on what it identifies as Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Although this is, in fact, just another name for LIC, the authors justify the name change in that they address activities that take place in peacetime that were not included under the LIC rubric. As the principal author of Chapter 13 has stated on numerous occasions, the activities listed are not exhaustive; they are merely illustrative. Nevertheless, the OOTW activities replace the four LIC operational categories. Similarly, the LIC imperatives are replaced by the principles of OOTW. While the activities list provides detail for what FM 100-20 included in the LIC operational categories and expands the description of what military forces may be called upon to do, the new principles represent, in some cases, real conceptual change. The first, and in the eyes of many including the principal author of 100-20, most important imperative, "political dominance" is subsumed in the principle of the Objective. Yet they are not the same; one can certainly conceive of military objectives that are nearly devoid of political content. Legitimacy, unity of effort, and perseverance are retained in their original form while adaptability is dropped. In turn, restraint and security are added.14 We will discuss these in greater detail in conjunction with our analysis of the seven dimensions of the paradigm. Here, we are simply satisfied to show the doctrinal evolution.

That evolution, in turn, took another step in 1994 with the publication of FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*. While that volume provides numerous practical approaches to doctrine and some very useful information (such as the UN Charter and examples of Rules of Engagement and a campaign plan)15 the particular relevance of the document for this discussion is that it accepts the principles of OOTW as if they were principles of peace operations. Although it expands on the discussion of the principles as a means of adapting them to the environment of peace operations, it makes no effort to examine rigorously their validity and otherwise leaves them intact. Thus, FM 100-23 advances little beyond FM 100-5 and, if the theory on which the principles of OOTW are based is either significantly deficient or wrong, then the current manual simply compounds the error. Hence, the next section will consider the seven dimensions of the Manwaring Paradigm and their relationship with the principles of OOTW. It will also review briefly the methodology used to derive the dimensions.
The SWORD Model/Manwaring Paradigm

The model consists of seven dimensions derived from 72 individual variables. Each of the variables was proposed by one or more of the panel of scholars and practitioners that Manwaring used in his original research. The individual variables were then reduced to seven dimensions through the technique of Factor Analysis which statistically grouped most of the variables while eliminating 22 of the original 72 which could not be correlated as Factors. The Factors then were termed dimensions and given names which attempted to describe in words their central tendency.

The dimensions, as applied to peace operations, are: Unity of Effort, Legitimacy, Support to Belligerents, Support Actions of Peace Forces, Military Actions of Peace Forces, Military Actions of Belligerents and Peace Forces, and Actions Targeted on Ending Conflict. Each dimension, as noted, is composed of a number of individual variables. Thus, Unity of Effort involves the clarity of the mandate, the perception of coincidence of interests between the Peace Force (PF) and the belligerents, and the degree of political polarity between the belligerents and the PF. Legitimacy addresses the degree of support for the peace operation and the PF as well as the public perception of PF legitimacy. These perceptions are important both in the belligerent nation(s) and the world community at large. Also important for legitimacy are the perceptions that the PF can provide security and humanitarian assistance, that it is not seen as corrupt, and that peace will provide political alternatives to endemic violence.

The Support to Belligerents dimension represents the obverse of PF legitimacy. Its component variables include the degree to which the belligerents are not isolated from their support, the time when sanctuaries became available to the belligerents and their continued availability, as well as active outside support for their cause(s). Critical variables comprising Support Actions of Peace Forces are the perceived strength of PF commitment, perceived length of PF commitment, and consistency of military support for the PF. Military Actions of Peace Forces includes as one strong variable the number of troops involved. This variable generally supports success when the numbers are either small or when they follow the British peacekeeping maxim of "maximum strength/minimum force." Other key variables are the type of military activity with those addressing de-escalation of conflict leading to success, the non-use of "unconventional" (dirty war) operations, looting, vandalism, and other criminal acts.

The dimension of Military Actions-Belligerents/PF focuses primarily on the professionalism of the forces. The dimension includes both forces because, as David Last points out, belligerents must be seen as potential allies against the real enemy, conflict itself. Thus key variables include aggressive
patrolling, proficiency of military and paramilitary units, and the willingness to take casualties, particularly among officers. Finally, Actions Targeted on Ending Conflict address as critical variables the early initiation of population and resource control measures, intelligence operations, psychological operations, and civic action.

The Paradigm and its Relation to Current Doctrine

Current US doctrine for peace operations as found in FM 100-23 stresses the six principles of OOTW discussed above. As noted, those principles originally derived from the interaction of SWORD, the LIC Proponency Office, and the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict with the dimensions of the SWORD Model informing the LIC Imperatives of FM 100-20—the predecessor of the OOTW principles.

Relating the dimensions of the paradigm to the OOTW principles one finds, first, that Unity of Effort encompasses two of the principles. The first of these is Objective. As I have shown elsewhere, common objectives are necessary but insufficient conditions for Unity of Effort. Second, the dimension of Unity of Effort equates to the principle of Unity of Effort with the conceptual definition of the latter taken directly from the definition of the former. The key to understanding both the dimension and the principle is that the players are independent of each other to a greater or lesser degree. Thus, Unity of Effort results not from command but from negotiation to achieve common ground.

The dimension of Legitimacy and the principle of Legitimacy, again are the same. The variables which make up the dimension clearly comprise the principle as well. However, the principle of Legitimacy also addresses the dimension we have called Support to Belligerents. The dimension focuses on the legitimacy of the belligerent parties in terms of their internal and external support. The fact of a separate dimension serves to differentiate between the legitimacy of the peace forces and the belligerents which should enhance the explanatory power of the paradigm for peace operations just as it did for the analysis of insurgency. Closely related to this dimension is the perseverance of the supporters of the belligerents. What applies to the Peace Forces in the next paragraph applies here to the belligerent supporters.

Support Actions of the Peace Forces addresses the actions of the forces themselves, the international organization giving the mandate, and the governments that make up that organization. In every case one would expect to find that the actions of the Peace Forces and their organizations and governments that suggested a willingness to be committed to the operation as long as necessary contributed greatly to the success of the operation. By contrast, actions which indicated an urgency to depart or a lack of appropriate
resource support would have contributed to the perceived failure of the operation. This description of the dimension clearly defines the principle of perseverance.

The several studies that have led to this volume confirmed that the Military Actions of the Peace Forces (Intervening Power in previous studies) required the exercise of restraint if success were to be achieved. This meant restraint in the quantity of troops deployed or in their employment. With respect to quantity, Manwaring and others found that generally success was more likely if fewer troops were deployed but if large numbers were needed it was essential that they be deployed "up front," in the manner the British have called with respect to peace operations, maximum strength/minimum force. Not only was the quantity of the force important, but also the ways it was used. This provides focus on the appropriateness of Rules of Engagement (ROE) as well as the behavior of the troops both with respect to the ROE and to issues not covered directly by either the law of land warfare or the ROE. US military doctrine has captured the essence of this dimension in the principle of restraint.

The principle of restraint is linked with the principle of security in the dimension called Military Actions of the Belligerents and Peace Forces. The dimension focuses on the professionalism and proficiency of the military and paramilitary forces engaged by the peace operation. The rationale for including both the belligerents and the Peace Forces lies in the need in a peace operation to see the "enemy" as conflict itself. If that is the proper perception, then the belligerents and the Peace Forces are potential allies. Much anecdotal evidence lends its support to the argument that it is always easier to keep agreements if the forces involved behave professionally. Professional troops and police tend to behave in a disciplined manner with restraint thereby enhancing their security.

The last dimension, Actions Targeted on Ending Conflict, directly ties into the principle of security. Made up of population and resource controls, intelligence focused on the threats to the peace, psychological operations, and civic action, it links combat and contact related skills and ties the several types of peace operations together. What the variables used to define the dimension show is that peacebuilding is an essential component of peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

This brief discussion of the relationship of the elements of the paradigm to current doctrine suggests that there probably is reason to believe that the doctrine is likely to be valid for peace operations as well as for other types of OOTW. The strength of the doctrine is that it is grounded in serious research--research which not only produced the SWORD Model but has been subjected to continuous questioning and refinement over the years. It is the testing of the model and its continued use as the underlying assumption of doctrine that qualifies it as a paradigm. Thus, it is to the development of the
paradigm over the course of the last decade in a series of publications that we now turn.

From SWORD Model to Manwaring Paradigm

The first document to appear in the series of studies making use of the Manwaring Paradigm was published as SWORD Paper #1, What Is to be Done? Counterinsurgency by Robert M. Herrick and others, including Manwaring. While it appeared in several places, it is preserved in the SWORD Papers collection. This document was followed by ten more SWORD Papers as of August 1988. While the Sword Papers were being published, Manwaring got his research material together and, now working again as a civilian for SWORD's contractor, BDM Management Services Company, produced, in 1987, the research report that described the SSI 2 model, (now called the SWORD Model). 26

SWORD had focused many of its efforts on the war in El Salvador. At the urging of General John R. Galvin, the SOUTHCOM Commander in Chief, and the US Ambassador to El Salvador, Edwin Corr, Manwaring was engaged in a project that conducted numerous in depth interviews with the participants of that conflict. These were recorded in several volumes produced by BDM and turned over to SWORD. They provided the grist for a book edited by Manwaring and Court Prisk, El Salvador at War: An Oral History. A spin off of the oral history was, The Comandante Speaks: Memors of an El Salvadoran Guerrilla Leader, edited by Courtney Prisk.

The main line of publication of the studies undertaken by SWORD was in US military publications such as Military Review which, beginning in 1988 and for several years thereafter, devoted a special issue to Low Intensity Conflict. Several of these articles began their life as SWORD Papers and a number were collected and published in 1991 in Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm of Low Intensity Conflict. The essence of the book, however, was its explication of the SWORD Model in the context of Latin America and the insurgencies that were taking place in the SOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility.

Ambassador Edwin Corr, having retired from the US Foreign Service and accepted an endowed Chair in Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, turned his attention to expanding the focus of the SWORD Model. Corr, who had written the introduction and conclusion of Uncomfortable Wars, with his Oklahoma colleague, Stephen Sloan, developed a book that would apply the model to a number of insurgencies outside Latin America. Thus, of the seven insurgency cases which make up the heart of Low Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World, four come from areas other than Latin America. Moreover, the critical contribution of the book is found in this test of the model.
War By Other Means?

for its explanatory power of specific cases beyond its region of principal interest and practice.\textsuperscript{31}

The years 1989 and 1990 found SOUTHCOM intellectually engaged in the war against illegal drugs proclaimed by President George Bush. Consultant support to SOUTHCOM, of course, shifted focus and Manwaring began to adapt the SWORD Model for application to the Drug War.\textsuperscript{32} The results of this shift of intellectual focus were published in \textit{Gray Area Phenomena: Confronting the New World Disorder}.\textsuperscript{33} Still, the book did not confine itself to the drug issue but also raised questions that ranged from contingency operations and their implications through conventional conflicts to organized crime as a national security threat. Nevertheless, the thrust of the book was on the application of the paradigm to the Drug War.

At the 1991 meeting of the American Political Science Association where several of the authors of \textit{Low Intensity Conflict} presented a panel, one of them, David Scott Palmer, urged Manwaring to publish in full the SWORD Model research report in a scholarly journal so that it could be more easily accessible. He also urged that it take account of some of the more recent publications on revolution. Manwaring was, at the time, overcommitted and asked John Fishel to undertake the revision of the study for publication. Fishel took on the task, not only developing the discussion of revolutionary theory Palmer had suggested, but also adding several appendices that had not appeared in the original work (although three of the four had been available).\textsuperscript{34} The article was published in the Winter 1992 issue of \textit{Small Wars and Insurgencies} thus making the paradigm fully available to the wider scholarly audience.

Ambassador David Miller's chapter in \textit{Gray Area Phenomena}, "Beyond the Cold War: An Overview and Lessons," provided the impetus for the most recent book in this series, \textit{Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success}.\textsuperscript{35} In his chapter, Miller suggested that the three pillars of success in contemporary conflict were a theory of engagement, appropriate weapons systems, and an effective Executive Branch management structure. In the new book these concepts are developed theoretically and illustrated by case studies which range from the insurgency in El Salvador through the peace enforcement operations in Somalia in 1992-93. Although the book is not constructed specifically around the dimensions of the Manwaring paradigm they permeate the discussion. For example, the two chapters on management structure explicitly address the issue in terms of the dimension of Unity of Effort.\textsuperscript{36} Perhaps, the critical point for our discussion is that this is the first time that the SWORD Model has been applied directly, in any way, to the analysis of a peace operation. The results suggest that the application in a more general way would be fruitful.
Testing the Paradigm in Peace Operations: The Scope of the Book

This book attempts, at the same time, to be both evolutionary and revolutionary. Similarly, it seeks to address the intellectual concerns of scholars and the practical concerns of the soldiers and statesmen who must conduct peace operations. The book is clearly evolutionary in that it is a product of research supported theory that has been in use for the past decade. Indeed, this chapter has made the case that the theoretical construct of the SWORD Model has informed the doctrinal paradigm of the Principles of OOTW. Thus, Ambassador Ed Corr has been absolutely correct in labeling the model, "the Manwaring Paradigm."

Although the application of the model has evolved from its single-minded intent of explaining the correlates of success in counterinsurgency through the analysis of the drug wars to addressing the concerns of organized crime as a security threat and touching on peace operations, it never has been subjected to a real test as to its applicability in any arena but that of counterinsurgency. The original study undertaken at the Strategic Studies Institute constituted such a test; Corr and Sloan's use of seven case studies provided an excellent replication and validation of the paradigm. There, however, scientific confirmation of the model ceased. Rather, what we have in the subsequent works is the development of new hypotheses coupled with the related unquestioning reification of the paradigm as principles in US military doctrine in areas well beyond what the data can support on the basis of scientific study.

It is on the basis of this analysis of the impact of the model that the book becomes revolutionary. For the first time in the development of military doctrine, it sets out to provide a test of the intellectual premises on which that doctrine is based. The test is found in the series of nine case studies of peace operations that make up the heart of the book.

If the reader has gotten this far, he knows that the underlying premise is found in Clausewitz' dictum that war is an extension of politics by other means. As all the other books in this series suggest, the concept is neither new nor unusual. Rather, it lies at the heart of all security issues. The use of military force is a political act designed to attain political objectives. This concept embodies the one assumption made in this book; all else is subject to test.

The means of testing the Manwaring Paradigm as it applies to peace operations is to organize the case studies in three groups of three. The first such grouping consists of our cases of "traditional peacekeeping" where a neutral and impartial force of peacekeepers has been designated to keep the belligerents separated and does so with their consent. The cases that fall into this category are: UNFICYP in Cyprus, ONUSAL in El Salvador, and MOMEM on the Ecuador-Peru border.
Our second group is an intermediate category found between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement which, for lack of a better term (and doing some violence to it, at that), we are calling "wider peacekeeping" somewhat in the British manner. Unlike traditional peacekeeping, these cases exhibit some lack of consent by one or more parties to the conflict. Nevertheless, like traditional peacekeeping, there is some degree of consent to the role of the peacekeepers on the part of the warring parties. The three cases in this group are: ONUC in the Congo, UNTAC in Cambodia, and UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia.

The third group of cases is one of extreme involvement which the Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros Ghali, has called peace enforcement. What differentiates these operations from the others is the mandate which directs the Peace Forces to impose a truce or other settlement on the warring parties whether they consent or not. The cases representing this category are: the IAPF in the Dominican Republic, UNOSOM II in Somalia, and UNMIH in Haiti.

The cases range from the Cold War era to the present. They represent United Nations operations, UN authorized operations, an operation undertaken by a regional organization without the direct involvement of the UN, and finally an operation conducted by an ad hoc multinational organization created specifically for that purpose. In other words, they represent the entire range of peace operations in all their complexities and with all the difficulties of categorizing them with respect to where they might fall on a spectrum of consent.

Each case is organized and presented in the same way. Following a brief introduction to set the political context, the case authors examine the impact of the dimensions of the paradigm in the following order: Unity of Effort, Legitimacy, Support to Belligerents, Support Actions of Peace Forces, Military Actions of Peace Forces, Military Actions of Belligerents and Peace Forces, and Actions Targeted on Ending Conflict. Finally, each case concludes with a brief assessment of the degree to which it supports or denies the validity of the paradigm.

The final section of the book focuses each of its two chapters on different aspects of lessons learned in the analysis of the cases. One chapter looks at the impact of the cases on the theory, examining the degree to which the paradigm is supported, how the cases modify the theory, as well as where it is denied. The final chapter considers the paradigm and its revisions with respect to practice on the ground. It suggests modification to doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures as a result of the analysis of the case studies and seeks to articulate clearly useful lessons for soldiers and diplomats assigned to peace operations.

Finally, the book seeks to make a contribution to our understanding of the world we have bequeathed to the next generation of scholars, soldiers, and
diplomats. In this we hope that our students at all levels, along with our peers and the decision makers, will see the utility of our endeavor.

Notes

3 Interview with Max G. Manwaring, 1986.
4 Manwaring and Fishel, also Ibid.
6 The author was a participant in all of these efforts and coordinated the assessment plan for the study of the Salvadoran Armed Forces, hereafter cited as Participant Observation.
7 Participant Observation.
9 Interviews with members of OASD-SO/LIC.
11 Promote Liberty continues in Panama as of this writing where it supports the development of Panama's infrastructure.
13 Ibid., Chapter 6.
14 FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, Chapter 1, and FM 100-5, Chapter 13.
16 Manwaring and Fishel, Appendix III.
17 Ibid.
18 We should note here that the naming of the dimensions, in the end, was arbitrary and the names have been modified in some cases in the various published versions of the work to be discussed in the next section. In this note I will identify each dimension with its original name in the order in which they will be discussed in the text with, however, a further modification to conform to the issue of peace operations. The specific names of the dimensions are in no way critical; rather, as long as the variables which comprise them remain unchanged comparability is assured. Dimensions: Unity of Effort, Host Government Legitimacy, Degree of Outside Support to Insurgents, Support Actions of Intervening Power, Military Actions of Intervening Power, Host Government Military Actions, and Actions versus Subversion. See Manwaring and Fishel, Tables 7 and 8, p. 284.
War By Other Means?

See Manwaring and Fishel, Appendix II, pp.301-304. The listing of variables in this chapter always includes the strongest within each dimension but may not include all the variables included in the Factor Analysis.

Personal communication from Major David Last, Ph.D., Canadian Army, now Executive Assistant to the Deputy Force Commander, UNPROFOR.


This point was impressed on me by Major David Last, Canadian Army, in numerous discussions over the past year.

The SWORD Papers, although long out of print, are archived in their entirety by the private research organization, the National Security Archives, in Washington, DC.

Dr. Max G. Manwaring, *A Model for the Analysis of Insurgencies*, BDM Management Services Company, Ft. Lewis, Washington, 1987. (Copies of this document are to be found in the National Security Archives. Hereafter, documents that may be consulted there will be identified by the notation NSA after the date.)

These volumes have been collected by the NSA.


Manwaring and Prisk now were working for Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc. which had won the SOUTHCOM support contract.


Manwaring and Fishel. Only Appendix IV, "Operational Definitions," was new.


Notes

1 M.A. Esplin, 'Efforts to resolve the Cyprus dispute', in D.B. Bendahmane and J.W. McDonald, eds, Perspectives on Negotiation (Washington: Foreign Service Institute, Department of State, 1986).
2 EOKA is the Greek acronym for the armed guerrilla movement for union with Greece.
3 The Blue Helmets, A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, Second Edition, United Nations, August 1990, pp. 287. The peacekeeping force was called the United Nations Force in Cyprus and known by the acronym of UNFICYP.
5 Nicos Sampson was a Cypriot and former "EOKA" fighter. Basically banished from Cyprus in the late 1969, he was selected to replace Makarios by the architects of the coup as he had a hero's reputation with the general Greek Cypriot public. After the coup he was arrested and successfully tried for treason. Although given a life sentence, he served 20 years then was pardoned and released by decree of the President with strong support of the legislature and the Greek Cypriot public.
6 "The Blue Helmets", pp. 290 - 300
7 General George Grivas was a Greek national who led the armed element of the EOKA insurgency against the British 1954 - 1959. A veteran of guerrilla fighting in World War II and the following "Greek Civil War", he was a skilled and charismatic commander. Nicknamed Denghanias, he is a Greek Cypriot national hero of a stature only rivaled by Arch-Bishop Makarios, leader of the Cyprus Orthodox Church and first President of Cyprus. His efforts in the insurgency struggle and his significant public stature won him the post as the first commander of the fledgling Greek Cypriot National Guard.
so craftily established will be able to withstand social, political and financial pressures in order to ensure continued development and democratization.

Notes

3 Ibid.
8 General Jaime Abdul Gutierrez, "We Had To Administer Reform, But We Had No Resources," in El Salvador At War An Oral History, Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, editors, Washington, D.C., The Institute For National Strategic Studies, 1986.
9 Duarte, My Story.
16 Storrs, p. CRS-12.

Ibid.


The United Nations Observer Mission In El Salvador.


Ibid, p. 36.

Ambassador Corr was also an observer at both rounds of this election.


Ibid.

Ibid., p. 295.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Adams.

Ibid.

Ibid.
Actions Targeted on Ending Conflict

Actions targeted on ending the Jan-Feb 1995 conflict have been singularly successful. The isolated and sparsely populated character of the conflict zone and the quiet professional work of the MOMEP leadership were key. Once the declaration was signed -- MOMEP froze the forces in contact and proceeded to separate units one by one. This was accomplished over a period of about two months (March and April 1995). By May 1995 forces in the conflict zone had been reduced to 50 Ecuadorian soldiers in Coangos and 50 Peruvian soldiers in PVI ("Puesto de Vigilancia #1") -- in accordance with the Declaration of Peace. This situation is maintained today and verified through a 24 hour a day presence of MOMEP observers in both PVI and Coangos and through periodic overflights of the DMZ and Security Zone Alfa to insure no new forces have been reintroduced into the area.

Again, the success of MOMEP to date in accomplishing its original missions (force separation, DMZ establishment and mobilization) and its follow-on missions of confidence building, will have long term and lasting impact only if progress is made on the underlying issue of the border itself. MOMEP has proved it can reduce the prospects of renewed fighting. However, the resolution of the border issue itself remains a political issue in the hands of politicians.

Conclusion

The paradigm is clearly applicable to assess the performance of MOMEP operations. While quiet but clear military preparations on both sides remain of concern, the problem is now political in nature. Can Perú and Ecuador break the cycle of border clashes/combat operations followed by the failure of political initiatives to find a solution? MOMEP is a proven successful tool. The key factors which must remain if MOMEP is to continue to be successful are Unity of Effort (Factor #1) and the continued success of the Military Actions of the Peace Forces (Factor #4) -- with emphasis on the role of a fully integrated Observer force. We are left with one final question: Is there enough political will and patience on the part of the Guarantors and the Parties to leverage this MOMEP success while a political solution is hammered out?

Notes

The maps shown in figures 1-3 are representations intended to show the relationships between place names, key geographic features and general distance factors. These are not intended as definitive maps. These figures have been modified from maps used in MOMEP/SOUTHCOM briefings.

Sources for events which occurred prior to the author's arrival in Patuca on 23 August 1996 are based on official SOUTHCOM reports and discussions with the first US Contingent Commander, COL Glenn Weidner, and COL Jorge Gomez Pola, Senior Argentine Representative to MOMEP, March - November 1995.

Events described during the period August 1995 - February 1996 are based on the author's personal observations as a participant in those events.
Notes

3 All analyses of force levels are dependent on the gross numbers from Lefever, Volume 3, Appendix H, Chart E.
4 Wainhouse, 316.
5 Karl von Horn, Soldiering for Peace, pp. 203, 213, 228, and 237.
6 Wainhouse, 310, 314, 325, and 328-329.
8 Wainhouse, 325-326. Lefever, Volume 3, Appendix P-3 and P-5.
9 Wainhouse, 310.
11 Wainhouse, 301.
12 Lefever, Volume 3, Appendix P includes brief sketches of the military incident and related information about casualties.
13 Lefever, Volume 3, Appendix O-4.
14 Lefever, Volume 2, 360.
15 Lefever, Volume 2, 361.
16 Lefever, Volume 2, 363.
17 Wainhouse, 297.
18 Lefever, Volume 2, 365.
21 Lefever, Volume 2, 109-117.
23 Lefever, Volume 2, 365-367.
25 Lefever, Volume 2, 92-93 and 346-347.
previously noted, UNAMIC/UNTAC participant units did not accept UN command and control in every instance, and were not necessarily equipped or trained for assigned missions. All of these factors had an impact on how successful UNTAC could be in accomplishing this prodigious mission.

Finally, the ad hoc nature of UN operations and the lack of true centralized control within the UN were key factors that degraded the ability of UNTAC to carry out its mission. Officers could not communicate with one another or with Cambodians because of language problems. No standard operating procedures existed for the mission and there were no training requirements for participating units. In addition, the military-civilian working relationships were often strained and too often uncoordinated, although this relationship improved over time. Even though Mr. Akashi was given full authority over all UN elements working in Cambodia, perhaps the most critical factor in UNTAC not achieving its core military mission was the early and uncoordinated UNHCR refugee repatriation operation.

The political process begun with the elections in 1993, continues into the summer of 1997, not with ballots but with bullets. UNTAC provided a decent interval and a promise of real change, but Cambodia appears to be returning to government by military coup and dictatorship. Nevertheless, the precedents for good governance, democratic processes and elections are there, the brutal Khmer Rouge faction and its leadership has been virtually eliminated as a factor, and regional states are attempting to bring Cambodia into the family of nations in Southeast Asia. Progress had been made and the UN played a significant and positive role in that transition.

Notes

5 Boutros-Ghali, p. 15.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., 23.
9 Boutros-Ghali, p. 33-38.
10 Mayall, p. 50.
13 Ibid., p. 112.
14 Findlay, pp. 43-45.
15 Boutros-Ghali, pp. 18, 36.
16 Ibid., p. 139.
17 Thompson, Eugene L. Interview conducted at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 7 August 1997. LTC Thompson served as UNTAC Military Observer Team Leader in Cambodia from January through July of 1993.
18 Boutros-Ghali, p. 17.
crisis during UNPROFOR's lifetime, the complete failure to operate within either of these dimensions renders, in my view, discussion on some of the remaining dimensions somewhat meaningless. The real tragedy however was the dichotomy between public expectations and the reality: as far as UNPROFOR troops were concerned, their job was humanitarian in nature and they tried to do it well; but delivering food from armored vehicles bristling with heavy weapons while not being able to use those weapons to save lives became more and more impossible to accept. By engaging in displacement activity rather resolving to end the crisis politicians degraded their own military forces and undermined UN peacekeeping in all respects. Recovery will take a long time.

Notes

1 Arkan is the nom de guerre of Zeljko Raznatovic, a Belgrade playboy who has yet to be indicted for war crimes. *TIME*, May 13, 1996.
3 In late June 1991, less than a week before the forecast independence of Slovenia and Croatia, US Secretary of State James Baker visited Belgrade and reportedly stated that, although opposed to the use of force, there would be no penalties if it were used.
5 Ibid.
6 The Author went to New York to argue the case with the Director of Political Affairs, Marrack Goulding who relented, but only after I agreed to lend 15 APCs to the Nepalese.
7 The signing actually took place at 0400 hours, March 30 in the Russian Embassy but the documents were already dated March 29.
13 From a conversation with the Deputy Force Commander, Major General Ray Crabbe, August 8, 1995.
14 In September 1994, following a Croatian attack in the Gospic area of Sector South, the Canadian battalion, augmented with two French companies, blocked the Croatian advance and pushed them out of the pocket, but not before systematic ethnic cleansing had taken place.
It was in fact, a twin ladder process by which non-agreement at lower levels triggered a referral for decision at the next higher level. It was not a UNPROFOR construct but was designed by four NATO officers: Admiral Boorda as CINCSOUTH, Lt Gen (Canadian) Jack Dangerfield, Director of NATO's international military staff, Brigadier (UK) Phil Sturley, NATO LO to UNPROFOR and me.


Notes


2 Quoted material in this paragraph is taken from Telegram no. 1051, American Embassy, Santo Domingo, to Secretary of State, 25 April 1965, National Security Council History of the Dominican Crisis, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.

3 Bennett had been in Georgia visiting his seriously ill mother when the crisis erupted. Upon receiving reports of the revolt, he traveled to Washington for consultations, then headed back to Santo Domingo. Regarding the events of Tuesday afternoon, he maintained then and later that he lacked authority to mediate the crisis.


5 Details of these initial military activities by US troops between 20 April and 3 May can be found in *ibid.*, 78-96.

6 The exact number of communists involved in the Dominican revolt and the degree of influence they exerted over it has never been determined. Some recent assessments simply argue that communist involvement and influence was greater than conceded by the rebels and less than imagined by the Johnson administration.


8 The IAPF was the first hemispheric multilateral peace force to be created and deployed by the OAS. Some US military officers and political advisers hoped that the IAPF could be institutionalized or, in the event of another crisis, resurrected. Both hopes proved unrealistic, in that many Latin Americans, in regarding the IAPF as an instrument that violated the principle of noninterventionism, had no wish to repeat the experiment. The administration of President Jimmy Carter found this out in the late 1970s when it proposed a new "IAPF" to oversee a post-Somoza transition in Nicaragua. See Robert A. Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 145. It should also be noted, however, that multilateral forces containing hemispheric elements were employed by...
the Organization of East Caribbean States in Grenada and approved by the OAS for use under the UN in El Salvador and Haiti.


(Guzmán, it might be noted, was elected president of the Dominican Republic in 1978.) In addition to presidential emissaries from the United States, diplomats representing the OAS were also busy in Santo Domingo. While they generally coordinated their activities with US officials, they, too, suffered from the fact that no one person or group among them was authorized to speak for all. Consequently, they enjoyed no more success in arranging a settlement than did their US counterparts during the first days and weeks of the crisis.


19 As an example of the coordination that took place between the junta and US officers, the military operations undertaken by the Marines and paratroopers on Friday, 30 April, were briefed in advance to Loyalist officers at San Isidro on instructions from Ambassador Bennett. A small Loyalist force was with the paratroopers at the bridgehead Friday night, mainly for the purpose of patrolling the gap between the 82d and the Marine positions in Santo Domingo. The lack of fire discipline on the part of this force, however, led a US colonel to request that the men be sent back to San Isidro. *Ibid*, 78; Palmer, *Intervention in the Caribbean*, 36, 196 n5.


21 The perception that the United States would stay the course in the Dominican Republic may have changed, however, had the intervention continued beyond 1966. In 1965, US involvement in the war in Vietnam increased dramatically, and as that conflict escalated, it siphoned off more and more of America's military manpower. By 1966, US units in the Dominican Republic had set up areas in which they could train for what they would be called on to do in Vietnam in the likelihood they would be sent there.

22 With the arrival of the IAPF, however, the Marines began to redeploy back to the United States. Furthermore, over the following year, there would be a gradual withdrawal of various US Army units no longer needed in Santo Domingo or required elsewhere.

US troops in Santo Domingo generally understood why they could not use artillery, mortars, and other heavy weapons. They also accepted with equanimity some limits on their use of small arms. But as rules of engagement (ROE) became more restrictive, to the point of prohibiting US troops from returning sniper fire or from firing on "enemy" soldiers unless US positions were in danger of being overrun, frustration mounted, as did confusion over the proliferation of ROE. Political considerations determined much of the ROE, but so did the commander on the scene. Soon after his arrival in Santo Domingo, Palmer spent one night at a Marine strong point in the LOC. Listening throughout the night to what struck him as indiscriminate fire on the part of the Leathernecks, he became convinced of the need for strict ROE. By the end of his tour, he still upheld the necessity for rules of engagement, although he conceded that they might have been excessive in some cases. Ibid, 140-43; Palmer, Intervention in the Caribbean, 52-53.

Yates, Power Pack, 128-33, 206 n16.

Ibid, 147-49.

Ibid, 158-59; Palmer, Intervention in the Caribbean, 80-83, 200 n11.


Ibid, 136-38
Peace Enforcement in Somalia

reassessed their support. The changing degree of support for the operation was reflected in the military actions of the PF as UNOSOM II sent mixed signals regarding the strength and focus of the effort. The inverse relationship between the increasing professionalism of Aideed's militia and the decreasing professionalism of the several UNOSOM force contingents reflected especially the nature of the support Aideed was receiving both from Somali clans and factions and from the Italians as well as the PF weaknesses in the other dimensions.

Finally, the inability of the several components of UNOSOM II to identify clearly the actions required to end the conflict—a problem which developed during UNITAF between the US and the UN Secretary General—greatly contributed to the failure. When the SRSG and Force Command finally did identify the required actions, they could not get the other components to deliver what was needed in a timely fashion. It was, in a cliche, too little and too late.

Notes

2 Ibid., p. 4.
5 Interviews with officers who have served in UN peacekeeping operations over a number of years.
7 FM 100-23.
8 Terms of Reference (TOR) for US Forces in Somalia, April 1993.
9 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 UNOSOM II Fax from the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations to the Special Representative to the Secretary General, Subject: "Draft Resolution on Somalia, S/25889," 6 June 1993, pp. 2-4.
15 UNOSOM II Memorandum from Force Command to the Special Representative to the Secretary General, Subject: Trip Report to Italian Brigade, 27 May 1993, p. 2.
UNOSOM II Code Cable from the Special Representative to the Secretary General to the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Subject: Additional Concerns of Force Commander, 18 July 1993, p. 1.


Ibid., pp. 44-49.

UNOSOM II Force Command Special SITREP to UN New York, 3 July 1993, pp. 1-3 and UNOSOM II Code Cable from the SRSG to the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Subject: "Additional Insights re Situation in Mogadishu," 16 July 1993, p. 2.


UNOSOM II Force Command SITREP to UN New York, 7 July 1993, p. 9.


UNOSOM II Memorandum from Force Command to the Special Representative to the Secretary General, Subject: "UNOSOM Transition Process," 18 April 1993.

Ibid.

UNOSOM II Fax from Commander Belgian Brigade to the Force Commander, Subject: "Situation in Kismayo," 7 May 1993.


Daze, Field Notes, 22 June 1993.

Letter from the Chief of the French Defence Staff to Force Command, 14 June 1993.


This account is taken from UNOSOM II Force Command SITREP to UN New York, 3 October 1993 and US Quick Reaction Force, Falcon Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, Summary of Operations on 3 October 1993.


Interview with a member of Ambassador Oakley's staff, 1994.


Ibid., p. 30.

Notes

3 LTC Colonel Timothy Vane, spokesman, XVIII Airborne Corps, FT Bragg NC, correspondence with the author dated May 10, 1996.
5 "UNMIH Overview", pg. 8; provided by HQ UNMIH, Port-au-Prince Haiti, March 5, 1995.
8 As reported by the expatriate newspaper Haiti Insight, Aristide regarded the gangs as much as political phenomena as a criminal one and sought to promote "a dialogue between HNP and the well-armed civilian gangs. See J.P. Slavin, "The Haitian Police: Struggling With Inexperience" Haiti Insight, April/May 1996, p. 4.
10 Telephone interview with Prof. Bryant Freeman, University of Kansas, July 2, 1996. A fluent Creole speaker and long-time observer of Haitian affairs, Dr. Freeman monitors the Haitian Press on behalf of the U.S.-based Haitian Institute. He was a civilian member of UNMIH and an election observer for Haiti's December 1995 elections.


"Success in Peacekeeping", UNMIH After Action Report (AAR), US Army Peacekeeping Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA pg. 6. This report was prepared by General Kinzer's staff in May and June of 1996. Hereafter cited as UNMIH AAR.

LTC Colonel Timothy Vane, spokesman, XVIII Airborne Corps, FT Bragg NC, correspondence with the author dated May 10, 1996.

MG Kinzer interview, Carlisle PA, 10 May 1996.

UNMIH Command Briefing, 31 January 1996, courtesy of HQ UNMIH.

MG Kinzer interview, Carlisle PA, 10 May 1996.


Freeman interview, University of Kansas, July 2, 1996.


MG Kinzer interview, Carlisle PA, 10 May 1996.


MG Kinzer interview, Carlisle PA, 10 May 1996.

Fishel characterized the effort to retrain FAd'H members as IPSF as "too much in too short a time with significantly less than was required in human resources". John T. Fishel, "The Intervention in Haiti", in Civil Military Operations in the New World Order Praeger, Westport, CT; 1997.

John T. Fishel, "Haiti Ain't Panama, Jack", unpublished conference paper, courtesy of Dr. Fishel.


LTC Timothy D. Vane, telephone interview, 02 March 1996. LTC Vane was the Public Affairs Officer for JTF 190.


Haiti AAR, pg 9.

Interview with BG Richard A. Potter (USA, ret), 6 March 1996, Carlisle Barracks, PA; Brigadier General Potter commanded Task Force (TF) Black, the initial Joint Special Operations Task Force under JTF 180. He subsequently commanded TF Raleigh, the Army Special Operations Force remaining in Haiti after the departure of JTF 180. UNMIH officers point out that disarmament was not specified in the mandate.


Ibid.

Potter interview, March 6, 1996.

MG Kinzer interview, Carlisle PA, May 10, 1996.


Interview with Max G. Manwaring, Carlisle, PA, June 14, 1996.

Interview with Max G. Manwaring, Carlisle PA, July 26, 1996.


MG Kinzer interview, Carlisle Barracks PA, May 8, 1996.

Nevertheless, no regime, group, or force can legislate or decree moral legitimacy or political competence for themselves or anyone else. Legitimation and stability derive from popular and institutional perceptions that authority is genuine and effective, and uses morally correct means for reasonable and fair purposes. These qualities are developed, sustained, and enhanced by appropriate actions or behavior over time.

In the short-term, however, a fragile regime will likely require outside help in developing these qualities. Probably the best an outside power or coalition of powers can do is to help establish a temporary level of security that might allow the carefully guided and monitored development of the ethical and professional political competence underpinnings necessary for long-term success in achieving a relatively better quality of national and international stability and well-being. But, again, the enormity and logic of the peace building solutions required for the achievement of legitimate governance and stability demand a carefully thought out, phased, long-term planning and implementation process for sustainable political development.

The primary implications of this analysis are clear. The ability of "fragile" and menaced governments to control, protect, and enhance their stability and well-being is severely threatened in the contemporary security environment. A theory of engagement that is focused on Legitimacy and political competence by the employment of the seven dimensions of the SWORD model empowers a realistic response to the injustices, insecurities, and instabilities generated by corrupt, incompetent, and/or misguided governance.

The conscious choices that the United States and the international community make about peace operations now and in the future will help define the processes of national reform, regeneration, well-being, and thus relative internal and international peace. Success in countering the new world disorder and in fulfilling the hope for a better international peace will be constructed on the same pillars that supported favorable results in the past, including a theory of engagement derived from the SWORD Model. This is nothing radical. It is basic foreign policy and military asset management, which, in the end, must rest upon the foundations of Legitimacy and Unity of Effort.

Notes

1 X (George F. Kennan), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, July 1947, pp. 566-582.
4 Ibid.
Notes


12 Breunig, pp. 74-76.


Breunig, 226-7.


Druckman and Diehl have used delphic surveys to distinguish empirically between first-party and third-party roles in peacekeeping-related missions.


J. Mathew Vaccaro, "The UN Peacekeeping Operation in the Congo, 1960-1964: The Nexus of Decolonialism and Superpower Conflict in the Guise of UN Peacekeeping".

David Last, "Peacekeeping in Divided Societies: Limits to Success," forthcoming, *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement*.


Winning "The Savage Wars of Peace" 237


31 For a case study of the dynamics in northwest Bosnia, see David Last, "Defeating Fear and Hatred: Multiplying the Peacebuilding Impact of a Military Contribution," forthcoming in Canadian Foreign Policy.

32 Colonel P.G. Williams, OBE, "Bosnia as a 'NATO Safe Area'- A Post-SFOR Solution?" unpublished paper provided by author, 11 June 1997.

33 Stephen C. Fee, "Peacekeeping on the Ecuador-Peru Border: The Military Observer Mission - Ecuador/Peru (MOMEP)".


35 According to a Canadian officer on the Operations staff at the time, interviewed at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, May 1997.


37 Use of contact and combat skills is discussed in greater detail in David Last, Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Conflict De-Escalation in Peacekeeping Operations (Clementsport, NS: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), 43-64.

38 COMMARC's Policy Guidance No 8 - Civil Tasks, 23 March 1996, paragraph 10.

39 Private communication with author.

40 Vaccaro. See also Michael S. Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: USIP, 1996), 32-49. Institution building is appropriate to post-conflict peacebuilding; other techniques are appropriate to different stages in the life cycle of a conflict, 38.

41 Examples from Bosnia are provided in David Last, "Implementing the Dayton Accords: The Challenge of Inter-Agency Coordination," in Cornwallis Group Seminar Proceedings, forthcoming Canadian PK Press.

42 Eric A. Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1977) 117.

43 Fee.


47 Lawrence A. Yates, "Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966".

48 Fishel and Daze.

49 NATO Peace Support Operations [see Baxter review, C44 file]


I have personal experience with both Muslim police of the Federation and Serb police of Republic of Srpska doing so at Otoka, 19 April 1996. Other examples can be found in the Combined Press Information Centre briefings, November 1996 to March 1997.

Interview with a UN Civil Affairs officer from UNTAES at Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, 21 June 1997.

Vaccaro.


Establishing A Canadian Capability in Peace-Building, Background Paper for the National Forum on Foreign Policy (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, 1997).

Fee.

David Last, "Peacekeeping in Divided Societies: Limits to Success," forthcoming in *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement*.

This relationship was described by Dana Eyre, a US Civil Affairs officer and professor at the Naval Post-Graduate School, Monterey, in 1996. It implies a different relationship from that described by a similar figure showing force, impartiality and consent in FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, Final Draft, 1995, page 1-6.

Vaccaro.


The distinction was drawn by A.B. Fetherston, *Toward a Theory of UN Peacekeeping*, and is elaborated in David Last, *Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Conflict De-escalation*. 