The Middle East
in Global Strategy
About the Book and Editor

Emphasizing the vital links between international politics and strategy, the contributors provide a comprehensive analysis of the strategic interests of the major international actors in the Middle East. The policies of the superpowers toward the Middle East are fragmented and unproductive, the authors contend, and must be integrated into overall strategic doctrine. For example, inadequate awareness of the strategic value and interests of two key regional actors—Syria and Israel—has led to external misperceptions of their roles.

NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) have not been effective, despite their potential to exert considerable influence. Such problems as the divergent views of the West European allies and the United States as well as almost total Soviet dominance in foreign policy decisions made in the WTO have greatly limited collective alliance input. Moreover, emphasis on the Arab-Israeli conflict has obscured the pivotal role the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war play in the region’s continuing upheaval. Such deep-seated instability further highlights the need for international actors to define and act upon their strategic interests clearly and comprehensively.

Aurel Braun is associate professor of international relations, University of Toronto.
The Middle East in Global Strategy

edited by
Aurel Braun
To my sons

Daniel and David
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Preface

A volatile area, the Middle East has been the subject of a great many studies but there remain gaps and inadequacies in the scholarly literature. In placing some of the key regional issues in the context of global strategic concerns one should get some additional insights into the problems facing regional and external actors and about strategy and strategic assessment. This work is a collective effort, based largely on a conference held at the University of Toronto under the auspices of the Canadian Professors for Peace in the Middle East.

I have benefitted from the encouragement and support of many individuals and organizations. Generous financial aid has been provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Office of Research Administration's Humanities and Social Sciences Committee at the University of Toronto, the Canadian Professors for Peace in the Middle East, and Erindale College, of the University of Toronto. My wife, Julianna, an art critic and editor, gave me both encouragement and useful advice in the preparation of the manuscript for publication. Dr. Eva Dessen, the Executive Director of the CPPME, did a tremendous job of handling the details of the conference, and her experience and helpfulness were invaluable assets. Chris Arden of Westview Press thoroughly copyedited the manuscript. My research assistant, Douglas Alderson, did a fine job in checking sources and in helping proofread the manuscript. I also benefitted from the advice of Susan McEachern, the acquisitions editor, and Lauri Fults, associate editor, at Westview Press in getting the manuscript ready for publication. Dean L.J. Brooks of Erindale College contributed not only college computer services but also a good deal of his own time in the technical preparation of the manuscript. Typing, computer inputting and final preparation were all done by the following individuals who exhibited a great deal of dedication, patience and professionalism: F. Burke, Brenda Samuels, Lyn Gladman and Mary Pacy at the University of Toronto. I would also like to thank Henri Durand of Computerized Pagemaking for specialized computer services. I am, of course, responsible for all errors and omissions.

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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AIOC</td>
<td>Anglo-Iranian Oil Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>APFSDS</td>
<td>armor-piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding sabot</td>
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<td>ASMs</td>
<td>air-to-surface missiles</td>
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<td>ASW</td>
<td>antisubmarine</td>
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<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control System</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Congressional Budget Office</td>
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<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Central Command</td>
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<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCAFMED</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Mediterranean</td>
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<td>CINCSOUTH</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMEA</td>
<td>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance</td>
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<td>COMCON</td>
<td>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMNAVSOOUTH</td>
<td>Commander Naval Forces, South</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPSU</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Soviet Union</td>
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<td>DFLP</td>
<td>Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
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<td>FR</td>
<td>Flexible Response</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<td>GSFG</td>
<td>Group of Soviet Forces Germany</td>
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<td>IAF</td>
<td>Israeli Air Force</td>
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<td>IAI</td>
<td>Israel Aircraft Industries</td>
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<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israel Defense Forces</td>
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<td>JHC</td>
<td>Joint High Command</td>
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<td>KFIR</td>
<td>Lion (Hebrew)</td>
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<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mutual Assured Destruction</td>
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<td>MARAIRMED</td>
<td>Maritime Air Mediterranean</td>
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<td>MFO</td>
<td>Multinational Force and Observers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIDEASTFOR</td>
<td>Mid-East Force</td>
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<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NAVSOUTH</td>
<td>Naval Forces South</td>
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<td>NSWP</td>
<td>Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact</td>
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<td>NVA</td>
<td>National People's Army (GDR)</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<td>OSS</td>
<td>Office of Strategic Services</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>Political Consultative Committee</td>
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<td>PDPA</td>
<td>People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan</td>
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<td>PDRY</td>
<td>People's Democratic Republic of Yemen</td>
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<td>PFLO</td>
<td>People's Front for the Liberation of Oman</td>
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<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDF</td>
<td>Rapid Deployment Force</td>
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<td>RPVs</td>
<td>remotely piloted vehicles</td>
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<td>SAC</td>
<td>Strategic Air Command</td>
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<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Europe</td>
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<td>SACLANT</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Allied Forces, Atlantic</td>
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<td>SAMs</td>
<td>surface-air missiles</td>
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<td>SAS</td>
<td>Special Air Service (Britain)</td>
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<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>SIOP</td>
<td>Single Integrated Operational Plan</td>
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<td>SLBMs</td>
<td>submarine-launched ballistic missiles</td>
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<td>SLCMs</td>
<td>sea-launched cruise missiles</td>
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<td>SLOC</td>
<td>sea lanes of communication</td>
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<td>SSBNs</td>
<td>nuclear ballistic missile submarines</td>
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<td>SSMs</td>
<td>surface-to-surface missiles</td>
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<td>STRIKFORSOUTH</td>
<td>Striking Forces, South (NATO)</td>
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<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>United Nations Disengagement Observer Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>United States Navy</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>Warsaw Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>YAR</td>
<td>Yemen Arab Republic</td>
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PART ONE
INTRODUCTION:
ON STRATEGY, STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT
AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Aurel Braun

Terms such as "strategy" and "strategic" have become virtual buzzwords in the 1980s. Although these terms are hardly new in the field of international relations, their increased use indicates a greater concern with a dimension of national and international interests that may have been inadequately dealt with in the past. This strategic dimension has not only broad implications but limitations as well: Strategy does not provide an all-encompassing explanation of issues and concerns. Similarly, it is not the purpose of this book to provide universal prescriptions or to suggest instant solutions to what certainly appear to be often intractable problems in the Middle East. Rather, the authors hope to promote a better understanding of what constitutes some of the vital interests of both local and external actors and thereby to suggest more effective means of managing problems. As a comprehensive analysis of the policies of all regional and concerned external actors would have been impossible within the scope of one volume, only selected policies are discussed. Nevertheless, the focus on certain key regional and external states can provide vital insights into the interests of regional and external parties and the overall management of disputes and conflicts.

Despite the limited scope of this work, we felt it necessary to employ a global context. Again, this is not to say that we have attempted a comprehensive analysis of, for instance, a superpower's global strategy in order to focus on the Middle East; rather, our objective is to recognize the interdependence of regional and external variables. The ongoing Arab-Israeli dispute, the Iran-Iraq war, the continued dependence of much of the world on oil exports from the Middle East, and the terrorism that emanates from the region but reaches into all parts of the world--all have important global implications. Not surprising, therefore, is the great international concern with developments in the region. This concern also illustrates the necessity of allowing some geographical flexibility in defining the region. Although a good deal of the world's attention has been focused on the Arab-Israeli conflict in the eastern Mediterranean, the other part of the region--the Gulf area--has been embroiled in a war far more destruc-
tive in human terms and at least as dangerous in its potential for escalation. Moreover, developments such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which is outside the Middle East proper, or the conflict among the Arab states in the Maghreb can alter significantly the strategic interest of both local and external actors. Furthermore, domestic developments can very clearly affect foreign policy. Internal instability or the fragility of the leadership structure can and often does create significant interdependence with foreign policy. Thus, in considering the interdependence between domestic and external variables in the formulation of foreign policy and between regional and extra regional actors, we find it necessary to think of strategic concerns in global terms.

In any case, however, the entire analysis is largely dependent on the very definition of strategy. All too often strategy is thought of in narrow military or in crude geopolitical terms. By employing a narrow definition or ill-formulated concepts, some on both the right and the left have argued for the need to protect the "strategic" interest when in fact they are only advocating their own special interests. (All too often quantitative factors are emphasized over qualitative ones. That skewed emphasis, in turn, largely determines what is considered a strategic asset or a liability.) Therefore, we must clarify the concepts upon which a definition of "strategy" is built.

The contributors to this volume have been encouraged to employ a combination of Clausewitzian and Beaufréan concepts of strategy in their analysis of issues in the Middle East. "Strategy," as noted, is not a new term--certainly the concepts underlying it are not new. Moreover, these concepts have been subject to a long process of evolution. The works of Karl von Clausewitz and André Beaufré are useful landmarks on this long evolutionary road.

In particular, Clausewitz's great work On War forms a useful core, not necessarily because of its originality but, rather, because of the clarity and persuasiveness with which the author explains certain key concepts. Nevertheless, Clausewitz is often misunderstood. It is not uncommon to attribute a purely or largely military concern to Clausewitz's formulation of strategy. Certainly he does hold that the function of strategy is to determine the force commitment necessary to achieve the objectives defined by policy. To that extent this function is, of course, a military one. On the other hand, such an interpretation of strategy takes it out of the larger context of Clausewitz's work. Moreover, a narrow military interpretation misses what Clausewitz rightfully considers the single most important idea in all strategy--namely, that war takes place within a political milieu from which it derives all its purposes. Furthermore, in arguing that the influence of purposes upon the means must be continuing and pervasive, he states emphatically:

According to this view it is an unpermissible and even harmful distinction, according to which a great military event or the plan for such an event should admit a purely military judgement; indeed, it is an unreasonable procedure
to consult professional soldiers on the plan of war, that they may give a purely military opinion, as is frequently done by cabinets; but still more absurd is the demand of theorists that a statement of the available means of war should be laid before the General, that he may draw up a purely military plan for the campaign in accordance with them. [italics in original]²

Thus Clausewitz emphasizes political primacy in the formulation of strategy or in the conduct of war. Indeed, he goes so far as to suggest that political intercourse with the enemy does not cease through the onset of war but continues to exist "whatever may be the means which it uses...the main lines along which the events of the war proceed and to which they are bound are only the general features of policy which run all through the war until peace takes place."³

Vital interests are also determined politically and not just militarily. A sovereign nation decides itself what constitutes a vital interest based on the judgment of its political leaders. How these leaders come to their assessments varies according to their personalities and the domestic political systems in question (which are subject, in turn, to varying inputs from the population). But the process is not a purely objective one. Some, analysts, such as the late Bernard Brodie, have even contended that "vital interests, despite common assumptions to the contrary, have only a vague connection with objective fact."⁴ Therefore, perception is extremely important, and strategy must be formulated at the highest level as well as broadly construed. Clausewitz's emphasis on politics, which, in turn, contains elements of psychology, economics, and diplomacy, sets the stage for a natural broadening in the evolution of the concepts of strategy.

Conflicts in the latter part of the nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century have shown as well that the concepts of strategy had to be continually enlarged. These concepts, though, should be built on the base defined by Clausewitz. The collapse of Russia in 1917 demonstrated that internal disintegration or revolution or psychological corruption of the will to fight could play a decisive role in determining the outcome of a conflict. Historically, then strategy could not be thought of as a strictly military concept. The German chief of staff at the end of World War I, General Erich Von Ludendorff, used the term "total war" and another German, General Karl Haushofer (whose writings unfortunately found great favor with Hitler), later wrote of "expanded strategy", which aimed at augmenting military power through the addition of both revolutionary ideas and economic potential. The great British strategist, Basil Liddell Hart, contended on the basis of his observations of the behavior of the great powers in Europe during the interwar period that resolute political action and psychological-propagandistic pressures on the opponents, as well as the existence of credible, highly equipped armed forces, could be used to force an opponent to yield without armed resistance. Hence he wrote about the merits of the "indirect method" of military strategy, with the battle being merely the most severe form of imposing political will.
V. I. Lenin is credited with developing the state doctrine within which Soviet military strategy resides. In the principles of Marxist-Leninism and the doctrine of revolutionary transformation of the world, Lenin (who read Clausewitz extensively) ensured that there were inseparable ties between Soviet foreign and military policy. Although class struggle itself contains ideological, economic, political, and military dimensions in foreign policy, in practice it is the political element that decides strategic interests and policy. The importance of the relationship between strategy and the forces of production and the role of the various contradictions is formally acknowledged; but given the centralized system of the Soviet state, politics invariably prevails in strategy. Even in the nuclear age the Soviets have declared, with a twist of Clausewitz’s famous dictum, that war remains "the continuation of class and state policies with the means of force and arms" (emphasis added).

It was, however, General André Beaufre who developed a definition of "strategy" that incorporates those concepts we feel best reflect the need to understand and protect vital national interests. Rooted in Clausewitz's concepts Beaufre's "total strategy" explicitly comprises political, economic, diplomatic, psychological, and military dimensions. Beaufre accords military force only a secondary role in achieving the primary political goal. He places greater emphasis on correct assessment and the handling of the psychological aspect, and contends that military force as the "direct method" should be used only as a last resort.

Beaufre also defines strategy as "the art of interaction of forces to achieve the political objectives" or "the art of dialectics of will, which uses power for solving its conflicts." It is significant that he talks about the art of interaction or dialectics rather than science, because the latter points to important elements of perception and to the intrinsic uncertainty involved in strategic assessment. Strategy must also cope with contradictions and resolve them. According to both Hegel and Marx, a thesis produces a contradictory antithesis. This in turn leads to a synthesis, a higher state of truth. Even though the contradiction is solved, it remains recognized. Accordingly, Beaufre outlines concepts that operate in a fairly complex matter and involve political objective, will, and initiative as well as a dialectic process.

Beaufre speaks of three different kinds of strategy. "Total strategy" is the most important task and is thus the responsibility of the top-level leadership (i.e. the chief of government). On the other hand, "general strategy," which is required to fulfill parts of the overall objective and whose sequence and order of priority are laid down by the Executive, is carried out in the administrative sector. Finally, "operational strategy" works below this ministerial management and decisionmaking level and deals with problems in the tactical and technical field. Although there is some overlap among the three levels of strategy, our concern here is with what Beaufre defines as "total strategy." It is this strategy that incorporates the key concepts of Beaufre, and it is also this strategy that is employed to force or induce an opponent to act in a desired way, to impose one actor's will on another, or to dissuade him from an action he has taken or is about
to take. It is, therefore, a way of protecting or enhancing vital national interests without causing unacceptable damage to oneself. The means that are selected for the task may involve direct or indirect strategies. In the latter the decision is sought through a political-economic approach and possibly by negotiations.

Beaufre's concepts of strategy are subtle, flexible, and nuanced and perception is a seminal ingredient. Strategy for Beaufre is an art rather than a science because it cannot have clearly determined rules. It does, however, have considerable scope. Soundly formulated strategy should be long-range, comprehensive, flexible, yet consistent, and it must ultimately cope with intrinsic contradictions in the international system as well as between domestic and external variables. As such, strategic assessment must discard the dangerously naive measurements of geopolitics or pseudo-geopolitics that emphasize the quantitative elements in a relationship. It must concentrate instead on the qualitative dimensions. It is within such a conceptual framework that the contributors address themselves to the various issues involving the Middle East.

In Chapter 1 of this volume, Howard Teicher of the U.S. National Security Council, highlights the conceptual difficulties involved in formulating an effective strategy. He also provides an excellent example of strategic vision in his tour d'horizon of a broad geographical region that includes what is commonly referred to as the Middle East. Moreover, he examines a variety of concepts within the context of some of the main issues confronting the Middle East, including the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Iran-Iraqi conflict, and terrorism. He contends that power and diplomacy are not distinct alternatives so much as interactive variables. His examination is not an abstract one, however, inasmuch as she refers to the United States for examples of how a state ought to define its strategic interest or try to ensure that its policies incorporate the "appropriate mix of political, economic and military instruments in support of a diplomatic initiative."

In Chapter 2, Gerald Steinberg and Steven Spiegel, also deal with some of the perceptual difficulties in defining strategy and strategic interest. In particular, they address themselves to the debate between "realists" and "idealists" regarding the position of Israel and the West and examine the different strategic perceptions of the United States and Western Europe. Given the controversy regarding the evaluation of Israel's strategic worth as exemplified by Harry Shaw, who contends that the state is basically a liability, and James Phillips of the Heritage Foundation, who advocates that Israel should be incorporated as NATO's "strategic anchor," Steinberg and Spiegel point to the importance of employing adequate concepts in reaching a useful assessment.

The interdependence between domestic and external factors is another aspect of strategy and strategic assessment under examination in this volume. In Chapter 3, Meir Zamir delves into this issue in his challenge of the thesis that Syria is emerging as the major power in the Middle East and that it now not only holds the key to a solution in Lebanon but also retains a veto power over processes contrary to its interests. In addition, Zamir examines the ability of the domestic system to support an ambitious for-
eign policy in Syria. In the process he points to the dangers of basing strategic assessments on a perception of foreign policy but without adequately understanding the stability of the domestic system. Some of the other contributors, such as Avner Yaniv in Chapter 7 and Roger Savory in Chapter 10, also touch on this interdependence in their discussions about the behavior of a number of states in the Middle East. Yaniv suggests that domestic politics has an impact on the reliability of states in alliances, and Savory, in his examination of Iran's behavior, examines the importance of Khomeini's decision to export revolution. Indeed, domestic instability plays a significant role in foreign policy and, hence, in the formulation of strategy. It must therefore be weighed in strategic assessment.

As external forces also have an impact on the states of the Middle East, extraregional actors often need to formulate policies that best protect their vital national interests. Sanford Lakoff, Neil MacFarlane, and Joel Sokolsky examine the strategic doctrines and perceptions of the superpowers in relation to the Middle East, particularly the area bordering the Eastern Mediterranean. In Chapter 4, Lakoff examines not only the U.S. perception of developments in the region but also the possibilities of formulating a more effective doctrine and the chances of building military instruments of foreign policy that can be employed to protect vital national interests. Then, in Chapter 5, MacFarlane examines Soviet strategic doctrine. He looks at Soviet objectives, and how they are reflected in political and military doctrine as well as in Soviet behavior toward the conflict, and he examines the extent to which these objectives can be satisfied through a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Within this context he addresses the Soviet Union's difficulties in formulating effective strategy as well as the problems for a researcher in finding sources for the Soviet decisionmaking process.

In Chapter 6, Sokolsky looks at the strategies of both superpowers, but this time from a maritime dimension. The great effort that the two powers have exerted in the Mediterranean region justifies the inclusion of a chapter on this aspect of the competition--specifically because of what it can say about the problems of formulating an effective overall strategic doctrine. Sokolsky starts with the assumption that regional conflicts have complicated an already existing rivalry centered on Europe and that the ultimate objectives for both the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies are ashore. Ultimately, he tries to assess how each nation can best fit regionally focused policies into its overall strategy.

Each of these three chapters, however, refer to superpower interests and behavior as examples of the problems of strategic formulation rather than suggesting that they are the only external actors who exercise influence or should have any real interest. Regional alliances as well as those between the Middle Eastern states and extraregional powers reveal another aspect of the interplay within the international system and thus highlight another dimension of strategy. In Chapter 7, Avner Yaniv analyzes the problems of alliances in general and those in the Middle East in particular. Instability and unreliability are not only problems for alliances but crucial variables in strategy as well. They relate to the definition of
strategic interest and to the weighing of strategic assets.

It is still an open question, though, whether alliances can function as effective international actors—especially in so volatile a region as the Middle East. The two main military groupings, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, apparently seek to play a role because of the very keen interest of the primary powers in each alliance. Since states do not formulate strategy in isolation, those in alliance systems must be mindful both of their own national interests as well as those of the alliance. In Chapter 8, Edwin Fedder analyzes the policies of the NATO alliance to see how the Americans on the one hand and the Europeans on the other define strategic interests in general and in the region. Thus he examines not merely alliance relations with the Middle East but also West-West relations and the difficulties in formulating a comprehensive alliance strategy. In Chapter 9, the editor of this volume assesses the ability of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) states to contribute to the formulation of Pact strategy or to embark on independent policies that safeguard their particular national concerns.

All of the problems related to the formulation of an effective strategy—perceptual clarification, the interdependence of external and domestic variables, the impact of external forces, and the role of alliances—apply not only to the eastern Mediterranean but also to the states in the Gulf region. Although much has been written about this area in the past decade, it has not enjoyed the same sustained interests in Western scholarship as the issues revolving around the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nor have Western statesmen always appreciated the significance of the Gulf area as a source of instability that equals or might surpass that of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For instance, Gary Sick, who was President Carter’s chief White House aide for Iran during the 1978-1979 revolution and the hostage crisis, writes that Cyrus Vance, the U.S. secretary of state, was so preoccupied with the Arab-Israeli peace talks that he failed to devote sufficient time to build a moderate political center in Iran composed of nationalist secular elements. If he had done so, according to Sick, Ayatollah Khomeini might not have been able to seize control of the government.

In a related vein, the authors in the last three chapters, show that this area of the Middle East is subject to the same strategic considerations as the eastern Mediterranean and that both local and external actors need to formulate more effective policies. In Chapter 10, Roger Savory examines not only the historical roots of the Islamic revolution but also the intrinsically unstable nature of the region. He assesses, as well, the problems of alliances in the Gulf area, especially in view of Khomeini’s desire to export revolution and the impact of the revolution on the interests of external actors, particularly the two superpowers.

In Chapter 11, Robert Litwak considers the Soviet role in the region in light of such issues as strategic measurement, the political use of military power, and the problems of threat perception. Keeping in mind that the Soviet Union did not anticipate the collapse of the Iranian regime, Litwak examines subsequent Soviet policies in his effort to gauge that superpower’s ability to adapt its policies to new situations.
In Chapter 12, Zalmay Khalilzad analyzes the United States' Middle East policies with particular attention to the problem of deterrence. Specifically, he directs his analysis toward the difficulties of extending deterrence to a distant region such as the Gulf area. Moreover, he provides an evaluation on the basis of what he calls the balance of interest—a factor he believes is essential to both the formulation of strategic doctrine and the concept of extended deterrence. It also places the problems of the region in a global context.

In short, the authors in this volume examine both the conundrums of the Middle East and the difficulties in formulating effective strategies. Local and extraregional actors have to think in strategic terms, but they suffer many perceptual problems—precisely because strategy and strategic assessment contain uncertainties and internal contradictions. The authors also deal with the interdependence of domestic and external factors, which, in turn, involves questions of stability and reliability. Hence external powers must define clearly their vital interests in the Middle East and formulate their strategies accordingly. As alliance membership can be a part of such strategies, the organization as an actor in the international system must also search for a suitable strategy. Finally, given the fact that the balance of interest varies in this highly segmented region, the authors touch on the question of whether external (or local) actors can afford to allow the focus on a particular set of concerns in one location to detract their attention from actual or potential problems in another part of the area. That is, an effective strategy needs to cover the entire region in a comprehensive fashion while retaining the flexibility to focus strength in a particular area without losing interest or capability in another. The goals for both regional and external actors is to protect their national interest, of course, but they must try, in the process, to diminish the chances for local conflict and the escalation of existing conflicts within the region and especially beyond.

NOTES

2 Ibid., p. 598.
3 Ibid., p. 556.
5 *Communist Vooruzennych Sil No. 6* (1975), p. 71.
8 Ibid., p. 24.
9 Ibid., p. 48.
10 Ibid., p. 54.
balance of power.

In conclusion, the United States faces a time of challenge in the Middle East as great as any in recent memory. Indeed, it must use both diplomacy and military power, along with other resources, to protect and advance its interests and ideals. A favorable power balance in an area as fluid, dynamic, and violence-prone as the Middle East is not easy to maintain or influence. But such a balance is an essential objective of U.S. strategy.

NOTES

The views expressed in this chapter are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. government.

NOTES

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12 Benjamin S. Lambeth, Moscow's Lessons for the 1982
Lebanon War (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, R-3000-AF).
17 Peter Hellman, "Israel's Chariot of Fire," Atlantic Monthly (March 1985), pp. 81-95.
18 Steinberg, Recycled Weapons, pp. 28-38.
19 The Israeli contribution to the Mirage V was later embodied in the NESHER and KFIR aircraft, which were manufactured in Israel. See D. Goldstein, "Israeli Aeronautics: Thanks to de Gaulle," Israel Yearbook, 1982 (Tel Aviv: Israel Yearbook Publishing, 1982), pp. 261-262.
22 Gabriel, Operation Peace for Galilee, pp. 62-84.
23 In the first days of the 1967 war, some two hundred Israeli aircraft flew several thousand missions. See Zeev Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army (San Francisco, Ca.: Simon and Schuster, 1974), p. 172.
24 Steinberg, Recycled Weapons, pp. 28-38.
27 Washington Times (March 14, 1984).
30 "Decoy Competition," Aviation Week and Space Technology

31 Ibid.
41 Maariv (May 26, 1982).
44 Hellman, Chariots of Fire, p. 86.
46 See, for example, Harry J. Shaw, "Strategic Dissensus," Foreign Policy, No. 61 (Winter 1985-1986), pp. 125-141.
Maronites and Druze. The Syrians, for ideological and practical reasons, however, cannot support such a solution. The coming months will therefore be crucial for Assad, and many of his rivals will follow his policy in Lebanon very closely.

Lebanon is also an area of potentially dangerous confrontation between Syria and Israel. Israel's evacuation of South Lebanon without any security arrangements has created a hazardous situation. It can be assumed that Assad is currently seeking to reduce tension as he needs time to establish Syrian control over Lebanon. In Israel, there is certainly no desire for a new confrontation, but it is doubtful whether this fact could be sufficient to prevent an escalation that might retrace the pattern of events which triggered the 1982 war: terrorist attacks from South Lebanon, whether by radical Shiites or Palestinians, that will force an Israeli retaliation, leading to clashes first between Israeli aircraft and the Syrian air-defense system and later even to a full-scale military confrontation. Furthermore, there is the fear that if the Syrians encounter difficulties in solving the Lebanese problem, or if the peace initiative gathers momentum, Assad may be tempted to increase the tension with Israel. Whether events will develop in this direction or Assad will decide to pursue a more cautious and accommodating policy toward Israel is still too early to tell.

NOTES

1 The most prominent of these was Salah Bitar who, together with Michel Aflaq, founded the Ba'th party. Bitar was assassinated in Paris in July 1980 after ignoring warnings to cease his activities against the regime.

2 New York Times (September 13, 1984).

3 Assad, in an interview with the French weekly Le Point, as reported by the New York Times (December 24, 1983); and Tass, AP (December 29, 1983).

4 For details of the Syrians' attitude toward the Lebanese state and their struggle to restore these districts, see M. Zamir, The Formation of Modern Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1985), particularly Chapter 4.


6 See: M. Zamir, "Faisal and the Lebanese Question, 1918-1920," to be published in Middle Eastern Studies.


8 In his review in the New York Times of Eric Silver's book Begin, the former editor of the Observer, Connor Cruise O'Brien, wrote that in the wake of the 1982 war, the Syrians sent a message to Israel through a third party, expressing their willingness to reach an understanding with Israel in Lebanon. The Syrian proposal was rejected
by then Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, as reported in Ma'ariv (Tel Aviv, November 25, 1984).


10 Assad's heart attack also led to the postponement of Amin Jemayil's visit scheduled for the middle of November. Consequently, an agreement between the two leaders was reached only at the beginning of March 1984, when the visit took place.

11 On the goals of U.S. policy in Lebanon and the Middle East, see J. Sisco, "The Middle East: Progress or Lost Opportunity?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 3 (America and the World, 1982), pp. 611-640.


13 On July 30, 1984, the Soviet Union reissued its Middle East peace plan based on an international conference. The plan was endorsed by Syria; but when Mubarak and Hussein called for an international UN sponsored conference in early October, the Syrians renounced it.

14 In a speech to the Council, Arafat charged unspecified heads of state with planning to bomb the building in which the Council was being convened. See also Assad's interview in Le Monde (Paris, August 2, 1984).

15 According to a French News Agency report of March 13, 1985, Arafat had visited Moscow earlier that month.

16 Christian sources charged that the Soviet Union is now supplying weapons directly to Walid Junblat's Druze forces.
NOTES

1 A definition similar to the one used here is that of Russell F. Weigley: "the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force," from The American Way of War (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. xvii; cited by Captain James A. Bowden, "The RDJTF and Doctrine," Military Review (November 1982), p. 57. Charles Burton Marshall distinguishes between two different understandings of strategy: "first, the principle of coherence between an organized society's capabilities for waging warfare and its enduring purposes: and second--in the form of 'a strategy' or 'strategies'--such a society's related policies and understandings without regard to their conforming or not conforming to that criterion of coherence." See W. Scott Thompson, ed., "Strategy: The Emerging Dangers," National Security in the 1980s: From Weakness to Strength (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Books, 1980), p. 425. I use the term "strategic doctrine" here in both senses. When used in the first sense, it is qualified as "comprehensive"; otherwise, it refers to regional "policies and undertakings." In practice, the relationship between the two is apt to be closer than the analytical distinction suggests.


5 As Janice Stein has remarked, although President Carter and his secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, took a sharply different tack at first, "by the time the President and his advisers began their unprecedented attempt at mediation at Camp David, . . . it was difficult to distinguish Carter's strategy and tactics from that of Kissinger." See "Kissinger and Carter: An Analysis of the Structures, Strategies, and Tactics of Mediation in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," paper prepared for a meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology (Toronto, June 1984), p. 2.

6 Quoted in Reich, "United States Middle East Policy," pp. 20-21.


8 The actual and projected capabilities of the RDF are described in Raphael Lungerich, "U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces--USCENTCOM--What Is It? Can It Do the Job?" Armed Forces Journal International (October 1984), pp. 88-107, 134.

9 Charles Mohr, "Marine Brigade Prepares for Role in Persian


12 As Robert Litwak points out, "In an area of chronic domestic instability--one in which the so-called process of conflict resolution has more often been a function of manipulation than management--the problem of conflict resolution remains acute." See Security in the Persian Gulf 2: Sources of Inter-State Conflict (London and Montclair, N.J.: International Institute of Strategic Studies/Allenheld, Osmun & Co., 1981), p. 34.

continuing to tie the USSR to its Arab clients is prestige, in addition to the associated unwillingness of the Soviets to accept a role inferior to that of the United States or, more strongly, the exclusion of Soviet influence from the region, a settlement guaranteed by the two superpowers would be attractive in that it would institutionalize the Soviet role in the region. It is clearly more attractive than a peace organized by the United States without Soviet cooperation—and this is a prospect that has reared its head more than once. It would also serve to confirm the Soviet claim to status as a power seriously interested in peace. Moreover, if a settlement addressed to some extent the Arab concerns about Palestinian rights and the return of occupied lands, the USSR would be delivering to its clients on a number of their basic demands. Such a development could presumably also provide some basis for influence in the region. Finally, given that the animosities associated with forty years of war are unlikely to disappear overnight, the Arab states are likely to continue to feel some degree of threat from Israel. In this context, the USSR, as a guarantor, would continue to serve as protector of last resort. There would thus appear to be a number of reasons why the USSR, in pursuing its interests in the region, and given the rather ambiguous success of the last thirty years of Soviet diplomacy there, might well be serious about peace in the Middle East if that peace were structured in such a way as to address a number of its more basic security concerns.

The record of Soviet diplomacy in the Middle East after the 1967 war—when the difficulties of manipulating the regional conflict to advantage were brought home to the Soviets in a particularly compelling way—is such as to suggest that the Soviets are serious about seeking a resolution of the conflict on terms that permit the continuation of a major Soviet role in regional politics. This was evident, for example, in their pressure upon Egypt, Syria, and the PLO to accept the terms of Resolution 242—that is, in their attempt to move their regional clients well beyond positions the latter were willing to take independently. What the Soviets are not willing to accept is a settlement that would undermine their presence in the region while enhancing the influence of the United States. Their behavior since the 1973 war suggests that they are ready to go to considerable lengths to undermine any such peace. Left unanswered, of course, is the question as to whether the United States is willing to accept a regime in the region that gives the USSR a substantial formal and substantive role. It also leaves unanswered whether the regional actors involved in the conflict have the political flexibility and will necessary for a resolution of the conflict. The record would suggest that these regional uncertainties, and not Soviet strategy, is the principal impediment to peace in this area of the Middle East.

NOTES

1 The term "strategy" as it is used here connotes a set of
general principles according to which a state seeks to realize its basic objectives in foreign policy. A number of factors determine the character of any state's strategy. A strategy is shaped by the state's objectives, it is affected by the instruments available, and it is influenced by phenomena both internal and external to that state.


3 The term "rational" applies here to the state as a whole and suggests a considered attempt to maximize its values. In other words, it implies a conscious and informed pursuit of what a country's leadership agrees is the "state's interest."


5 This latter characteristic is, of course, by no means peculiar to the Soviet Union.

6 An example of this genre is Edward Luttwak's The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union (New York: St. Martin's, 1983), in which the author conducts an analysis of Soviet objectives without reference to a single Soviet source in the original or in translation. This failure to address Soviet sources probably accounts for the somewhat mystical and eccentric quality of the work.

7 Some sources are more reliable than others in this respect. Reliability presumably depends to a considerable extent on the audience to which a publication is directed. The problem of disinformation is liable to be greatest in publications that are explicitly intended for Western audiences and with wide circulation outside the USSR (e.g., International Affairs and New Times) and that are less significant in the monographic and journal literature of the military itself. In its discussion of Soviet military doctrine, this study relies heavily on such Soviet military sources.


9 As S. Vishnevsky put in in response to a Pipes diatribe, "Does that mean that Genghis Khan, Batu, Mamai, Napoleon, and Hitler were merely defending themselves against Russian expansionism--on Russian soil?" See S. Vishnevsky, "Watch Out Here Comes Pipes," Pravda (February 18, 1981), as translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. 33, No. 7 (March 18, 1981), p. 10. For a Western source that argues that Soviet expansionism is the result of a long history of invasion

10 By the term "stability," I mean a situation in which a political system is free from substantial internal challenges to its existence as it adapts to a continually changing political and social environment. For a discussion of the meaning of legitimacy, see S. Bialer, Stalin's Successors (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 183.

11 Ibid., p. 154.


13 One plausible explanation is that this argument has utility in justifying Third World entanglements, high defense expenditures, and the sacrifices associated with party rule in terms of a higher duty to mankind as a whole. A second is that these external groups are potentially useful allies in the struggle against the West.


18 It should be noted, however, that these are not the only justifications for the substantial increase in the Soviet Navy since the mid-1960s. Admiral Gorshkov in particular has asserted that naval forces are an important instrument of policy in peacetime and a means of influencing the outcome of local wars. As such, sea power has been a necessary adjunct to great power status. See S. G. Gorshkov, Morskaya Moshch' Gosudarstva (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), pp. 380-411.
See also, V. D. Sokolovskii and M. I. Cherdenichenko, *Krasnaya Zvezda* (August 25 and 28, 1984). One might also cite the point stressed in the 1963 edition of *Voennaya Strategia* that in the future the navy's primary theater of operations would be the open sea and that it must not for that reason be tied to maritime support of ground operations as an earlier response to this evolution in U.S. nuclear deployment. See V. D. Sokolovskii, *Voennaya Strategia* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963), p. 248. See also S. Gorshkov, in *Morskoi Sbornik*, No.2 (1973), p. 26; and in *Pravda* (July 28, 1974).


22 On the other hand, it should be noted that a number of disadvantages are associated with the Indian Ocean as a deployment area for U.S. SLBMs, and also that there is little evidence of sustained U.S. deployment in the region. Moreover, Soviet deployments in the region apparently are not indicative of a predominately ASW role. The ocean is sufficiently large and U.S. submarines are sufficiently hard to detect that Soviet ASW in the Indian Ocean is a rather problematical proposition.


24 This is the case particularly given the reduction in the intensity of the Sino-Soviet conflict in the Third World in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

25 One might as well argue, however, that the sources of stability in the USSR should not be underestimated and, hence, that such fears are overblown. Moreover, even if one accepts this view of the intensity of the internal crisis, it is at least equally plausible that the Soviet leadership may seek external tranquility in order to address these internal issues with undivided attention.

26 Cf. the account of differences between Yegorychev and, by implication, Shelepin on the one hand and Brezhnev on the other concerning Soviet support for the Arabs during the 1967 war, in H. Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Détente* (Ithaca; N.Y.: Cornell, 1984).


29 See "Lokal'naya Voina", *Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopedia*, Vol. 5, p. 22. For a chronicling of this evolution, see also S. N. MacFarlane, "The Soviet View of the Utility of Force in the Third

30 Kulikov, Izvestia (May 18, 1976), p. 2.
34 D. Ustinov, Pravda (February 23, 1978).
35 One is reminded here of Mohammed Heikal's comment; "I do not believe that the Russians had ever evolved an overall strategy for the Arab world. They had been sucked into the complexities of the Middle East scene before they realized what was happening," quoted in The Sphinx and the Commissar (London: Collins, 1978), p. 173.
even war; and in that case, the more U.S. resources tied up in the Gulf area, the fewer would be available to Europe. It is unlikely, however, that the Europeans will greatly increase their conventional forces in order to compensate for this situation. On this problem, as with the whole panoply of uncertainties and ambiguities that beset NATO's strategic posture, the Alliance may simply agree to disagree on what would happen in the event of war. In the meantime, with regard to the Gulf area, as in the Mediterranean, the indigenous disputes will continue to complicate Western collective security, especially its maritime dimensions.

CONCLUSION

Resolution of the many conflicts in the Middle East will not bring about a significant withdrawal of either superpower. Both west and east of the Suez each will continue to maintain major maritime forces, because this part of the world encompasses the extended security spheres of the United States and, especially, those of the Soviet Union. What a reduction in the chances of regional conflict can do, however, is lower the risk that either superpower will come to the fateful conclusion that its interests in the region are so threatened that it must intervene directly with military forces in order to secure them.

It is therefore with good reason that prospects for war or peace in the Middle East command the world's attention.

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9 Letter from Admiral Horacio Rivero, USN (Ret.), May 16, 1983.


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16 Ranft and Till, The Sea, p. 192.

17 Wilson, The U.S. Sixth Fleet, p. 13.


19 See, for example, Alan Mairoano, "A Fresh Look at the Sixth Fleet," USNIP, Vol. 110, No. 2 (February 1984); Jan. S. Breemer, "De-Committing the Sixth Fleet," United States Naval War College Review, Vol. 35, No. 6 (November-December 1982).


22 Ibid., statement by Senator Carl Levin, p. 3148.

23 Ibid., testimony of Brig. Gen. William E. Klien, Assistant Deputy Director for Force Development and Strategic Plans, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 3122.

tual background suggested in this chapter, if it is viewed with the self-perpetuating condition of regional anarchy in mind, and if one recalls that the regional pattern in this regard is inseparably intertwined with a wider global predicament, then the conclusions to be drawn are not all that optimistic. A certain pattern of consolidation appears to be emerging. But it is still frail and may yet prove to be transient.

NOTES


4 This is the title of an interesting recent article on Irani-Syrian relations. See Yair Hirschfeld, "The Odd Couple: Ba'athist Syria and Khomeini's Iran," in Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv, eds., *Syria Under Assad* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 105-124.


12 Herbert Butterfield, *History and Human Relations* (New


22 For details, see Chaim Herzog, The War of Attonement (Jerusalem: Steimatzki, 1975).


26 See Gabriel Ben Dor, Iran and the Arab State System (Haifa: Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, February 1976) (In Hebrew).


30 This section draws, inter alia, on Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv, "On A Short Leash: Syria and the PLO," in Ma'oz and Yaniv Syria Under Assad, pp. 189-206.


32 This is an adaptation to the issue of alliance politics of the familiar economic notion of "Terms of Trade". The author of the idea is Robert E. Osgood. See Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962), p. 42.

33 For a detailed account, see Howard M. Sachar, Europe Leaves the Middle East 1936-1954 (London: Allen Lane, 1972).
The greater the extent of U.S.-Soviet confrontation, the more likely it is that the regional powers will seek to distance themselves from the superpowers.

This situation does not apply to the Middle Eastern countries, however. Israel over the years has put all its eggs in one basket, though not entirely by choice, by becoming so inextricably tied up in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Although it likes to see itself in the role of the "honest broker," the United States starts from a premise of commitment to the principal Israeli positions relative to status, territory, and so on. In spite of disclaimers, the effect of the Reagan administration's intervention in Lebanon was the promotion of Israeli goals in the region. Reagan may have convinced himself otherwise, but the Arab and European states were not blind to the effects of this U.S. policy.

Who are the legitimate actors who must be brought into any real attempts to establish regional peace? The U.S. policy that excludes the Soviets from participating in any settlement makes sense in terms of the primary positioning U.S. interest in the region. The consequence of this policy has been the creation of an opportunity for the Russians to impose a veto upon potential peace arrangements. Of course, the United States may oppose reentry of a Russian diplomatic presence into the Middle East given that, for the United States, a comprehensive settlement of disputes between Israel and its neighbors may be less important than the exclusion of Soviet interests and involvement.

Survival rather than solutions of Middle Eastern disputes may be the best practicable outcome attainable in the foreseeable future. If we recall the wars and conflicts raging throughout Europe for centuries and compare that history of turmoil and upheaval to the relatively benign situation at present, we may glean some useful insights. It is likely that the sublimation of diverse competitive European claims to territory, status, and position have been subsumed by the overarching conflict between the United States and the USSR. It was not until these two essentially non-European actors became the most important European bloc leaders that indigenous European rivalries were suppressed. The lesson provided by that experience is not a terribly optimistic one to be projected upon the Middle East. But then Europe has had forty years of peace and, to a large extent, prosperity. Forty years of peace and prosperity would not be such a bad thing for the Middle East.

NOTES


9 Ibid.

10 Fedder, "The Concept of Alliance," p. 132.


12 Ibid.
the total. Hungary has generally followed Soviet pronouncements, but it has pursued a minimalist approach to the Middle East. At Moscow's urging, however, it transferred a few dozen obsolescent T-34 tanks to the PLO in 1981 and 1982.

CONCLUSION

A number of elements have emerged in this analysis of the Warsaw Pact's strategic interests and policies toward the Middle East. First, the Warsaw Pact is very much a Soviet creature, with only Romania exercising the rather limited options that are available in the southern tier in order to formulate a more autonomous foreign policy and thus strategy. The evolution of the Warsaw Pact itself, with its emphasis on the northern tier as the first strategic echelon, demonstrates the preponderant input of the Soviet Union in military strategy and hence the primary focus of the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, barring any shift in terms of threat perception or "windows of opportunity" that would refocus Soviet strategy southward, the Middle East will continue to play a secondary role in Warsaw Pact strategic calculations.

On the other hand, even the most tightly controlled of the Warsaw Pact states, such as the GDR, have the opportunity to at least emphasize certain aspects of overall Soviet strategy or to infuse it with particular nuances. The GDR in particular, it would appear, does perceive a significant psychological strategic dimension in the Middle East. Thus, by condemning Israel and by attempting to delegitimize it, the GDR seems to be convinced that it is helping its own Abgrenzung and thus its own legitimacy. Romania, however, is motivated more by the political and economic aspects of strategy, and its ability to formulate an autonomous foreign policy has helped it in the region. The composite picture of the NSWP states, however, shows a group of international actors for whom the Middle East plays a secondary or even tertiary role in their strategic calculations and whose policies in turn have had a limited impact on the region.

NOTES

1 Globe and Mail (Toronto, April 27, 1985).
12. G. Milde, pp. 82, 83.
17. Ibid, p. 92.
18. Ibid, p. 94 (Interview with General Leon Dubicki).
30 Pravda (December 19, 1985), and Izvestiia (December 18, 1985).
31 Pravda (October 19, 1983).
32 Ibid.
34 Ibid., p. 44.
37 Horizont No. 34, (Berlin, 1982).
38 Horizont No. 39 (1982).
39 Neues Deutschland (September 21, 1982).
41 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt, March 10, 1982).
42 ACDA (1985), pp. 131-134.
43 Scinteia (June 18, 1982).
46 Between 1979 and 1983 sales to Libya totalled $250 million and to Iraq, $850 million. ACDA (1985), pp. 131-134.
47 Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (Sofia, November 8, 1983); Foreign Broadcast Information Service, (FBIS) (November 10, 1983).
49 Ceteka (Prague, April 9, 1982); FBIS (April 11, 1982).
50 ACDA (1985), pp. 131-134.
51 Schiff and Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, p. 83.
CONCLUSION

Khomeini's Islamic Revolution has posed a challenge in Islamic terms to all secular states in the region, whether they be socialist states such as the Ba'athist regime in Iraq or military dictatorships operating under an ineffective smokescreen of Islam, as in Pakistan. The Revolution has posed a dialectical problem for Marxists. As noted, religion, according to the Marxists, is a narcotic used by capitalists to drug the masses into insensibility and has been used in a dramatic way by Khomeini to mobilize the masses. For Sunni Muslim states in the Middle East and elsewhere, the unthinkable has happened. For the first time in fourteen centuries of Islamic history, an Ithna 'Ashari Shiite is making a bid for the leadership, not only over the 100 million or so Shiites in the world but over all the 800 million or so Muslims in the world, both Sunnis and Shiites. This is not a figment of the imagination; it is actually written into the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. Article 10 reads: "All Muslims form a single nation, and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has the duty of formulating its general policies with a view of the merging and union of all Muslim peoples, and it must constantly strive to bring about the political, economic and cultural unity of the Islamic world." Contrary to Khomeini's claims, however, the Iran-Iraq conflict has proved that Islam does not necessarily transcend long-standing ethnic, linguistic, and tribal differences. Whatever happens in Iran after the death of Khomeini, I venture to predict that the fundamental problem of sovereignty in the Ithna 'Ashari state will not easily be solved. No temporal ruler, whether he be called king or president, can ever gain legitimacy in the eyes of the religious classes. In the last analysis, therefore, Iran will remain ungovernable unless some consensus emerges as to the system of governance. One thing is certain: The mullahs will not easily surrender the power for which they fought for nearly five centuries.

NOTES

6 Quoted in Sir Arnold Wilson, The Persian Gulf, p. 192.
Some of the following material has already appeared in my article, "Khumayni's Islamic Revolutionary Movement," in Robert Spencer, ed., *Iran, Iraq and the Gulf War* (Toronto: University of Toronto, Centre for International Studies, 1982), pp. 32-54.

This faction is the Jujjatiha, led by Shaykh Maumud Halabi, who aims at seizing political power in order to prepare Iran for the second coming of the Mahdi.

11 Ibid.
12 Iraq, under the 1972 Soviet-Iraqi Treaty, had been supplied with Soviet T-54 tanks, MIG jets, and Soviet anti-aircraft missiles.
13 *Economist* (December 15, 1984).
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
20 *Economist* (May 28, 1983).
21 *Economist* (July 14, 1984).
22 In "Washingtonese" these bases are known as "access arrangements".
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1975 Helsinki Conference was thus used by Moscow as an occasion to refloat the Asian collective security scheme; the clear message was that the Helsinki experience should be replicated in Asia using the Brezhnev proposal as its basis. The treaties of friendship negotiated by the USSR with various Asian states (e.g., India and Iraq) are depicted not as strictly bilateral arrangements of limited scope. On the contrary, they are characterized as elements of a continental security edifice that has not yet fully taken shape. Though comprehensive, the Asian collective security scheme affords the Soviet Union considerable diplomatic flexibility. The ability of Soviet proposals to be recast as tactical circumstances warrant was evidenced in Brezhnev's December 1980 proposal, which called for a specific linking of an Afghan settlement with a Gulf security scheme. In creating such a security framework, the Soviet Union aims to become the security manager for the region—that is, the power that must be consulted on all issues affecting Asia. The exclusion from regional affairs of all non-Asian states (viz. the United States) is, of course, the obverse of this policy. Within this context, the Soviet-chaired Tashkent Conference (ending the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war) can be viewed as a precedent that the Soviet Union would like to see transformed into a norm.

The conjunction of Soviet proximity, power, and interests in Southwest Asia poses a unique challenge to the West. The U.S. response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has centered on the need to rectify the existing imbalance of outside power forces (via the establishment of CENTCOM, etc.). This strengthening of the U.S.'s ability to project power is viewed as a prerequisite for the pursuit of any Western policy in the Gulf area and South Asia, including the subtle diplomatic-economic track advocated by the Europeans. Failure to maintain the regional military balance will weaken deterrence and potentially allow the Soviet Union to capitalize on the "shadow effect" of its adjacent power through the pursuit of coercive diplomacy against vulnerable regional states. This prescription does not directly affect the situation in Afghanistan, but it will at least allow the West to respond more effectively to the challenge of Soviet policy in the Gulf region.

NOTES

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2 Alexander Dallin, for example, argues: "The Soviet move [into Afghanistan] was not motivated by fear of the effect of Muslim self-consciousness abroad on the Turkic/Muslim population. . . . [T]here is no


view such an approach is far too narrow and thus is unjustified. A Soviet move against the Gulf as a whole is extremely unlikely. If a Soviet invasion takes place, as in the case of Afghanistan, it is more likely to be against one country only. The nature of relations among the countries of the area is not such as to necessitate treating them as a single security unit; moreover, no joint defense pact exists among the states of the area.

If we consider various parts of the region, it appears that Saudi Arabia and the small oil-producing shaykhdoms are more important to the United States and its allies than to Moscow. However, the balance of interest in the northern tier appears much more ambiguous. A case could even be made that Soviet interests might be somewhat greater in the northern tier than U.S. interests there.

If our assessment of the balance of interest is correct, then deterring an attack against the northern tier within the MAD framework poses substantial difficulties. As we have seen, MAD assumes the necessity of a favorable balance of interest for the prevailing side. The additional difficulty for the MAD framework in this region is that it contains many internal instabilities that could change the balance of interest, making intervention less risky for one side and deterrence more difficult for the other.

NOTES

8 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 35.

22 Ibid.
25 Thomas L. MacNaugher, *Arms and Oil*, p. 49.
27 Alexander George, "U.S.-Soviet Global Rivalry: Norms


29 Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing divide the concept of interest into three categories: strategic interests, reputational interests, and intrinsic interests. The first two are the same as the security category used in this chapter. The third has been divided into political and economic interests here. See Snyder and Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 1979).


33 The 1921 treaty was amended in 1927, with two new features: (1) a clarification of articles 5 and 6, making the treaty limited to anti-Soviet partisan attacks, and (2) the addition of a new article providing for the neutrality of either party should the other be involved in conflict with one of several powers. *Treaties and Alliances of the World*, 3rd edition (London: Longman, 1981), p. 7.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.


37 Ibid.

38 *Treaties and Alliances* p. 213.

39 If the sale of arms by West Europeans to the region is added to the U.S. sales, the total Western sales will be higher than those of the Soviet bloc countries.


43 4C. V. Hollen, quoted in the *Washington Post* (December 27, 1981); Senator Hart, 1984 presidential campaign.

45 American Petroleum Institute (API), Basic Petroleum Data Book, Vol. 5, No. 2 (May 1985). Section 9, Table 2a.
46 Ibid. Section 9, Table 1.
47 Ibid.
48 Albert Wohstetter, Power and Interest in the Persian Gulf, p. 18.
50 API, Basic Petroleum Data Book Section 10, Table 5.
51 Ibid.
53 Thomas L. MacNaugher, Arms and Oil, p. 7.
54 Basic Petroleum Data Book, Section 9, Table 4b.
55 Christian Science Monitor (September 17, 1985).
56 Ibid.
57 See IMF, Directions of Trade, for various years starting with 1958.
58 Ibid.
60 Strategic Survey, 1977, pp. 64-68.
61 For details, see Zalmay Khalilzad, "Islamic-Iran, A Social Dilemma," Problems of Communism (January-February 1984).
a global strategy, all parties could help better integrate the region within
the somewhat more tranquil international system, and that would be a
worthwhile step indeed in the long and difficult road to peace.

NOTES

1  Hans J. Morgenthau (revised by K. W. Thompson), Politics
2  Ibid., pp. 127-168.
3  Harry J. Shaw, "Strategic Dissensions," Foreign Policy,
4  Ibid., pp. 121-145.
5  Hannes Adomeit, Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behaviour
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1982).