Right-wing populism is a global phenomenon that challenges several pillars of liberal democracy, and it is often described as a dangerous political ideology because it resonates with the fascist idea of power in terms of anti-pluralism and lack of minorities’ protection. In Western Europe, many political actors are exploiting the fears and insecurities linked to globalization, economic crisis, and mass migrations to attract voters. However, while right-wing populist discourses are mainstream in certain countries, they are almost completely taboo in others. Why is right-wing populism so successful in Italy, Austria, and France while in Germany it is marginal and socially unacceptable? It is because each country developed a certain collective memory of the fascist past, which stigmatizes that past to different levels. For this reason, right-wing populism can find favorable conditions to thrive in certain countries, while in others it is considered as an illegitimate and dangerous idea of power. Through a comparative study of eight European countries, this book shows that short-term factors linked to levels of corruption, economic situation, and quality of democracy interact with long-term cultural elements and collective memories in determining the social acceptability of right-wing populist discourses.

Luca Manucci is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Lisbon, Portugal. He obtained his PhD at the University of Zurich, where he worked at the Department of Political Science.
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Populism and Collective Memory
Comparing Fascist Legacies in Western Europe

Luca Manucci
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Since I started writing this book in 2015, populism has been constantly at the centre of academic debates and a recurrent topic in mainstream media all over the world. I am grateful to the Swiss National Science Foundation for giving me the opportunity to work on such a thrilling topic by funding my research through the NCCR programme *Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century*. I am grateful in particular to all of my colleagues at the University of Zurich, at both the institutes of Political Science and of Media Studies, with whom I had many insightful discussions. Without them, this work would have not been possible. Thanks to Lea Heyne, Michael Strebel, Alice el-Wakil, Michi Amsler, Edward Weber, Saskia Ruth, Martin Wettstein, Laurent Bernhard, Simon Bornschier, Anne Schulz, Nicole Ernst, and Dominique Wirz. A special mention goes to Doreen Spörer-Wagner, for her guidance through this odyssey called PhD.

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wondered what other people using the microfilm section might have thought of my research, but I guess I will never know.

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This book has been a long, strange trip, and if I do not regret a single step, it is only thanks to my family and friends. They always reminded me where I come from and that not all that glitters is gold. In turn, I did my best to convince them that not all those who wander are lost because deep roots are not reached by the frost.

L.M.
Figueira (Portugal), Spring 2019
Introduction
Populism and fascist legacies

Giving a definition of democracy is not a trivial task, while fascism is a complex mixture of right- and left-wing ideas. Alas, populism is much worse. Like a Fata Morgana, populism appears to be everywhere because the term has become a passe-partout, a keyword supposed to explain every development of contemporary politics. This is far from true, but studying the links between populism, democracy, and fascism allows us to better grasp what is going on in Western Europe and why many commentators and scholars evoke the 1930s, the Great Depression, and a certain fascist Zeitgeist. The impression is that while liberal democracy lost its appeal, a populist idea of democracy has been gaining momentum.

However, this phenomenon is not taking place in every country with the same intensity. Populism, in fact, is not equally accepted in every public debate across Western Europe, and while it is safe to claim that its relevance and electoral success are steadily increasing, it would be premature to celebrate the funeral of liberal democracy. Populism is testing the limits and strengths of liberal democracy, and by challenging certain ideological pillars, it shows what politics could become in the future. For this reason, understanding under which conditions populism thrives or fails is a crucial task.

The aim of this book consists precisely in understanding why populism blooms in certain countries while it remains a taboo in others. The current wave of populism in Western Europe is generating a lot of confusion because short-term economic and political factors often fail to explain the social acceptability of populist discourses across countries. While the vast majority of studies point to contingent demand- and supply-side factors that are supposed to explain the electoral success of populist discourses, this study shows the importance of considering populism from a long-term, historical perspective in order to understand its social acceptability. The populist idea of power circulates in every public debate across Europe, but its social acceptability is strongly determined by the collective re-elaboration of the European fascist past.

Losing sight of the historical dimension of populism and – in particular – of its resonance with the authoritarian turn that Europe experienced in the 1920s and 1930s, one would fail to explain why populism is socially acceptable in certain countries while it is highly stigmatized in others. The presence of high levels of
corruption combined with poor economic performance and growing inequalities, for example, might not automatically lead to a populist triumph. Similarly, populist actors might thrive in a country characterized by a growing economy and a responsive political system. This can only be explained by adopting a long-term perspective that focuses on the stigma generated by different collective memories of the fascist past.

Naturally, long-term legacies that determine the Salonfähigkeit (social acceptability) of populism always interact with short-term socio-economic and political-institutional factors. It is impossible to ignore that, in Western Europe, populist movements, parties, and leaders often settle the political debate and obtain remarkable electoral results. Populist discourses have become mainstream in liberal democracies to the point that the political climate characterizing the last two decades has been described as populist Zeitgeist. When the political system is out of touch and isolated in its ivory tower, and those in power do not deliver on their promises, citizens want to be heard and to hold their representatives accountable. If the media add fuel to the fire of supranational integration and the refugee crisis, the perfect Molotov cocktail is served, and populism becomes a very effective way to mobilize resentment by offering redemption from the old politics and by exploiting the fears of constituencies disoriented by modernization.

In 1922, Antonio Gramsci was witnessing the rise of fascism in Italy, and he perfectly understood the social climate of the time: dense of fears, resentment, and anti-politics feelings. In his words, “fascism presented itself as the anti-party, opened the doors to every candidate and – with its promised impunity – allowed a motley multitude to cover with a fresh paint of vague and nebulous political ideas the wild flood of passions, hatreds, and desires.” A century later, populist parties tap into popular resentments and insecurities, exploit the shortcomings of established political parties, and take advantage of disillusioned voters through an anti-elitist rhetoric that promise to give back the power to the confused multitudes that Gramsci was describing.

In times of protracted economic crisis and deterioration of the credibility of political parties and institutions, the growing political weight of populist actors should not come as a surprise. Populism gains traction when the gap between representatives and represented grows to a critical point, which is why it can be considered as a potential “barometer” of the health of representative politics (Taggart 2002, 71); high levels of populism might indicate the malfunctioning of liberal and constitutional democratic mechanisms. Moreover, by observing previous waves of populism, one can see that socio-economic turbulence and political transformations have always been key factors for the success of populism. If one considers that the last three decades in Western Europe have been marked by the Great Recession, a process of supranational integration, and a flow of migrants from the Middle East and Northern Africa, the boisterous success of populism seems to be the obvious ending of a well-known story rather than a flash in the pan.

When trying to understand the mechanisms determining the social acceptability of populist discourses across countries, one must constantly bear in mind that populism is increasingly successful in elections and often accepted in the political
debate. Indeed, the data examined in this work confirm a growing presence of populist discourses in West European party manifestos. This indicates that short-term supply- and demand-side conditions are favourable for populism to thrive. Socio-economic and political-institutional factors, however, are only part of the explanation, and they must be considered in interaction with the national political culture of each country, which can either prevent or foster the Salonfähigkeit of populism. Indeed, it is remarkable to observe that the social acceptability of populist discourses greatly varies across countries which are experiencing the same transformations and turbulences across a similar timescale. This suggests that, in some countries, populism thrives despite unfavourable conditions, and vice versa. While certain countries can be considered as ‘populist paradises’ (e.g. Italy, Switzerland, Austria), in other countries populist discourses do not have sufficient legitimacy to leave the periphery of the public debate and become a credible alternative (e.g. Sweden, Germany, Portugal). Why is that the case?

To understand the cross-country variation of populism’s social acceptability, one must observe how short-term social, economic, and political factors interact with cultural elements. In particular, different collective memories of the fascist past can open up or, conversely, close down windows of opportunity for the social acceptability of populist discourses. By observing different re-elaborations of that past, it is possible to determine the degree of stigma attached to it and therefore determine the Salonfähigkeit of populist discourses in a given society. This explains why populist discourses are widespread and electorally successful in countries where short-term factors seem unfavourable, and vice versa.

Four different types of collective re-elaboration determine the degree of stigmatization of the fascist past: culpabilization, heroization, cancellation, and victimization. In countries characterized by victimization – producing a very low degree of stigma of the fascist past – populism is particularly acceptable. By contrast, in countries characterized by culpabilization – producing a very high degree of stigma – populism is taboo and therefore socially unacceptable, at the margins of the public debate.

It is not surprising to observe that, in particular, it is the social acceptability of right-wing populism that proves to be linked very strongly to the levels of stigma of the fascist past. Indeed, the authoritarian past in Western Europe is represented by the fascist regimes in power in Italy and Germany between 1922 and 1945. Countries which did not deal with the fascist past in a profound and responsible manner are therefore supposed to constitute a fertile ground for right-wing populism to thrive. For example, while Germany took responsibility for its past and admitted its guilt (a process called Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit or Vergangenheitsbewältigung), Austria shifted the blame and refused to critically deal with its past (Art 2006). These two opposite types of collective memory produce, respectively, a very high and a very low degree of stigmatization of illiberal elements. Given the fact that the two countries have similar levels of economic development or accountability and responsiveness of the political system, one can hypothesize that their different types of collective memories about the fascist past either trigger or block the social acceptability of populism.
A key element of this argument is represented by the *elective affinities* between populism and fascism. On the one hand, the two are extremely different phenomena, and the aim is not to collapse the two concepts into each other to the point of making them undistinguishable. On the other hand, what matters here is the fact that the populist idea of power is often portrayed as a dangerous political ideology vis-à-vis liberal and constitutional ideas of power precisely because of its *illiberal elements*, which strongly resonate with certain traits of the fascist idea of power, in contrast to liberal and constitutional democracy. This negative characterization of populism is very much present in the European collective imagination. Politicians accused of being populist are often implicitly linked to the cumbersome legacy of the twentieth century and hence to the absence of democracy.

Indeed, the term *populist* is often evoked in European politics in order to label someone as an anti-democratic demagogue, and populism is ultimately seen as a proto-totalitarian and illiberal ideology because the populist idea of power is at odds with the liberal and constitutional types of democracies which became dominant in Western Europe in the aftermath of World War II. The tension between liberal and populist ideas of power is the expression of opposite types of democratic qualities: rule of law versus majoritarianism; checks and balances versus unmediated exercise of power; constitutionalism versus unconstrained will of the people; and division versus concentration of powers. The fascist past resonates as soon as politicians articulate one of these points and criticize representative politics.

This study does not constitute the first attempt to explain cross-country and longitudinal variations in the presence of populism. Nonetheless, it displays three innovative elements concerning the measurement of populist messages, the amplitude of the data used for the analysis, and the introduction of a novel condition linked to the presence of populism. First, the discursive dimension of populism is considered. This means that the phenomenon to be explained is the *Salonfähigkeit* of populist discourses, measured as the combination of levels of *populism in party manifestos*, the parties’ degree of *radicalism*, and their *electoral performance*. Second, the presence of populist discourses is measured in eight West European countries since the 1970s through an extensive content analysis of 173 party manifestos. Third, this study introduces the idea that collective memories are connected to the social acceptability of populism and starts from the assumption that socio-economic and political-institutional factors are complementary to cultural opportunity structures in explaining different levels of populist discourses.

**Structure of the book**

This work follows several steps in order to test whether the levels of stigma of the fascist past – in interaction with traditional demand- and supply-side factors – can explain the social acceptability of populism. The first task consists of illustrating the theoretical framework used in order to operationalize and measure
populism, as well as the link between the populist idea of power, fascism, and liberal democracy (Chapter 1). Once it is clarified how populism is understood and conceptualized, Chapter 2 presents the existing literature about the conditions that are supposed to explain the electoral success of radical right-wing parties. This literature, however, focuses on a mono-dimensional idea of populism as a right-wing and often extremist political ideology. Moreover, short-term supply- and demand-side factors appear to leave unexplained part of the cross-country variation in terms of populism’s social acceptability. Hence, the idea that different collective memories determine different degrees of stigmatization or acceptance of populism, and therefore play a role in triggering or blocking the social acceptability of populist discourses, is introduced (Chapter 3).

The research design is presented in Chapter 4. This provides all the details concerning the operationalization and measurement of populist discourses in party manifests, a discussion of the case selection, and a brief description of the methodology implemented. Chapter 5 presents the results of the content analysis and offers an overview of the presence of populism. The percentage of populist statements in party manifests is weighted by the vote share and degree of radicalism of each party, thus providing a measure for the social acceptability of populism across countries and over time. Chapter 6 presents the relevant literature about each country’s type of re-elaboration in order to establish, for each case, the overall level of stigmatization of the fascist past.

Chapter 7 tests the role of several conditions usually associated with the electoral success of populism. Derived from the literature review presented in Chapter 2, these supply- and demand-side factors are supposed to trigger the social acceptability of populism. The analysis assesses the presence of sufficient and necessary conditions for the social acceptability of populist messages in eight West European countries over the last three decades. Finally, Chapter 8 tests the impact of the degree of stigma associated with the fascist past. It shows to what extent long-term cultural factors are essential in explaining the social acceptability of populist discourses. The Conclusions aim at proposing directions for future research, as well as assessing the generalizability of the findings outside Western Europe.

Notes
1 “The word evokes the long-simmering resentments of the everyman, brought to a boil by charismatic politicians hawking impossible promises. Often as not, populism sounds like something from a horror film: an alien bacteria [sic] that has somehow slipped through democracy’s defences – aided, perhaps, by Steve Bannon or some other wily agent of mass manipulation – and is now poisoning political life, creating new ranks of populist voters among ‘us.’” The Guardian, “‘We the people’: the battle to define populism,” by Peter Baker, January 10, 2019, available online (consulted in March 2019): www.theguardian.com/news/2019/jan/10/we-the-people-the-battle-to-define-populism.
2 This idea has been introduced by Mudde (2004), and it has remained at the centre of the debate on populism ever since.
3 Translation of the author. The article was published by L’Ordine Nuovo, April 26, 1921. Published in Gramsci (1966).
In Portugal, António Salazar’s regime remained in power until 1974 and Francisco Franco in Spain until 1975. Given the different timing and length, the memories of these two regimes after 1945 follow a different trajectory compared to the one relevant for the present study. These issues are discussed in more detail in the Conclusions.

For example, contrary to populism, fascism also includes para-militarism, corporatism, and imperialism. Similarities and differences between populism and fascism are thoroughly discussed by Eatwell (2017). Among other things, the author argues that, unlike fascism, populism is a form of democracy, albeit not liberal democracy.

In 2012, then EU President Herman van Rompuy and then European Commission President Barroso warned against the danger for democracy represented by populism, followed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, and Prime Minister of Norway Erna Solberg.

As will become evident in Chapter 1, whether or not populism is a threat depends on the normative idea of democracy used as a yardstick for comparison.

Slater speaks of a “tension between democratic inclusivity and democratic constraints”, and a “friction between vertical and horizontal accountability” to describe the relationship between different ideas of democracy based on different levels of liberalism (2013, 732).

Such an extensive content analysis has been possible thanks to the NCCR Democracy programme: Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century (Module 2: Populism in the Context of Globalization and Mediatization).

For an interesting study concerning the use of the term in the British media, see Bale, van Kessel, and Taggart (2011). A telling statement form Moffitt and Tormey (2014, 382) reads as follows: “It is an axiomatic feature of literature on the topic to acknowledge the contested nature of populism. . ., and more recently the literature has reached a whole new level of meta-reflexivity, where it is posited that it has become common to acknowledge the acknowledgment of this fact.”

This quote was found in Margaret Canovan’s book Populism (Canovan 1981, 7).

Both plots show the number of articles mentioning populism or related terms (populis* or populist* or populism*) in six languages (English, German, French, Italian, Swedish, and Dutch) between 1969 and 2016. On the left, through Factiva, the major newspapers are included (the pre-1985 levels are particularly low also because only a few newspaper articles are available, but what matters most is the increase after 2010). On the right, through Web of Science, the major academic peer-reviewed journals are considered.

Themistocles, Athenian politician and general, is sometimes described as a paleo-populist since he decided to move to Keramikos, a down-market part of Athens, in order to be perceived as a man of the people. According to Plutarch, his role of attorney and arbitrator gained him further popularity among the hoi polloi (the many, the majority).

The negative connotation of the word Idios (the Greek term for ‘private person’), speaks volumes about the political role of the citizens in Ancient Athens. However, ‘direct’ does not mean ‘inclusive.’ In fact, it was a very restrictive idea of democracy. It excluded women, slaves, and those who did not have the Athenian citizenship.

Jordan Bardella, spokesperson of the Rassemblement National (former Front National) and leader of the youth organization of the party (Génération nation), in a meeting with other movements of the European far right recently declared (translation of the author): “Europe is the Athenian democracy, not Brussels’ technocracy. Europe is imperial Rome, not the Treaty of Rome. Europe is Le Pen and Salvini, not Juncker and Moscovici.” Internazionale, “L’incontro dei giovani sovranisti a Roma non è andato come previsto”, by Giada Zampano, April 2, 2019, available online (consulted in April 2019): www.internazionale.it/notizie/giada-zampano/2019/04/02/giovani-sovranisti-roma
Narodniki comes from the Russian word *narod*, translatable as “people” or “folk.”

The Narodniki is one of the rare examples of exclusively top-down populist movements.

From the German word *Volk*, again translatable as “people.”

“I]n so far as German liberalism was universalist and inclusive, it was ultimately rejected by a völkish constituency. Conversely, in so far as the liberals assimilated and promoted certain tenets of the völkish *Weltanschauung*, German liberalism clearly helped to pave the way for Hitler and National Socialism.”

To mention just a few studies, among others one could list: Betz (1994); Kitschelt and McGann (1995); Kazin (1995); Taggart (1995); Rydgren (2005); Mudde (2007).

The framework of analysis must be at the same time precise enough and flexible enough to include every instance of populism while excluding other types of discourses, this avoiding both type I and type II errors.

On this point, there seems to be quite a large consensus among scholars: Jagers and Walgrave (2007); Stanley (2008); Hawkins (2009, 2010); Pauwles (2011); Rooduijn, de Lange, and van der Brug (2014); to mention just a few.

The term was introduced by Michael Freeden (1998). However, the same author is uncertain about the applicability of the concept to populism. See: Freeden (2017).

The combination of a thin (populist) ideology with a thick (or full) one describes the vast majority of populist manifestations. Indeed, it is very rare to find populism in its purely thin form. The case of the Italian *Five Star Movement* could go in this direction, since the party refuses to be labeled as right- or left-wing, and indeed seems to rely on a vague post-ideological approach. On this topic: Manucci and Amsler (2018).

This definition of populism, used by the whole module on *Populism in the Context of Globalization and Mediatization* of the NCCR Democracy program, is mainly derived from Mudde (2004), and Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008).

Other approaches, for example, define populism in stylistic terms (Kazin 1995), according to its organizational features (Weyland 2001), or as a type of mobilization (Jansen 2011).

This can happen, among other ways, through speeches (Hawkins 2009), party manifestos (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011), newspaper articles (Rooduijn 2014), and also interviews and parliamentary discussions. Moreover, different types of actors can articulate populist discourses: while politicians and journalists play a crucial role in circulating populism in the public debate, also common people as well as celebrities and representatives of NGOs and famous brands or other organizations, can articulate populist discourses.

The methodological aspects concerning calibration are discussed in detail in Chapter 4 and in Chapter 7.

About demoticism and populism, see March (2017).

In the historical manifestations of populism presented in section Populism in historical perspective, it is possible to identify each of the main conceptions of *demos* presented here.

Here it is important to introduce a caveat: all the people belonging to a certain territory (generally a country but also existing and even imaginary regions, like *Padania* in Italy) are included. Moffitt (2017) wrote about how populists construct “the people” above the national level. De Cleen (2017) argues that in nationalism concepts such as state, democracy, and culture acquire meaning in relation to the nation, while for populism this is not necessarily true. Moreover, while nationalism constructs the nation as an organic community that all members of the nation are part of, populism often divides the nation internally between people and elites. Indeed, populism divides society on a vertical,
down/up axis and does not necessarily construct ‘the people’ as nation. Moreover, while nationalism is intrinsically national, populism can be a transnational phenomenon. Examples in this sense are the Occupy movement as well as Yannis Varoufakis’ Democracy in Europe Movement 25 (DiEM 25). While several populist radical right parties stand united in presenting themselves as defenders of European identity and civilisation against immigration and ‘Islamisation,’ this is an example of an international rather than transnational phenomenon. Finally, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017, 72) argue that “for the European populist radical right ethnicity is not part of the populist distinction between the people and the elite, who are part of the same ethnic group, but rather of the nationalist distinction between ‘natives’ and ‘aliens’ . . . . In the case of Latin American ethnopopulism, on the other hand, the nation is defined as a multicultural unit, within which the people and elite are divided by both morality and ethnicity.”

It might seem counterintuitive to link left-wing populism to the lack of minority protection, while it might seem more obvious for right-wing populism. However, in principle, both left- and right-wing populism rely on a majoritarian and anti-pluralistic approach, therefore it is possible to claim that populism per se is a threat to minority rights.

The paradox is based on the coexistence of a democratic pillar and a liberal pillar. This implies that even if every person belonging to the demos has equal rights (liberal pillar), on the other hand it must be established who belongs to the demos and who does not (democratic pillar), and this inevitably triggers inequality. “What cannot be contestable in a liberal democracy is based on the idea that it is legitimate to establish limits to popular sovereignty in the name of liberty. Hence its paradoxical nature” (Mouffe 2000, 4). Moreover, as Abts and Rumens argued, “populist resentments arise when constitutional democracy is perceived to be out of balance in favour of the constitutional pillar” (2007, 410).
Another element has been mentioned in the literature: the presence of an appealing and well-organized populist party (Taggart 2000; van Kessel 2015). However, the presence of a credible populist party in a certain country might be associated with the national political culture of the country and indirectly with the collective re-elaboration of the fascist past. Including that as a relevant condition would be a tautology, and, more importantly, it would generate an endogeneity problem. Therefore, this condition will not be further examined.

Pariteitenverdrossenheit is translatable as “anti-party sentiment” or “disenchantment with the political parties.”

For studies about the impact of electoral systems, see among others: Jackman and Volpert (1996); Golder (2003).

Jackman and Volpert (1996) found that higher electoral thresholds reduce the support for extreme right parties, but Swank and Betz (2003) and Golder (2003) disproved their findings.

The concept of self-mediatization was introduced by Meyer (2002) and developed by Strömbäck (2008) and Esser (2013). It refers to the ability of political actors to adapt to the media-logic in order to gain visibility.

In particular, Plasser and Ulram (2003); Biorcio (2003); Birnenbaum and Villa (2003), and Hellström, Nilsson, and Stoltz (2012) linked the success of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria, the Lega Nord in Italy, the Front National in France, and the Swedish Democrats in Sweden to the role of the media. For an overview on this topic, see Manucci (2017).

For The effects of unemployment, see among others: Knigge (1998); Arzheimer and Carter (2006); Bjorklund (2007). Arzheimer and Carter argue that perhaps voters turn to mainstream parties in times of high unemployment because they are considered more experienced.

Immigration has a relevant role according to Thränhardt (1992); Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers (2002); Anderson (1996); Knigge (1998); Golder (2003).

Immigration has a negligible role according to Mayer and Perrineau (1989); Kitschelt and McGann (1995); Norris (2005); Arzheimer and Carter (2006).

It is important to notice that, according to Rovira Kaltwasser (2014, 497), by considering populism as an ideology it is possible to “grasp that its rise and fall is related to both supply side and demand side factors.”

To be fair, there is not full consensus among scholars on the effects of different electoral systems on the performance of radical right-wing populist parties.

According to Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers (2002), the effect of different levels of anti-immigrant attitudes is large in Norway, the Netherlands, and Denmark but much smaller in Austria, Italy, and Sweden. Moreover, among the European countries with the highest number of migrants per 1000 inhabitants, there are Austria and Switzerland (displaying high levels of populism), while among those with the lowest number of migrants there are Italy, France, Poland, and Hungary (also with high levels of populism). Source: Eurostat (online data codes: migr_imm1ctz and migr_pop1ctz). This means that one should also consider other factors such as the salience of the topic in the public debate, as well as the framing and the attention devoted by the media to the topic. However, the data concerning these elements are extremely difficult to obtain in a reliable and comparable way for a period of several decades across eight countries.

The work of Ennser-Jedenastik (2018) seems to confirm this impression, although with several caveats. In general, the relationship between right-wing or left-wing populism and types of welfare system remains unclear.
It is also possible to argue that the economic performance of a country, which includes the Gini coefficient after redistribution, already contains some elements that resonate with the type of welfare system and how inclusive and universal it is.

The statistics about age, ratio of men to women, and median age were obtained through Eurostat. The remaining data were obtained through the database of QoG (Quality of Government), and they all refer to the last measurement performed.

There is little consensus on how to conceptualize historical legacies (Wittenberg 2015; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017). The situation is even more complicated when it comes to empirically measure those legacies and establishing their effects (Simpser, Slater, and Wittenberg 2018). However, given that the work on communist legacies is more developed and uniform compared to studies concerning fascist legacies, those dealing with the latter can learn from the former. Indeed, Eastern Europe has been studied through the lenses of communist or pre-communist legacies, and many outcomes have been linked to the concept of historic legacies: patterns of democratic consolidation, electoral behavior, state-society relations, and cultural attitudes.

Classic works assessing authoritarian legacies alongside legacies of the “mode of transition” include Crawford and Lijphart (1997). The authors claim that the legacy of communism has an impact on centralized economic planning. At the same time, they warn that historic legacies do not act in a vacuum but rather coexist with other forces. For example, the influence of historical legacies in this case compete with incentives for liberalization from the US and the EU.

Pre-communist legacies are equally relevant and have been considered as well. For example, Kitschelt et al. (1999) found that in Eastern Europe the level of social and administrative modernization before communism influence the choice of post-communist political institutional arrangements. Moreover, they argue that the type of political regime and nature of political mobilization before communism influenced the degree of bureaucratization (and repression) employed during communism.

Other studies tested the impact of communist legacies on a vast array of political outcomes. Grzymała-Busse (2002) linked the legacy of communism to the skills necessary to navigate politics, while Pop-Eleches (2007) found that different legacies drive different aspects of democratization. In their essential book on “Communism’s shadow,” Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017) show that the communist legacy brings overall diminished mass support for democracy and markets. They also studied the relevance of fascist memories: where the right bore the stigma of fascism, the pull of communism was stronger and resulted in a larger leftist bias.

Fascist legacies have been studied less systematically than communist ones, and their link to political outcomes appears only occasionally in the literature. For this reason, it is important to consider the existing studies on communist legacies in order to adapt similar concepts, methodologies, and practices to the study of fascist legacies. In particular, two main lessons can be incorporated. First, several possible mechanisms can link a certain past to an outcome. Wittenberg (2015) identifies three possible mechanisms. In this study, the first of them is adopted: the concept of legacies is here employed to study an outcome (partially) unexplainable given the circumstances contemporaneous with that outcome. In particular, the fascist legacy is used to explain different degrees of social acceptability of populist ideas of power. Second, when studying a certain type of historic legacy, it is important to consider that pre-existing legacies might play an important role. In particular, in this study, it is important to consider features of national political cultures that predate the fascist experience.

At the same time, crucial differences exist between this study and the existing literature on communist legacies. First, the focus here is not on individual values.
and behaviors but on macro mechanisms. There clearly is a link between the social acceptability of populist ideas of power and individual attitudes, but they are not the same phenomenon. Second, what matters here is the role of collective memories in forming different fascist legacies; therefore, it is possible to include countries that experienced fascism in some form without having being ruled by fascism, while studies on communist legacies focus exclusively on post-communist countries (opposed to countries without a communist past). Third, since here it is irrelevant to determine the effects of the fascist legacy on individuals’ values and behaviours, it is possible to study fascist legacies on communities that bear no direct memory of fascism. This is linked to the fact that collective memories are intergenerational.

2 As already mentioned, the general argument refers to any authoritarian past that a country has experienced. Since the focus of this study is on Western Europe, the authoritarian past is here represented by the fascist past.

3 On the concept of Salonfähigkeit and its link to the study of populism, see Art (2006, 103).

4 A notable exception is represented by Art (2011b). More generally, the link between collective memory, political culture, and populism has not been applied to comparative studies but rather to case studies or binary comparisons. Most of them are mentioned in the following pages when analyzing the type of collective memory present in each of the eight countries considered. The situation is certainly different when it comes to the study of communist legacies in Eastern Europe, which are the object of a much more consistent strand of literature (Wittenberg 2015).

5 The term ‘stigma’ is often used by researchers examining how mainstream parties interact with the radical right (Art 2011a; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2015; Van Spanje and van Der Brug 2007). Erving Goffman defined stigma as “the situation of the individual who is disqualified from full social acceptance” (1963, 12). The same definition can be used for parties instead of individuals.

6 Historical studies sometimes consider the role of previous regimes on the formation of political cultures. For example, Aguilar and Humlebaek (2002) examine the impact of the authoritarian past on Spanish political culture. Similarly, Power and Zucco (2009) wrote about Brazilian political culture and noted that the transition to democracy after a right-wing authoritarian regime generated the so-called direita envergohada (‘ashamed right’).

7 A country can be directly under an authoritarian regime or have to deal with neighboring countries led by an authoritarian regime. The fascist past in Western Europe directly affected only a few countries (Germany, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Spain, and those temporarily invaded by them), but indirectly every other West European country has had to take a position and subsequently re-elaborate that past.

8 Many authors described the illiberal elements of populism. Among them: Abts and Rummens (2007); Canovan (1999); Pappas (2014); Pinelli (2011); Plattner (2010); Riker (1988); Rovira Kaltwasser (2012); Urbanati (1998).

9 In Umberto Eco’s (1995) list of traits typical of the fascist ideology, there is selective populism: “Since no large quantity of human beings can have a common will, the Leader pretends to be their interpreter. Having lost their power of delegation, citizens do not act; they are only called on to play the role of the People. Thus the People is only a theatrical fiction. To have a good instance of qualitative populism we no longer need the Piazza Venezia in Rome or the Nuremberg Stadium. There is in our future a TV or Internet populism, in which the emotional response of a selected group of citizens can be presented and accepted as the Voice of the People.”

10 Of course, the link between populism and fascism (and the corresponding stigma) is stronger for neo-fascist and radical right parties articulating populist discourses.
For this reason, the levels of populism in party manifestos will be weighted by the degree of radicalism of each party. See Chapter 4 for more details.

11 Peronism in Argentina is probably the first example of post-war populist democracy. Finchelstein (2014, 476) observes how “Peronism is not fascism, but fascism represents a key dimension of its origins.”

12 For a seminal study on the differences and commonalities between individual and collective memory see Halbwachs (1950). For a comprehensive collection of papers on the topic: Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Levy (2011).

13 The fact that the German language provides the most appropriate terms to define the process of elaboration of the past is clearly not a coincidence. In fact, Germany is the country that, more than others – in Europe, certainly, but probably all over the world – has had to face and re-elaborate its past in order to build a new identity and redefine its political culture.

14 Other seminal works about the link between collective memories and identities are Todorov (1995) and Ricoeur (2000).

15 Another key moment of definition of national identity for modern nations has been the process of state formation in the nineteenth century.

16 Pakier and Stråth (2010) describe in detail the silencing phase and its characteristics. The silencing phase is also the reason why it is not possible to compare countries like Portugal and Spain with the rest of Western Europe. The process of memory-building here did not start until the 1990s, and therefore the temporal comparison with the other countries would be compromised.

17 The popular expression “once bitten, twice shy” could be applied here to explain why culpabilization implies a higher degree of stigma than heroization.

18 To be clear: the countries’ past is only partially endogenous to their memory. Collective memories are intrinsically linked to the process of collective re-elaboration which, in turn, is linked to the country’s role but also to the construction of memories of the country’s role which are not necessarily historically accurate and serve as ex-post justifications.

19 In this case, the pre-existent national political culture is quite important. If a liberal and democratic political culture has flourished for a long time, it can provide the necessary antibodies against illiberal elements. Otherwise, the stigmatization of illiberal elements might be weakened.

20 In the Oxford Dictionaries, “denial” is defined in one of its meanings as “Failure to acknowledge an unacceptable truth or emotion or to admit it into consciousness, used as a defence mechanism.” Available online: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/denial (consulted in November 2017).

21 In this case, pre-existent national political cultures are extremely important. Since the country does not distance itself from that past but rather refuses to deal with it, the stigmatization of illiberal elements is mainly linked to the long-lasting effect of a pre-existent national political culture.

22 A case in this direction would be Poland, which neither collaborated with the Nazis nor surrendered.

23 This does not mean that the mechanism described here as cancellation is based on inaction. To the contrary, a process of cancellation takes place deliberately, proactively. When a country decides to “conveniently forget” certain elements of its own past (in this case it could be its complicity with the Nazis), this has profound political implications since it actively blocks the formation of stigma. In this sense, cancellation is not true forgetfulness but rather forced removal, intentional tabula rasa.

24 The absence of a public debate might be linked to a bottom-up lack of interest in the population but also by a top-down decision to restrict the access to public archives or by the absence of political actors that want to capitalize on historical controversies.
For more information about *Angrist*, see Wettstein (2014, 2016). The documentation (retrieved in March 2019) about Angrist is also available online: www.tarlanc.ch/angrist/ANGRIST_Dokumentation.pdf.

The actual number of coders involved in this particular research project was 43. Data about populism in party manifestos before the 1970s are not available. However, given the silencing phase described in Chapter 3, it would have been empirically less relevant for the present study since the effects of fascist legacies before the 1970s would have been non-existent or less strong.

On Brennan and Prediger’s Kappa, see Brennan and Prediger (1981).

The coefficients are presented for all the variables, including those used uniquely for the alternative operationalization.

An extensive overview about the possible measurements of populism is offered in Aslanidis (2018).

Following previous studies about the presence of populist discourses, I define public debates as the public discussion of ideas, facts, feelings, and opinions relevant to politics and involving citizens, politicians, and experts, with the media acting at the same time as ‘gatekeepers’ and actors themselves (Rooduijn 2014; Bennett and Entman 2001; Vliegenthart and Roggeband 2007). National newspapers, magazines, television programs, and internet fora all constitute places where the public debate takes place.

Once again, this tremendous and unprecedented effort to understand and measure populism has been possible thanks to the third phase of the NCCR Democracy programme, the many researchers that worked on it, and the coders that have been trained to provide the most reliable (and comparable) results.


Papadopoulos (2002, 53) discusses in detail the impact of the institutional dimension on the degree of populism.

Although populist parties perform even better in the context of the elections for the European Parliament, national elections are more appropriate than European ones as the latter are mostly second-order national elections (Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996).

In the first round of presidential elections all the candidates are still participating in the electoral campaign, and therefore it is possible to retrieve an electoral manifesto for each party. Legislative elections, on the other hand, are relatively less relevant, given the French semi-presidential system.

In 2006, the centre-left coalition “L’Unione,” for example, counted nine founding parties. The Italian election of 2008 would have been technically available because the different parties presented separate electoral manifestos. However, this would have been in contradiction to one of the criteria stated above: since all the other countries under consideration held elections in the period 2001–2003, selecting an election from 2008 would have diminished the degree of comparability.

Other authors use paragraphs as the sample unit. The whole manifesto, as explained by Aslanidis (2018, 1250), is better than paragraphs because they “frequently contain bullet-pointed lists and short motivational sentences or quotes, features that further undermine comparability. . . . segmentation into paragraphs still involves a discount in semantic resolution, since mildly populist paragraphs receive identical scores with intensely populist ones that carry greater informative content.”

A statement that is discarded from the coding process because it does not include any actor evaluation or issue positioning, might sound like this: “Next year there will be elections and our party will participate” or “This manifesto aims at illustrating the goals of our party.”
The golden rule expressed in the codebook about this aspect is “If you have to ask yourself whether a statement is explicit enough to code it, it is not.”

The number of manifestos that would have ‘zero’ populism with the co-occurrence principle but that in fact show populism with this operationalization is 56 (around 30% of the sample): 8 in the 1970s, 10 in the 1980s, 15 in the 1990s, 10 in the 2000s, and 13 in the 2010s. Of these, 13 are Swedish manifestos, but the levels of populism are always extremely low; therefore, coding them as non-populist does not change substantially the image of Sweden as a country without populism.

For example, the SVP (CH) in the 1990s, the ÖVP (CH) in four occasions, and the FDP (CH) and the FPÖ (AT) in the 2010s would have been coded as having no populism, precisely because they show people-centrism but no explicit anti-elitism. In a similar way, several left-wing parties would have been coded as non-populist: the SPÖ in Austria (in four occasions), the Left Party in Sweden (in five occasions), and the French Socialist Party (in four occasions).

Rooduijn et al. (2014, 567), for example, use the co-occurrence operationalization, and indeed nearly all mainstream parties have a very low populism score.

Appendix 10 shows the variables used for the alternative operationalization (Table A10.1), the amount of populism in each manifesto obtained with the alternative operationalization (Table A10.2), as well as the raw and fuzzy values of populism according to the alternative operationalization (Table A10.3).

The Socialist Party in Italy in the 1970s has a score of 40%, but the populist statements are 2 out of 5, therefore the reliability of such a measurement is questionable.

In a paper with Edward Weber (2017) we measured populism in manifestos and newspaper articles, and we used a metaphor to make sense of the presence of populism: “one can think about the difference between apple cider, beer, and wine: the presence of populist statements can be compared to the percentage of alcohol in the three drinks. For example, the manifesto of a highly populist party – like the SPD (Germany) in 1983 or the FPÖ (Austria) in 2013 – with 20–30% of populist statements, would be a Martini cocktail, while the manifesto of a moderately populist party – 5% populist statements, as in the case of the new Austrian party NEOS in 2013 – would be a pilsner beer.” To provide an extra element of comparison, one can think about the fact that 5.1% of the statements coded in manifestos contain the populist ideology, while 4% of statements are about immigration politics and 7% about European integration and EU-politics.

When possible, in order to determine the levels of radicalism, the Chapel Hill survey is used (Bakker et al. 2015). However, the survey does not cover the 1990s, for which the Party Manifesto Project is used (Lehmann et al. 2016). The values from the two datasets are then normalized and standardized. The data concerning the electoral results are obtained via Caramani (2000, 2015).

The levels of the outcome are then transformed into a 0–1 scale in order to perform the analysis; the thresholds for cases to be considered as being members of the outcome or not are explained in detail in Chapter 7. A simple logarithmic normalization from 0–100 based on maximum and minimum values would leave most of the cases below 50, for example, thus making the interpretation of the values even harder.

Outcome and conditions could be understood as dependent and independent variables, but it is not advisable to create terminological confusion since they are not fully overlapping concepts. The underlying logic of QCA, in fact, is different from the one characterizing statistical techniques (Schneider and Wagemann 2010).
The most important theoretical works about the concepts used in QCA are: Ragin (1987, 2000, 2008) and Schneider and Wagemann (2012).

This is a general principle of every comparative method, and it goes back (at least) to John Stuart Mill (1906), who did not believe it was possible to apply the method to social sciences, as explained in Caramani (2009).

Appendix 10 (Tables A10.2 and A10.3) shows the same descriptive data based on the alternative operationalization implementing the co-occurrence principle. The main difference consists in the fact that the alternative operationalization based on co-occurrence raises the amount of right-wing populism in the 2000s.

Figures A10.1 to A10.4 show the same type of data as Figures 5.1 to 5.4, but the calculations are based on the alternative operationalization that relies on the co-occurrence principle.

The measurement based on co-occurrence is different but gives similar results, and the rise over time is not statistically significant. See Appendix 11 (Tables A11.9 and A11.10).

In 2013, the weighted measure for right-wing populism in Austria is 2,968, the highest recorded for any country in any decade, and Austria holds the second position as well, with 2,341 in the 1990s.

Even before the beginning of the nineteenth century, the so-called Boulangism (from the founder Georges Boulanger) was considered a populist threat for the French Republic, although from rather left-wing positions (Chebel d’Appollonia 1996).

This transformation described for the Front National was similar to what the Italian Social Movement (MSI) was doing in Italy at the same time.

The 2017 election for France is not included in the content analysis.

Until 1976, it was called Union for the Defence of the Republic (Union pour la Défense de la République – UDR).

“It has become increasingly evident that some of the party’s most prominent personalities have turned their backs on democracy altogether. . . . They have characterized refugees as “invaders”, the German government as a “regime” and the Third Reich as nothing but a “speck of bird shit” on German history.” Die Spiegel, “Germany Considers Monitoring Right-Wing AfD”, October 16, 2018, available online (consulted in April 2019): www.spiegel.de/international/germany/germany-considers-monitoring-right-wing-afd-for-extremism-a-1232995.html.

The emergence of AfD and its electoral results in the last years might change the status quo and indicate that even Germany is changing its narrative. This will be discussed in the conclusions.

This is because the analysis focuses on the last three decades only. The data concerning the conditions to test are not available for the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, measured according to the co-occurrence principle, the value of populism would be zero (both CDU and FDP show only people-centrism but no anti-elitism).

The exception is only “partial” because with a different operationalization the value of right-wing populism would be zero.

Under the leadership of Matteo Salvini, in particular, the Northern League has become a fully-fledged national(-ist) party, and therefore dropped the reference to the North, thus becoming simply Lega.

Between 2007 and 2013, its name has been “People of Freedom” (PdL).

In Italy, members of the family Mussolini can be candidates for extreme right parties without raising any major scandal, a thing that would be unimaginable in Germany. For example, two Mussolinis ran for a seat in the 2019 European Parliament elections: Alessandra, experienced politician and already member of the EP, and Caio Giulio Cesare, who describes himself as “a post-fascist who refers to those values in a non-ideological way.” The Guardian, “Mussolini’s great-grandson claims...

16 Qualunquismo “presented itself as the voice of ordinary people, those excluded from the division of power, fed up with greedy and corrupt politicians, indifferent to ideologies they saw as a mere cover for elite ambitions of domination, skeptical of any program and mistrustful of electoral promises they expected to be systematically broken by those elected” (Tarchi 2002, 122).

17 Pentapartito was the five-party coalition that governed Italy between June 1981 and April 1991. It comprised: Christian Democracy (DC), Italian Socialist Party (PSI), Italian Democratic Socialist Party (PSDI), Italian Liberal Party (PLI), and Italian Republican Party (PRI).

18 Several other scholars consider Go Italy as a populist party. Among others: Ranziolo (2006), Pasquino (2007), Ruzza and Fella (2009).

19 The Democratic Party of the Left is oddly coded as right-wing in 1994 according to the Party Manifesto Project. For the purposes of the analysis, this does not make any difference, although it is clearly debatable to what extent the PDS was proposing a truly left-wing manifesto at the time.

20 About the difficult classification of the M5S, see Manucci and Amsler (2018).

21 In 1994, even if the PDS would have been coded as left-wing (as it is normally considered), Italy would still belong to the outcome. On the other hand, it would not belong to the outcome for left-wing populism, although it would be close enough to the crossover point.

22 In 2002, Fortuyn’s former party – Liveable Netherlands – also obtained two seats in the House of Representatives.

23 On that occasion, the centre party D66 (Democraten 66) is coded as left-wing according to the Manifesto Project. However, even if it were coded as right-wing, the Netherlands in 1994 would still not belong to the outcome for right-wing populism.

24 It would be extremely interesting to know the levels of populism scored by the Sweden Democrats in the 2018 elections. Unfortunately, our data arrives only at the 2014 elections.

25 UKIP, contrary to the other right-wing movements mentioned above, has the advantage of being relatively free from any association with the fascist past.

26 Five of the six manifestos containing the highest percentage of populist statements were written either in the 1970s or in the 2010s. The exception is the manifesto from the German SPD in the 1980s.

27 Among the coded manifestos, 47 (around 27%) did not show any trace of populism. They are mainly manifestos of Swedish parties (23), as well as Swiss manifestos from the 1970s and 1980s (11) and Dutch manifestos from the 1970s–1990s (6).

1 This section builds on (and expands) the analysis presented in Caramani and Manucci (2019). The paper, which constitutes a first step in the direction of examining the role of collective memories in explaining populism, presents additional information concerning the classification of countries. In the online appendices, the relevant literature for each country is presented with the indication of the source, the relevant pages, and keywords that help assigning master and secondary narratives as well as to assess changes of narrative. Finally, in the online appendices are listed at least two experts per country who have been consulted in order to assess whether the literature included was relevant and complete enough.

2 The advantage of assigning collective memories through the analysis of secondary literature consists in effectively addressing two of the caveats identified in Chapter 3: the presence of secondary narratives and the variation over time of collective memories.
Since the type of past analyzed here is fascism (and not, for example, colonialism), the United Kingdom does not have to deal with a cumbersome past.

Italy describes as ‘victims’ even the fascist soldiers killed in the Northeast by Tito’s partisans. Neo-fascist organizations, indeed, can openly celebrate the “victims of Communism” each February, during the recently institutionalized “National Memorial Day of the Exiles and Foibe.” To diminish the atrocities of the fascist regime, the mantra of those “killed in the foibe” is highly recurrent, and not only among extreme right-wing activists but also in mainstream parties both from the right and from the left, anxious to put the past behind them and finally form a shared memory (Tenca Montini 2014). Tellingly, a picture that often circulates to represent “the atrocities against the poor Italian victims” actually depicts Italian soldiers killing civilians in Slovenia. In this way, 20 years of fascist violence in the Balkans are removed. What remains is the victimization of a country that pretends not to remember what Italians did in Istria and Dalmatia (Focardi and Klinkhammer 2004).

In 1994, the memorandum titled by the British Secret Intelligence Service Atrocities in Italy, was found in a wooden cabinet in Rome. The magistrate that exposed the content of the armoire of shame was Antonino Intelisano, who later condemned the SS commander Erich Priebke to a life sentence for participating in the Ardeatine massacre in Rome (March 1944) in which 335 Italian civilians were killed. Priebke could live for 50 years in Argentina after the defeat of Nazi Germany.

It will suffice to cite a very recent example. In March 2019, the president of the European parliament Antonio Tajani has declared that Mussolini had done positive things and, in particular, that he had a good record on developing infrastructure. Now, imagine a German politician (not necessarily as important as the president of the European parliament) who attributes positive traits to the government of Adolf Hitler. This simple thought experiment is quite effective in showing the opposite collective memories developed in the two countries.

In 2017, Marine Le Pen claimed that in her opinion France is not responsible for the Vel d’Hiv. She was thus denying that France (which in 1942 was governed by the Vichy regime) was responsible for the roundup of more than 13,000 Jews who were then sent to Nazi death camps. Her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, has been convicted repeatedly for Anti-Semitic and racist comments such as calling the Holocaust a “detail of history.”

It would be extremely interesting to observe whether a correlation can be established between the cancellation of the fascist past in Western countries and the denial of the atrocities committed in their former colonies.


In 2018, the Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz claimed that Austria was so quick to embrace fascism in the 1930s because of “the endless quarrels between the right wing and the left,” which in turn made democracy slip into chaos. A dialogue “with all political sides” constitutes his recipe for a strong democracy. Coherently,
Chancellor Kurz handed to the Freedom Party (which has roots in Austria’s Nazi past) the posts for the interior and foreign ministries. The leader of the Freedom Party and now vice chancellor of Austria, Heinz-Christian Strache, has been photographed more than once participating in paramilitary exercises with banned Nazi groups. The quotes from the speech of Sebastian Kurz are in: *Time*, “Austria’s Young Chancellor Sebastian Kurz Is Bringing the Far-Right Into the Mainstream”, by Simon Shuster, November 29, 2018, available online (consulted in March 2019): http://time.com/magazine/south-pacific/5466661/december-10th-2018-vol-192-no-24-asia-europe-middle-east-and-africa-south-pacific/.

It is unclear to what extent Austria has really dismissed its former narrative, in particular after the formation of the coalition government between ÖVP and FPÖ in 2017. Christian Kern, former Austrian Chancellor, claims that Kurz and his allies are “shifting the red lines of what is morally and politically acceptable permanently to the right.” *Financial Times*, “Sebastian Kurz: saviour of Europe’s mainstream or friend of the far-right?”, by Ben Hall and Ralph Aykins, January 6, 2019, available online (consulted in March 2019): www.ft.com/content/9396664c-044d-11e9-9d01-cd4d49afbee3.

Edgar Bonjour, a Swiss historian, questioned the neutrality of the country and examined its implications. See Bonjour (1970).

The reactions of the Swiss public opinion remind the Austrian case in the aftermath of the Waldheim affair.

Tellingly, only a small number of collaborators were prosecuted, and none of them served a sentence of more than 15 years (De Haan 2011, 78).

It is remarkable to notice that the Netherlands state-owned train company, Nederlandse Spoorwegen (NS), decided to compensate individuals whose Jewish relatives were deported on its trains to concentration camps. The decision came only in November 2018, after the company already apologized in 2005 for its role in the WWII deportations of Jews. However, no real public debate took place about the country’s past.

Although the myth does not necessarily contain only truth, since “myth and historical consciousness tend to be mutually exclusive as approaches to reality” (Colla 2002, 131).

The results of the Sweden Democrats at the last two elections (2014 and 2018) show that they established themselves as the country’s third largest party. This might signal a new change of direction in Sweden’s collective memory. The fact that a party with roots in neo-Nazism and that promises to “give Sweden back to the Swedish” can expect to participate in a government coalition in the near future reveals that the levels of stigma might have decreased in Sweden. However, it is also true that the Sweden Democrats toned down their radicalism in order to be accepted as a credible party. In the meantime, “the country’s political discourse has so drastically transformed in both tone and content that the Sweden Democrats’ worldview no longer appears as part of a radical fringe, but rather a prominent fixture of the mainstream.” *Jacobin*, “The Far Right Comes to Sweden”, by Petter Larsson, November 1, 2016, available online (consulted in March 2019): www.jacobinmag.com/2016/01/sweden-democrats-jimmie-akesson-far-right-europe/.

It also included a survey published (in English) in 2006, titled “Sweden’s Relations with Nazism, Nazi Germany and the Holocaust.”

A few passages of the speech delivered in Parliament at Westminster, 18 June 1940, are worth mentioning to better understand the British heroization narrative (author’s italics): “Upon this battle depends the *survival of Christian civilisation*. Upon it depends our own *British life*, and the *long continuity of our institutions* and our Empire. . . . Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. . . . Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so
bear ourselves, that if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thou-
sand years, men will still say: ‘this was their finest hour’.”

In social sciences, the tendency in studies using QCA is to discard solutions show-
ing coefficients below .750 for inclusion and coverage. Here these thresholds are 
not considered as particularly relevant because the most important aspect con-
cerns the comparison of the two models before and after introducing the levels of 
sto
gma. However, it is possible to say that in this study solutions with coefficients 
for inclusion below .750 will be treated as inconclusive (because the solution is 
not precise enough), while coefficients for coverage below .800 will be considered 
as sub-optimal (because this means that the solution leaves unexplained more 
than 20% of the cases). Finally, when the coefficients for inclusion are below .750 
it is irrelevant to observe the coefficients for coverage.

The next chapter relies on the same operationalization and calibration; therefore, 
this section will not be repeated.

The point at which a country has full non-membership in the outcome is 0 for all 
the examined types of populism (total, right- and left-wing).

For Switzerland, the data on radicalism are derived from the Party Manifesto 
Project since the Chapel Hill survey does not include the country.

Normalization and Standardization are operated by the Democracy Barometer 
in the indicator “Absence of Corruption.” It is considered as part of the features 
determining governmental capabilities and, in particular, its transparency.

For details about the indicators of the Democracy Barometer, see Merkel et al. 
(2016).

The DB codebook provides all the information concerning the sources of the 
data, and their scaling and standardization. Moreover, it offers detailed definitions 
of the concepts employed and notes about the measurements. The dataset of the 
DB does not directly refer to concepts such as responsiveness and accountability; 
therefore, I use their dataset by interpreting the type of information it contains in 
order to adapt it to the scope of this analysis.

OECD (2017), Unemployment rate (indicator). Doi: 10.1787/997c8750-en 
(Accessed in April 2017).

International Financial Statistics (World Economic Outlook), June 2015, avail-
able online (accessed in April 2019): www.imf.org/external/datamapper/LUR@ 

Solt (2016) SWIID version 5.1.

World Development Indicators, GDP growth (annual %), December 2015, avail-
able online (accessed in April 2019): https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG.

Dalton measures the Polarization Index (PI) as follows. \( PI = \sqrt{\sum \{\text{party vote share}_i \cdot (\text{party L/R score}_i - \text{party system average L/R score})/5\}^2} \). In particular, 
“,” represents individual parties. Here the formula is slightly adjusted. First, the 
left–right score is calculated according to the Chapel Hill survey or, since the 
survey does not cover the 1990s, the Party Manifesto Project is used (see notes to 
Table A3.1). Second, the effective number of parties is here intended as the num-
ber of parties which obtained at least 5% of the vote share, in order to include only 
those parties whose electoral manifestos are included in the analysis. The Com-
parative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) provides all the information needed 
to measure the polarization index: www.cses.org (consulted in October 2017).

The results remain consistent, both with the normal operationalization (Appendix 
9, Table A9.1 and A9.2) and with the alternative one based on the co-occurrence 
principle (Appendix 11, Table A11.7 and Table A11.8).

Appendix 11 reports all the solution formulas for the alternative operationaliza-
tion (Table A11.1 to A11.3).
About the different types of solutions in QCA, see Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 165–77).

All analyses are performed using the free software R, in particular the packages: ‘QCA: Qualitative Comparative Analysis’ (Dusa 2019) and ‘Set methods: Functions for Set-Theoretic Multi-Method Research and Advanced QCA’ (Medzhikovsky et al. 2016).

Other credible inclusion cut-offs have been tested but they are not reported for reasons of space. The results remain consistent with those obtained with the cut-off point at .88.

See Ragin (1987) on different ways to treat logical reminders.

All the cases are displayed in Figure 7.1. However, typical cases and deviant cases consistency (in relation to sufficient terms or single terms) are not interpretable through this plot. When relevant, this is done separately (see Appendix 8). What is interpretable and relevant for process tracing and causality mechanisms when plotting the whole solution, like in this case, is the comparison between deviant cases coverage and individually irrelevant cases (Rohlfing and Schneider 2013).

An inclusion cut-off of .81 (closer to the jump in the values) gives extremely similar results. The results of this study (also in comparison with the findings that are presented in Chapter 8) would remain consistent also with cut-off points set at .82 or .84. This means that with any reasonable cut-off level by introducing the level of stigma the results show that right-wing populism becomes explainable.

Again, there is no clear jump to be used for the inclusion cut-off. Given the membership of the cases in the outcome, a rather high threshold is used. Higher thresholds have been tried as well, but they give even less interpretable solutions.

The inclusion cut-off is identical to the one used in Chapter 7 for maximum comparability. The same is true for the sections about right- and left-wing populism.

This observation is not surprising since the coefficients for inclusion and coverage often are a trade-off between the two measures (Schneider and Wagemann 2012).

About unique and raw coverage, see Ragin (2006).

Interestingly, by observing the results obtained with the alternative operationalization, it emerges a different parsimonious solution: E + S + D*CNVG. This solution, despite being slightly more complex, is able to explain the social acceptability of populism with even higher precision (see Table A11.4). In particular, it has an inclusion coefficient of .849 and a coverage coefficient of .870. Moreover, the levels of stigma alone have an inclusion coefficient of .880 and a coverage coefficient of .703. Finally, it is important to notice that no matter the operationalization used for the measurement of populism in party manifestos, the results remain consistent and in line with the hypotheses.

Going into further detail, the United Kingdom shows alarmingly low levels of government capability (pertaining to responsiveness) and competition (pertaining to accountability), and this is true not only for the 2003 elections but also for the other two decades considered.

Concerning Austria in 2002, it is possible to observe that the levels of right-wing populism’s social acceptability are exceptionally low (as already explained in Chapter 5). This might be because the FPÖ produced a party manifesto that shows unusually low levels of populism. For example, in the 1990s, their manifesto contained high levels of populism (more than 10%) and in the 2010s extremely high levels of populism (more than 21%). However, in 2002, their manifesto contained only 0.7% of populist statements. Interestingly, in 2002, the party was deeply divided and unable to organize an effective political strategy, a situation that decreased its share of the vote to 10.2%, almost two-thirds less than its previous share.
7 The alternative operationalization produces very similar results. The relation of sufficiency between levels of stigma and acceptability of right-wing populism has a coefficient of .823 for inclusion and .764 for coverage. See Appendix 11 (Table A11.5).

8 It is important to notice that the intermediate solution is $S + C*D*E*CNVG \Rightarrow POP_R$ (see Table A7.2). This solution is particularly in line with the expectations because it shows that low levels of stigma ($S$) or a combination of all the other four conditions ($C*D*E*CNVG$) explain the social acceptability of right-wing populism. Moreover, the coefficients for inclusion and coverage are almost identical to those expressed in the parsimonious solution (.859 and .804 respectively). The difference between intermediate and parsimonious solution consists in the assumptions made. The intermediate solution is built on easy counterfactuals, and it discards difficult ones. Counterfactuals are called easy when the assumptions about the outcome of logical remainders are simplifying and in line with the theoretical expectations (in this case, $C$, $D$, $E$, and $CNVG$ are supposed to produce $POP_R$). A counterfactual is difficult when it is simplifying the solution but runs counter to the theoretical expectations. Because the intermediate solution might not allow all simplifying assumptions to be made, it contains some conditions that are redundant in the sense that they do not make a difference to the outcome (Schneider and Rohlfing 2016).

9 Before the introduction of levels of stigma, the solution was $C*cnvg + E*CNVG \Rightarrow POP_R$, with a coefficient for inclusion of .896 and a coefficient for coverage of .600.

10 About the fact that both high and low levels of stigma are present in the solution, it is interesting to notice that the PRI value for the solution is very low: .542. This means that the solution is sufficient for the outcome only slightly more than it is sufficient for the negation of the outcome.

11 With the alternative operationalization, the solution formula is similar: $D*s + c*CNVG*s$ (see Appendix 6, Table A11.6). Once again, it is possible to notice that both $S$ and $s$ are present, and in particular the solution term $D*s$ is consistently present, this time with a coefficient of unique coverage of .260. This solution term, once again, explains the social acceptability of left-wing populism in Germany and the UK. Importantly, the parsimonious solution would have an acceptable coefficient for inclusion (.838). However, it explains only two-thirds of the cases (coefficient of coverage .660).

1 Washington Post, “This is how fascism comes to America”, May 18, 2016, available online (consulted in October 2017): www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/this-is-how-fascism-comes-to-america/2016/05/17/c4e32c58-1c47-11e6-8c7b-6931e6d33c7_story.html?utm_term=.7d82807b9279.


3 The Pegida movement (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West) re-popularised the term Lügenpresse in rallies across German cities since 2014.


5 In studying the legacies of different authoritarian pasts in other regions of the world, it might be necessary to expand or reformulate the typology of collective memory proposed in this study. Moreover, it is possible to imagine that the social acceptability of different ideas of power is linked not only to the legacies of authoritarian...
regimes but also to other critical junctures, such as colonialism, revolutions, civil wars, and regime changes.

**Bibliography**


