This book explores the anti-Islamic turn and expansion of the far right in Western Europe, North America, and beyond from 2001 onwards.

Driven by terror attacks and other moral shocks, the anti-Islamic cause has undergone four waves of transnational expansion in the period since 2001. The leaders and intellectuals involved have varied backgrounds, many coming from the left, uniting historically opposed sets of values under their banner of a civilizational struggle against Islam. The findings presented in this book indicate that anti-Islamic initiatives in Western Europe and the United States form a transnational movement and subculture characterized by a fragile balance between liberal and authoritarian values. The author draws on a broad array of data sources and methods, including network analysis and sentiment analysis, to analyze the impact of the anti-Islamic expansion and turn at a macro level, and the theoretical implications for our understanding of the current far right flowing from this. Offering an overview of anti-Islamic activism, the book explores the background of their leaders and ideologues, provides an in-depth look at their ideology, online organizational networks, and the views expressed by their online members as well as which emotions and messages continue to drive their mobilization.

The book will be of interest to scholars in the social movement field, as well as political scientists, sociologists, and general readers interested in issues such as populism, extremism, and understanding the ways in which the contemporary far right challenges liberal democracies.

Lars Erik Berntzen is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Department of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen, Norway. Berntzen currently studies affective, identity-based polarization in Western Europe using a combination of panel-based survey experiments and social media experiments. He studied sociology at the University of Bergen, before taking his PhD at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy.
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LIBERAL ROOTS OF FAR RIGHT ACTIVISM

The Anti-Islamic Movement in the 21st Century

Lars Erik Berntzen
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7.1 Propaganda material from the EDL 145
Writing this book has been a long journey. I want to give you a little preamble before you delve into it, so that you can understand the premises for it.

I start by winding the clock back to the very beginning of my academic career, and then some. My journey into academia began August 2006 at the Department of Sociology, University of Bergen. Bergen is my hometown, and the region of Norway where my ancestors come from as far back as anybody has traced them. I am among the first persons in my family who have completed a higher education. My mother was a hairdresser, while my father began as a carpenter before he gradually advanced to a higher management position in a construction company. The generations before them have been farmers, fishermen, factory workers, and housewives. Today, many of my relatives work in the oil industry or related fields. This journey of upward mobility through the generations is not unique to my family or me, but has been one core characteristic of Norwegian society during the last century.

Perhaps not surprisingly, when I began studying sociology, most of the classes I took were on the welfare state, class differences, and questions of poverty and inequality. Already instilled with a sense of pride in Norwegian social democracy, my understanding of the welfare state as the single greatest achievement of our society was solidified during these years.

Then I came across Sigurd Skirbekk’s Nasjonalstaten: Velferdsstatens grunnlag (The Nation-state: Foundation of the Welfare State). Skirbekk claimed that the support necessary to maintain this costly welfare state was being eroded. Not only that, it was being eroded by the increased ethnic and cultural diversity which immigration brings with it. The premise was that the Norwegian majority population would withdraw their support for economic redistribution as society became more diverse. Was he right?
My own sociological background and its emphasis on the explanatory power of economic issues and class differences over notions of ethnic and cultural differences made me resistant to the idea. I nonetheless decided to delve into the matter. Based on a limited amount of survey data between the 1980s and 2008, my tentative answer was that the normative foundations for the Norwegian welfare state had until that point in time not been substantially undermined through immigration. However, this work had made me increasingly aware of the organized and popular opposition against immigration. Particularly Muslim immigration.

Inspired by the social anthropologist Marianne Gullestad and her book *Det norske sett med nye øyne* (*Norwegianess Seen with New Eyes*), I decided to study this opposition from the point of view of the majority rather than looking at the Muslim minority and how it impacted them. The result was the first study of anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim mobilization in Norway, finished in May 2011. The anti-Islamic movement in Norway, I argued, was a peaceful one. But its view of Islam and Muslims as an existential and totalitarian threat contained the seeds of anti-democratic and violent solutions.

No more than two months later, Norway was struck by two large-scale terror attacks on the fateful summer day of 22 July. Of the 77 people killed, most were youths. Another 46 had been severely injured. It was by far the most devastating attack in Norwegian peacetime, and the consequences of which reverberate through our society to this day.

To most people’s surprise, the perpetrator turned out to be Anders Behring Breivik – a white Norwegian man from Oslo. Just before committing these attacks, Breivik had uploaded a 1,518-page manifesto titled *2083: A European Declaration of Independence*. I immediately downloaded the manifesto, and together with Sveinung Sandberg (Department of Criminology and Sociology of Law, University of Oslo Professor), I analyzed the extent to which his views overlapped with the broader Norwegian anti-Islamic movement. The overlap was considerable. Considering this, we argued that the violent solutions he championed – and committed – were just as plausible an outcome as peaceful ones for those who believed that the West was in danger of going under. This would indicate that the potential for radicalization among anti-Islamic activists was considerable.

After that, I began delving into the support Breivik received among these activist groups and online forums. It quickly became apparent that Breivik and his choice of violence in fact had little or no support among anti-Islamic activists. What meagre support there was came from a fringe collection of individuals who got together online – mass murderer and school shooting fans, some ideologically motivated people and a collection of people who seemed drawn into this small community through the allure of romance and brotherhood. The anti-Islamic scene remained largely peaceful, and Breivik represented a clear outlier.

At that point in time, two distinct pathways lay before me. First, either continue down the track of studying the important but marginal phenomenon of actual
extreme right political violence. Second, continue studying the broader and largely peaceful anti-Islamic mobilization. Both remained heavily underexplored. Furthermore, both dimensions are needed to explain the intertwined issues of the dynamics and mechanisms that lead to right-wing violence and those that lead to an absence of violence. Of the two, I chose to focus on the anti-Islamic mobilization.

Studying the broader anti-Islamic mobilization also means that my work is precisely that – broad. A project can be both ambitious in its scope and informative in its outcome, but the obvious risk is that it ends up saying too little about too much. Whether I managed to walk that tightrope is up to you, the reader, to decide. It certainly would have been broader still without the excellent input and guidance I got along the way.
This book is based on doctoral work undertaken at the European University Institute (2013–2017). A special debt of gratitude is owed to my thesis supervisor, Professor Donatella della Porta, and to the other faculty and fellow PhD candidates at the European University Institute’s Department of Social and Political Sciences. A debt of gratitude is also owed to the Department of Comparative Politics at the University of Bergen for taking me in on a research exchange (2015) and the Center for Research on Extremism, Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo for housing me and subsequently providing the necessary support for this book to come into fruition (2016–2019). I am also particularly grateful to colleagues who have provided input and advice, namely: Stefano Bartolini, Hanspeter Kriesi, Manès Weisskircher, Swen Hutter, Elisabeth Ivarsflaten, Mikael Johannesson, Jan Oskar Engene, Lise Lund Bjånesøy, Carl Norlund, Sveinung Sandberg, Tore Bjørgo, Anders Jupskás, Jacob Ravndal, Pietro Castelli, Caterina Froio, Joel Busher, Graham Macklin, and Hugo Lewi Hammer. Finally, I wish to thank my family: my father, Svein Erik Berntzen; my partner, Linn Sandberg; and finally, Linn’s parents, Laine Gnista and Per Sandberg.
### ACRONYMS

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<th>Original name</th>
<th>English name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4F</td>
<td>Four Freedoms Community</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AFA</td>
<td>Anti-Fascist Action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfD</td>
<td>Alternative für Deutschland</td>
<td>Alternative for Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIG</td>
<td>al-Jama‘ah al-Islamiyah al-Musallaha</td>
<td>Algerian Islamic Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BFP</td>
<td>British Freedom Party</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>British National Party</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>BPE</td>
<td>Bürgerbewegung Pax Europa</td>
<td>Citizens’ Movement Pax Europa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPI</td>
<td>Blok proti islámu</td>
<td>Bloc Against Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVF</td>
<td>Center für Vigilant Freedom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDE</td>
<td>Direkte Demokratie für Europa</td>
<td>Direct Democracy for Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDF</td>
<td>Den Danske Forening</td>
<td>Danish Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDL</td>
<td>Danmark - Det Danske Samfund</td>
<td>Danish Defence League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF</td>
<td>Dansk Folkeparti</td>
<td>Danish Peoples’ Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFG</td>
<td>Die Freiheit – Bürgerrechtspartei für mehr Freiheit und Demokratie</td>
<td>German Freedom Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDV</td>
<td>Freiheitlich</td>
<td>Liberal Direct Democratic People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMI</td>
<td>Folkevebegelsen mot innvandring</td>
<td>People’s movement against immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>Front National</td>
<td>Front National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPÖ</td>
<td>Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs</td>
<td>Freedom Party of Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FrP</td>
<td>Fremskrittspartiet</td>
<td>Progress Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoV</td>
<td>Gates of Vienna</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRS</td>
<td>Human Rights Service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFPS</td>
<td>International Free Press Society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Original name</td>
<td>English name</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State in Iraq and Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jobbik</td>
<td>Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom</td>
<td>Hungarian Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGB</td>
<td>Liberty Great Britain</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>LGF</td>
<td>Little Green Footballs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LN</td>
<td>Lega Nord</td>
<td>Northern League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPF</td>
<td>Lijst Pim Fortuyn</td>
<td>Pim Fortuyn List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NdIE</td>
<td>Nie dla Islamizacji Europy</td>
<td>No to the Islamization of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDL</td>
<td>Norwegian Defence League</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONR</td>
<td>Oboz Narodowo-Radykalny</td>
<td>Radical Nationalist Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEGIDA</td>
<td>Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes</td>
<td>Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PI</td>
<td>Politically Incorrect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Partido Popular</td>
<td>Peoples Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê</td>
<td>Kurdistan Workers Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVV</td>
<td>Partij voor de Vrijheid</td>
<td>Party for Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Sverigedemokraterna</td>
<td>Sweden Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIAD</td>
<td>Stop Islamiseringen af Danmark</td>
<td>Stop Islamization of Denmark</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIAN</td>
<td>Stopp Islamiseringen av Norge</td>
<td>Stop Islamization of Norway</td>
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<td>SIOA</td>
<td>Stop Islamization of America</td>
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<td>SIOE</td>
<td>Stop Islamization of Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIOED</td>
<td>Stop Islamization og Europe Deutschland</td>
<td>Stop Islamization of Europe Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>SION</td>
<td>Stop Islamization of Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIOTW</td>
<td>Stop Islamization of the World</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVP</td>
<td>Schweizerische Volkspartei</td>
<td>Swiss People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFS</td>
<td>Trykkefrihedsselskabet</td>
<td>Free Press Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>United Kingdom Independence Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VB</td>
<td>Vlaams Belang</td>
<td>Flemish Interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ViS</td>
<td>Verdier i Sentrum</td>
<td>Core Values</td>
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</tbody>
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FAR RIGHT AND LIBERAL?

Introduction

Europe is currently undergoing large-scale demographic and cultural change. An otherwise ageing and secularizing corner of the world has received an influx of younger, non-Western and often religious migrants. This influx has been increasingly and consistently contested by a resurgent far right from the 1980s onwards (Klandermans & Mayer, 2006, p. 3). For decades, as the conflict revolved around race, ethnicity and nationality – Africans and Arabs, Turks, Moroccans, and Pakistanis – some on the far-right upheld Islam as a positive, conservative force.

That has changed. In tandem with a long list of spectacular acts of political violence committed in the name of Islam and controversies such as the Muhammed cartoon crisis¹, Muslims and Islam have now become the predominant enemy for the far right in Europe and beyond.

This book is about that anti-Islamic turn and expansion of the far right. It is about a growing movement and subculture that is transnational in scope ranging from the United States, Western Europe, and, increasingly, Central and Eastern Europe. It has old ideological roots, but the movement began to coalesce online in the wake of the terror attacks on the United States by Al-Qaeda on 11 September 2001 (9/11). Since then, the anti-Islamic struggle has given rise to several distinct waves of activism under the names of Stop Islamization, Defense League, Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes, PEGIDA) and others. Anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim groups flourish online. In party politics, new initiatives such as the Dutch Pim Fortuyn List (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF) and later Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV) made opposition to Islam their main issue.

The parties that mobilize on anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic ideas and arguments are now the most studied of all the party families (Mudde, 2016). In contrast, we
know less about the broader movement and subculture. An important reason for precisely why far-right parties are the subject of so much research, and why the anti-Islamic movement(s) and subculture merit closer scrutiny, is the idea that these initiatives either want to destroy democratic society itself or will in some way lead to its corrosion.

Franz Timmermans, the first Vice President of the European Commission, stated in an official speech that “The rise of islamophobia is one of the biggest challenges in Europe. It is a challenge to our vital values, to the core of who we are” (2015). Given this notion of a threat to “our” values, it is striking that the anti-Islamic far right in Western Europe and North America argue that they are defending democracy and freedom of speech (Betz & Meret, 2009, p. 313), while often proclaiming their support for Jews, gender equality, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transsexual (LGBT) rights (e.g. Dauber, 2017, p. 52). If we turn the clock back two decades, we find a surge in neo-Nazi violence (Koopmans, 1996) and outspoken hostility towards Jews, homosexuals, and modern gender norms was commonplace.

Hearing far-right politicians and activists talk in such different terms today may appear paradoxical, given the legacy of opposition towards both progressive and liberal ideals, movements, and parties. Is the far right, which has been so closely tied to antagonism towards these very groups, now one of their defenders?

Viewed through the lens of history, it is their apparent self-portrayal as defenders of progressive and liberal ideals – and not their opposition to Islam and Muslims – that is most distinctive. In academic circles, this is often portrayed as being only skin deep, a thin veneer masking their true positions – and that the far right hides a radical “back stage” behind its moderate “front stage” (Fleck & Müller, 1998, p. 438) which is racist, anti-Semitic, homophobic, against women’s rights, and hostile to democracy. It is defined as a transparently strategic vocabulary (Scrinzi, 2017) used to circumvent and defend against allegations of racism. This is deemed a necessity on their part, since openly racist remarks have been stigmatized and pathologized (Lentin & Tittley, 2011, p. 20) ever since the total defeat of the Axis powers in World War II (Jackson & Feldman, 2014, p. 7). The claims by Marine Le Pen of the French Front National (FN) to defend women’s rights are, for instance, understood as “instrumental” and “pseudo-feminist” (Larzillière & Sal, 2011). In much the same way, Mayer, Ajanovic, and Sauer (2014) state that the far right exploits gender and LGBT arguments strategically in order to denigrate Muslim men. Others have conceptualized this as homonationalism (Puar, 2013; Zanghellini, 2012), and femonationalism (Farris, 2012, 2017).

Critical positions and scepticism are not without merit. For instance, studies of the British National Party (BNP) that go beyond the “front stage” by examining speeches and memos not intended for the public reveal that they toned down their anti-Semitism and anti-democratic positions as a ploy to win over new recruits and circumvent opposition from mainstream society (Jackson & Feldman, 2014, p. 10). These findings are in line with the broad consensus in the literature. Yet, we
risk misconstruing the anti-Islamic turn and expansion if we limit ourselves to a theoretically based rejection or if we rely exclusively on single-case evidence from organizations with a clear fascist legacy. As a starting point for mapping the anti-Islamic movement and to investigate this apparent paradox and its ramifications on a broader scale, I pose the following research questions:

RQ1 What characterizes the anti-Islamic movements’ structure and composition?
RQ2 How, and to what extent, does the anti-Islamic movement incorporate progressive and liberal values?

In order to investigate the movements’ configuration and degree of entanglement with progressive and liberal ideals, this book provides a study of four specific dimensions: 1) the background of leaders; 2) their official ideology; 3) organizational networks; and 4) the mobilization of sympathizers. The extent to which liberal and progressive positions and arguments permeate the anti-Islamic movement has far-reaching consequences for our basic understanding of what the anti-Islamic movement is. In addition to saying something about their entanglement with progressive and liberal ideals, these dimensions give us insight about the anti-Islamic turn on the far right.

First, tracing the waves of activism and the biographies of the leaders, representatives, and ideologues provides us with insight into their motivation for joining the anti-Islamic cause and whether they have their roots in the old far right or not. Second, studying their official ideology (front stage) gives an indication of whether their positions are consistent or fragmented across countries and organizations. Third, network analysis tells us whether these initiatives form a cohesive whole or consist of disjointed communities. Taken together, the historical and biographical overview, alongside the analyses of ideology and networks, go to the core of the matter. Is this really a movement, or is it just a question of different groups driven by national, regional, and local legacies and peculiarities? And do they represent a continuation of the old far right or not? By studying their mobilization, we uncover whether they have managed to recruit moderates or extremists, and to what extent they are aligned with the official ideological platform espoused by the leaders. It also provides insight into the drivers of their continued online mobilization and ability to spread their message, and why certain messages get more traction than others.

The four steps

The broader anti-Islamic turn consists of two parallel developments: first, an anti-Islamic reorientation of pre-existing radical right parties; second, an anti-Islamic expansion of the far right with new political initiatives. While the expansion includes some electorally successful parties, such as Pim Fortuyn’s LPF and Geert Wilders’ PVV, both in the Netherlands, it largely consists of alternative news sites
and blogs, think-tanks, street protest groups such as the English Defence League (EDL) and PEGIDA, and minor political parties. Empirically speaking, the universe of cases dealt with in this book is limited to the anti-Islamic expansion. The findings and theoretical claims, however, have some bearing on the broader anti-Islamic turn.

The book starts by tracing the growth of anti-Islamic activism between 2001 and 2017, focussing on initiatives and central figures from six “stronghold” countries: Britain, the United States, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, and Denmark. This is followed by a frame analysis of official statements by 11 key initiatives known for their anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic rhetoric in Germany, Norway, and Britain. All three countries are epicentres of anti-Islamic activism. Norway was the first country to have an explicitly anti-Islamic activist organization in Stop Islamization of Norway (SIAN) in 2000. Britain was the location where the online communities first gathered for a street march in 2005, and which witnessed the rise of the EDL in 2009. Finally, Germany gave birth to the latest version of anti-Islamic activism with PEGIDA in 2014, which has since spread across Europe (Berntzen & Weisskircher, 2016). I then trace the online anti-Islamic network starting with these 11 anti-Islamic initiatives’ from Norway, Britain and Germany and 16 of their offshoots across the world in March 2015 and March 2016; that is, before and after the “refugee crisis”. When examining members of these networks, the case selection consists of the anti-Islamic groups found in the network analysis that were active during the summer of 2016 – totalling 300 groups across Europe, North America, and Australia (Figure 1.1).

**FIGURE 1.1** The four steps taken to explore the anti-Islamic movement and expansion
Findings and the argument(s)

As the old, highly authoritarian and ethnocentric far right lost its vitality, a new phenomenon arose to take its place: anti-Islam. It is a new addition to the far-right family, but no child of the old far right. The anti-Islamic cause was borne by a curious mix of people with leftist and conservative backgrounds, all of whom professed their attachment to many liberal ideals. Their leaders and intellectuals – many of them journalists and historians – came to see their own political camps as ignorant of the dangers posed by Islam. In their eyes, Islam was not a regular religion but a totalitarian ideology equivalent to communism and fascism. Propelled by their belief in a civilizational struggle between the West and Islam, these activists managed to establish a transnational anti-Islamic movement consisting of activist groups, think-tanks, and alternative media outlets, as well as some political parties. The movement itself has undergone four waves of expansion in response to acts of terror and other moral shocks, starting with 9/11. Most of their claims and positions about what they represent resonate with broad majorities in Western Europe: free speech, preservation of the Christian heritage, democracy, gender equality, LGBT rights and the protection of Jews. Their outspoken hostility to Islam and Muslims further resonates with substantial minorities.

Their civilizational worldview, which combines previously divergent political projects, is broadly consistent across organizations and countries. They continuously include both traditional and modern perspectives on a broad range of issues. On the one hand, hostility towards the Muslim minority and defence of traditions sits well with the older far right. On the other hand, their inclusion of modern gender norms and key liberal positions are clearly at odds with the traditional far right with its rigid views on gender roles and hostility toward democracy. For instance, when it comes to the supposed threat posed by Islam and Muslims to women’s rights, they vacillate between “protector frames” with a male point of view (our women), and “equality frames” with a female point of view. I define this ideological duality as strategic frame ambiguity.

The anti-Islamic network mirrors this ideological duality. Anti-Islamic groups reach out to animal rights, LGBT, and women’s rights groups, as well as Christian conservatives and Jewish and pro-Israeli initiatives. Some, but not all, of these reciprocate. Furthermore, both main components of the ideology – 1) Islam as an existential threat enabled by “the elites” either through a willed conspiracy or due to their sheer ignorance; 2) which undermines Western traditions and Christianity, democracy, gender equality, and minority rights – resonate with the online activists and followers. In terms of the two overarching research questions, the findings in this book can be summarized in one structural and one ideology-centric argument:

First, the initiatives that make up the anti-Islamic expansion of the far right comprise a transnational movement and subculture with a consistent worldview and prominent ideologues.

Second, the anti-Islamic movement and subculture is characterized by a semi-liberal equilibrium.
It is to the second argument I now turn. The transnational anti-Islamic movement exists in a state of balance between modern and liberal values on the one hand, and traditional and authoritarian values on the other. Both components are part of their civilizational, anti-Islamic identity. I have chosen to describe this state of balance as semi-liberal. Therefore, it is also semi-authoritarian. Using the label of liberal instead of authoritarian is justified by the fact that their leftist-to-conservative-liberal stances largely predate clearly authoritarian ones. When looking at the far right in its totality, the anti-Islamic movement represents a profound unmooring from ethnically based nationalism and pervasive authoritarianism, as well as homophobia and anti-Semitism. This sets them apart from the older far right, which is firmly rooted in precisely these values.

Although the old far right with its all-pervasive authoritarianism and ethnocentrism certainly exists in a diminished state today, most pre-existing radical right parties in Western Europe have undergone an ideological transformation that makes them ideologically similar to the anti-Islamic movement that arose after 9/11. Herbert Kitschelt (2012) described this transformation as a partial decoupling between authoritarianism and the radical right through an adoption of liberal positions on many issues. The starting point was an authoritarian one.

For the anti-Islamic movement that emerged after 9/11, the precise opposite holds. As the anti-Islamic movements’ roots and original set of ideas come from outside the far right, it represents a partial coupling between liberalism and authoritarianism from a liberal starting point. In other words, the anti-Islamic expansion is in fact liberalism that has drifted to the far right. What is the cause of this drift? My material clearly points to the pivotal role of their conception of Islam and Muslims as the ultimate embodiment of authoritarianism, narrow-mindedness, patriarchy and misogyny as the root cause. Ostensibly starting from a position of tolerance, they have concluded, “in order to maintain a tolerant society, the society must be intolerant of intolerance” (Popper, 1945, p. 226). That is, Islam as the ultimate manifestation of intolerance must be met with intolerance itself to preserve a tolerant Western civilization. This demonstrates that it matters who the enemy is.

If the anti-Islamic movements’ roots and many of their central ideas are not far right, why call them far right? Labelling them as part of the far-right family hinges on two aspects of their ideology. The first and main aspect is nativism. Just as nativism is the bedrock of older far right ideologies, so it is with anti-Islam. Nevertheless, their qualitative conception of nativism is fundamentally different. The nativism espoused by the anti-Islamic movement is primarily founded on citizenship and adherence to “Western values”, not ethnicity or race. It is therefore a more inclusive form of nativism. It is not an awakening of white ethnic identity as white, but a coming together around a civic identity that builds on progressive and conservative varieties of liberalism. Emphasizing broad categories such as nativism therefore masks fundamental differences between the anti-Islamic project and the old far right. There is no strong continuity between the old far right and the anti-Islamic movement in this regard, but rather an abstract similarity. It is, organizationally
speaking, a “new” phenomenon with new actors who hold many substantially different beliefs compared to the old far right.

The second criterion is precisely their turn toward intolerance and authoritarian solutions to combat Islam in order to defend and maintain an otherwise tolerant Western civilization. Therefore, while their civic nativism clearly sets the anti-Islamic movement apart from the old far right, their intermittent call for authoritarian solutions makes the difference less clear cut.

The ideological evolution of Hege Storhaug, a prominent female anti-Islamic activist and spokesperson for the Norwegian organization Human Rights Service (HRS) serves to illustrate the gradual coupling of progressive stances with conservative, and eventually some authoritarian stances under an anti-Islamic banner. Storhaug came from a left-wing background, seeing herself as a feminist champion of women’s causes. Her main antagonists were Christian conservatives and others opposed to gender equality, abortion rights, and so forth. During the 1990s, she began focussing on the plight of Muslim women living in Norway who had been victims of female gender mutilation and forced marriage. In the years following 9/11, and especially after the Muhammed cartoon crisis, Storhaug became increasingly dogmatic in her focus and hostility toward Islam, seeing it as a threat to Western civilization and in particular, women’s rights. In my interview with her, she said she came to the gradual realization that Christianity had largely been a force for good and was something altogether different from Islam. In the aftermath of the refugee crisis, she became outspoken in her praise of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and the Polish Law and Justice Party’s authoritarian policies and rejection of Islam and Muslim immigrants. Neither Orbán nor the Polish Law and Justice Party are great defenders of gender equality, LGBT rights, or free speech. By 2017, Storhaug had taken to arguing that mosques should be banned and the Quran rewritten. Geert Wilders and other key players in the anti-Islamic movement came to such conclusions far earlier, whereas some still adhere to a softer approach.

As the case of Storhaug’s ideological journey hints at, the current semi-liberal equilibrium characterizing the anti-Islamic far right is fragile. The first source of fragility lies in their view of Islam as an immediate and existential threat to Western civilization. This creates a space for more authoritarian, extreme, and explicitly anti-democratic solutions to gain ground. The second source of fragility stems from their activist base. Anti-Islamic activist groups contain a vocal minority of extreme activists who espouse long-standing hostilities and notions about race, homosexuals, Jews, and democracy. These extremists stand poised to exploit the movements’ ideological discrepancies if the opportunity arises. The continued inability to stem the growth of either Muslim minorities or incidents of terror attacks committed by Islamist extremists represents just such an opportunity. Finally, the recent eastward expansion now means that their transnational network includes radical and extreme right groups of the old ideological order. Since the Eastern European groups are closely aligned with the extremist minority within the anti-Islamic movement in Western Europe and North America, this expansion has made the anti-Islamic far
right more susceptible to profound internal identity struggles. For these reasons, the pendulum may swing in a decisively authoritarian direction and the semi-liberal equilibrium overturned.

**Motivation and limitations**

This is an exploratory study whose aim is to better grasp the anti-Islamic expansion at a macro level, and the theoretical implications for our understanding of the current far right flowing from this. As far as I am aware, it is the first study of this nature, and therefore fills a large gap. It helps rectify the fragmented and lopsided knowledge base which pre-existing single case studies of extra-parliamentary initiatives alongside the voluminous body of work on radical right parties provides. I have already described the merits of this approach and the findings that it has produced.

However, as an exploratory study of the anti-Islamic expansion in the aftermath of 9/11, my study also has several clear limitations. First, studying the anti-Islamic expansion entails focussing on the “successful” cases, their networks, and mobilization. My work offers limited insight into “failed” cases, the question of timing or why the old far right remains dominant in many countries. What it does provide, however, are good grounds for investigating these questions in future studies. As a first step, the clues my findings do provide to these questions are leveraged to sketch out some tentative answers in the conclusion.

Second, emphasizing the macro level comes with some clear costs. In particular, my work provides little insight into the variations between organizations and countries when it comes to what their online members and followers write and respond to. Rather, this data is treated in aggregate to discern the major patterns. This means that potentially significant distinctions between anti-Islamic and far-right activism in various countries are glossed over. Further in-depth analyses such as those conducted by Caterina Froio (2018) of the French far right would be the logical next step in fleshing out and nuancing findings and arguments provided in this book.

Furthermore, while this book covers a sizeable share of the anti-Islamic far right, the material does not span the entire width and breadth of anti-Islamic initiatives. In other words, this is a limited galaxy of cases, and the findings represent a partial – but significant – trend. While the incorporation of liberal and progressive claims is an overarching pattern found among the anti-Islamic initiatives scrutinized in this book, this is by no means generalizable to every individual anti-Islamic activist group, party, website, or think-tank in Western Europe or North America.

Moreover, my findings concerning the entanglement between anti-Islamic activism and liberal values is not readily generalizable beyond the North American and North-West European core region where the anti-Islamic movement originated. In fact, it is probable that the macro-level patterns I identified are reversed outside of these areas. Instead of having a majority of activists embrace liberal values, with only a minority pushing clear-cut racism, ethno-nationalism, and explicitly anti-democratic ideas, it seems plausible that a majority of those who engage in anti-Islamic activism in regions such as Eastern Europe profess racist and
anti-democratic ideas. My own material hints at this. In other words, the attachment between liberalism and mobilization against Islam and Muslims is historically and geographically contingent.

To a certain extent, this study challenges the party-movement distinction by introducing the conceptual categories of ideological reorientation versus expansion. These categories are independent of organizational form. Empirically speaking, however, the focus is on the extra-parliamentary actors. Therefore, I cannot tell the extent which radical right parties have undergone an anti-Islamic, ideological reorientation which includes supplanting ethnic nativism with civic nativism, except by drawing on secondary literature. My findings resonate with some recent studies on these pre-established radical right parties, but the degree to which my findings carry over is nonetheless unclear.

Relatively, my work does not substantially go into the exchange of ideas between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary actors. Nor does it say anything about the extent to which the new anti-Islamic initiatives have influenced the ideological reorientation of older radical right parties. Although outside the scope of this study, such interactions remain a promising avenue of research.

Finally, the network analysis only captures one online dimension of their interactions with other groups. It does not refer to “deeper” ties, such as economic transactions, membership overlap, or mutual participation in collective action on the streets.

In the following sections, I look at the state of the art and list key contributions on the issues of ideology and framing, networks, and the mobilizational aspects of recruitment and message diffusion.

Anti-Islam, the far right and liberal values

Concepts, ideology and framing

Anti-Muslim prejudices are widespread across Europe (Wike & Grim, 2010; Savelkoul, Scheepers, Veld, & Hagendoorn, 2012), but these prejudices are not directly affected by the actual number of Muslims in any given country (Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012, p. 567). This puts the onus on the anti-Islamic initiatives and their role in diffusing anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim ideas, as well as mobilizing activists and citizens to this cause. Examples of anti-Islamic rhetoric include portraying Europe as in danger of being “overrun” by Muslims and an “Islamization” manifested through the introduction of halal products, Sharia law, Muslim ghettoes, and honour killings, all of which constitutes a totalitarian threat. Some initiatives openly talk of “Eurabia”, an alleged conspiracy between amorphous European political elites and Arab rulers whereby the European elites agree to transform the continent into a part of the Islamic world through Muslim colonization in return for access to oil (Bangstad, 2013, p. 3). In the literature, anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim opposition is mainly understood as stemming from the radical and extreme right (e.g. Strabac & Listhaug, 2008; Grabow & Hartleb, 2014). Anti-Islamic initiatives
with no organizational links to older extreme or radical right organizations and milieus and that adopt this rhetoric are also labelled as radical right, extreme right, neo-fascist, or simply Islamophobic (e.g. Zúquete, 2008; Jackson & Feldman, 2011; Archer, 2013; Lee, 2015). In short, these initiatives have consistently been defined as belonging to the far right. However, their almost exclusive focus on Islam and Muslims has led some researchers to distinguish between them and the broader far right (e.g. Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun, 2013; Goodwin, 2013).

Ideology – that is, worldview – is what distinguishes the far right from other political phenomena, not their organizational form or actions. The emphasis on ideology makes the way we define and conceptualize their ideologies vitally important. In this field, we find a profusion of concepts and definitions – all of which have implications and guide our analysis in specific directions. For instance, as far back as 1996, Cas Mudde identified over 26 different definitions of the term “extreme right”. As Caiani, Della Porta, and Wagemann state, we have to “acknowledge that the term extreme (or radical) right has multiple facets” (2012, p. 4). Many of these terms are used as slurs in politics and everyday interactions, and this can muddy the field of analysis. Before we move on, some clarification is therefore required. See Chapter 2 for an in-depth discussion.

As there is no clear-cut consensus on the different terms, I draw on some of the most widely cited definitions to compile a taxonomy of far-right ideologies. The term “far right” is not used to define an ideology in itself, but is a highly abstracted conceptual container which includes extreme and radical right ideologies. “Nativism” is broadly considered to be the common denominator for far-right ideologies, whereby the nation-state should only consist of members of the native group. Non-natives are therefore a threat by default (Mudde, 2007, p. 17). If an ideology does not have nativism at its core, it is incorrect to define it as far right. The distinguishing characteristics of radical right versus extreme right ideology lies in their approach to the political system and the solutions they profess. Whereas the extreme right is anti-democratic and willing to use non-state violence to achieve their goals, the radical right is for working within the confines of the democratic system, but is critical of the establishment (e.g. Bornschier, 2010). Within this framework, fascism is one permutation of extreme right ideology, whereas the ethno-pluralism of the nouvelle droite and others is a permutation of radical right ideology.

Key to many studies that use these terms is that while they deal with anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic antagonism from parties and activist groups, they generally raise the level of abstraction and define them as, for instance, hostile to immigrants and minorities – thereby stressing the continuity between current and older iterations of the far right. Emphasis on continuity through theoretical abstraction has been a factor in the scant attention afforded to these initiatives’ claims of defending liberal and progressive values.

The studies that specifically scrutinize opposition to and mobilization against Islam and Muslims alternate between three concepts: anti-Islam, anti-Muslim, and Islamophobia. The three have been used intermittently, but it is Islamophobia that has received the most attention and which has been most developed (Doyle &
Ahmad, 2013). Although the term “Islamophobia” has a long history (Bangstad, 2016), it resurfaced in Britain in the 1990s, when Muslim rights groups attempted to put the discrimination of Muslims on the political agenda. In 1997, a left-wing think-tank, a Commission of the Runneymede Trust, issued a report on British Muslims and Islamophobia (CBMI) (1997) entitled “Islamophobia: a challenge for us all”. The Commission defined Islamophobia as “an unfounded hostility towards Islam, and therefore fear or dislike of all or most Muslims” (ibid., p. 4). The use of the term became widespread, and entered into academic discourse, especially in the Anglo-Saxon sphere. Islamophobia as a concept was – and to a large extent still is – used “because there [was] a new reality that need[ed] naming” – but also as a tool so that in identifying it could be “acted against” (Sayyid & Vakil, 2008, p. 40).

Animosity towards Islam, Muslim culture, and immigration takes different shapes, some more moderate and some more extreme – at times seemingly inseparable from secular criticism, at times one of vitriolic racism. Research that relies on the term Islamophobia, however, is often linked with the tradition of fascism studies, describing Muslims as “the new Jews”, and paying less attention to the issue of liberal and progressive values. Siding with Sedgwick (2013, p. 209) and Busher (2015, p. 29), I set aside the concept of “Islamophobia” as a confusing term which conflates different phenomena and unnecessarily places the emphasis on irrationality.

Based on an ethnographic logic, Joel Busher (2015) uses the term “anti-Muslim” for two reasons. It reflects the activists own self-portrayal (p. 20) while also keeping present the fact that there are actual people on the receiving end of their activism.

In this book, I use the term “anti-Islamic” in combination with the term “the far right”. I specifically rely on the term anti-Islam based on an analysis of the various actors’ views of Islam as a political, totalitarian force. Their claims indicate that they are negative not only towards Islamism, but towards Islam in general. On an ideological level, their opposition to Muslim immigration and culture flows from their view of Islam as a totalitarian and destructive force. On a personal level, it may be just the opposite for many people. This book, however, is concerned with the meso and macro levels of organizational actors and ideology, not with the underlying prejudices driving individuals at the micro level. At the meso and macro levels, “anti-Islam” is therefore a more precise label than “anti-Muslim”. In line with this reasoning, I define anti-Islam in terms of framing Islam as a homogenous, totalitarian ideology which threatens Western civilization; whereas the term “Islamophobia” contains an inherent emphasis on (emotional) reaction, conceptualizing anti-Islam in terms of framing moves the focus to the agency of far-right initiatives.

Ambiguity, the anti-Islamic master frame and GAL/TAN

In essence, this entire book speaks to the ideologically oriented debate about the far right. In the previous section, I sketched out two of my contributions which draw on existing work: first, by providing a taxonomical conceptualization of far-right ideologies, and second, by offering a definition of anti-Islam in terms of framing.
Beyond this, two larger contributions are worth highlighting. The first comes from a ground-up approach in which I compare the collective action frames of anti-Islamic across organizations and countries, followed by an in-depth analysis of how these initiatives frame issues such as women’s rights. When exploring the issue of women’s rights, I identify two sets of frames that are used intermittently by all the anti-Islamic initiatives examined: protector frames with a male point of view, and equality frames with a female point of view. I characterize the simultaneous use of both as strategic frame ambiguity.

Second, in order to contextualize the anti-Islamic turn in relation to other versions of the far right, I expand on Jens Rydgren’s conceptualization of far-right ideological evolution since World War II (2005a, 2007). In line with the broader literature, Rydgren argues that the original extreme right ideology – or master frame – became unviable in the political climate after World War II and the defeat of the Nazis and fascists (2005a, p. 413). The situation for the far right only changed after a period of ideological reorientation and moderation – that is, with the invention of a second master frame by the new right (nouvelle droite) and the French Front National (FN), which stressed anti-establishment populism and xenophobic ethno-nationalism. The (partial) embrace of democracy embodied by this new master frame signalled a major shift – the establishment of radical right ideology. Furthermore, their xenophobic ethno-nationalism was packaged in the notion of “separate but equal cultures”, meaning that the superiority and inferiority of ethnicities and cultures was no longer part of the equation (2005a, p. 427). This is in stark contrast to the supposedly biological, racial hierarchies of the older extreme right. For the sake of clarity, the first master frame is hereafter defined as “fascist”, whereas the second is defined as “ethno-pluralist”.

The distinction between the two master frames – and as a consequence, between extreme and radical right ideology – rests on two dimensions: their view of the political system, and their conceptualization of “the other”. I argue that the anti-Islamic collective action framing (Chapter 5) is sufficiently distinct from both these master frames to be categorized as a third master frame for the far right, but not as a distinct ideology. Instead, in its predominant form, it is a new permutation of radical right ideology. First, unlike the ethno-pluralist radical right, anti-Islam reintroduces notions of superiority and inferiority, but this time they speak in terms of civilizations – Western, Judeo-Christian versus Islamic – and not race. Second, and more importantly, distinguishing anti-Islam as a third master frame rests on introducing a third dimension; their conception of themselves, particularly when it comes to family and gender relations. The fascist and ethno-pluralist master frames more or less overlap on this dimension, as both build on “traditional” family and gender values. In contrast, the anti-Islamic, civilizational master frame incorporates LGBT rights and women’s rights, in addition to the historically vilified Jewish minority.

On an abstract level, the anti-Islamic master frame resembles the fascist master frame in its strong emphasis on hierarchies of worth, while the anti-Islamic master frame overlaps directly with the ethno-pluralist master frame in its partial acceptance of democracy. The anti-Islamic master frame basically breaks with both, and
incorporates liberal and progressive perspectives on gender and minority rights. This means that the anti-Islamic master frame transcends the libertarian-traditional divide at the core of the so-called Green–Alternative–Libertarian (GAL) versus Traditional–Authoritarian–Nationalist (TAN) cultural cleavage, which some have argued is the most salient struggle in Western politics (Kriesi et al., 2008; van der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009; Bakker et al., 2015). This is important, as the radical right are seen as championing the TAN side in a struggle against the libertarian left (Bornschier, 2010, p. 5).

**Far-right networks, movements, and transnationalization**

Ideology and framing are interconnected with networks, but the causal relationship is difficult to untangle. Social networks function as channels for the construction of meaning, and operate as both resources and constraints (Caiani et al., 2012, p. 30). The network-oriented perspective helps us to get a grasp on the interplay between competition and cooperation among plural and complex actors (ibid., p. 210). The presence of networks between the initiatives is also one of the necessary factors to establish whether or not we are talking about a movement. A social movement can be defined as “a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity” (Diani, 1992, p. 165). Social movement research has long stressed the importance of online communication platforms as resources for the mobilization of transnational movements, as information can be disseminated virtually instantaneously (Petit, 2004), overcoming problems of leadership and decision-making (Castells, 2000), and creating transnational solidarity (Chase-Dunn & Boswell, 2002). It has been argued that online networks are important for groups that are marginalized in their own domestic politics (della Porta & Tarrow, 2005, pp. 1–21). Caiani and Wagemann (2009) claim that online networks have been particularly important for the extreme right, due to the constraints they face when taking to the streets or trying to mobilize in other offline arenas. Speaking of the radical right parties, however, Cas Mudde argues that the notion of transnational far right alliances and networks are inflated (2016).

Narrowing things down to extra-parliamentary anti-Islamic initiatives, there is a small but growing body of research that goes beyond the study of particular organizations to look at the network constellations between anti-Islamic and other far-right groups within specific countries, primarily the United States (e.g. Bail, 2012, 2014). In one of the first empirical studies of anti-Islamic initiatives in the United States, such as ACT! For America and Stop Islamization of America, Ali et al. (2011, p. 2) claim that “this core group of deeply intertwined [anti-Islamic, sic] individuals and organizations manufacture and exaggerate threats of “creeping Sharia”, Islamic domination of the West, and purported obligatory calls to violence against all non-Muslims by the Quran. Detailed network analyses and the plagiarism detection programme (Bail, 2012, 2014) show that the network of anti-Islamic
organizations in the United States has grown in influence and become agenda-setting, sometimes dominating the news cycle due to emotionally charged language.13 While focussing on Norway, Berntzen and Sandberg (2014) claim that these communities form a transnational social movement “sharing an anti-Islamic identity and rhetoric, and have overlapping and close ties” (ibid., p. 761). The transnational character of the anti-Islamic movement, with organizational and ideological roots across Europe and the United States has been further outlined by several scholars. Meleagrou-Hitchens and Brun label it as an “identifiable pan-European far-right movement” (2013, p. 1), and Goodwin describes it as “an amorphous network of think-tanks, bloggers and activists” (2013, p. 1), whereas Denes characterizes it as a “loose global fraternity” (2012, p. 295). Small empirical inroads have been made by Yang and Self (2015) and Lee (2015). Yang and Self conducted a network analysis starting from the anti-Islamic blog, Atlas Shrugs, finding that it primarily had connections to other US right-wing sites. Beginning with five anti-Islamic websites, and tracing their hyperlinks, Lee made a partial mapping of what he defines as the “Counter-Jihadist Nebula”, uncovering an online network of 46 websites (2015, p. 256). Furthermore, it has been claimed that “the ‘counter-jihad’ network seems to have dissolved, as many right-wing populists have branded themselves primarily anti-EU” (Fleischer, 2014, p. 69). Apart from these studies, has been known about the full scope and configuration of the anti-Islamic movement and subculture.

Growing, ideologically diverse, and transnational network

The network analyses (Chapter 6) fill a large gap and can be divided into three categories; size and persistence, ideology, and transnationalization. First, my analysis shows that the anti-Islamic movement and subculture is large and growing. In 2015, the network consisted of just over 3,000 groups. A third of these were explicitly anti-Islamic. By 2016 the network had expanded to over 4,000, with anti-Islamic groups accounting for a somewhat larger share. Although growing and structurally cohesive at the macro level, the movement and subculture which the online network analysis captures also indicates that there is a large degree of fluidity. One-third of the groups present in the network in 2015 were no longer present in 2016, whereas over 2,000 new groups joined. There are also major internal shifts, with close to one-third of the groups present in 2015 migrating from one community to another by 2016. This fluidity may be a function of the media platform itself. Setting up a new group on Facebook does not demand resources, although being noticed and accepted by pre-existing anti-Islamic groups does require some effort. Fluidity aside, the movement and subculture has persisted for over two decades, and can no longer be described as “embryonic” (see e.g. Goodwin, 2013; Busher, 2015).

Second, we see that “birds of a feather flock together”. The overview of the various clusters within the network in both 2015 and 2016 gives an immediate picture that closely mirrors what my own and other qualitative studies have uncovered about anti-Islamic initiatives’ rhetoric and worldview (e.g. Zúquete, 2008;
Goodwin, 2013; Berntzen & Sandberg, 2014). They have strong ties to Israeli and pro-Israeli groups, which consist of everything from Christians for Israel to the official website of the Israeli Defence Forces. By 2016, the anti-Islamic movement and the pro-Israeli community had become further integrated, with a large chunk of the former Stop Islamization community being absorbed by the pro-Israeli community. This means that the anti-Islamic far right is clearly different from the traditional anti-Semitic extreme right on this dimension. The growing presence of women’s rights, animal rights, and LGBT groups within the network also highlight its distinctive quality when compared to the ethno-pluralist far right, which emphasizes traditional gender and family values. Their presence underlines the fundamental shift that the focus on Muslims and Islam means for the far right, particularly in Western Europe and North America. If progressive actors and ideas continue to exert influence, the anti-Islamic movement – and the far right as a whole – seems to be set on a course for continued moderation.

In combination with the comparative frame analysis, the network analyses also contribute to the understanding of the ongoing transnationalization of the far right. As this book shows, the ties between Western European anti-Islamic initiatives and Eastern European radical and extreme right initiatives increased in the wake of the 2015 “refugee crisis”. Major far-right parties such as the Hungarian Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom), have also adopted anti-Islam positions (Thorleifsson, 2017), moving away from their characteristic focus on anti-ziganism (Roma), anti-Semitism (Jews) and biological racism (Wodak, 2015). Simultaneously, in Western Europe, the “refugee crisis” seems to have led to a resurgent focus on asylum seekers and refugees and a comparative decline in emphasis on Muslims and Islam (see e.g. Haanshuus & Juupsää, 2017).

In other words, the refugee crisis has facilitated an increased transnationalization and Europeanization of the far right, and has also led to some degree of breakdown between the (ideal type) ethno-pluralist and anti-Islamic master frame. These two co-occurring processes in the wake of the “refugee crisis” reveal not only the increasing impact of anti-Islam, but also that old and new far right ideologies can to a certain extent be interchangeable without causing major internal ruptures within these initiatives – be it parties or activist groups. In other words, both the eastward expansion and mixture indicate that these two master frames are sufficiently similar to co-exist without causing organizational breakdown, in much same way that extreme right ideas intermittently surface among the members of old populist radical right organizations.

Organizationally speaking, the movement’s attempts to reach out to groups championing women’s rights, LGBT groups, and animal rights, as well as Christian conservatives and pro-Israeli initiatives, are primarily best understood as ongoing efforts to build a negative coalition. This term comes from the studies of social revolution, which suggest that multiclass coalitions were critical to revolutionary success (Goldstone, 1994, 2011; Goodwin, 2001). For instance, Dix (1984) attributed the degree of success enjoyed by revolutionary movements in Latin America to their ability to construct a negative coalition which brought together different classes
united by a common rejection of the ruling regime. More specifically, a negative coalition is “a coalition displaying highly diverse preferences on most major politically salient issues but united primarily by their common rejection of a particular outcome” (Beissinger, 2013, p. 3).

**Mobilization**

Mobilization – and more specifically, recruitment – is a pivotal aspect in all spheres of politics. David Art argues that it is precisely who the radical right recruit that is crucial when it comes to determining whether or not a given radical right party succeeds or fails (2011, p. 33). What characterizes those recruited by far-right initiatives? In his analysis, which builds on interviews and ethnographic fieldwork, Art distinguishes between three kinds of activists on the basis of their views and motivations: moderates, extremists and opportunists (ibid., pp. 31–33). Extremists reject democracy and espouse racist and anti-Semitic ideas, but moderates embrace democracy and distance themselves from explicitly racist views. Art identifies opportunists as those without a radical right legacy or ideological motivation. Narrowing this down to the anti-Islamic far right, work by Goodwin, Cutts, and Janta-Lipinski (2016) on who sympathized and joined the EDL showed that supporters hold more classic racial prejudice than the population as a whole (ibid., p. 4). Extrapolating from this, we would therefore expect that anti-Islamic initiatives should draw a large amount of what Art defines as extremists.

Why do people join? The social movement literature presents three variables for recruitment: ideological compatibility, or frame alignment (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986), personal networks (McAdam, 1988; Goodwin & Jasper, 2014), and external shocks (Gould, 2009). First, an underlying assumption is that participation in a movement or group is dependent on the congruence between the goals and ideology of the organization and the individual activist and members (Snow et al., 1986, p. 464). However, with some exceptions (e.g. Beissinger, 2013; Ketelaars, Walgrave, & Wouters, 2014), this has not been tested. In contrast, personal networks and external shocks have now been empirically identified as important in a number of studies. In his ethnographic study of the EDL, Joel Busher (2015) also identified personal networks (ibid., pp. 42–43) and external shocks (in this case, personal trauma) as two of the main factors driving activist recruitment. Only a minority were deeply involved in EDL ideology before joining (the ideologically compatible). Nonetheless, one of the reasons for their importance is because of the meaning they transmit. In other words, they were channels which facilitated ideological compatibility. According to Busher, the same holds for external shocks (critical events). When these aligned with the EDL position, they made the person susceptible to the rest of their views.

As already mentioned, the literature on the far right also indicates that strategic thinking and planning plays a role for far-right initiatives and those people who adopt anti-Islamic and civilizational claims. They are thought to do this to fend off allegations of racism and the potential normative and political sanctions that it
Far right and liberal?

entails. They are therefore opportunists, but of a different variety than those cited in Art’s research.

**Different entry pathways, bound by belonging**

Building on these perspectives, I suggest two different, causal pathways for adopting the anti-Islamic, civilizational master frame, and thereby potentially joining the transnational movement (Chapter 8). There is one pathway for people with a far right, nativist outlook, and another for those with a liberal and progressive outlook. The first pathway is strategic, escaping normative sanctions against xenophobic nativism. I call this the strategic calculation (SC) pathway. The second pathway is when jihadist terror attacks and other critical events trigger a fear-based response (moral shock), whereby they come to adopt the civilizational claims about Islam being a totalitarian, existential threat. I call this the emotional response (ER) pathway.

Regardless of their entry pathway, the views activists express is probably far more important than the views they hold for the trajectory of a single initiative and the broader movement. In this sense, the degree of ideological compatibility and frame alignment becomes the important factor once a person has joined. This book sheds light on what is expressed by those who have become (online) activists (Chapter 7). Orienting myself towards Art (2011), I therefore make a bipartite distinction between moderate and extreme activists in studying the views expressed by those who have become activists. As with previous studies on alignment, my findings indicate a strong congruence on the diagnostic framing of Islam and Muslims as the penultimate threat to Western civilization. Furthermore, a majority seem to embrace the expansive in-group which includes women, LGBT, Jews, and others deemed to be threatened by Islam. Nonetheless, expressions of racist, misogynistic, anti-Semitic, and anti-democratic ideas are also present. This points to a subset of extreme activists who are not (strategically) motivated to disguise their views.

This book also connects with the growing literature on the role of emotions in understanding continued mobilization and message diffusion. It studies which emotions drive online mobilization within anti-Islamic groups active on Facebook and their diffusion on the same platform. According to Klandermans, van der Toorn and van Stekelenburg (2008), the mobilizing role of emotions had previously been neglected in social movement literature. This also holds for those who employ framing theory (e.g. Benford, 1997), even though frames are tailored to elicit emotional responses and, for instance, hot cognition has been recognized as pivotal for mobilizing potential members (Zajonc, 1980; Gamson, 1992). I find that joy and trust are strongly associated with mobilization. The more joy or trust-related words a post contains, the more comments it gets. Increases in joy- and trust-associated words also correlate with an increase in the number of times a post is shared by members and followers, either with friends, on their own Facebook wall, or in other groups they participate in. The pattern is not as clear for anger-associated words, and fear seems to have no effect at all. In contrast, fact-heavy statements
seem to drive down responses and shares beyond the specific group. When looking at the content of these posts, mobilizing messages focus on the in-group and the building of a common identity. The core theme is “belonging”.

**Chapter outline**

The book is divided into eight chapters. After this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 provides an overview of the main research traditions and concepts, and how they inform our analysis of anti-Islamic mobilization. The chapter has three main sections. After providing a brief overview of the research field, the first section draws on key literature to construct a taxonomical ladder of far-right ideology. In it, the far right is used as an umbrella term for the extreme and radical right, respectively, whereas fascism is understood as one permutation of the extreme right and ethnopluralism is understood as one permutation of the radical right. The second section deals with the concepts of Islamophobia, anti-Islam, and anti-Muslim, and how far-right antagonism towards Islam and the inclusion of liberal and progressive positions have been understood. The third section presents the dominant perspectives and claims about far right and anti-Islamic networks and mobilization.

Chapter 3 provides an overview of the methodological tools and data used. It includes qualitative content analysis of statements made by leaders and representatives of anti-Islamic initiatives in Norway, Britain, and Germany, tools used to harvest data from Facebook, network analysis, and the dictionary-based, automated sentiment analysis for large amounts of text.

Chapter 4 provides a chronological overview of the anti-Islamic expansion which emanates from the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, and Denmark, as well as a comparative analysis of the background of 30 figureheads (leaders, ideologues, and representatives) from these countries. First, it argues that the anti-Islamic movement has undergone four waves of expansion, precipitated by large-scale critical events and smaller moral shocks. Second, the comparative analysis shows that many of the figureheads have both a left-wing and a right-wing background, with only a few having any previous affiliation with the far right. Just as extreme right legacies can help continue old extreme right ideas, legacies from outside the far right may have contributed to the inclusion of progressive and liberal ideals among the anti-Islamic initiatives.

Chapter 5 consists of three main sections. The first is an analysis of the collective action framing of the leaders and representatives of anti-Islamic initiatives in Norway, Britain, and Germany. Similarities and differences in their diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framework are identified. The main finding is that their positions are broadly aligned across country cases and organizational forms – parties, activist groups, or online groups. The understanding of Islam as an existential threat is unison, and so is the rejection of the “establishment”. Furthermore, they are aligned in their understanding of what and who is threatened (democracy, the Christian cultural heritage, gender equality, and LGBT rights), as well as in their inclusion of pro-democratic solutions. In the second section, I delve down to
look at how they frame women’s rights. I identify two sets of frames that are used intermittently by all the anti-Islamic initiatives in question: protector frames that operate with a possessive, male point of view; and equality frames operating with a female point of view. I characterize the simultaneous use of both as strategic frame ambiguity. In the third section, I synthesize and discuss these findings in the light of Rydgren’s work on the evolution of far-right master frames and the literature on the cultural cleavage between initiatives which represent the Green–Alternative–Libertarian (GAL) versus the Traditional–Authoritarian–Nationalist (TAN) dimensions. Extending Rydgren’s argument, I claim that anti-Islam is best understood as a third, distinct master frame. The anti-Islamic, civilizational master frame transcends the fundamental GAL/TAN divide by incorporating the libertarian dimension.

Finally, I employ grid/group analysis first developed by Mary Douglas (1982) to further elaborate on the distinctions between the three versions of the far right. Arising from this, I argue that the anti-Islamic far right is characterized by a form of liberal sectarianism. This resonates with Herbert Kitschelt’s (2012) argument that some radical right parties have partially decoupled from authoritarianism in their embrace of some liberal positions. For the anti-Islamic movement, however, the process is reverse. Their ideological journey is one where they have embraced some authoritarian positions from an ostensibly liberal starting point. In both cases, the end result is the same: the anti-Islamic far right straddle the gap between liberal and authoritarian values at the core of the GAL/TAN cleavage.

Chapter 6 takes the anti-Islamic organizations in Norway, Britain, and Germany, and offshoots around the world present on Facebook, as a starting point for a network analysis that ends up uncovering a transnational constellation of approximately 3,600 and 4,600 groups in March 2015 and March 2016, respectively. Beyond uncovering the fundamentally transnational nature of the anti-Islamic movement and subculture, the major finding is that extreme right groups were virtually non-existent in the network in 2015, whereas anti-Islamic initiatives do reach out to groups that label themselves as favoring women’s rights, LGBT rights, and animal rights, as well as Jewish and pro–Israeli groups. This is in line with the framing activity of the organizations, as identified in Chapter 5. However, by 2016, the share of extreme right initiatives had risen with the introduction of more groups from Eastern Europe. In general, the broad ideological span between the initiatives which anti-Islamic groups attempt to create ties with can be defined as attempts at building negative coalitions – united primarily by what they are against.

Chapter 7 looks at the arguments and sentiments expressed by the members and followers of 300 anti-Islamic groups on Facebook, using a selection based on the preceding network analysis. In other words: who have they mobilized? When compared to the framing activity of the organizations in Chapter 5, we can identify a strong alignment on the prognostic framing (what and who is the problem), less so on the solutions. Furthermore, the inclusion of the “progressive” in-group (LGBT, women and people of different religious and from different ethnic backgrounds with the exception of Muslims) is dominant. Nonetheless, the traditional extreme right views of black people, Jews and LGBT and arguments in favour of
violent solutions are also present. A second aim is to identify the emotions and messages which drive internal online mobilization in the form of comments and messages disseminated beyond the specific groups in the form of shares. Here I used a dictionary-based sentiment analysis, which ranks emotions connected to specific words. Using multilevel regression analysis, the major findings are that positive emotions of joy and trust, often connected to messages that affirm the in-group identity, drive mobilization. Anger plays a secondary role.

Chapter 8 provides syntheses of the findings and develops the core arguments relating to the two overarching research questions. I argue that the various initiatives that make up the anti-Islamic expansion of the far right comprise a cohesive transnational movement embedded in a larger subculture. This movement and subculture has a consistent worldview and prominent ideologues. Today, the anti-Islamic movement and subculture is no longer an embryonic phenomenon. The anti-Islamic civilizational master frame, or worldview, draws on both liberal and traditional, authoritarian values. This civilizational master frame (partly) structures their organizational online networks and dominates among their online members. I therefore argue that the anti-Islamic movement and subculture is characterized by a semi-liberal equilibrium. This demonstrates that it matters who the enemy is, but not just in the way that earlier research indicates. I suggest two mutually exclusive pathways into adopting the worldviews espoused in the anti-Islamic movement and subculture. In the first, opposition to Islam precedes an inclusion of some progressive and liberal positions, driven by a strategic attempt to escape social and political sanctions. In the other pathway, progressive and liberal positions precedes an understanding of Islam as a totalitarian ideology and an existential threat, driven by an emotional response to jihadi terror attacks and other critical events. The equilibrium is threatened by the eastward expansion of the network; the sizeable minority position, which includes racist and anti-democratic positions, and the inherent tension in their worldview, which portrays Islam as an apocalyptic threat, but which should be met by adhering to democratic procedures. The semi-liberal and peaceful equilibrium is therefore fragile.

Notes

1 The Muhammad cartoon crisis denotes the backlash by Muslims in Western Europe and Muslim majority countries after the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published 12 editorial cartoons on 30 September 2005, most of which depicted Muhammad.

2 Art (2011) and Busher (2015) are two prominent and notable exceptions. The existing studies of “non-parties” are predominantly case studies of single activist groups. They show that anti-Islamic initiatives like the English Defence League (EDL) (e.g. Allen, 2011; Jackson & Feldman, 2011; Kassimeris & Jackson, 2015; Busher, 2015) and PEGIDA (Daphi et al., 2015; Dostal, 2015; Berntzen & Weisskircher, 2016) are fixtures of the broader political landscape.

Several authors point out that far right initiatives outside of party politics and the networks they form deserves more attention (e.g. Mudde, 2007, p. 5; Rydgren, 2007, p. 257; Macklin, 2013, p. 177).
For instance, following the attack on the gay club in Orlando, where an IS sympathizer killed 50 people, the far-right news site Breitbart commentator Milo Yiannopoulos wrote that “America has to make a choice. Does it want gay rights, women’s emancipation, and tolerance for people of all nonviolent faiths—or does it want Islam?” (12 June 2016). Available at: www.breitbart.com/milo/2016/06/12/left-chose-islam-gays-now-100-people-killed-maimed-orlando/?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=social (accessed 8 November 2016).

The concept of homonalism refers to the use of gay rights for racist and islamophobic ends (Zanghellini, 2012, p. 357).

Scepticism of what far-right initiatives say and write precedes the explicit focus on Islam and claims of defending liberal values and the rights of women and minorities. Mudde argues that one explanation for this assumption of is that most authors define them as “the other” (2000, p. 21). The academic othering of those they study mimics the anti-Islamic narrative about Muslims engaging in *taqiyya*; that is, deception and lying about their true goals and beliefs. For as Arne Næss says, “An important ingredient in descriptions of outgroups is the hypothesis that the outgroup says one thing, but means another” (1980, p. 136).

The pre-existing radical right in Western Europe and the transnational anti-Islamic movement that emerged after 9/11 had opposite ideological starting points, but the outcome is broadly similar: an anti-Islamic, civilizational identity that draws on many liberal values. Since 2001, then, we have witnessed a convergence between radical right actors using liberal rhetoric to justify their intolerance and authoritarianism, and liberal actors moved in an authoritarian direction by the desire to preserve tolerance against a perceived intolerant force.

Karl Popper described this as the paradox of tolerance.

Speaking of the then exceptional case of the Dutch List Pim Fortuyn, Tjitske Akkerman defined this as a liberalism turned inward, driven by fear (2005, p. 346).

In his book “Whiteshift” (2018), Eric Kaufmann argues that we are witnessing a politicization of the white majority’s ethnic identity. In contrast, my study points to a politicization of civic identity vis-à-vis Muslims and Islam, and not whiteness. The ethnic makeup of the majority becomes an incidental and secondary factor in this picture.

This is in contrast to Art’s relative definition of the far right as “an umbrella term for any political party, voluntary association, or extra-parliamentary movement that differentiates itself from the mainstream right” (2011, p. 10). In Art’s definition, the far right is a relative phenomenon precisely because it is dependent on what ideas the mainstream right chooses to adopt.

See Chapter 2 for a more in-depth discussion and comparison of these terms.

Personal correspondence with Joel Busher.

Bail uses the label “anti-Muslim”.

For a thorough overview, see Jens Rydgren’s article “The Sociology of the Radical Right” (2007).

Social movement scholarship is dominated by sociology, but includes the work of social psychologists, historians, political scientists, and social anthropologists (van Troost, van Stekelenburg, & Klandermans, 2013).

As of June 2017, going by Google Scholar, Roger Griffin’s article “The Nature of Fascism” (1993) was cited 910 times, Cas Mudde’s “Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe” (2007) 1,800 times, and Jens Rydgren’s “Is Extreme Right-wing Populism Contagious? Explaining the Emergence of a New Party Family” (2005a) 408 times.

This understanding of master frames shares some similarities with what some call “thin-centered” ideology.

Others, such as Elisabeth Carter (2005) use the term “right-wing extremism” as the overarching conceptual container in which she combines both spatial and absolute reasoning. Carter identifies five subsets of extreme right parties from the 1980s onwards: neo-Nazi, neo-fascist, authoritarian xenophobic, neo-liberal xenophobic, and neo-liberal populist.
Although Griffin’s definition allows us to delimit “fascism” from other forms of far-right ideology, many of those who use the term include the very political actors which Griffin himself excludes. These works are perhaps the most easily identifiable as the lumpers committing the sin of conceptual stretching.

The anti-democratic position is a necessary factor to designate a political initiative under the rubric of right-wing extremism, but the biological racism which defines fascist nativism (at least of the Nazi variety) can be exchanged with ethno-pluralist or other forms of nativism.

Mudde uses the term “Islamophobia”. See conceptual discussion of this term ahead.

Dinet and Ibrahim (1918).

See, for example, Halliday (1999, p. 899), and Zúquete (2008, p. 324). This is an issue common to all terminology used to describe the far right, however, and outside the control of academia.

Instead of making theoretical assumptions about irrationality and fear as constitutive elements, concepts need to be built (and tested) from the ground up.

While Rydgren includes negative and positive feelings and evaluations in his definition of prejudice, positive evaluations and feelings are a priori excluded from anti-Muslim prejudices: “A prejudiced stereotype can be defined as an attitude or set of attitudes held toward a group or members of a group, encompassing over-simplified beliefs and a set of negative or positive feelings and evaluations” (2004b, p. 129).

Although Fleischer uses the word “prejudice”, which commonly refers to individual-level attitudes, his analysis and discussion actually revolves around ideology.

Clearly, the conceptualization and delimitation of what a social movement is and what it is not has a big impact for our understanding of the anti-Islamic far right. This is highlighted by the fact that several studies which look at initiatives such as the EDL and PEGIDA define them as movements unto themselves, and not social movement organizations which are part of a wider movement.

I use the word initiative(s) as a generic term referring to the broad panoply of collective actors that engage in anti-Islamic activism, ranging from street-based activist groups, think-tanks, political parties, websites, and online communities.

I conducted semi-structured interviews with the leader of the activist group Stop Islamization of Norway (SIAN), the alternative news site Document.no and spokesperson for the self-described think-tank Human Rights Service (HRS). The interviewees were selected and approached due to the central position their respective organizations hold within the anti-Islamic scene in Norway. The interviews were carried out in October 2010.

List of the 27 initial anti-Islamic Facebook pages used as seeds for the two-step network analyses:


See Zúquete (2008) and Betz and Meret (2009) for an analysis of the anti-Islamic reorientation of several populist radical right parties.

Briefly called Aksjonsskomiteen mot bonnerop.

In the wake of these attacks, President George W. Bush launched what he called a Global War on Terror, drawing in allies from across the globe. After having approached the

4 Or anti-jihadist, the terms are used interchangeably.

5 IsraelNN.com. (2004, May 11). “At Israel’s Right”. Article is no longer accessible online, screen dump provided by Daniel Munksgaard through personal correspondence.

6 Geller was a frequent poster on LGF. The LGF forum and its host later became one of the most ardent critics of the counter-jihadi scene.


8 http://archive.frontpagemag.com/Printable.aspx?ArtId=12077fa

9 Later named Act! For America Education

10 In an interview with the Dutch newspaper Volkskrant, Fortuyn was asked “why he hated Islam”, to which he replied “I don’t hate Islam. I consider it a backward culture. I have travelled a lot and wherever Islam rules, it’s just terrible. All the hypocrisy. It’s a bit like those old reformed Protestants. The Reformed lie all the time. And why is that? Because they have standards and values that are so high that you can’t humanly maintain them. You also see that in that Muslim culture. Then look at the Netherlands. In what country could an electoral leader of such a large movement as mine be openly homosexual? How wonderful that that’s possible. That’s something that one can be proud of. And I’d like to keep it that way, thank you very much”. (Volkskrant, 9 February 2002).

11 In an interview with The Guardian in 2008, Wilders was asked if his “provocative rhetoric fermented hatred”, to which he replied “I don’t create hate. I want to be honest. I don’t hate people. I don’t hate Muslims. I hate their book and their ideology”. Source: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/17/netherlands.islam (accessed 2 September 2014).

12 The raison d’etre given for publishing them was that the Danish author Kåre Bluitgen had trouble finding an illustrator willing to draw Mohammed in his children’s book (Kapelrud, 2008).

13 The free speech rally in London was attended by around 300 protesters, who stated they were not against Muslims and that they feared infiltration from the fascist British National Party. Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/london/4844634.stm (accessed 2 September 2014).

14 Quote from the text “A Brief History of the Transatlantic Counterjihad by the Counterjihad Collective”, available online: http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.co.uk (accessed February 2013). The group formalized in 2007, calling itself the Center for Vigilant Freedom (CVF). They later merged with other activists, rebranded as the International Civil Liberties Alliance, taking their name from a quote by Thomas Jefferson saying that “the price of liberty is eternal vigilance”. www.libertiesalliance.org/about-2/ Today, they continue as a Swiss-based NGO called the Center for Vigilant Freedom.

15 Gravers Pedersen first tried to enter politics with Stop Islamization of Denmark, which received a total of 11,172 votes in the municipal elections in Aalborg, 2005.

16 www.actforamerica.org/policy


18 These initiatives share each other’s stories, participate in joint celebrations, and have established formal collaboration. For instance, HRS and Hege Storhaug participated in the ten-year anniversary celebration of Trykkefrihedsselskabet in Denmark alongside Hans Rustad from Document.no and Raaschou from Snaphanen.dk. TFS and Document.no have also provided funding to Snaphanen. For a short time in 2016, Uriasposten
was shut down and Kim Møller headed up Document.dk in collaboration with Hans Rustad and Document.no. www.trykkefrihed.dk/tr trykkefrihedsselskabet-pa-mosbjergfolkefest.htm

20 By 2017, PI was ranked as the 389th most visited website in Germany www.alexa.com/siteinfo/pi-news.net (accessed 13 June 2017).
21 Headed by Willi Schwend.
22 Lars Hedegaard has become a well-known figure internationally after a failed attempt on his life by a jihadist in 2013 (the perpetrator later joined ISIS).
23 Quote from SIAN's 'about us' webpage section (in Norwegian), http://sian.no/om-sian (accessed 12 March 2014). Norwegian group later split when a moderate faction split off following a heated general assembly meeting early 2014, forming a group called Core Values (Verdier i Sentrum, ViS).
25 “Policing EDL demo in Bristol cost force £495,000”, BBC News, 10 August 2012.
26 “A Brief History of the Transatlantic Counterjihad”, available online: http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.co.uk (accessed February 2013).
31 In January 2013, the European Freedom Initiative listed affiliated defence leagues in Britain, the United States, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Sweden, Germany, Australia, Serbia, Greece, Indonesia, Poland, the Philippines, Belgium, Czech Republic, Romania, and Luxemburg. Website no longer available.
32 Wilders was on trial for hate speech and inciting racism: www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/08/far-right-geert-wilders-protest (accessed 4 February 2015).
34 www.nrk.no/norge/takket-de-10-frammotte-1.7587515
38 This was likely because he was refused entry to the United States to attend a protest against building a mosque on the “Ground Zero” site two years before.
41 “KURDEN DEMO DRESDEN”, YouTube:www.youtube.com/watch?v=d6aFr9GVE2c (accessed 1 December 2016). In the video description, Bachmann wrote “They are demanding weapons for the PKK. This is a terrorist organization, which is banned in Germany, and they demand weapons on our streets! Where’s the police?” (author’s translation).
PEGIDAs symbol is a man throwing flags carrying the emblems of the Kurdish PKK, Nazi Germany, Anti-Fascist Action (AFA), and ISIS into a trash bin. www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/pegida-leader-lutz-bachmann-steps-down-over-hitler-photograph-9993425.html (accessed 1 December 2016).


In Norway, PEGIDA held 19 marches across the country between January and June 2015. The largest drew 200 participants, with an average of 40 participants across the marches (Berntzen & Weiskircher, 2016).


On organizational or ideological continuity, see also Ignazi (1992, 2003), Rydgren (2007), and Carter (2005).

Whose true name is Stephen Christopher Yaxley-Lennon.


The section on the anti-Islamic collective action framing builds and expands on parts of the article “The Collective Nature of Lone Wolf Terrorism: Anders Behring Breivik and the Anti-Islamic Social Movement” (2014), co-authored by Sveinung Sandberg. This is done with the explicit consent of Dr. Sandberg.

Previously covered in Chapter 2.


It is not uncommon that the leaders and spokespersons list many of these issues at once, as exemplified by a statement by Tatjana Festerling (PEGIDA) at a rally in Warsaw: “We


7 Some of the most prominent historical events include the conquest and establishment of Al-Andalus in Spain beginning in 711, the conquest of Byzantium by the Ottomans in the 12th century, and the attack on Wien in 1683.


9 HRS stands out in this regard as the sole Norwegian initiative which doesn’t explicitly single out the Labor Party.


11 Excerpt from Tatjana Festerling’s speech made in Warsaw (6 February 2016).


13 HRS is the initiative most clearly advocating an emphasis on teaching about democracy in schools, which they have argued for in several articles, as well as in the interview conducted by Berntzen (4 October 2010).


15 In Norway, the fringe group SIAN is the one most fervently arguing for intervening in Muslim communities in such a manner. Intervention in Muslims communities was generally something which the leader of SIAN advocated consistently in the interview (1 October 2010).

16 When talking about their internal opponents, they tend to identify them with the “radicals of ’68”. Radicals of ’68 refers to the broad panoply of protest movements and cultural values pushed by the younger generations during the late 1960’s, all of which were directed at and challenging the pre-existing cultural norms and institutions of Western societies in that era.

17 As such, HRS has published several reports on the rate of immigration and population growth based on datasets from the Norwegian Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Norway (SSB).

18 This excerpt is taken from the interview with the editor of the prominent webpage Document.no (29 September 2010).


20 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2270642.stm


22 Whether or not the elite is portrayed as willfully enabling Muslim men is a key distinction between “moderate” and “radical” anti-Islamic actors. The notion that the elite is willfully enabling Muslim men/Muslim patriarchy to the detriment of women is an extension of the Eurabia theory.

23 For instance, the leader of PEGIDA Norway stated that gender mutilation and forced marriage was because of Muslim immigration and the influence of Islam: www.dagbladet.no/2015/01/12/nyheter/innenriks/samfunn/politikk/pegida/37136855/
Tahrir-like scene refers to the sexual molestation of women during the demonstrations taking place on Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, during the Egyptian revolution of 2011.

In my interview with the HRS spokeswoman, she told me that they realized that Christianity was a positive force for society when they saw how it contrasted with Islam on the issue of women’s rights.


Rydgren does mention that the ethno-pluralist doctrine is embedded in “a general sociocultural authoritarianism, stressing themes like law and order and family values” (2005a, p. 433, n. 1).

McGann and Kitschelt introduced economic issues as a third dimension in addition to grid-group, which he labeled greed. The greed dimension is equivalent to the economic left-right, or socialist-capitalist dimension (e.g. McGann & Kitschelt, 1995, p. 15). While certainly relevant to model and explain the dimensions on which political parties (have to) compete, I contend that this third dimension provides little descriptive or explanatory power to the anti-Islamic turn itself.

1 Following Diani’s definition, a movement is understood as “networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups, or associations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict on the basis of a shared collective identity” (Diani & Bison, 2004, p. 282), whereas a subculture is one in which actors experience a sense of commonality that cuts across the boundaries of specific groups, but there is no systematic exchange between organizations (ibid., p. 285).

2 The analysis does not include data on more traditional arenas of activism or collaboration. A group or constellation of groups within the network that is sizeable online may only have a small institutional footprint or presence on the streets.

3 The groups come from the three last waves of anti-Islamic activist groups, which are cited in Chapter 4.

4 The survey approach certainly is able to get at the broader support in the population, as well as the electoral support for these platforms, but completely neglects the reality of these groups’ present existence. Let us not forget that it does not take a large amount of people to become engaged for this phenomenon to have staying power, certainly less than is within the margins of statistical error (normally calculated as in the 3% range). Similarly, a qualitative approach, while being able to provide much insight into specific phenomenae, suffers from a severe blind spot in not being able to rigorously trace networks and movements because of their innately high demand on resources.

5 See Tables I and II in Appendix I for a full list of communities ranked by the number of groups.

6 http://archive.adl.org/international/polanddemocracyandextremism.pdf

7 Sweden received over 160,000 asylum applicants in 2015, second only to Germany in the entire EU. See Table 1 in the article “Overwhelmed by Refugee Flows, Scandinavia Temps its Warm Welcome” by the Migration Policy Institute (2016): https://


10 In an interview with Vox, Cas Mudde is quoted saying that “2015 unleashed an orgy of Islamophobia”: www.vox.com/2016/5/31/11722994/european-far-right-cas-mudde (accessed 21 November 2016).


1 Awareness of this turn has been picked up by major newspapers and media outlets for some time. For instance, as noted an article on LGBT and racism in The Guardian: “The far-right movements on the march across the western world are consciously trying to co-opt the LGBT rights campaign for their own agenda. Muslims are portrayed as an existential threat to gay people, particularly after Orlando” (The Guardian, 24 November 2016, accessed 25 November 2016). Available from: www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/24/no-asians-no-blacks-gay-people-racism?CMP=fb_gu

2 For instance, when focusing on women vis-à-vis Muslims, they vacillate between traditional, male-centric “protector frames” and feminist “equality frames”.

3 Members and followers are not self-reported, but official Facebook statistics. They can inflate the numbers by creating “fake” Facebook profiles and having them join, but that means setting up new email accounts and using a phone number registered in their name.

4 Frame alignment is defined as “linkage of individual and SMO interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary” (Snow, Rochford, Worden & Benford, p. 464).

5 For instance, in a study on the use of emotional stimuli in presidential speeches Villalobos and Sirin (2017) found that anger leads to higher support for military interventions in civil conflict.

6 Joy and happiness are associated with collective activities such as singing and dancing during protests – what Durkheim described as “collective effervescence” (Jasper, 1998).

7 More specifically, hatred of outsiders (Scheff, 1994) and love of the group have been claimed to maintain activist enthusiasm (Berezin, 2001).

8 www.blog.google/products/translate/found-translation-more-accurate-fluent-sentences-google-translate/ (accessed 4 December 2016).

9 Respondents were asked whether specific terms were strongly associated, moderately associated, weakly associated, or not associated with the target emotion.

10 The second, and parallel genesis point of import was the Dutch party LPF. See Chapter 4 for an overview of the anti-Islamic expansion, which is largely synonymous with the establishment of an anti-Islamic movement and subculture.

11 The share of various nationalities is naturally skewed by the network analysis starting with Western groups such as the EDL, PEGIDA, and SIOE. The network analysis was large enough to capture a majority of anti-Islamic groups that are present on Facebook, but misses isolated outliers.

12 It also made its way into the “manifesto” of the terrorist Anders Behring Breivik in his justification for seeing Islam as a totalitarian force that must be destroyed before it obliterates the West. For analysis of Breivik’s manifesto, see Berntzen and Sandberg (2014).


14 http://americaninfidel.com/faq (accessed 4 October 2016)
15 www.facebook.com/niedlaislamicjeuropy/about/?entry_point=page_nav_about_item (accessed 7 October 2016).
18 Of the words in my analysis, white is also the one most strongly associated with trust.
21 Taken as a whole, this specific post could be interpreted as containing both anger and joy.
1 By strategic, I do not attempt to indicate deception.
2 For instance, on its website the IFPS linked to a website for donating to Dutch PVV party leader Geert Wilders’ trial defense fund: www.geertwilders.nl
3 As nativism explicitly refers the idea that the nation-state should only consist of members from the native group.
4 Related work by Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, and Passy (2005) indicate that political and cultural opportunity structures combined can account for much of the differences in extreme right framing between Western European countries.
5 Junctures are generally traced to economic crises, military conflicts, and other large-scale disasters (Hall, 1996).
6 To this day, the far-right initiative Soral considers French republicanism and secularism their primary target and solidarize with immigrant communities (Froio, 2018).
7 See e.g. Mark Beissinger’s (2007) work on revolutions in the former Soviet Union. He introduces the concept of modularity to explain the interdependent spread of revolutions from one country to another.
8 It is important to stress that the motivation and causes for Breivik’s radicalization and acts of political violence are many, and that it was the “anti-Islamic story” that he wanted to tell at the time. His actions and self-portrayal also share similarities with school shooters (Sandberg, Oksanen, Berntzen, & Kiilakasko, 2014).
1 “If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them” (Popper, 2012, p. 226)


Fleischer, R. (2014). Two fascisms in contemporary Europe? Understanding the ideological split of the radical right. In M. Deland, M. Minkenberg, & C. Mays (Eds.), *In the tracks of Breivik: Far right networks in Northern and Eastern Europe* (pp. 53–70, 54). Vienna and Münster: LIT.


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