WAR AND THE MARXISTS
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Socialist Theory and Practice in Capitalist Wars

Volume 1

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A Personal Preface

This study concerns the attitudes of socialists towards war in general, and towards the major wars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Ever since the inception of modern socialism, well over a hundred years ago, its adherents have been debating issues relating to war: how to prevent it, how to respond to it, and what opportunities there were for advancing the socialist cause in wars between capitalist powers. These questions have been a major concern of mine for nearly half a century.

On the eve of the Second World War, I was a radical socialist and convinced Marxist. World war seemed inevitable; to people of my persuasion the question of how to react was not just an academic problem of Marxist theory: it had immediate practical and personal significance. As revolutionary socialists, should we be neutral in a war between 'imperialist' powers, or should we support the less reactionary side, for example, the Western democracies in conflict with fascist Italy and nazi Germany? If so, what form should our support take? The probable involvement of the Soviet Union, which most of us considered a socialist country, created additional problems of principle.

At the time I was a political exile from Hitler's Germany, a militant of the Trotskyist International Communist League (Bolshevik-Leninist), which became the Fourth International in 1938. For several months in 1937 I belonged to the Paris executive of the German section (International Communists of Germany – IKD), but when war broke out I was in London. I shared Trotsky's view that the conflict was an imperialist venture on all sides, so revolutionary socialists and workers of all belligerent countries should refuse to support it.

In London I took part in the discussions of a group of fifteen or twenty left-wing socialists, most of them committed Trotskyists or Trotskyist sympathizers; they were all refugees from Germany or other continental countries. We conducted our debates in German and called ourselves Marxistische Arbeitsgemeinschaft (Marxist Working
Group). In January 1940, as a contribution to our discussions, I wrote (in German) a paper entitled ‘Theses on the War and the Situation in the Labour Movement’. Broadly reflecting the views prevalent among socialists of the extreme Left, it defined the war as imperialist, like the First World War, and asserted that neither camp deserved socialist support, but there was no unanimity on the character of the war or whether we should defend the country that had given us sanctuary. Some comrades favoured support for the anti-nazi alliance, arguing that a German victory would be an immeasurable disaster for our cause: it would destroy for decades the rights and liberties workers still enjoyed in the countries of bourgeois democracy, let alone any prospect of socialist revolution.

I stuck to the anti-war line during the initial, ‘phoney’ phase of the war, but was converted to the pro-Allied, ‘defencist’ position (in Marxist parlance) in the summer of 1940, after the Germans had vanquished and occupied several democratic capitalist countries in Scandinavia and Western Europe. Having come to the conclusion that the defeat of Hitler and his intention to invade Britain must be the over-riding objectives for a socialist, I volunteered for the British army, and served from August 1940 to November 1945.

In 1942 my unit was stationed in Scotland, first near and later in Edinburgh, and I made contact with the Workers International League (WIL), the strongest Trotskyist group in Britain, and with left-wing, near-Trotskyist members of the Independent Labour Party (ILP). Discussions with WIL and ILP militants led me to write another paper in April 1943, ‘The Present War and the Policy of Revolutionary Internationalism’. I reasoned that although not only the Axis powers but Britain and the US were waging an imperialist war, the Leninist concept of ‘revolutionary defeatism’ must be rejected for a capitalist democracy at war with a fascist power. Three and a half years of war had shown that defeat by the nazi armies engendered not revolution but counter-revolution in the defeated countries — the imposition of fascist or near-fascist régimes. Read side-by-side with the ‘Theses’ of January 1940, this paper illustrates the change in thinking of many left-wing socialists during that period. (Edited versions of both papers will be included as Appendices I and II in the second volume, War and Twentieth-Century Socialists, which covers the inter-war period and the Second World War.)

The Edinburgh Trotskyists took my arguments seriously but were not wholly convinced. A leading member intended to submit my paper
as a discussion document to the scheduled WIL conference in London, but before then my services were required in another theatre of war. I was posted away from Scotland and lost touch with the Edinburgh Trotskyists. I never did find out if my paper had figured at the London conference: the group's journal, *Workers' International News*, which reported on the proceedings and contained the main speeches, did not go into the details of the discussion.

At that stage, socialists' attitudes towards the war had again become a subject of purely theoretical debate. In 1940, after the fall of France, the support of the overwhelming majority of Britain's socialist labour movement was essential in the national crisis. That support was still there in 1943, when the outcome of the war was no longer in doubt, especially after the Italian surrender. Victory for the Anglo-Soviet-US alliance, and the downfall of nazism, seemed assured, whatever socialists in Britain or elsewhere in the West might say or do. Yet my interest in the potential impact of socialist views and policies about war persisted. It grew stronger after 1945 when new conflicts — the Chinese Civil War, the wars in Korea and Vietnam, and various Middle Eastern conflicts — provoked comments and actions from socialists.

This led me to study more intensively the historical aspects of the problem: the words and deeds of socialists from the middle of the nineteenth century, when Marx and Engels first commented on contemporary conflicts. *War and the Marxists* is the product of these investigations. It is intended as a straightforward factual account of what leading socialists said and did when faced with the threat or reality of war. It is not a theoretical treatise and, while mentioning certain obvious inconsistencies and contradictions, it does not try to judge the merits of the concepts and policies.

Although not all socialists mentioned or quoted in this volume were committed Marxists, the title *War and the Marxists* seemed appropriate. Marxist phraseology and idiom predominated in the debates, and most participants adopted Marxist criteria in defining their positions. Besides, the borderline between strict Marxists and non-Marxist socialists is by no means distinct and rigid. Karl Liebknecht’s statements and actions during the First World War were generally indistinguishable in content and purpose from those of Rosa Luxemburg, and they were wholly approved by Lenin, who regarded himself as an orthodox Marxist. Liebknecht did not endorse the materialist conception of history or Marxist dialectics, but to treat him
as a non-Marxist in the context of the debates on socialist policy in that war would be sheer pedantry.

This volume spans seventy years, to the end of the First World War. Marx died in 1883, halfway through this period. Engels was an active political writer until his death twelve years later. The presentation of the views of Marx and Engels shows that they often believed war would lead to revolution in a belligerent country, but never evolved a comprehensive theory about the link between war and revolution. They always hoped for the victory of the more 'progressive' side; when tsarist Russia was at war, they wanted her enemies to win. In the early twentieth century, when socialist parties existed in most capitalist countries and socialist revolution seemed a short-term possibility, the followers of Marx and Engels tried to hammer out a consistent policy to exploit the war-conditioned crises of capitalism and hasten its overthrow.

A further volume will deal with the inter-war period, the Second World War, and very briefly the years since 1945. The major powers have not confronted one another directly in any of the many wars of the last forty years, and the arrival of the nuclear age has invalidated socialist assumptions in their debates about war. Since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, most discussions about war, among socialists and non-socialists, have been concerned with preventing nuclear war and avoiding escalation of non-nuclear conflicts. Socialist attitudes have not been basically different from those of liberal or conservative politicians and commentators: the post-1945 debate about war and wartime policies has been devoid of a specifically socialist dimension.

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PART I

Marx and Engels, and the Wars of the Nineteenth Century
1 The ‘Revolutionary Wars’ of 1848–9

The Prussian-Danish War

The revolutionary tide which engulfed much of Europe in 1848 and 1849 provoked some minor wars involving German states, especially Prussia and Austria. Almost all Marx and Engels wrote about these wars was bound up with the expectation of early proletarian revolution. They believed that Europe was ripe for such a revolution. In the Communist Manifesto, which appeared at the beginning of 1848, they asserted — correctly, as it turned out — that Germany was ‘on the eve of a bourgeois revolution’ and went on to predict, erroneously, that this would be ‘but the prelude to an immediately following proletarian revolution’. They must have felt sure that once proletarian rule had been established in Germany, it would not be confined to that country.

Marx and Engels believed, again mistakenly, that a great European or even a ‘world war’ would break out shortly and would hasten the process of European revolution. For this reason they actually hoped for a war waged by one or more European powers against tsarist Russia, the most reactionary and oppressive power, the bête noire of democratic and progressive elements of that time.

The first war the two friends commented on in detail was the Prussian-Danish war of 1848–9. The issue was the fate of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, with predominantly German populations but linked to the Danish crown. After a revolution had begun in Prussia and other parts of Germany in the spring of 1848, the Germans of Schleswig and Holstein set up a provisional government in Kiel, proclaimed secession from Denmark and appealed to the German Confederation (a loose association of states, with Austria and Prussia as the leading members) for the admission of Schleswig-Holstein as a single state. Thousands of young Germans enlisted as volunteers and went to the aid of the rebel armies.

On behalf of the German Confederation, Prussia went to war with
Denmark. In April 1848 Prussian troops occupied the whole of Schleswig and Holstein and invaded Jutland, but withdrew after reverses on the battlefield and a Russian threat to intervene. After more inconclusive fighting in 1849 an armistice was agreed, followed by a Danish-Prussian peace treaty in June 1850, which in all essentials restored the status quo of Danish rule over the duchies. The Germans in Schleswig-Holstein continued to resist but were defeated. The settlement was confirmed by the treaty of London of May 1852, which placed it under the guarantee of the main European powers.

Marx and Engels were wholeheartedly in favour of the war against Denmark, and they urged the German side to conduct it with energy and resolve. In their view, the armed rising of the Germans in Schleswig-Holstein was part of the revolutionary struggle for a united democratic Germany — a cause dear to their hearts. Engels wrote in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, the radical newspaper they published in Cologne, that 'the war we (Germans) are waging in Schleswig-Holstein is a truly revolutionary war.'

While approving of the Schleswig-Holstein rising and the war, Marx and Engels (both Prussian by birth) distrusted the royal Prussian government. They described its conduct of the war as inept and attacked the armistice and the 'treacherous peace'. But they dissociated themselves from the jingoist excesses of some Germans and part of the German press.

At the time Denmark enjoyed the support of Russia, and this was a further reason for wanting the Danes defeated. Marx and Engels thought that war, not only with Denmark but with Russia, was the prerequisite of a positive solution of the European revolutionary crisis. They also believed such a war to be inevitable. In June 1848, Engels accused Prussia of lacking 'the courage to accept . . . the long-awaited and unavoidable conflict with Russia'.

In July 1850, Engels reiterated the indictment of Prussia for deserting the Schleswig-Holstein troops in battle and then signing a 'treacherous peace'. He elaborated a theory he had formulated on a previous occasion — that the Danes and some other small ethnic groups had no claim to independent nationhood. According to Engels, revolutionary democrats had to work and fight for the unification of 'the great nationalities hitherto cut up in small states' (like the Germans and Italians), but not for the independence of 'those small wrecks of nationalities, such as Danes, Croats, Czechs, Slovaks, and
so on, counting from one to three millions each at the very outset, or ... those mongrel would-be nations, such as the Swiss and Belgians’. Only the ‘great and equally powerful nations, such as the French, English, German, Italian, Hungarian and Polish’ would belong to a future ‘European confederacy of republics’. As for the people of Schleswig and Holstein, they should not be ‘forced to follow the fate of small, impotent, half-civilized Denmark, and to be slaves of Russia for ever’; rather ‘they should be allowed to re-unite themselves to a nation of forty millions, which was then just engaged in the struggle for its freedom, unity, and consequent recovery of its strength.’

This startling and un-socialist contempt for the small and ‘would-be’ nations which the young Engels displayed in the late 1840s — apparently in agreement with Marx — is not found in the mature writings of the two friends. There is no trace of it in Engels’s comments on the war of 1864, when Austria and Prussia defeated Denmark and Schleswig and Holstein were ceded to the German powers.

It is clear from what Marx and Engels wrote during the Danish war of 1848–9 that they wanted their native Germany to be strong and united as a democratic republic. In this sense they were German patriots, but they were not chauvinists or even nationalists. In conflicts involving Germans they did not back the German side ‘right or wrong’; their support went to the party they regarded as more progressive. Engels wrote that in recent history the Germans had usually played a reactionary role: they had supplied mercenaries to the British in the American revolutionary war; they had intervened against the French Revolution; Austria and Prussia had joined Russia in dismembering and plundering Poland, and Austria was guilty of repression in Italy and Hungary. He went on:

The blame for the infamies committed with the aid of Germany in other countries falls not only on the governments but to a large extent also on the German people. But for the delusions of the Germans, their slavish spirit, their aptitude as mercenaries and jailers ... the German name would not have been so detested, cursed and despised abroad.

Yet a new era had dawned, he wrote,

Now that the Germans are throwing off their own yoke, their
whole policy vis-à-vis foreign nations must also change — or else the fetters with which we have chained other nations will shackle our own new freedom. . . . Germany will liberate herself to the extent to which she sets free neighbouring nations. ⁵

Revolts against Habsburg Rule: Rising in Italy

Marx and Engels hoped for a German victory in the conflict with Denmark; they backed the non-German side in the wars which shook the Habsburg monarchy during the same revolutionary period — the Italian and Hungarian wars. The aim in Hungary was national independence and internal democracy. The Italian revolution had the same objectives, as well as the unification of Italy, which consisted of a number of states, most under direct or indirect Austrian control.

Marx and Engels sympathized with the Hungarians and the Italians, whose cause they considered was progress and revolutionary democracy. They also thought the defeat of Austria would hasten the downfall of the hated Habsburg monarchy. They welcomed actions by Austrian revolutionaries to help the insurgents, and applauded when the people of Vienna began an insurrection in October 1848 to prevent the departure of Austrian troops to the Hungarian front. They spoke with regret of the ‘confusion’ in the minds of some German Austrians who had taken part in the Vienna revolution of March 1848 but had then volunteered for the campaign against the Italians. ⁶

A rising in Sicily against Neapolitan rule marked the beginning of the Italian revolution in January 1848. Unrest in other parts induced the princely rulers of several states to grant constitutions, but the revolution in Vienna on 13 March 1848 really brought things to the boil and ended Prince Metternich’s forty-year dominance at the Austrian court. The news sparked armed rising in the two provinces under direct Austrian rule, Lombardy and Venetia. The citizens of Milan chased the Austrian garrison (mainly Croats) out of their town. The Austrian troops, led by the aged Fieldmarshal Radetzky, then evacuated most of Lombardy. In Venice the Austrian garrison was induced to leave, the ‘Republic of St Mark’ was proclaimed. King Charles Albert of Sardinia-Piedmont declared war on Austria. Patriotic enthusiasm gripped the whole of Italy, and volunteers streamed to the theatre of war in the north.

Progressive opinion both in Italy and abroad saw the ideal
framework for Italian independence in a unitary democratic republic; this was the solution championed by Giuseppe Mazzini and his radical-republican friends, and the one preferred by Marx and Engels. Certain Catholic and conservative elements favoured a federation of the existing Italian states, perhaps with the pope at its head. Others visualized unity under the house of Savoy, the reigning dynasty of the kingdom of Sardinia and Piedmont — which is how unification eventually came about. The one objective all patriots had in common was the total expulsion of Austria from the Italian peninsula.

In April and May 1848 the Piedmontese army scored some successes, but the Austrians gained the upper hand, and in August King Charles Albert was compelled to sign an armistice virtually restoring the status quo. The king resumed fighting in March 1849, but his army was decisively beaten at Novara, and he abdicated in favour of his son. The new king, Victor Emmanuel II, had to accept Austria's onerous peace terms; but he lived to fight again and, contrary to Marx's and Engels’s predictions, became the first king of an independent Italy some twelve years later.

During the summer of 1849 unrest in all parts of Italy was quelled, largely by Austrian military intervention, and princely rulers were reinstated. Venice was retaken by the Austrians in August, and Sicily was subdued by the Neapolitans. The revolution had failed throughout Italy.

After the armistice between Austria and Piedmont which ended the first phase of the Italian war, Engels praised the Italian people's courage and devotion in the struggle for freedom. He attributed failure to the vacillation and cowardice of the pope and the native princes, and especially of the king of Sardinia and Piedmont. Charles Albert, this 'arch-enemy of Italian liberty', who had let himself be acclaimed the 'liberator' and the 'sword of Italy' (la spada d'Italia), had in fact been concerned only with territorial aggrandizement and with his own 'great power and magnificence'. The king's ambitions, his hatred of all truly liberal people, and his and his generals' military incompetence, had enabled the Austrians to score a decisive victory. But things would now change:

Henceforth the Italians can and will no longer entrust the cause of their liberation to a prince or king; to ensure their salvation they must get rid, as soon as possible, of this spada d'Italia which has turned out to be useless. Had they done this earlier, had they
superannuated the King and his system . . . and established a democratic union among themselves, not a single Austrian would by now have remained in Italy.  

The Italian people would learn from bitter experience, would discard their illusions and 'secure . . . independence under a single democratic banner'.

When the same King Charles Albert resumed fighting seven months later, Engels ardently hoped for the victory of the Piedmontese army, and he was bitterly disappointed by its defeat at Novara. He went further than before in his denunciation of the Sardinian king’s alleged treachery, and in discerning a link between the monarchic system and defeat in war. He declared that in a national crisis a monarchic system was unable to wage war successfully. Only a republic could have taken the requisite measures:

A nation fighting for independence must not limit itself to the ordinary methods of warfare. Levee en masse, revolutionary war, guerillas everywhere — that is the only way for a small nation to stand up to a large one, the only means whereby a comparatively small army can be enabled to withstand an army that is stronger and better organized.

In a monarchy, even a constitutional one like the Piedmontese, an initial military defeat (such as Novara) meant a lost campaign.

But in a republic this defeat would have been by no means decisive. Monarchy is intrinsically craven, never dares to resort to extreme revolutionary means. Had Piedmont been a republic . . . it would have found a way to conclude the campaign quite differently.

After outlining the military moves a revolutionary leadership would have been likely to make, Engels continued:

The levee en masse, with the whole people taking up arms — that is something royalty shrinks from doing. Only the republic will resort to such means, as the events of 1793 prove. The application of such methods presupposes revolutionary terror, and where has a monarch ever been willing to resort to that? When a people needs to exert all its strength to save itself, nothing will hinder it so much as the monarchy. If Italy is not to perish because of the monarchy, then it is imperative that monarchy in Italy should perish.
Engels foresaw that the defeat of the Piedmontese would mean reactionary restoration in Florence and Rome. He was wrong, however, in his repeated and emphatic assertion that a monarchic régime would be unable to lead Italy to independence and unity. He almost certainly misjudged Charles Albert of Sardinia-Piedmont when he accused him of treachery and suggested that the king had engineered his own defeat. Charles Albert reaped no reward for his alleged treachery. Defeat was a terrible blow to him. He abdicated, a broken man, at the age of 51 and died in his Portuguese exile a few months later.

How did Marx and Engels see the link between war and revolution in the Italian events of 1848–9?

In their eyes, revolution was not the likely consequence of defeat in war but the pre-condition of victory over the Austrians. Marxist advice to the Italians amounted to what was later called ‘revolutionary defencism’: determined resistance to the external enemy combined with internal struggle to replace a reactionary monarchy with a progressive, radical republic.

The fierce criticism which Engels levelled against the Sardo-Piedmontese king and his establishment, hand in hand with the expression of ardent hopes for the victory of the Piedmontese and all Italian insurgents, evokes a more recent example of revolutionary defencism: Trotsky’s position on the correct ‘Marxist’ policy in the event of the Soviet Union (under Stalin) being involved in war with an ‘imperialist’ enemy. For all his denunciation of what he regarded as the counter-revolutionary treachery of Stalin — that ‘gravedigger of the Revolution’ — and of the ruling bureaucracy, Trotsky maintained to the end of his life that the Soviet Union was still a ‘workers’ state’ and that all revolutionary socialists should be committed to her unconditional defence in the kind of war that started ten months after Trotsky’s death.

Engels considered the monarchic system in Piedmont and other Italian states to be responsible for the disastrous outcome of the war with Austria; that is why he preached a republican revolution which, he argued, would lay the foundation of future victories. Similarly, Trotsky described the Stalin régime as the greatest obstacle to victory and urged the Russian working class to return to the Leninist and ‘proletarian’ form of government which had brought victory in the civil war. Both Engels and Trotsky erred in regarding a change of
régime as essential for success; Italy achieved unity and independence under the same Piedmontese dynasty that had lost the war of 1848—9. The Stalin régime led the Soviet Union to victory against Hitler’s Germany, with substantial territorial gains and a tremendous increase in world power.  

**Hungary’s Revolutionary War**

At the time of the great European upheavals of 1848—9 the kingdom of Hungary, then inhabited by less than five million people, had been part of the Habsburg dominions for over a century. A Hungarian national movement fought for what is now usually called ‘Home Rule’ (a separate Hungarian government) without challenging Habsburg’s dynastic reign. The great majority of Hungarian nationalists were ready to accept the Austrian emperor as king of Hungary.

In the autumn of 1847, a few months before the Vienna revolution, the Hungarian Diet meeting at Pressburg (now Bratislave, the Slovak capital; the city’s Hungarian name is Pozsony) had adopted, under the influence of Lajos Kossuth, a number of progressive legislative measures. These included the commutation of feudal obligations, the emancipation of the Jews, and equal taxation of all classes of society. After the rising of March 1848 a weakened Austrian government could no longer refuse the more far-reaching demands for Hungarian autonomy. An independent Magyar administration then went beyond the Diet decisions and abolished all feudal rights and privileges, all tithes and labour services, and introduced universal suffrage.

A crucial feature of the Hungarian revolution of 1848—9 was the antagonism between the Magyars, the predominant ethnic group, and the Croats and other Slavonic races whose territory formed part of the Hungarian kingdom. The Croatian nobleman Jellačić, who had been appointed ‘Ban’ (governor and military commander) of Croatia by the king-emperor, strove to detach it from Hungary and turn it into an Austrian province, to be ruled from Vienna. He invaded Hungary with a Croatian army in September 1848. A few weeks later Emperor Ferdinand issued a manifesto dismissing the ‘rebellious’ Hungarian government (then headed by Count Batthyanyi and Lajos Kossuth) and empowering Jellačić to take action as governor of Hungary, but Jellačić was defeated by the Hungarians and retreated to the walls of Vienna. The Austrian government sent him reinforcements, which
provoked another rising in Vienna on 6 October. It was crushed, and cruel retribution followed. A half-hearted attempt by the Hungarians to go to the aid of the Vienna rebels ended in failure.

In December 1848 the feeble-minded Emperor Ferdinand abdicated in favour of his eighteen-year-old nephew Francis Joseph, who went on to reign for sixty-eight years, until his death during the First World War. The Hungarians refused to recognize the new emperor as king of Hungary, since the changeover had no regard for the Hungarian constitution.

The war of independence began in earnest. After initial reverses the Hungarians drove the imperial army from their country. In April 1849 the Hungarian government severed all ties with the Habsburg monarchy: Kossuth was proclaimed head of the independent Hungarian state. But in May Russia intervened in support of the Vienna government and invaded Hungary, scoring decisive victories by early August. On 13 August the Hungarian supreme commander, Görgey, surrendered an army of 160,000 to the Russians. The Hungarians had lost their war of independence.

Engels and Marx gave unqualified support to the Hungarian revolution and its democratic leaders. Accusations such as they levelled against the Prussian leadership in the Schleswig-Holstein war, and against the king of Sardinia and his government in the conflict with Austria, are absent from their analysis of the Hungarian revolutionary war, written after a victorious campaign by the Magyars in the spring of 1849, on the eve of Russia's intervention. 11

The sympathies which Engels and Marx felt and expressed for the Hungarian leaders and their revolutionary-democratic policies were enhanced by several factors. The intervention of reactionary Russia tended to confirm the progressive nature of the Magyar struggle, and a feature of the Hungarian war was its international dimension — the links the revolutionaries had forged with like-minded militants of other nations. An alliance with the Poles had been proclaimed in January 1849, and, according to Engels, over 20,000 Poles volunteered for the Hungarian army. A fighting alliance with the German revolutionaries of Vienna had taken practical shape in the Vienna rising of October 1849, and in the Hungarians' abortive attempt, in turn, to render military assistance to the German-Austrian insurgents.
The ‘Imminence of World War and Revolution’

There was another reason why the two German socialists regarded the Hungarian struggle with sympathy. They believed and hoped that the conflict between Habsburg’s autocratic reaction and the Hungarians’ democratic radicalism would lead to a full-blown European war — and a European revolution.

Engels predicted an early collision between Britain and Russia as a result of the latter’s armed intervention in central Europe, on the grounds that ‘the English bourgeoisie cannot be expected to let Austria become a Russian province.’ In the concluding paragraph Engels wrote:

War will come. Paris is on the threshold of revolution . . . While in southern Germany the core of a German revolutionary army is being formed, which prevents Prussia from taking an active part in the Hungarian campaign, France is on the point of playing an active role in the struggle . . . Soon the French, the Magyar-Polish, and the German revolutionary armies will celebrate their fraternization on the battlefield before the walls of Berlin. 12

Thus Engels expected Germany, Poland and Russia to be involved in a war originating in the Austrian-Hungarian conflict, Britain being drawn in by balance-of-power considerations. He was confident that this all-European war would culminate in the triumph of international revolution.

The interaction of war and revolution was the subject of an earlier article by Marx, which foresaw a new rising by the French working class, and ‘world war’ in 1849. Proletarian revolution in France, Marx argued, was the pre-condition for the liberation of Europe, but the chief obstacle to this liberation was British capitalism:

England dominates the world market, and England is dominated by the bourgeoisie . . . Old England can be overthrown only by world war, since war alone can provide the Chartists, the organized English working-class party, with the conditions for a successful rising against their all-powerful oppressors. When the Chartists take over the British government, then, and only then will social revolution pass from the realm of utopia to that of reality. Yet any European war in which Britain is involved is a world war . . . A European war will be the first result of the victorious proletarian revolution in France. As in the days of
Napoleon, England will lead the armies of counter-revolution; yet that war itself will make her the leader of the revolutionary movement, and thus England will repay the debt she incurred by her actions against the revolution of the eighteenth century.  

He referred to these predictions in the last issue of the paper, in an article dealing with its suppression. ‘In saying farewell to our readers we remind them of what we said in our first January issue: a revolutionary rising of the French working class and world war — that is what the year 1849 has in store for us.’

Marx and Engels obviously agreed on the world situation and the immediate future. Once again their expectations were not borne out. The French workers did not rise, and when a major war broke out in 1853-4 it bore no resemblance to the ‘world war’ of Marxian prophecy, and produced no revolutionary upheavals.

Engels’s vision (presumably shared by Marx) of the French, Hungarian, Polish and German revolutionary armies fraternizing ‘on the battlefield before the walls of Berlin’ seemed to presuppose that the reactionary camp would comprise the three powers of the ‘Holy Alliance’, Russia, Austria and Prussia. What is not clear is how Engels and Marx saw the position of Britain: her participation would assuredly impart a global character to the war. In his New Year article Marx had predicted that capitalist Britain would lead the counter-revolutionary camp, but after a Chartist-led revolution a British working-class government would be at the head of the revolutionary movement. Yet Engels, writing in the last issue of NRZ, regarded Britain’s involvement as due to the fact that ‘the English bourgeoisie cannot be expected to let Austria become a Russian province.’ This suggests that Britain would feel compelled to intervene, from the start, as an enemy of the (Russian-led) counter-revolutionary camp, and a potential ally of the progressive coalition of republican France and revolutionary Germans, Magyars and Poles. It would seem that Marx and Engels, while agreeing on the outlines of impending events, were not in complete accord about the details concerning the ‘world war’ they considered inevitable.

The attitude of the Marxist journal towards its own country, Prussia, was defeatist inasmuch as it foresaw, and welcomed, a Prussian defeat in an imminent war. Neue Rheinische Zeitung does not spell out the exact relationship between revolutionary action and military developments. But it would have been logical for Marx and
Engels to argue — as Lenin did over sixty years later — that reciprocal interaction existed in that revolutionary militancy was apt to cause setbacks at the front and, *vice versa*, that the defeat of one's own reactionary government would further the cause of revolution.

In his article of 1 January 1849 Karl Marx predicted a Chartist takeover in Britain, due to her involvement in world war. Again, the mechanics of cause and effect were not explained. What he apparently meant was that reverses early in that war — with Britain leading the ‘counter-revolutionary armies’ — would weaken the bourgeois establishment and create a revolutionary situation. This too is in line with Lenin’s notion of revolutionary defeatism in the First World War.

**The Future of the Slav Races**

During the Prussian-Danish war of 1848–9, Marx and Engels voiced their contempt for reactionary small ‘would-be’ nations like the Danes, the Dutch, the Belgians and the Swiss. More scathing still were their comments, in the context of the Hungarian revolutionary war and the predicted European war, on some of the Slav nations: the Czechs, the Slovaks, and above all the Croats. When the people of Prague rose against Habsburg rule in June 1848, Engels stressed the democratic and revolutionary character of the rising; he denounced the brutal retribution meted out by the Austrian commander, Prince Windischgrätz, and once again condemned the perennial German policy of subjugating and enslaving other nations.\(^{15}\)

Yet his — and Marx’s — attitude changed completely when the Czech and Slovak nationalists showed willingness to come to terms with the Austrian rulers some months later, and displayed hostility towards the Hungarians and the revolutionary Germans. That, at any rate, is how Engels saw the situation. He contrasted the revolutionary role of the German and Hungarian democrats in 1848 with the help given to Habsburg reaction by Czechs, Slovaks and Croats:

All the South Slav races . . . placed themselves at the disposal of Austrian reaction . . . The Austrian *camarilla* found support only among the Slavs. It was the Slavs who played a decisive part in the downfall of Italy and who stormed Vienna, and it is the Slavs who now are staging a concerted attack on the Magyars.
A peculiar personal resentment or disappointment seems to have contributed to Engels's change of heart, for he added: 'This is their gratitude for the support which the whole German democratic press gave to the Czech democrats in June (1848), when they were shot down by Windischgrätz – the same Windischgrätz who is now their hero.'

In passing judgement on certain nationalities or ethnic groups Marx and Engels did not normally formulate their views in 'class' terms, for example by blaming the capitalist classes but exonerating the workers, as present-day Marxists invariably do. In the East German (1956) edition of the *Collected Works* the editorial notes on Engels's article about the Prague rising assert that at the time in question (June 1848) 'the masses of the Czech people, peasants and proletarians' had played an active part in the revolutionary movement; later the 'Czech liberal bourgeoisie', which supported the Habsburgs in their fight against revolution and democracy, had given a nationalistic slant to the movement. In this respect Marx and Engels were less 'Marxist', or less in keeping with stereotype present-day Marxian concepts, than their twentieth-century interpreters. The condemnations by the two founding fathers were directed against the peoples as such, without distinctions between (good) proletarians and (bad) capitalists. The Czech, Slovak and Croatian workers and peasants are not exempted, either explicitly or implicitly, from Engels's statement that 'all the South Slav races' had aided Austrian reaction. In his article on 'The Revolutionary Movement', Marx accused 'Croats, ... Czechs ... and similar riff-raff' of having strangled the cause of freedom in Vienna. In 'The Magyar Struggle', Engels declared that after a victorious proletarian revolution in France 'the Austrian Germans and Magyars will be free to wreak bloody vengeance on the Slav barbarians.'

We encountered this contemptuous attitude towards small 'reactionary' or 'would-be' nations in their comments on the Danish war of 1848, where the Danes, the Dutch, the Belgians and the Swiss were deemed unworthy of national independence. Engels was even more explicit in condemning the Czechs and other Slavic entities to national extinction. He attempted a historical justification of the case for denying them independent nationhood:

Except for the Poles, the Russians, and perhaps the Turkish Slavs, no Slav people has a future, for the simple reason that all the other Slavs lack the elementary historical, geographical, political and industrial conditions. Peoples which have never had
a history of their own . . . or which were forced to attain the first stage of civilization only by means of a foreign yoke, are not viable and will never be able to achieve any kind of independence.

And that has been the fate of the Austrian Slavs. The Czechs, among whom we would include the Moravians and Slovaks, . . . never had had a history of their own . . . Bohemia and Moravia passed definitely to Germany and the Slovak regions remained with Hungary. And this historically absolutely non-existent ‘nation’ puts forward claims to independence? 19

This is not unlike some of Hitler’s utterances during the Sudeten crisis of September 1938, when he denied the existence of a Czechoslovak nation. But if these reactionary Slav peoples, according to Engels, have ‘no claims to independence’ and ‘no future’, what is to become of them?

The impending general war will . . . wipe out these petty hidebound (Slavic) nations, down to their very names. The next world war will bring about the disappearance from the face of the earth (vom Erdboden verschwinden machen) not only of reactionary classes and dynasties, but also of entire reactionary peoples. And that, too, is progress. 20

In conjunction with other Engelsian passages on the history and the future of the various European races, the context seems to indicate that ‘disappearance’ will be the result not of genocide but of absorption by stronger and more progressive neighbours, followed by assimilation. That is the usual interpretation, but it is not undisputed. Karl Kautsky, a great Marxist authority of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, believed that Engels was speaking of the necessary extermination of the ‘reactionary’ Slav races.

Kautsky quoted the above passage and commented:

One reads such remarks with utter amazement, indeed with horror. In many respects they reflect not just a totally fallacious view of actual conditions but also — which is still more objectionable — an abandonment of principles which form the basis not only of international socialism but particularly of Marxist thought.

We are told that, except for the Poles, the Slavs are all counter-revolutionary by nature; hence they would not only have to be fought in the present situation . . . No, they must be exterminated
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... The only solution was to fight and destroy them...
Actually Marx and Engels displayed this terrible hatred of the Slavs only for a very brief period.21

The curious thing about Kautsky's criticisms of this advocacy of genocide (as he understood Engels's remarks) is that, a long time before this criticism, he had echoed Engels's 1848 dicta in a different context; in respect of barbarian tribes in Asia.

In a letter to Engels, dated 11 May 1882, Kautsky (then twenty-eight years old) dealt with the question of what would happen to India and other British possessions after a successful proletarian revolution in Britain. After suggesting that under the guidance of a socialist Britain India might be able to skip the capitalist phase and proceed directly to socialism, Kautsky continued, 'Those savage tribes (die wilden Voelkerschaften) which cannot be assimilated to modern culture, will probably have to disappear from the face of the earth.'22 It can hardly be an accident that Kautsky used exactly the words (vom Erdboden verschwinden) which Engels had used of the impending fate of some Slav peoples thirty-three years earlier. It would seem that Kautsky had read the 1849 article without being horrified by its sentiments, and that as a young man he did not scruple to express similar feelings regarding other ethnic groups; but as an octogenarian he saw matters in a different light. It would probably have been a shock to him, towards the end of his life, had his attention been drawn to his cruel words more than half a century before.

Whatever Engels meant when he predicted the 'disappearance' of entire reactionary peoples, it is an atrocious statement to make, apart from being wide of the mark as a prediction. Small wonder that Kautsky and other twentieth-century Marxists have felt uneasy about this wholesale death sentence. This is one of the rare instances of the communist editors of the Collected Works repudiating the views of the masters:

It must be evident to us today that the articles 'The Magyar Struggle' and 'Democratic Pan-Slavism' contain some erroneous judgements on the past and future of the small Slav peoples incorporated into Austria... History has not confirmed Engels's opinion that the small Slav peoples of central Europe were doomed to be absorbed and assimilated by their larger and more civilized neighbours.
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By way of furnishing a ‘Marxist’ explanation for the master’s un-Marxist views, they continue:

In these pronouncements, Engels was probably influenced by the gravity of the political situation at the time, and this accounted for the sharp polemical tone of his articles . . . A certain part was played in this by the idea which Marx and Engels entertained at that time of the nearness of a simultaneous victory of the proletarian revolution in the developed countries, a revolution which would have put an end to both social and national oppression . . .

This interpretation is not quite in keeping with Engels’s prediction of a workers’ rising in France which would set the Austrian Germans and Hungarians free to ‘wreak bloody vengeance on the barbarian Slavs’. However, it is certainly true to say that Marx and Engels believed proletarian revolutions to be imminent at that time. Their expectation of an impending European war reflects the belief in the close link between revolution and war, but they thought that, apart from furthering the cause of revolution, war would tidy up and simplify the map of Europe, by eliminating a number of small countries.

Engels’s prophecy of the disappearance of ‘entire reactionary peoples’ ostensibly refers to the Austrian Slavs; but in view of what he wrote in a different context about the ‘small wrecks of nationalities’, the ‘mongrel would-be’ or ‘miserably powerless so-called nations’ which could never form part of ‘a European confederacy of republics’, we may assume that the Danes, the Dutch, the Belgians and the Swiss – not to speak of the people of Luxembourg or Liechtenstein or Andorra (not even mentioned in this context) – likewise have no chance and no right to survive. The Marx-Engels version of post-revolutionary Europe – to the west of Russia – would seem to be a confederation comprising six republics: France, Britain, Germany, Italy, Hungary and Poland. The list does not include the four nations inhabiting the Iberian or the Scandinavian peninsulas – Spain, Portugal, Norway and Sweden. They are not specifically doomed, but apparently are not regarded as potential members of the coming confederation of European republics.
Notes

PART 1 – Marx and Engels and the Wars of the Nineteenth Century

Chapter 1: The ‘Revolutionary Wars’ of 1848–9


2. *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* (henceforward *NRZ*), June 1848; K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works* (henceforward *CW*), VII, 34. Most articles on Schleswig-Holstein and the war against Denmark were written by Engels.

3. ‘Letter from Germany’, first published in English in G.J. Harney’s *Democratic Review*, July 1850; *CW*, X, 393–4

4. See below, 63–4

5. ‘Germany’s Foreign Policy’ in *NRZ*, 3 July 1848; *MEW*, V, 155

6. *CW*, XI, 49

7. ‘The Italian Liberation Struggle and the Cause of its Present Failure’ in *NRZ*, 12 August 1848; *CW*, VII, 385ff; *MEW*, V, 366ff

8. A reference to the successful resistance of the French First Republic to foreign armed intervention

9. *NRZ*, 31 March 1849; *CW*, VII, 170ff; *MEW*, VI, 386ff

10. Trotsky voiced his criticisms not as a journalist observer but as a prominent member of the central committee of the Soviet Communist Party. In 1927, during the showdown in the USSR between Stalin’s ruling faction and the inner-party opposition (Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev and so on), which led to Trotsky’s expulsion, Trotsky reiterated his loyalty to the Soviet state and its defence. To illustrate that this did not conflict with his criticisms of the Stalinist leadership, he evoked the precedent of Clemenceau’s policy in 1914, when the German army was about...
fifty miles from Paris: Clemenceau waged a determined struggle against the incompetence of the Viviani government and its conduct of the war; he gained power and secured victory. Trotsky said the opposition within the CSPU would likewise seek to wrest power if war should come, so as to wage it with revolutionary firmness. Stalin and his followers exploited Trotsky’s statement by persuading the party rank-and-file (largely ignorant of France in the First World War) that Trotsky would take advantage of military reverses to seize power by force (which Clemenceau had not done) — in other words, that Trotsky was prepared to pursue a policy of (counter-revolutionary) defeatism in case of war. The detailed account of this controversy is in I. Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed, 349–56

11. NRZ, 19 May 1849
12. ibid., CW, IX, 463
13. ‘The Revolutionary Movement’ in NRZ, 1 January 1849; MEW, VII, 148–50
14. NRZ, 19 May 1849; MEW, VI, 506
15. NRZ, 18 and 25 June 1848; MEW, V, 80–2 and 108–9
16. ‘The Magyar Struggle’ in NRZ, 13 January 1849; MEW, VI, 173
17. ‘The Revolutionary Movement’, op. cit.
19. ‘Democratic Pan-Slavism’ in NRZ, 15 February 1849; MEW, VI, 275
20. ‘The Magyar Struggle’, CW, VIII, 238; MEW, VI, 176
23. Preface, CW, VIII, xxv
24. Cf. above, 4–5

Chapter 2: The ‘Eastern Question’ and the Crimean War

1. CW, XII, 13–17
2. ibid., 17
3. New York Daily Tribune (henceforward NYDT); CW, XII, 32–6
4. NYDT, 5 August 1853; ibid., 212
5. NYDT, ibid., 163
6. Marx thought the earl of Aberdeen, prime minister at the time, vacillating and soft
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7. NYDT, 25 July 1853; CW, XII, 196
8. NYDT, 5 August 1853; ibid., 212–13
9. NYDT, 18 November 1853; ibid., 476
10. CW, XXXIX, 423–6
11. NYDT, 2 February 1854; CW, XII, 555, 557–8
12. ibid., 553–4
13. ibid., 33
14. NYDT, 10 July 1854; CW, XIII, 256
15. Published in Neue Oder-Zeitung, 2 January 1855; ibid., 555
16. NYDT, 27 April 1855; CW, XIV, 142–5
17. ibid., 144
18. NYDT, 31 October 1854; CW, XIII, 504
19. CW, XIV, 614 and 623ff.

Chapter 3: Britain’s Wars against Persia and China 1856–60

1. Cf. V.G. Kiernan, Marxism and Imperialism, 176
2. NYDT, 30 July 1853; CW, XII, 201
3. NYDT, 7 January 1857; quoted in K. Marx and F. Engels, On Colonialism, 83–5
4. NYDT, 10 April 1857; ibid., 86 and 105
5. ibid., 91
6. ibid., 105–6
7. NYDT, 5 June 1857; ibid, 111–16
8. On Colonialism, 205
9. ibid., 204
10. ibid., 220
11. ibid., 204

Chapter 4: The Indian Mutiny

1. On Colonialism, 118
3. ibid., 97
4. ibid., 85
5. ibid., 126
6. MEW, XXIX, 259

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9. Unwillingness to regard India as ripe for independence was also implicit in what Engels wrote in a letter to Kautsky in September 1882, which dealt with colonial policy after the proletarian revolution. Engels thought that the colonies with a European population (Canada, the Cape, Australia) would become independent: 'on the other hand, the countries inhabited by a native population, which are simply subjugated—India, Algeria, the Dutch, Portuguese and Spanish possessions—must be taken over for the time being by the proletariat and led as rapidly as possible towards independence.' (*On Colonialism*). Engels apparently saw colonial emancipation as a gradual and laborious process. As for Ireland—'England’s first colony' in Engels’s phrase—the solution Marx and Engels envisaged was not complete and separate independence, but repeal of the Union and its replacement by 'a free and equal federation with Great Britain' (cf. Marx’s letter to S. Meyer and A. Vogt 9 April 1870; *ibid.*, 299). While sympathizing with the Irish struggle and defending the Fenians, Marx and Engels roundly condemned terrorist outrages like the Phoenix Park murder, which Engels denounced as a 'boastful and senseless' act and as 'crass stupidity'. (Letter to E. Bernstein 26 June 1882; *MEW*, XXXV, 339)

Chapter 5: The Italian War of 1859 and its Aftermath
1. *MEW*, XIII, 282; the article was in fact written in London
2. *ibid.*, 161–7
3. The New York paper carried this as its leading article on 24 January 1859, thereby accepting Marx’s views as its own
5. *ibid.*, 391–3
6. See above, 12–13
7. *MEW*, XIII, 404
8. *ibid*.
9. *NYDT*, 12 February 1861; *MEW*, XV, 241
10. *ibid.*, 250
11. *ibid.*, 251
12. *ibid.*, 252–3; *CW*, XVI, 240
13. *MEW*, XIII, 573

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14. ibid., 611
15. ibid., 612
17. ibid., 102
18. ibid., 107
19. *MEW*, XXIX, 432
20. ibid., 'Boustrapa' was Marx's and Engels's nickname for Napoleon III
21. Cf. 42 above

Chapter 6: Conflicts in the Western Hemisphere in the 1860s

1. K. Marx and F. Engels, *Surveys from Exile*
2. *MEW*, XV, 329 – 38
3. ibid., 338
5. ibid., 346
7. *Die Presse*, 25 November 1861; *MEW*, XV, 346
9. ibid., 41
10. ibid., 47 – 8
11. *MEW*, XXX, 254 – 6
12. ibid., 270 – 1
14. ibid., 552-3
15. This was written over a year before Lincoln's Gettysburg address
16. *MEW*, XXX, 294
17. Abraham Lincoln was the son of a poor pioneer farmer and an illiterate mother
19. ibid., 71 – 2
22. ibid., 366 – 73
23. The Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in Moscow has a different explanation in its editorial notes (cf. *MEW*, XV, 665). The aim of the intervention, Note 170 says, was to topple the Juarez government, turn Mexico into a colony of the European powers and use its
territory for pro-Southern assistance in the United States. This is not Marx's interpretation. While he apparently thought it possible that Napoleon III wanted to make Mexico a French colony, he did not suggest that intervention on the side of the Confederacy was one of the objectives of the European expedition. The view of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute is not consistent with the facts: in 1863–4, when the American Civil War was still undecided, French forces controlled nearly all of Mexico but did not cross into US territory or give any military aid to the Confederacy.

24. *MEW*, XV, 366
25. *MEW*, XXXI, 155
26. *ibid.*, 157
27. *ibid.*, 159

Chapter 7: Rising in Poland 1863

1. *MEW*, XXX, 324
2. *ibid.*, 327
3. *ibid.*
4. *ibid.*, 333
5. 'Deutscher Bildungsverein für Arbeiter'; *MEW*, XV, 576–7
6. *MEW*, XXX, 377
7. Another erroneous Engels prophecy: the following summer joint Austrian-Prussian action wrested the duchies from Denmark. Russia was in no way involved.
8. *MEW*, XVI, 153–63
9. Lassalle, *op. cit.*, IV, 305–6
10. *ibid.*, 306
11. See above, 44; as early as 1859 Lassalle had urged Prussia to fight Denmark for the duchies.

Chapter 8: The Wars of German Unification 1864–71

1. Letter to his uncle in Holland, March 1864; *MEW*, XXX, 650
2. *MEW*, V, 395
3. *MEW*, XXX, 377; he also concluded that the duke of Augustenburg had just title to Holstein, but that his claim to Schleswig was doubtful
4. Letter 4 December 1863; *ibid.*, 379
5. Letter 2 November 1864; *MEW*, XXXI, 7
6. *MEW*, XXX, 384
7. Resolution drafted for General Association of German workers; Lassalle, *op. cit.*, IV., 307

8. A reference to the suggestion that the duchies should cease to be part of Denmark but that the Danish king should be duke of Schleswig-Holstein through a personal union, along the lines of the British-Hanoverian links between 1714 and 1837

9. Letter 6 December 1863; Lassalle, *op, cit.*, IV, 309

10. *ibid.*, 312

11. *MEW*, XXXI, 200

12. *ibid.*, 204

13. *MEW*, XVI, 169 – 89

14. *MEW*, XXXI, 200 – 1

15. *ibid.*, 226 – 7

16. *ibid.*, 233

17. *ibid.*, 240 – 1

18. *ibid.*, 241

19. Letter to Engels 20 July 1870; *MEW*, XXXIII, 5


21. Letter to Marx 31 July 1870; *MEW*, XXXIII, 16

22. Letter to xxxxxxxxxx 15 August 1870; *ibid.*, 39 – 42

23. *ibid.*, 40

24. *ibid.*, 41 – 2

25. *Writings on the Commune, op. cit.*, 38

26. Quoted in Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, 300-1

27. *MEW*, XXXIII, 127

28. Letter to Marx 31 July 1870; *ibid.*, 16

29. They were eventually annexed, but not to any single German state; they became Reichslände, imperial territory directly under the emperor’s sovereignty. As the German emperor was also king of Prussia, Alsace and Lorraine were really under Prussian administration

30. *MEW*, XXXIII, 43

31. *Writings on the Commune*, 46

32. Letter to Marx 4 September 1870; *MEW*, XXXIII, 51

33. Letter to Marx 7 September 1870, *ibid.*, 57

34. 17 December 1870; *MEW*, XVII, 111 – 12

35. Letter to de Paepe, a leading member of the Belgian section of the International, 14 September 1870; *MEW*, XXXIII, 147

36. Letter to Marx 12 September 1870; *ibid.*, 61 – 2

37. *Pall Mall Gazette*, 17 September 1870; *MEW*, XVII, 105 – 8

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38. They were released on 30 March 1871, but the charges were not withdrawn. The German supreme court subsequently quashed their sentences. Bebel and Liebknecht were also arrested and tried; they both served two years.

39. Letter to de Paepe 14 September 1870

40. King William had declared that he was fighting to repel the French emperor's aggression, but was not making war on the French people.

41. *Pall Mall Gazette*, (henceforward *PMG*), 29 October 1870; *MEW*, XVII, 154–6

42. *PMG*, 21 November 1870; *ibid.*, 178–9

43. *PMG*, 26 November 1870; *ibid.*, 184–8

44. *PMG*, 8 December 1870; *ibid.*, 201–2

45. *PMG*, 17 December 1870; *ibid.*, 212

46. *MEW*, XXXIII, 162–4

47. *ibid.*, 176–8

48. *ibid.*, 180–3

49. Eventually reduced to half that sum

50. *PMG*, 8 February 1871; *MEW*, XXXIII, 257

51. *Writings on the Commune*, 34

52. *ibid.*, 51–97

53. *ibid.*, 52

54. *ibid.*, 51–2

55. A similar accusation was made by the Russian Bolsheviks in 1917, that Kerensky and his 'provisional government' planned to abandon Petrograd and leave it to the Germans to stamp out the spark of revolution in the Russian capital. Cf. L. Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution*, 914–16

56. *Writings on the Commune*, 95

Chapter 9: The 'Russian Menace' in the 1870s and 1880s

1. *PMG*, 21 November 1870

2. *MEW*, XVII, 286


4. *MEW*, XXXIV, 48

5. *ibid.*, 74

6. *ibid.*, 296

7. Cf. B.D. Wolfe, *Marxism, One Hundred Years in the Life of a Doctrine*, 57–8

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9. Salisbury had represented Britain at the abortive Constantinople conference prior to the Russo-Turkish war. He became foreign secretary in March 1878

10. *MEW*, XXXIV, 320 – 4

11. *ibid.*, 324

12. *ibid.*, 597 – 8, n 429; as the manuscripts of Marx’s letters are not extant, Liebknecht’s pamphlet is the only source

13. Letter to Marx 9 September 1879; *ibid.*, 105

14. Letter to N.F. Danielson 12 September 1880; *ibid.*, 464; Wolfe, *op. cit.*, 64 and n 25. Danielson, Russian economist and ‘Narodnik’, was the translator of Marx’s *Das Kapital*; he was later attacked by Lenin as a ‘utopian’

15. This organ of the (illegal) German Party was edited and printed in Zurich while Bismarck’s Anti-Socialist Law was in force (1878 – 90)

16. Letter to Eduard Bernstein 22 February 1882; *MEW*, XXXV, 278 – 84

17. *ibid.*, 283 – 4

18. Letter to August Bebel 22 December 1882; *ibid.*, 416

Chapter 10: Colonial Conflicts and Problems 1882

1. Letters to Marx and Karl Kautsky 12 September 1882; *MEW*, XXXV, 92 and 356

2. Letter to Eduard Bernstein 9 August 1882; *ibid.*, 349

3. *ibid.*, 422

4. *ibid.*, 357 – 8; *Selected Correspondence*, 399

5. Here follows the strange passage about the ‘savage tribes’ which might have to ‘disappear from the face of the earth’, mentioned above, 16

6. Letter 11 May 1882; *Briefwechsel*, 56


8. *ibid.*, 662

**Part II – Socialism after Marx – The Approach of Armageddon**

Chapter 1: The Danger of European War in the 1880s and 1890s

1. A group led by William Morris and Belfort Bax, which had seceded from H.M. Hyndman’s Democratic Federation
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2. Letter to Laura Lafargue, daughter of Karl Marx, 16 April 1885; MEW, XXXVI, 298–9
3. Le Cri du peuple, 31 March 1885
4. This war was the setting for Bernard Shaw’s Arms and the Man
5. Letter to August Bebel 17 November 1885, MEW, XXXVI, 390–1
6. ibid., 526
7. ibid., 316–17
8. ‘Introduction’ in December 1887 to a pamphlet by his late friend, Sigismund Borkheim, on events in Prussia 1806–7; MEW, XXI, 350–1
9. Two years earlier, in his letter to Bebel, he had spoken of six million; in 1889–90, the figure was ten to fifteen million, and in 1891–2 ‘fifteen to twenty million’. Ninety million armed men confronted one another during the First World War
10 MEW, XXII, 44–8; cf. Mayer, op. cit., II, 504–6
12. ibid., 507
13. Letter to Bebel 29 September 1891; MEW, XXXVIII, 159–63
14. Austria’s Polish province – her share of the partition booty
15. 13 October 1891; MEW, XXXVIII, 174–6
16. Letter dated 24–6 October 1891; ibid, 187–9
17. When an analogous situation arose during the Second World War, certain ‘orthodox Marxist’ groups clung to ‘revolutionary defeatism’ in the democratic countries at war with Hitler’s Germany. Even after the Nazis had done to the socialist and labour movement in German-occupied Europe exactly what Engels said a victorious Russia would do to German socialism, these groups still claimed that an abandonment of ‘defeatism’ would betray ‘Marxist-Leninist’ principles.
18. MEW, XXII, 252–6, in Engels’s translation for Neue Zeit
19. After Germany’s defeat in two world wars, France and Denmark annexed far less, Russia and her Polish satellite far more German territory than Engels anticipated
20. Quoted in Wolfe, op. cit., 73. Bebel made a number of similar statements in the following years. The last occasion was in 1907, when he was 67; like Engels, he declared himself ready to ‘shoulder a rifle’ to defeat Russian aggression
21. October 1892; MEW, XXXVIII, 498
22. 24 October 1892; ibid., 503

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23. cf. Mayer, *op. cit.*, II, 514
24. Kautsky, *op. cit.*, 308
25. *ibid.*, 305
26. *MEW*, XXXIX, 90–1; as an illustration of Engels’s point, the Weimar Republic retained the style of ‘Deutsches Reich’, an empire without an emperor

Chapter 2: The Sino-Japanese War 1894–5 and its Aftermath

1. Letter to Karl Kautsky 24 September 1894; *MEW*, XXXIX, 301
2. *ibid.*, 298–9
3. V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (henceforward *CW*), VIII, 48
4. *ibid.*, 88
5. Published in Germany; Lenin was also the author of the paper’s editorial, cf. A.B. Ulam, *The Bolsheviks*, 159

Chapter 3: Colonial Wars of the United States 1898–1901: Cuba and the Philippines

1. Kautsky, *op. cit.*, 312–16; cf. also V.I.Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (Moscow 1920)
2. See below, 119-25
3. Kautsky, *op. cit.*, 316 ff
4. For the following, cf. D.B. Schirmer, *Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War*
5. See below, 121

Chapter 4: The South African (Boer) War 1899–1902

1. G.B. Shaw, *Fabianism and the Empire*, 3
2. cf. below, 122
4. Shaw, *op. cit.*, 23–4
7. *ibid*.
8. B. Webb, *Our Partnership* (written in the 1920s and 1930s, but not published until 1948, five years after the author’s death), 193–4
9. Shaw, *op. cit.*, 22
10. *ibid.*, 35

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11. Webb, op.cit., 192
12. F.J. Gould, Hyndman, Prophet of Socialism, 129
13. Justice, 27 July 1901
14. ibid., 3 August 1901
15. Bax died in 1926; had he lived to see his 'United Africander Republic', he might not have cared for what he saw
16. Pease, op. cit., 129


1. Cf. above, 113
2. Father of the British politician of the same name
3. J. Martov and F. Dan, Geschichte der Russischen Sozialdemokratie, 94
4. CW, VIII, 52–3
5. In Proletary, 9 June 1905; ibid., 482–5
7. See above, 111
9. Ulam, op. cit., 227
10. ibid., 255 ff. The first Duma in which the bourgeois-liberal 'Constitutional Democrats' (the 'Cadets') were the strongest party was dissolved after just two months, but the second Duma was even more radical in composition. The third Duma, elected under a restrictive new law at the end of 1907, had a strong reactionary right wing. Count Witte had been dismissed in 1906 and replaced by the conservative Stolypin

Chapter 6: Socialists Debate the Threat of War 1906–13

1. As Karl Kautsky remarked in 1937 (op. cit., 398–9), Germany thus acquired a new potential enemy quite pointlessly; the 'great German navy' saw no full-scale action in the First World War
2. A. Rosmer, Le Mouvement ouvrier pendant la guerre (henceforward MOPG), 79–83
3. C. Tsuzuki, Hyndman and British Socialism, 210
4. ibid.
5. Kautsky, op. cit., 398
6. For the following see Tsuzuki, op. cit., 205–14

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7. In 1911 it was to merge with other groups to form the British Socialist Party (BSP)
8. *Morning Post*, 6 July 1910, quoted by Tsuzuki, *op. cit.*, 210; it was in this letter that Hyndman advocated ‘an aerial fleet’
9. See below, 144 – 5
11. In 1919 the BSP took part in the foundation of the Communist Party of Great Britain
12. Article in *Pravda*, 14 May 1913; *CW*, XIII, 93 – 5
13. Cf. below 136 – 7 and 144 – 4
14. Kautsky, *op. cit.*, 397
15. M. Beer, *Social Struggles and Modern Socialism*, 154 – 8; Kautsky *op. cit.*, 336
17. *ibid.*, 338 – 9
18. *CW*, XIII, 80 – 93
19. Kautsky, *op. cit.*, 344
20. *CW*, XIII, 91
22. In the Weimar Republic he was one of the leading lights of the Deutsche Volkspartei (German People’s Party), the right-of-centre party of Stresemann, Hugo Stinnes and the Ruhr tycoons
23. Kautsky, *op. cit.*, 343
24. *ibid.*, 341
25. *ibid.*, 347
26. Ledebour, unlike Lensch, did not forsake the cause. He voted against the war credits, played an active part in the Spartakus rising of January 1919, and remained a left-wing socialist until his death in 1947 at the age of 97
27. Kautsky, *op. cit.*, 348; W. Stewart, J. Keir Hardie, 301

Chapter 7: Curtain-raisers to World War: The Italo-Turkish and Balkan Wars
1. For the following see Kautsky, *op. cit.*, 354
2. The twenty-four-hour strike was largely a failure in Venice, where a large part of the work-force was engaged in the manufacture of arms and ammunition
4. For the following see Kautsky, *op. cit.*, 363–5; J. Braunthal, *Geschichte der Internationale*, 1, 345
5. Kautsky, *op. cit.*, 365
7. *Neue Zeit*, 30 September 1911
8. Kautsky, *op. cit.*, 354
10. *Pravda*, 16 October 1912 (all *Pravda* dates in this chapter are old style); *ibid.*, 349
11. ‘A democratic federation of the Balkan peoples’ was recommended by the Basle manifesto. It is remarkable that no federal solution was found for the communist Balkan states after the Second World War
12. *Pravda*, 21 October 1912; *CW*, XVIII, 368–9
13. *Pravda*, 7 November 1912; *ibid.*, 397–9
14. *Pravda*, 18 October 1912
15. *CW*, XVIII, 353–4
16. *Pravda*, 28 October 1912; *ibid.*, 372–3
17. *Pravda*, 29 March 1913; *CW*, XIX, 39
18. *CW*, XXXV, 76
20. *ibid.*, 153
21. *ibid.*, 157; not in *Kievskaya Mysl* but in the Odessa paper *Odesskie Novosti*
22. *ibid.*, 262 (*Kievskaya Mysl*)
23. In *Luch*; *ibid.*, 316
24. *ibid.*, 366–7
25. *ibid.*, 281–3
26. L. Trotsky, *Terrorism and Communism* (pamphlet), 96
27. *ibid.*, 58–9
28. *ibid.*, 61
29. The Nazis had a similar provision, called *Sippenhaftung* (collective family liability), during the Second World War
30. L. Trotsky, *Their Morals and Ours*, 26
31. Similar arguments were put forward in defence of the Hiroshima bomb in 1945
Part III — The First World War

Chapter 1: International Socialism at the Outbreak of the First World War

1. After the war Bosnia became — and still is — part of Yugoslavia
2. Quoted in Kautsky, *op. cit.*, 371 — 2
3. ibid., 441
4. Sembat and Jaurès favoured a general strike *before* the outbreak of war, since it would not be possible once war had started. Jaurès suggested that the strike should be called off in a country which offered to submit the dispute to arbitration. Jules Guesde argued that a general strike would harm advanced socialism; the country where the labour movement was strongest would be smashed in the war; cf. Kautsky, *op. cit.*, 370
5. ibid., 371 — 4
6. War hysteria was worse in Austria, except in the Slav regions. A similar mood could be seen in Russia; where there had been mass riots in St Petersburg a few weeks earlier, there were huge patriotic demonstrations
7. Kautsky, *op. cit.*, 373 — 4
8. ibid., 445
9. German chancellor from 1928 to 1930
10. Cf. for the following Kautsky, *op. cit.*, 445 — 6; Rosmer, *MOPG*, 312 — 27
11. Huysmans, apparently the interpreter, quoted the German phrase used by Müller: ‘Ein Ja-stimmen ist ausgeschlossen’ (a yes-vote is out of the question)
12. Cf. above, 131
13. This remark is reported by Müller but not by the other three
15. Jouhaux became, and remained, an ardent supporter of the French war effort
17. ibid., 490 — 2
18. ibid., 271 — 4
19. ibid., 280 — 2
20. Never published, but quoted by Rosmer, *MOPG*, 276
21. An ambiguous term, as Engels explained in 1893, cf. above, 112; Guesde’s objection was presumably to the imperial monarchy, not to the national-political unity of Germany
Chapter 2: Socialist Reaction to the War in 1914

2. See above, 109
3. Kautsky, *op. cit.*, 494
4. *ibid.*, 443
5. See above, 139
7. *ibid.*, 452; see below, 215–18
8. *ibid.*, 448–9
9. He was one of the German delegates who signed the armistice at Compiegne in November 1918, and was assassinated by right-wing extremists in 1921
11. One left-wing member, Kuhnert, left the chamber before the vote was taken
13. *ibid.*
14. Subsequently many Social Democrat deputies, including Haase and Eduard Bernstein, joined the opposition to the government and the war. This led to a split in the SPD and the formation of the Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD)
15. Cf. for the following Kautsky, *op. cit.*, 458–9; Scheidemann, *Memoirs*, 201–2
16. Scheidemann, *Memoirs*, 203; fourteen years after the event, Scheidemann still thought the 'Yes' vote on the credits had been correct; that is, that the Social Democrats would or should have supported the war even if they had known they had been misled
17. Martov-Dan, *op cit.*, 275
18. Kautsky, *op. cit.*, 493
19. *ibid.*, 500–1
20. Camille Huysmans, International secretary, eventually transferred the bureau to Amsterdam in neutral Holland. His attempts to organize conferences from there were foiled by the refusal of *Entente* socialists to meet German Social Democrats
24. Blanc, Brizon and Raffin-Dugens
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26. *ibid.*, 18


28. Edward R. Pease, the society’s secretary for twenty-five years and its historian, wrote (in January 1916) that ‘in accordance with the rule that forbids it to speak, unless it has something of value to say, it has made no pronouncement and adopted no policy’: *History of the Fabian Society*, 234. As Pease mentioned, the membership was divided on the war: Clifford Allen, a member of the executive, was organizing opposition to conscription and government policy, while other leading Fabians had joined the army; the poet Rupert Brooke was one of several who did not survive. Cf. also G. Lichtheim, *A Short History of Socialism*, 234, and M. Cole, *Beatrice Webb*, 128 – 31. The Webbs, like many Fabians at the time of the Boer War, seem to have felt that war was of no concern to socialists.


31. *ibid.*, 112


Chapter 3: Discord over Issues of War and Peace – the Austrian Socialists


2. When Austria’s parliament met in May 1917, the split in the German SPD had occurred; the anti-war Independent Social Democratic Party (*Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands – USPD*) had been founded the previous month.

3. Quoted in Kautsky, *op. cit.*, 481

4. See below, 215 – 18

5. Austria’s Social Democrats supported the movement for *Anschluss*, the return of German Austria to the motherland, until the Nazi takeover in Germany in 1933.


7. *ibid.*

8. Adler was released when the monarchy fell at the end of the war. Between the wars he was general secretary of the Labour and Socialist International; he died in 1960.

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11. Quoted in Kautsky, *op. cit.*, 485

Chapter 4: The French Socialists and the War

1. Cf. below, 218 – 22
3. Kautsky, *op. cit.*, 494
4. See below, 195 – 6
5. For the following see Rosmer, *MOPG*, 172 – 81
7. *ibid.*, 54; Kautsky, *op. cit.*, 500
8. See below, 216
9. The roles of the papers were reversed after the war and the party schism: *L'Humanité* became, and still is, the Communist Party daily, while *Le Populaire* was the official daily of the SFIO between the wars

Chapter 5: Socialist War Aims: the Alsace-Lorraine Question

1. Cf. above, 112
2. See below, 188-9; Scheidemann's Reichstag speech, December 1915; for the following account, see also E.R. Bevan, *German Social Democracy During the War*
3. Bevan, *op. cit.*, 57 – 8
4. See below, 225
6. *ibid.*, 11 – 18
7. Prime minister and minister of education respectively between the wars
9. *ibid.*, 21
10. *ibid.*, 24
11. 'Marinismus', a word Scheidemann coined
12. Quoted in Kautsky, *op. cit.*, 534
13. *ibid.*, 498 – 9
14. *ibid.*, 516 – 19

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15. *Manchester Guardian*, 31 May and 2 June 1917
16. *Manchester Guardian*, 2 June 1917. The Austrian delegates were not arrested on their return through Germany

Chapter 6: The German 'Peace Resolution'; Social Democracy Splits

2. Pinson, *op. cit.*
3. Bevan, *op. cit.*, 187
4. For the following, see Bevan, *op. cit.*, 40–62; Pinson, *op. cit.*, 33
5. Rosmer, *MOPG*, facsimile opposite 176
7. *ibid.*, 60–1; Pinson, *op. cit.*, 331
8. Bevan, *op. cit.*, 95
9. *ibid.*, 152. Chairman at the Gotha congress was veteran socialist Wilhelm Bock, who had presided over an earlier Gotha congress, in 1875, when a united Social Democratic Party resulted from the merger of the Lassallean General German Workers' Association and the (Marxist) Social Democratic Labour party led by August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht
10. The 'Junius' pamphlet is discussed on 244ff in connection with Lenin's critique
11. Cf. for the following Bevan, *op. cit.*, 32–3 and 47
12. *ibid.*, 51–2
15. Lutz, *op. cit.*, 18–23

Chapter 7: British Marxism and the War

1. Published in *Justice* on 13 August 1914; cf. Tsuzuki, *op. cit.*, 220
2. *ibid.*, 219
4. W. Kendall, *The Revolutionary Movement in Britain, 1900–21*, 88
5. Cf. for the following, Kendall, *op. cit.*, 88–90; Tsuzuki, *op. cit.*, 224–6

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8. ibid., 456 – 66
9. In his reply (XIX, 219) Harrison claimed he had been misunder-
stood on this point, but did not make clear what he did mean
11. ibid., 54
12. ‘The Coming Triumph of Marxist Socialism’ in *English Review*,
XIX, 292
13. ibid., 298
14. See above, 131 – 2
15. *English Review*, XIX, 217
16. ibid., 298
18. *Justice*, 6 May 1915; quoted in Tsuzuki, *op. cit.*, 221
20. Cf. for the following, Tsuzuki, *op. cit.*, 225 – 6; Kendall, *op. cit.*, 
91 – 2
22. In 1920 it was taken over by the Communist Party of Great Britain 
and renamed *The Communist*
cit.*, 101 – 4 Tsuzuki, *op. cit.*, 233 – 5
24. *Justice*, 28 October 1915
25. Kendall, *op. cit.*, 102
26. ibid.
28. The bulk of BSP members joined the Communist Party of Great 
Britain (CPGB) on its foundation. Hyndman’s NSP resumed the 
name Social Democratic Federation in 1919. It was a small sect 
without influence during the inter-war period. Hyndman died in 
1921
31. He later had reservations about Soviet and Comintern 
interference in the communist movement outside Soviet Russia, 
and he never joined the British Community Party; cf. Kendall, *op. 
cit.*, 284 – 91
32. See below, 212ff
33. For example, ‘Lessons of the Russian Revolution’
Chapter 8: International Conferences before Zimmerwald


2. E. Belfort Bax, *Reminiscences and Reflections of a Mid and Late Victorian*, 251

3. This actually happened in December 1914, before the Copenhagen meeting, following a suggestion by the Dutch socialist, P.J. Troelstra, during the preparatory discussions


5. Implied in a report in *L’Humanité*, 16 February 1915; Rosmer *MOPG*, 197

6. Bataille Syndicaliste, 19 February 1915, quoted in *MOPG*, 200–1, n1

7. Soviet foreign minister in the 1930s


9. *ibid.*, 370

10. For the following, see Rosmer, *MOPG, op.cit.*, 306–10

11. *Sotsial-Demokrat*, 1 June 1915; *CW*, XXI, 199–203

12. A typical example of Lenin’s habit of lumping together opponents of completely different hues, in this case pro-war and anti-war (‘centrist’) socialists

13. Later, in October 1915, Lenin called it ‘a miserable pacifist resolution’; *CW*, XXI, 388

14. See above, 195–6

15. Kautsky, *op. cit.*, 539–40

Chapter 9: Zimmerwald, September 1915


2. Rosmer, *MOPG, op. cit.*, 377–8


5. *CW*, XXI, 345–8

6. Rosmer, *MOPG*, 379–82, for the full text

7. *CW*, XXI, 383–8

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Chapter 10: Kienthal: The Second Zimmerwald Conference, April 1916

1. Balabanoff, op. cit., 126–7; the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (USPD), the Serbian Party and organizations in other countries declared their adherence after Kienthal

2. For the following, cf. Balabanoff, op. cit., 126–33; Rosmer, MOPPGM, 87–97 and 233–5; Kautsky, op. cit., 551–3; Braunthal, Gesch. Int., II, 63–6

3. Rosmer, MOPPGM, 82–6

4. ibid., 85

5. CW, XXII, 173–9

6. ibid., 177

7. Rosmer, MOPPGM 95–7

8. Echoing Karl Liebknecht’s message to the ILP Labour Leader, published on 31 December 1914: ‘Each socialist party has its enemy... in its own country. There it has to fight it. The liberation of each nation must be its own work.’

9. Text in Rosmer, MOPPGM 233–6

10. Monatte, Merrheim, Fairchild

11. When the vote was taken, most delegates said that they had specific reservations, but would support the resolution; cf. Balabanoff, op. cit., 131

12. Soon afterwards the three French socialist deputies who had attended the conference — Blanc, Brizon and Raffin-Dugens — cast their votes in parliament against the war budget

13. Rosmer, MOPPGM, 97–9

14. British Zimmerwaldians did not display much interest in the Kienthal documents. In 1916 the ILP’s Socialist Review mentioned the conference but not the manifesto or the resolution

Chapter 11: Stockholm: The Abortive Socialist Peace Conference; the Third Zimmerwald Conference, September 1917

1. For the following, see Braunthal, Gesch. Int., op. cit., II, 79–88


3. ibid., 131–2


5. Manchester Guardian, 2 June 1917


7. Fainsod, op. cit., 145–6

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8. *CW*, XXIV, 82
9. *ibid.*, 90
11. Cf. below, 237
12. See above, 179
13. Balabanoff, *op. cit.*, 169
15. *ibid.*, 94; Balabanoff, *op. cit.*, 172
16. The fact that two international socialist conferences — the third Zimmerwald and the (abortive) general peace conference — were scheduled for the same town at about the same time has caused some confusion among writers dealing with the events of 1917. Trotsky, for all his close association with Zimmerwald, managed to mix up the two events. In his *History of the Russian Revolution* (341 – 2) he mentions that Lenin was isolated in his party with his proposal to boycott Zimmerwald in 1917, and then goes on to say: ‘The Stockholm conference...was never held — a result of those same inner diseases of Zimmerwald which had led Lenin to break with it.’ Trotsky wrote these lines more than a decade after the events; by then he had apparently forgotten that the Zimmerwald conference did meet in Stockholm in September 1917, while the failure of the general conference to materialize had nothing to do with the ‘inner diseases’ of the Zimmerwald movement.

Chapter 12: American Socialism and the First World War
2. Some states prohibited church services in German and its teaching in schools. Hysteria expurgated the vocabulary: ‘Sauerkraut’ became ‘liberty cabbage’, ‘German measles’ were ‘liberty measles’
3. Link, *op. cit.*, 213 n 3

Chapter 13: Russian Defencists and Defeatists
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2. Katkov, op. cit., 61
3. Inside the Left, London 1942, 330
4. J. Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Litovsk. The Forgotten Peace, XIII
5. Inside the Left, 466
6. CW, XXI, 15 – 19
7. ibid., 18
8. In 1915 Trotsky described the wish for Russia’s defeat as ‘absolutely unjustifiable’. Later he recanted and endorsed Lenin’s formula.
9. Martov-Dan, op. cit., 282
10. Cf. for the following, Rosmer, MOPPGM, 104
11. CW, XXI, 163
12. ibid., 315
13. Cf. Lenin’s letter to Shlyapnikov of 31 October 1914; CW, XXXV, 171 – 2, in which he speaks of appeals to workers of the warring countries to wage ‘joint civil war against the bourgeoisie’
14. Rosmer, MOPPGM, 104
15. For the following, see Trotsky, Russian Rev., 300 – 44; Martov-Dan, op. cit., 292 – 302
16. Pravda, 28 March 1917 (new style, as all dates in this chapter); cf. Trotsky, Russian Rev., 305
17. ibid.
18. ibid.
19. CW, XXXIII, 288
20. CW, XXV, 113 – 15
21. CW, XXIII, 333 – 9
22. Such meetings reflected a rapprochement between the two parties, whose leaders held similar views of the war. There was a tendency towards unification, and mergers between branch organizations took place in the provinces. The reversal of the Bolshevik Party’s course under Lenin put paid to this tendency
23. CW, XXIV, 19 – 23
24. Trotsky, Russian Rev., 326
25. CW, XXIV, 270 – 3
26. CW, XXV, 33 – 4
27. For example, CW, XXI, 18, and see above, 234
28. In his last (unfinished) article Trotsky acknowledged the ineffectiveness of the defeatist slogan in the First World War
29. CW, XXVI, 195 – 215

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Chapter 14: Revolutionary Defeatism: International and Historical Aspects

1. For the following, see R. Luxemburg, *Politische Schriften*, II, 19–152; ‘Junius’ was her pen-name
2. *ibid.*, 53
3. *ibid.*, 107
4. *ibid.*, 119
5. *ibid.*, 130–1
6. *ibid.*, 113
7. See below, 248
8. See above, 103–4
9. ‘Junius’, 130
11. *ibid.*, 143–4
12. *ibid.*, 152
13. *CW*, XXII, 305–19
14. *ibid.*, 318–19
15. See above, 103–4; for the following cf. Wolfe, *op. cit.*, 92–5
16. Letter of 25 December 1916; *CW*, XXXV, 268
17. *ibid.*
18. The danger of dismemberment is a dubious criterion for the justice of a war. During the final phase of the Second World War, facing total defeat in the east and the west, Hitler’s Germany claimed to be fighting to prevent dismemberment. She was, and still is, dismembered, but neither Marx nor Engels, nor indeed Lenin, would have said that Germany was fighting a just war in 1944–5
19. *CW*, XXII, 310
20. *CW*, XXXV, 269
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