China at the Crossroads: Nationalists and Communists, 1927–1949
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China at the Crossroads: 
Nationalists and Communists, 1927–1949
edited by F. Gilbert Chan

Concentrating on a transitional epoch, 1927–1949, when China was at the crossroads of revolution, the contributors analyze the Kuomintang's inherent weaknesses as a revolutionary force and the Communists' success in the quest for new formulas to guide the modernization movement. Rejecting the suggestion that external factors determined the outcome of the Kuomintang-Communist conflict, they stress instead the more fundamental issues of the Chinese revolution, pointing to problems such as factionalism in Nanking, the weakness of the New Life Movement as an experiment in thought control and mass mobilization, the failure of land reform in Chekiang, and the ineffectiveness of the anti-Japanese boycott of 1931–1932. The regional power in Sinkiang and the rural problems in Chungking are also emphasized.

Dr. Chan, associate professor of history at Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, has previously taught at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Purdue University, and Wright State University.
China at the Crossroads: Nationalists and Communists, 1927–1949

edited by F. Gilbert Chan
To Ssu-yü Teng

with respect and admiration
Contents

Acknowledgments xi
Introduction: China at the Crossroads, 1927-1949
F. Gilbert Chan 1

PART 1
THE NATIONALISTS, 1927-1937:
A CASE STUDY OF REVOLUTIONARY FAILURE

1 Factional Politics in Kuomintang China, 1928-1937: An Interpretation
Hung-mao Tien 19

2 The New Life Movement before the Sino-Japanese Conflict: A Reflection of Kuomintang Limitations in Thought and Action
Samuel C. Chu 37

3 Agrarian Reform in Nationalist China: The Case of Rent Reduction in Chekiang, 1927-1937
Noel R. Miner 69

4 China's Vulnerability to Japanese Imperialism: The Anti-Japanese Boycott of 1931-1932
Donald A. Jordan 91

PART 2
SINKIANG AND SZECHWAN
IN THE ERA OF JAPANESE AGGRESSION

5 Regionalism and Central Power: Sheng Shih-ts'ai in Sinkiang, 1933-1944
F. Gilbert Chan 127

6 The Kuomintang and Rural China in the War of Resistance, 1937-1945
Robert A. Kapp 151
PART 3
THE COMMUNISTS, 1927-1949:
IN SEARCH OF REVOLUTIONARY MODELS

7 The Origins of Communist and Soviet Movements in China
   Ilpyong J. Kim

8 Chinese Communist Land Reform and Peasant Mobilization, 1946-1948
   Jane L. Price

Selected Bibliography
Contributors
Index
Acknowledgments

As a token of my appreciation for his impeccable scholarship and unfailing friendship, this volume is dedicated, with admiration and gratitude, to Professor Ssu-yü Teng of Indiana University.

Professor Teng came to the United States in the 1930s. In the following decades, Chinese studies flourished in many American universities. He is among the pioneering scholars who have contributed significantly to the understanding of China in this country. His writings have benefited numerous students, among whom are the contributors to this volume. We owe him our gratitude.

It is my personal privilege to have known Professor Teng since 1969, when we were colleagues at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He has since then been a generous friend and, above all, an inspiring teacher. I am particularly thankful for the many long hours he has spent reading my manuscripts, always helpful with constructive and illuminating comments.

It has been a pleasure to work with a group of scholars who share with me an interest in a fascinating period of Chinese history. I appreciate their patience and indulgence, especially when the publication of this volume seemed uncertain. I am grateful for the invaluable assistance of Professor Te-kong Tong, my former teacher at Columbia University, who is now associated with the City College of New York. I am also indebted to Mervyn W. Adams Seldon, whose support of this project has gone beyond the responsibility of a consulting editor, as well as to Henley McIntosh, my doctoral student at Miami University, who has proofread a large portion of the manuscript of this volume. Acknowledgments are due to the East Asian Institute of Columbia University for permission to publish Samuel Chu's article on the New
Life Movement in its revised form, and to Hong Kong University Press for permitting me to include parts of my earlier article on Sheng Shih-ts'ai in the fifth chapter of this volume.

A misfortune was inflicted on my family in April 1976 when I was working on this project. During one of my visits to New York, our house in Oxford, Ohio, was seriously damaged by fire. In my absence, my colleagues at Miami helped my wife, Rosalind, and our two children, Edmund and Sharon, salvage my books from the study. Among the items removed from the fire was the manuscript of this volume. My special thanks go to Richard M. Jellison, Dwight L. Smith, Jay W. Baird, John N. Dickinson, David M. Fahey, Maynard W. Swanson, and Edward B. Parsons. No expression of appreciation is adequate for Mary Jane and James H. Rodabaugh and Franca and Herbert L. Oerter for sharing their homes with us when we lost ours. Finally, I admire Rosalind, Edmund, and Sharon for going through a very difficult period with courage and understanding. Without the love and affection of my family and friends, I would not have been able to complete the work for this volume.
Introduction:
China at the Crossroads, 1927–1949
F. Gilbert Chan

This book concentrates on one crucial period of the Chinese revolutionary movement, which spans the years from the founding of the T'ung-meng-hui (Revolutionary Alliance) in 1905 to the post-Mao Tse-tung era. It deals with a transitional stage, 1927-1949, when China was at the crossroads of revolution. Thanks partly to the tutelage of Soviet Russia, the Kuomintang had risen to power in the 1920s with the tide of nationalism. As George Sokolsky observed in 1929, "no governmental group in China started under better auspices" than the Nationalists in Nanking. Nevertheless, shortly after its military victories of 1926-1928, the Kuomintang, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, was transformed from a party of revolutionaries to one of "traditionalist bureaucrats." In spite of the revolutionary fervor generated by the nationalist movement of the 1920s, the Nanking government was characterized by "ineffective administration, corruption, political repression, and factionalism." Its leaders were seemingly insensitive to the many social and economic problems of the people. The rule of the Nationalists was, in short, a classic example of revolutionary failure.

In contrast, the Kuomintang extermination campaigns notwithstanding, the Communist movement in China was far from dead. In 1934-1935, the party turned the disaster of the Long March into a moral victory. In their search for revolutionary models, the Communist leaders rejected Western democracy and embraced the Russian system of "soviets" as an alternative form of government. In an era of social revolution, they initiated land reform that promised to change the rural structure of Chinese society. They also took advantage of the development of peasant nationalism during the war against Japan and transformed the politically inactive sector of the popula-
tion into a strong revolutionary force. In sharp contrast to the Kuomintang failure, their successes won them the support of the masses, thereby helping to determine the outcome of the civil war in 1949. More important, their experimentation during these years of struggle laid the groundwork for their later endeavors in national reconstruction.

This volume is not a comprehensive study of the Chinese revolution in 1927-1949. It is, instead, a selective analysis of the Kuomintang's inherent weaknesses as a revolutionary force, as well as the Communist success in the quest for new formulae to guide the embattled movement. The book does not delineate the important achievements of the Nanking government; that subject has been sufficiently treated by other scholars. Moreover, with the exception of the two studies on Sinkiang and Szechwan, the chapters on the Nationalists concentrate on the 1927-1937 decade. They outline the chief shortcomings of the Kuomintang in a period when its leaders were supposedly successful in their "nation-building" effort. Significantly, these shortcomings were apparent before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. Indeed, my chapter on Sheng Shih-ts'ai and Robert Kapp's on the Kuomintang in Chungking (both covering the post-1937 years) are generally supportive of this argument. Historians should therefore look beyond foreign aggression for causes of Chiang Kai-shek's expulsion from the mainland.

The failure of the Nationalists, however, did not fully explain the victory of the Chinese Communists. To a considerable degree, the successes of Mao Tse-tung and his comrades were attributable to their ability to offer themselves as an attractive alternative to a government that had lost the "mandate of heaven" to rule China. The two chapters on the Communist movement examine the development of the soviets and the implementation of the land reform as successful examples of revolutionary modernization. In 1949, the Chinese people were confronted with a choice between a reactionary government with obvious weaknesses and a revolutionary movement that promised the nation a better future. Their decision was scarcely affected by the policies of either Soviet Russia or the United States.

In addition to the earlier classics by Edgar Snow and Agnes Smedley, many books have been published since 1960 on the Chinese Communist movement. Among the authors who are particularly interested in 1927-1949 are Chalmers A. Johnson, William Hinton, Mark Selden, Dick Wilson, Jane L. Price, and Ilpyong J.
Nevertheless, with the exception of the recent publications of Lloyd E. Eastman and Hung-mao Tien, little scholarly attention has been paid to the revolutionary failure of the Nationalists. 7 With the hope of stimulating research interest in the subject, this volume devotes more than two-thirds of its space to discussing the weaknesses of the Kuomintang government.

THE NATIONALISTS, 1927-1937: A CASE STUDY OF REVOLUTIONARY FAILURE

For years, scholars have debated the relative importance to assign to foreign and domestic elements in the Kuomintang debacle of 1949. Anthony Kubek blamed the American government for its "policy of appeasement," whereas Hu Shih, a prominent educator in China, maintained that the victory of the Chinese Communists was a product of "Stalin's grand strategy of world conquest." 6 Both views overemphasize the external factors of the Kuomintang-Communist conflict and ignore the more fundamental issues of the Chinese revolution. Indeed, however damaging it may have been for the Nationalists, the war with Japan was not the principal cause of their humiliating defeat in 1949; it only aggravated their problems and intensified their weaknesses.

As head of the Nanking government, Chiang Kai-shek had his share of responsibility for its failure. Nonetheless, to label him as "the man who lost China" is simplistic; no one can lose something he does not own. Chiang was a tragic figure. In an era of modernization, he championed an ideology reminiscent of the Self-Strengthening Movement of the nineteenth century. His military training and Methodist beliefs gave him a high degree of inflexibility that, in many ways, reinforced his obsession with the struggle against Communism. He led a united China to victory against the Japanese yet soon afterward plunged the nation into a civil war that resulted in his political exile to Taiwan. In the end, he symbolized the weaknesses of the Kuomintang government and was overwhelmed by the tides of the Chinese revolution.

In retrospect, many symptoms of the Nationalist failure had been evident in the pre-1927 years. The Kuomintang leadership was represented by a network of personal relations centering on Sun Yat-sen. Many of his comrades were loyal followers whose association with him dated back to the T'ung-meng-hui period. Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei were two notable exam-
ples. In this respect, Chiang Kai-shek was an inadequate successor with no comparable command of the loyalty of his associates. Moreover, the bitterness of the succession struggle after Sun's death in March 1925 remained to haunt him in his difficult task of bringing wealth and power to China. Without the unified support of the party, he had to rely on his unstable alliances with the militarists. This excessive dependence upon military forces undermined the civil authority of his government.

The Kuomintang learned about the political importance of mass mobilization from the Russian sovetnik during the period of party reorganization in 1924-1925. According to Ho Ying-ch'in, however, many of its members were "unwilling to do the real and lower-level work." They were more interested in the form of mass movement than in its substance. The few selflessly committed leaders were ridiculously overburdened. Liao Chung-k'ai headed the Bureau of Workers and, later, concurrently the Bureau of Peasants. At one time, he held thirteen important positions in both the party and the government. This practice of concurrent appointments continued into the 1930s. For instance, Chiang Kai-shek held twenty-one offices, Sun Fo thirteen, and Wang Ching-wei twelve. They paid little attention to the qualifications of the new recruits. Although the membership increased from 150,000 in 1926 to 2 million in 1937, only 10 percent of them were active in party affairs.

The Three Principles of the People, as elaborated in Sun Yat-sen's 1924 lectures, were a Chinese patriot's blueprint for national regeneration. To demonstrate his support for the Kuomintang alliance with Soviet Russia, Sun made some rhetorical concessions to Communism. Nevertheless, despite Tai Chitt'ao's contention, the principles lacked philosophical sophistication. Beyond such slogans as "land to the tiller," they failed to include any cohesive program of social transformation. But, in the absence of a viable political ideology, the Nationalists adopted these principles as their party bible. While the Northern Expedition of 1926-1928 attracted the backing of "old-style mandarins and militarists," the purges of Chinese Communists deprived the Kuomintang of the chance to experiment with new ideas and new leadership. In the 1930s, the Nanking government accomplished "unity of thought" through extensive indoctrination and political repression.

During the epoch of Kuomintang rule, China was at the crossroads of revolutionary modernization. The
political movement of 1911 had not produced any institutional stability. After Yüan Shih-k'ai's abortive attempt to restore the monarchy, Ts'ao K'un further "debased" the Chinese republic with his accession to presidency. While in power in Nanking, the Nationalists likewise did not give republicanism a fair trial. Under the guise of "tutelage," they established a party dictatorship which, according to some scholars, was not dissimilar to European Fascism. Instead of being a transitional stage of the Chinese revolution, the Kuomintang regime appeared as a reactionary interregnum.

The first four chapters in this volume analyze some important aspects of the Nationalist failure. In his essay on "Factional Politics in Kuomintang China, 1928-1937," Hung-mao Tien stresses the institutional weaknesses of the Nanking government. Factionalism was both a symbol and a cause of the failure of the Nationalists to accomplish political integration in China. The result was devastating. To strengthen his ties with loyal factional leaders, Chiang Kai-shek offered them substantial "tangible rewards." Their domination of the government prevented the affiliation of many other talented party members. Moreover, as Tien suggests, "the weaknesses of the Kuomintang as a political institution facilitated the growth of military apparatus." This, in turn, "undercut the party's ability to function" as an effective organization.

Samuel Chu's chapter on the New Life Movement studies the ideological weaknesses of the ruling Kuomintang. While Chiang Kai-shek and his party comrades perceived the movement as a mass campaign, they distrusted the people too much to give New Life any chance of success. Moreover, according to Chu, the movement exhibited an "almost exclusive concern with the urban sector of China." Its leaders were "elitist and paternalistic," and they emphasized appearance over substance. More important, as Chu argues, these damaging characteristics reflected "some of the central aspects of Kuomintang ideology."

Noel Miner's article on "Agrarian Reform in Nationalist China" examines the rent reduction campaign in Chekiang during the decade of 1927-1937. The province had an agrarian economy with an inequitable distribution of landownership. It was politically controlled by party leaders loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. The campaign followed Sun Yat-sen's ideological guideline of "land to the tiller." Nevertheless, the local officials needed the political and financial support of the landlords, and they chose to sacrifice
the opportunity to earn the backing of the masses. They "were not strongly motivated reformers," and they were more concerned with their own base of power than with the results of the campaign. Miner maintains that this "ineptness in rural reform provided the setting for successful Communist activities."

While reflecting on the failure of the Nationalists, Donald Jordan's chapter on the boycott of 1931-1932 does not restrict its discussions to the Nanking government. It stresses China's "vulnerability" to Japanese imperialism, illustrating the political impotence of the Shanghai financial, commercial, and industrial elite. The boycott was an outburst of "commercial nationalism." As Jordan concedes, however, the Chinese capitalists were not motivated solely by their "strong nationalist sentiment." They wanted to wage an economic war against foreign domination of the China market. Their disappointing performance, besides demonstrating the weaknesses of their leadership, revealed some of the problems of the Kuomintang government. The party's ambivalent support of the boycott suggested that the Nationalists did not recognize the potential strength of the anti-Japanese movement. Their inability to mobilize the capitalists at a time of national crisis was a clear indication of the failure of the Kuomintang. The lack of a "unified political and military power in China" partially accounted for the ineffectiveness of the boycott.

THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR AND THE KUOMINTANG DEBACLE OF 1949

The four chapters described above, constituting the first section of this volume, center on the inherent weaknesses of the Kuomintang, still unaffected by the devastation of the Sino-Japanese War. The next section, with two chapters by Robert Kapp and me, concentrates on the period following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria.

In his work on Chiang Kai-shek's "nation-building effort," Arthur Young contends that China's "promising outlook in mid-1937" was "tragically interrupted by Japan." This argument is inept and unconvincing. In fact, the Nationalist failure during the war resulted, to a considerable extent, from the deficiencies of Kuomintang leadership. In addition to the obvious damages inflicted upon the Chungking government, the Sino-Japanese War offered Chiang and his associates a new opportunity for political integration and national reconstruction. Their inability to ex-
plait the opportunity sealed their fate on China's mainland. The war against Japan was not the principal reason for their debacle in 1949.

When Chiang returned to Nanking from Sian on Christmas Day in 1936, his prestige reached a new height. As the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War approached in the following year, Mao Tse-tung and his Communist comrades pledged their support for the national resistance against Japanese aggression. For the first time since 1928, the Kuomintang forces extended their influence to provinces known for regional separatism. Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Szechwan were notable examples. China was politically more integrated than it had been since the decline of the Manchu dynasty.

Furthermore, when the Nationalists moved their seat of government to Chungking in 1937, they were in control of the agriculturally wealthy province of Szechwan. With successful agrarian reform, they could have attracted the support of the rural masses, thereby reducing the threat of Communist challenge in the postwar years. Yet, the Kuomintang leaders were too insensitive to the needs of the Chinese people to initiate any radical program of social change. If political unity on the eve of the anti-Japanese campaigns had generated new hope for national revivification, the optimism was premature and, in many ways, misguided.

Sheng Shih-ts'ai, the warlord in Sinkiang, was the lone challenger to the Kuomintang's attempt at centralization during the war years. My chapter on "Regionalism and Central Power" chronicles his resistance to Chiang's ineffectual endeavors to extend Nationalist authority to this northwestern province. During his governorship, Sheng "entertained a contemptuously low estimate" of the Kuomintang's capability to intervene in Sinkiang's affairs. He adopted an "independent foreign policy," which enhanced Russia's influence in the province at the expense of China's national interests. His rule in Sinkiang demonstrated the political weakness of the Kuomintang government. More important, in spite of their desire to gain effective control of the province, Chiang and his associates were conspicuously unsolicitous about its racial problems. In 1944, when they succeeded in luring Sheng to abdicate his power in Sinkiang for a cabinet position in Chungking, they did not propose any program of social and economic reconstruction to relieve the suffering of the subject races. Hostilities continued between the ruling Chinese and other nationalities, and Chungking's in-
fluence in the province remained tenuous after Sheng's departure.

As illustrated by Robert Kapp's chapter on "The Kuomintang and Rural China," the Nationalist performance in Szechwan during 1937-1945 was, at best, lackluster. While the "refugee regime" was "unprecedentedly dependent" upon the preindustrial resources of interior China, its leaders failed to meet "the daunting challenges of applying central government control to the rural sector of Chinese society." The slogan of "national reconstruction" became hollowly rhetorical, and neither the New Hsien System nor the tax-in-kind program succeeded in halting the decline of the Kuomintang government.

In spite of the gloomy outlook, however, the Nationalists emerged from the catastrophe of the Sino-Japanese War in an apparently strong position. Politically, Chiang benefited from the general euphoria resulting from China's victory over its arch-enemy. His government was diplomatically recognized by all major powers, including Soviet Russia, and such recognition was often accompanied by financial assistance. On paper, his military forces were at least three times more numerous than those of the Chinese Communists. Yet, in a few years, he would be compelled to yield the mainland to the Communists and lead his followers to exile on the island of Taiwan.

In their examination of the causes of the Kuomintang debacle, many scholars maintain that the civil war of 1946-1949 was mainly a military struggle, in which Chiang committed "organizational flaws and strategic errors." His interference in the conduct of war "muddled the command structure," and his insistence on undertaking the Manchurian campaign overextended his military strength. It ended with the loss of 300,000 of his best troops. Consequently, in 1948, the balance shifted "decisively in favor of the Communists."

The Kuomintang government, it is likewise argued, also suffered from the economic damages of postwar inflation. In 1948, the Chinese yüan depreciated to such an extent that it required 12 million to exchange one American dollar. In August, the Nationalists issued a new currency, the gold yüan, at the official value of four to one American dollar. But, barely nine months afterward, the ratio of exchange dropped to 70 million to one. As the Kuomintang was facing political disaster, an embroidered linen handkerchief cost 750,000 gold yüan, and a party of six people had to pay 50 million for a Peking duck dinner. "It
was impossible," noted a foreign journalist, "to find out how the desperately poor and the unemployed managed to keep living."

Nevertheless, military blunders and economic mismanagement offered only superficial explanations for Chiang's expulsion from China's mainland. They were manifestations, and not causes, of the Kuomintang's inherent weaknesses. The ridiculously low morale of the Nationalist troops could not have been attributable to strategic errors alone; it was the product of political corruption, as well as social and economic stagnation. Similarly, the Nanking government failed to control inflation mostly because its officials were unwilling to offend "vested interests." They lacked "courage and determination" to adopt stringent and, perhaps, unpopular anti-inflationary measures which would yield long-term benefits.

THE COMMUNISTS, 1927-1949: IN SEARCH OF REVOLUTIONARY MODELS

The Nationalist failure notwithstanding, the Chinese Communists did not move into a political vacuum and win the civil war in 1949 by default. Their leaders, notably Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, and Chou En-lai, had devoted their entire adult lives to the search for revolutionary models that would bring wealth and power to China. They had successfully merged the demands of a war against Japanese aggression with the needs of a social revolution. Their victory in 1949 concluded a significant stage of experimentation. The third section of the present volume, with chapters by Ilpyong Kim and Jane Price, analyzes two important aspects of the Communist experience.

With the purges of 1927, the Chinese Communist alliance with the Nationalists collapsed. The impact of the failure of the "bloc within" strategy was disastrous. The party membership dropped from 58,000 in April to "a little more than 10,000" by November. Without implicating the Comintern, Ch'en Tu-hsiu was blamed by his Communist associates for the catastrophe of Stalin's "united front" policy. In the following years, Ch'en's vacated position in the party leadership was filled by Ch'ü Ch'i'u-pai, Li Li-san, and the "twenty-eight Bolsheviks." The Chinese Communists, free from their alliance with the Kuomintang, were convinced that only they could bring about radical changes in China. Yet, by following the orthodox urban orientation of the Comintern, they
suffered one setback after another. The Russian revolutionary model had failed. On the eve of the Long March in 1934, the party was obviously in urgent need of new leadership and new direction.

The origins of "the Maoist strategy" can be dated from Mao Tse-tung's completion of his "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan." In this important document of 1927, the future Chinese Communist leader ignored the Marxian emphasis on the urban proletariat and stressed the revolutionary strength of the peasantry. Mao predicted that the peasants would "rise like a mighty storm, like a hurricane." They would unleash "a force so swift and violent that no power, however great, will be able to hold it back." This uprising against "the feudal landlords" would initiate "a revolution without parallel in history." Thus, Mao urged his comrades to change "all the wrong measures ... concerning the peasant movement." Nevertheless, his heretical plea fell on unsympathetic ears.

In 1927, Mao was "a vigorous young Communist, unhampered by a deep knowledge of Marxism-Leninism." His report on the peasant movement in Hunan was "written in the white heat of passion." It would be a mistake to assume that he planned, at this early stage, to challenge the orthodoxy of Soviet Russia by devising a new theory of revolution for China. The Sinification of Communism -- known to some scholars as "Maoism" -- was the product of a long process of adapting an alien, urban-oriented strategy to the realities of an agrarian society. It formed an integral part of the search for revolutionary models.

Mao's flight to Chingkangshan after the failure of the Autumn Harvest Uprising gave him the first opportunity to test his conception of a peasant revolution in China's hinterland. In defeat, he did not have many choices. Chingkangshan was not an urban center. He could not rely on the industrial workers to lead the peasantry. His inability to mobilize the rural masses would result in a personal catastrophe, probably terminating prematurely his revolutionary career. To gain the support of the peasants, he thus adopted the policy of "complete confiscation and thorough redistribution" of land. With Chu Teh's able assistance, he also blended the Chinese "peasant-insurgent military tradition" with "the Russian-imported political techniques of mass mobilization" to develop the "nucleus" of the Red Army. His guerrilla tactics proved extremely useful in the party's later struggles against both the Kuomintang and the Japanese aggressors.
Despite his success in the hinterland, Mao's road to power in the Chinese Communist Party was rough and uneven. His ideological conflict with the "returned students" did not end with the Tsunyi Conference in January 1935, when he assumed political control of the party. Nonetheless, the Long March strengthened his commitment to bringing about fundamental changes in China. By 1936, "the Maoist strategy" had taken "full form," and it transformed the "entire concept" of the Chinese revolution. Mao and his comrades were further helped in 1937 by the outbreak of the anti-Japanese War, which enabled the Communists to exploit the nationalist sentiments of the peasantry. The support of the rural masses provided the party with a solid base for its eventual challenge of the Kuomintang government.

In 1942, Mao reaffirmed his commitment to the "mass line" with his call for a rectification (cheng-feng) movement in Yanan. The Chinese revolution was a "people's war," and its political objective was to replace the Kuomintang "tutelage" with a "new democracy." Ideologically, Mao's campaign of rectification "marked the final eclipse" of the "returned students." The "Yenan way" evolved amidst attacks on subjectivism, sectarianism, and formalism. This experience in mass indoctrination, based on a "broad vision of man and society in revolution," helped to create an ideal Communist who "transcended barriers of specialization and status." An activist in the party should combine in himself "the values and accomplishments of the laborer, the leader, the soldier, and the student."

The last two chapters in this volume offer examples of the revolutionary experimentation of the Chinese Communist Party. This quest for new models contrasted sharply with the failure of the Nationalists. In "The Origins of Communist and Soviet Movements in China," Ilpyong Kim analyzes the development of soviets as "an organizational technique for mass political action." The adoption of this institution represented a forward step in China's march toward a proletarian-socialist revolution. In the process, the Chinese Communists adjusted the Russian model to suit the realities of their society. They turned an urban-oriented movement into one based upon the agrarian population of China.

In a complementary article, Jane Price discusses the intricate relationship between land reform and mass mobilization. During the civil war, the radicalization of the peasantry was a political necessity.
Yet, as Price argues, the reform was "never an end in itself." The Chinese Communist leadership was "ideologically committed to creating a nation in which private property would ultimately be abolished altogether." In spite of the tone of utopian idealism, this was an objective that helped the Communists to win a struggle spanning two decades.

IN PLACE OF CONCLUSION

As a revolutionary party, the Kuomintang was seriously defective. Both Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek overlooked the importance of organization and discipline, while demanding personal allegiance from their followers. The party lacked the unifying force of a well-defined ideology, and many members indulged in factional politics. They were often more concerned with their selfish interests than with the social and economic problems of the populace. In 1928, these weaknesses were sublimated by the success of the Northern Expedition, but they became intensified in the following years as the Kuomintang regressed "from revolution to restoration." Meanwhile, Chiang's obsession with anti-Communism diverted his government from the task of national reconstruction, and he prolonged the period of "party tutelage" under the pretext of Japanese aggression. In the end, the Kuomintang lost the support of the people, and its leaders had to seek political sanctuary on the island of Taiwan.

In contrast, the Chinese Communist Party accumulated an impressive record on revolutionary experimentation, despite its disastrous defeats in 1927 and 1934. Thanks to Mao Tse-tung's Sinification of Communism, the party formulated a successful strategy based upon land reform and mass mobilization. The Communist movement became a dynamic political force on the eve of China's victory over Japan, as the Kuomintang was dragged into the quagmire of inflation by its own inherent weaknesses. The civil war was a political struggle between the two parties, and the Communist triumph was as much the result of Mao's success as it was the product of Nationalist failure.

The Kuomintang-Communist rivalries during the critical years of 1927-1949 dramatized China's arduous experience in modernization. The military victory of the Northern Expedition created an illusion of revolutionary success. Chiang and the new ruling elites in Nanking did not initiate any lasting changes to improve the livelihood of the masses. They failed to give republicanism an opportunity to take root in
China. In 1949, the Communists overthrew a corrupt and reactionary government, yet this remarkable accomplishment did not by itself lead the beleaguered nation toward the path of revivification. As guardians of the "mandate of heaven," they must bear the awesome responsibility of bringing about China's socialist transformation. The nation's future depends upon their success in this formidable endeavor.

NOTES


10. Eastman, *Abortive Revolution*, pp. 10, 285-86. Similarly, the Chinese Communist Party has often appointed its leaders to concurrent positions, although such practice is less common in Western democratic nations.


17. Loh (ed.), *Kuomintang Debacle*, p. viii; Liu,
Military History, pp. 259, 260; and Barnett, China, p. 11.


Cf. Kataoka, *Resistance and Revolution*, in which the author argues that the Maoist strategy of "peasant war" collapsed in 1934. Henceforth, the Chinese Communists "turned toward the cities" (p. 9). They appealed to the nationalism of "the urban middle class and intellectuals" and compelled the Kuomintang to abandon its effort to exterminate Communism in China (p. 309).


sus fragmented, and broad-based support never materialized, the party's dominant factional system did much to alienate many talented Kuomintang leaders without being able to recruit enough substitutes of high quality. The party's failure to develop into an effective instrument of political integration and mobilization made it possible for its rival force, the Chinese Communists, to emerge as an alternative to foster China's political development toward a radically different course of action.

NOTES

1. To the extent that both factions and cliques depend heavily on personalities and personal ties for their survival, the two terms can be used interchangeably. The term "p'ai-hsi" in Chinese connotes the meanings of both "faction" and "clique," although "p'ai" alone spells more accurately the meaning of "faction," while "hsi" implies a narrower scope of group formation and activities that are best described by the term "clique." Thus, referring to the Chiang Kai-shek faction and the C. C. Clique that was attached to it, the Chinese equivalent expressions should be Chiang p'ai and Ch'en hsi respectively. Aside from such distinction, there is virtually no conceptual difference in the use of the two terms in this chapter. Insofar as such faction-like formations permeated the structure of political conflicts, we may speak of the Kuomintang politics in the decade of 1928-1937 as "factional politics."


7. Group division and competition based on strong ideological interests may not be the same as factional conflict. To the extent that a faction is an odd assortment of temporary allies held together by a series of dyadic ties and, in some instances, supportive structures, its interests mainly lie in acquiring and holding onto power, rather than in establishing and maintaining an ideological position. Grouping of rival Kuomintang elites on the basis of their strong ideological orientation during 1923-1927 differs from the usual definition of factionalism. The end of the Kuomintang-Communist alliance in 1927, however, marked the beginning of a political conflict structure that was not primarily dictated by ideological interests, although ideological rhetoric persisted. It is thus important to make some conceptual distinction between group competition within the Kuomintang before and after 1927. I would like to thank Professor James C. Scott for pointing out this important conceptual distinction.


9. The two good articles on the left-wing group are: Jerome Ch'en, "The Left Wing Kuomintang -- A

10. Andrew Nathan defines doctrinalism as "the couching of factional struggle for power in terms of abstract issues of ideology, honour, and fact." According to him, factions often "adopt rigid and minutely defined ideological positions, exaggerate small differences on abstract questions, and stress the purity of their own motives." See Nathan, "Factionalism Model," p. 49.


13. The important appointments were Ch'en Kung-po as minister of industry, Ku Meng-yü, minister of railways, and Kan Nai-kuang, vice minister of interior.


but also in almost everything else they tried to accomplish.

In short, the Kuomintang failed not only because of what it was, but also because of what it tried to be. It had before it the models of Japan and other nations. In later years, the Chinese Communist Party, in its social and hygienic programs, did much of what the Kuomintang had attempted to do in the New Life Movement. There were, of course, vast differences between Kuomintang and Communist operations. Thanks to the foresight of Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese Communists perceived the efficacy of tying their fortunes to the peasants. They strove for both substance and appearance, and they moderated their own paternalistic and elitist tendencies in their successful mobilization of the masses. Essentially there were no deficiencies in the content of the New Life Movement's aspirations or programs that another leader or another party could not have overcome. In this, the New Life Movement closely resembled its parent Kuomintang. The failure of the movement thus provides an excellent case study of the larger failure of the Kuomintang itself.

NOTES


4. Ibid., pp. 56-105.

5. Ibid., pp. 116-18.


12. The following materials on the promotion associations are largely drawn from *Handbook*, pp. 12-13; and *Report*, pp. 204-208.


14. Personal notes of Professor John E. Orchard, based on talks with Colonel Huang Jen-lin, April 24, 1939.


22. Ibid., pp. 284-390.

23. For the accomplishments of the movement, see *ibid.*, pp. 290-429.


27. Ibid., Vol. XXXIII (March 1936), pp. 1-2.

28. Ibid., p. iii.


31. Orchard notes.


36. *Tu-li p'ing-lun* /Independent Review/, Vol. CXV (April 8, 1934), pp. 17, 20; and *I-shih pao* /Pub-

superficial reform efforts, they left the peasants with no alternative except revolution and full expropriation of landlord property.

Even though rent reduction is its central subject, this chapter does not suggest that the Nationalist failure in agrarian reform is the only explanation for the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949. There are too many non-Communist societies with unequal land distribution to claim that inequitable landholdings can alone generate revolution. Even Mark Selden denies that the single factor of unequal distribution of land could have been enough to bring about Communist success. The effects of the Sino-Japanese War, Communist techniques of organization embodied in the mass line and new democracy, and the relative weakness of Kuomintang political, economic, or military leadership helped to determine the outcome of the civil war in 1949. Nevertheless, Nationalist ineptitude in rural reform did provide a setting for successful Communist activities. Inequitable land distribution and the oppressive socio-economic relationships it engendered helped provide the tinder that organized revolutionaries sparked into fire.

NOTES


7. Hsing-cheng-yuan nung-ts'un fu-hsing wei-


14. Yuji Muramatsu, "A Documentary Study of Chinese Landlordism in Late Ch'ing and Early Republican Kiangnan," in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol. XXIX, No. 3 (1966), pp. 566-99. Both the source materials and the interviews suggest that such bursaries were limited to only a few counties on the northern Yangtze plain, especially Wuhsing, Pinghu, and Shaohsing. Clan and temple land rent to tenant farmers in an impersonal rental system was far more common throughout the province.


19. Ibid., May 3, 1929; and August 9, 1929, p. 5.

20. K'ung Hsüeh-hsiung, Chung-kuo chin-jih chih
nung-ts’un yün-tung / The Rural Movement in China Today / (Shanghai, 1934), pp. 329-400.


31. Ibid., p. 34.
that the Japanese had on the Chinese market. Apparently the boycott did push the Japanese civilian population to support the military leaders who offered their "fundamental solution" to the matter of Japan's place in the Chinese economy. Despite the fervor of some patriotic elements among the Chinese citizenry against Japan's military and economic imperialism, the boycott revealed how vulnerable a decentralized, disunited China remained in 1931. At various stages of the boycott, the motivations of the in-fighting Kuomintang factions in Nanking and Canton seemed self-serving. Prior to the Manchurian Incident of September 18, many Chinese vacillated in their support of the boycott. The ambiguous support that the Nanking government provided to the commercial nationalism expressed in the anti-Japanese movement was not on a par with the positive influence that a more centralized political system could wield over an integrated nation-state. What was better than nothing was not good enough for China.

NOTES


5. Japan Advertiser (Tokyo), July 15, 1931, from Shanghai; Asahi shimbun, July 21, 1931, p. 2. See also Japanese Naval Attaché Kitaoka at Shanghai, telegram No. 70 (July 14, 1931) to Tokyo, in Reel 27 of the Library of Congress collection of Japanese Navy and Army Archives.


8. Remer, Chinese Boycott, cites a "National Salvation Fund Movement" of 1915 (p. 48). See also Mainichi, November 20, 1931, for the origins of
the 1931 boycott (p. 5).


16. North China Herald, August 18, 1931, and October 20, 1931; and ONI report of July 24, 1931, p. 5.


22. ONI Naval Attaché report from China, August 7, 1931, p. 7.

23. Mainichi, August 12, September 4, September 19, 1931. On these days, the financial page followed closely the sales abroad of Osaka's leading industry.

24. Ibid., August 3, 1931; and Asahi, August 12, 14, 15, 1931, from the Asahi correspondent in Shanghai and the Rengo news agency there.


31. Mainichi, August 18, 1931, p. 1, via the Dentsu service in Shanghai.
33. Ibid., p. 501; Japan Advertiser, August 13, 1931, p. 3; Asahi, August 15, 1931, p. 2; and Mainichi, August 18, 1931, p. 3.
34. Japan Advertiser, August 26, 1931, p. 4; September 1, 1931, p. 1.
35. Asahi, September 2 and 4, 1931, included reports by Dentsu, Rengo, and Asahi correspondents on the boycott in Tientsin and Manchuria.
36. Mainichi, September 9 and 10, 1931, front page headlines.
41. Japan Advertiser, September 27, 1931, p. 5.
43. Japan Advertiser, October 6, 1931, p. 1, via the Nippon Dempo service in Shanghai; and Mainichi, October 7, 1931, p. 1, Dentsu agency in Shanghai.
44. North China Herald, October 13, 1931, p. 41, from the official Kuo Min news agency.
45. John Israel, Student Nationalism in China, 1927-1937 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), and reported by contemporary press.
47. *Mainichi*, October 22 and November 19, 1931.
The financial pages summarized the official investigation of the effects of the Chinese boycott. See also *China Weekly Review,* November 21, 1931, p. 461.
48. *Asahi,* September 27, 1931, with reports on both meetings (p. 2). See also *Japan Advertiser,* September 30, 1931, p. 7.
49. *North China Herald,* October 6, 1931, p. 12; *Asahi,* October 6, 1931, p. 4.
52. *Asahi,* October 9, 1931, p. 2, from Shanghai; *North China Herald,* October 27, 1931, p. 127.
53. *Japan Advertiser,* October 14, 1931, p. 2.
60. ONI Naval Attache report of November 13, 1931, matches the special report from Shanghai, filed for *Mainichi,* November 20, 1931, datelined November 18. See also *Shih-pao / The Times /, December 12, 17, 18, 1931.*
63. *Asahi,* September 11, 1931, p. 3; *Japan Advertiser,* September 12, 1931, p. 9; and *Mainichi,* September 12, 1931, p. 7.
64. *Mainichi,* November 3, 1931, p. 7; *Japan Ad-
65. M. Gandhi, *Young India* (Bombay, July 17, 1931); and *Mainichi*, November 1, 1931, p. 7.


71. *Ibid.*, October 10 and 19, 1931, trade page. See also ONI Naval Attaché report on China, October 30, 1931, p. 10; *North China Herald*, March 15, 1931, p. 403; *Asahi*, October 14, 1931, p. 4, estimates that it would cost the AJNSA 36,000 yuan daily to pay the 60,000 plus workers while they were on strike.


73. *Japan Advertiser*, January 30, 1932, pp. 5 and 7; February 2, 1932, p. 7.


The weaknesses of Sheng's leadership could not, however, fully account for the failure of national integration. Because of their political ineptitude, Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang comrades were at least partially responsible for the development of regional independence in Sinkiang during 1933-1944.

Fortified by their nominal success in national reunification, the Kuomintang leaders were eager to consolidate their political gains in the northwestern province. Yet, they underestimated the limitations of their authority, and they failed to propose a positive program of provincial reconstruction after Chin Shu-jen's fall from power. Moreover, they alienated the new Sinkiang officials by playing one faction against another, thus hurting their chance to bring the province under central control. The estrangement also furnished the Russians with an opportunity to expand their influence over this border region.

Sheng's pledge of allegiance to Chungking in 1942 could have resulted in the resurrection of central authority in Sinkiang. Nevertheless, the Nationalists were too preoccupied with appeasing the Soviets to try to understand the complexities of provincial problems. They permitted Sheng to use their appointees in Urumchi as pawns for political bargaining. When Sheng extracted a cabinet appointment from Chungking, his removal seemed to demonstrate more the weakness of central power than its strength. In spite of the Chinese policy of appeasement, the Russians were waiting to reassert their influence in the midst of racial hostilities. In the end, the Kuomintang takeover of Sinkiang did not enhance the prestige of the central government in the province; nor did it halt the erosion of Chinese sovereignty in an era of Soviet penetration.

NOTES


2. RFIS, pp. 201, 207.

3. Owen Lattimore, Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict (New York: Macmillan Co., 1932). The first half of this chapter is based partly on my article, "The Road
to Power: Sheng Shih-ts'ai's Early Years in Sinkiang, 1933-1934," Journal of Oriental Studies, Vol. VII, No. 2 (July 1969), pp. 224-60. Acknowledgments are due to Hong Kong University Press, which publishes the journal, for permission to reproduce some sections of the article in this chapter.

4. SSIS, p. 13.


7. For reasons for Sheng's failure to earn an important appointment in Nanking, see SSIS, p. 14; and Owen Lattimore, Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1950), p. 70.


12. When Japan invaded Manchuria, these soldiers were driven out of their homeland. They finally reached Sinkiang after being interned in Russia. Eric Teichman describes them as "a strong body," and Owen Lattimore suggests that the Soviet government had sent them to Sinkiang to strengthen the provincial military capability. See Teichman, Journey to Turkistan (London: Hodder & Stoughton, Ltd., 1937), pp. 20, 187; and Lattimore, Pivot, p. 69. Cf. SSIS, p. 16.


14. RFIS, pp. 159-60. Sun Fu-k'un, a detractor,

15. Sheng described Sinkiang, with a population of fourteen different nationalities, as "a living ethnological museum." See RFIS, p. 156.

16. Sheng had allegedly surrounded the assembly hall with soldiers brought back from Uraba and engineered the election in order to produce the desired result. See Chang, *Sze-shih-nien*, p. 40.


22. For details of the mission, see Wu, *Turkistan*, pp. 148-69. The author was a member of the mission.


27. Peter Fleming, *News from Tartary: A Journey

28. Lo was accompanied by a secretary, Feng Yuchen, who recorded the visit in a book, Hsin-chiang shih-chia chī / An Account of the Sinkiang Investigation / (Shanghai, 1934). See particularly pp. 119-202.


30. RFIS, p. 163.

31. Sven Hedin reports that Apresoff was the only man "who was more powerful than Sheng" in Urumchi. See Hedin, The Silk Road (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1938), p. 166. See also Clubb, China, pp. 289-90, on Pogodin's organization of secret police.

32. RFIS, p. 163.

33. Ibid.

34. In August 1933, Pravda complained about the "imperialistic infiltration into Sinkiang." A Soviet diplomat also warned China of the danger of permitting the province "to become a second Manchuria." See SSIS, pp. 22, 24; and Theodore White, "Report from Turkestan," Time (October 25, 1943), p. 27.


36. RFIS, p. 164.

37. Quoted from Sheng's telegram to Nanking, July 16, 1934, in Su-lien tui Hsin-chiang, p. 32.

38. RFIS, p. 164.


40. RFIS, p. 161.


44. RFIS, p. 177.
46. SSIS, p. 35.
49. For details of the negotiations, see ibid., pp. 32-38.
51. SSIS, p. 50.
53. Ibid., pp. 191, 207.
55. Ibid., p. 222.
56. Ibid., p. 226.
59. Hsin-chiang jih-pao / Sinkiang Daily/ (Urumchi), April 15, 1943; June 18, 1943; and April 14, 1944.
60. John Davies to Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt, August 6, 1942, in Foreign Relations, 1942, p. 227.
65. SSIS, p. 98.
66. Vice President Wallace to President Roosevelt, July 10, 1944, in Foreign Relations, 1944, p. 240.
NOTES


8. Lin Chi-yung, Min-ying ch'ang-k'uang nei-ch'ien chi-lu: Wo-kuo kung-yeh tsung-t'ung-yuan chih hsū-mu / The Story of the Movement of Privately-Run Factories and Mines to the Interior: First Act in Our Country's Industrial General Mobilization / (Chungking, 1942) is the most detailed account of this industrial migration.

9. For wide-ranging discussions of the economic background in Szechwan, see Chiang Chun-chang, Hsin-nan ching-chi ti-lik / Economic Geography of the Southwest (Shanghai, 1946); Lu P'ing-teng, Ssu-ch'uan nung-ts'un ching-chi / Szechwan's Rural Economy / (Shanghai, 1936); and Kanda Masao, Shisen shō sōran / A General Look at Szechwan / (Tokyo, 1937).


16. Drumwright (Chengtu) to Vincent (Chungking), March 24, 1943, in Vincent (Chungking) to Department of State (893.00/15003); and Liao T'ai-ch'u, "The K'o Lao Hui in Szechwan," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XX, No. 2 (June 1947), pp. 161-73.


22. Ch'en Po-hsin, Chung-kuo ti-fang tzu-chih yü

24. An example is Wu Ting-ch'ang, Hua-hsi hsien-pi / Jottings from Hua-hsi/ (Kueiyang, 1943). Wu was for many years governor of Kweichow.

25. For a survey of KMT administrative policy in "Bandit Suppression Zones," see Ch'en Mou-hsing, Chiao-fei ti-fang hsing-cheng chih-tu / The Bandit-Suppression Local Administrative System/ (Shanghai, 1936). See also Tien, Government and Politics, pp. 96-114.

26. The full text of the "Outline" appears in Ta-kung pao / L'impartial/, September 22, 1939.


29. Ibid., p. 111.


38. P'eng, Ch'en, and Ch'en, Ch'uan-sheng t'ien-fu, p. 43.


42. Ch'en, T'ien-fu, pp. 103-104. See also Shih T'i-yüan, "Ssu-ch'uan sheng t'ien-fu kai-cheng shih-wu chih ching-kuo" / The Szechwan Experience with Converting to Tax-in-Kind /, Ching-chi hui-pao, Vol. VI, Nos. 1 and 2 (July 16, 1942), p. 6.


44. Daitōashō, Jūkei seiken no naijō, pp. 51-52; and Gaimushō, Seikō oyo Shisen kinjō, p. 39.

45. Of the 136 hsien-level land tax control bureaus established under the new system, more than ninety were formed by merely "reorganizing" existing
hsien collection bureaus (cheng-shou chü), which had survived repeated attempts to eliminate them or curtail their excessive independence. See Shih, "Ssu-ch'uan sheng t'ien-fu," p. 41. Particularly vivid evidence of this can be found in Jukei joho Chung-king Intelligence Report, May 19, 1941; and Hsin-hua jih-pao New China Daily, December 3, 1939, quoted in Kariya Kyutaro (ed.), Shina nöson keisai no shin dökō New Trends in the Chinese Rural Economy (Tokyo, 1940); and two speeches by Sun Fo, in Ta hou-fang yu-lun Public Opinion in the Great Rear Area (n.p., 1944), pp. 49-50.


50. Kuo-min ts'an-cheng hui Ch'uan-K'ang shih-ch'a t'uan pao-kao-shu Report of the Investigative Team on Szechwan and Sikang of the People's Political Conference (Chungking, 1939), p. 290, is one of many references to this.


52. A description of the recruitment mechanism appears in Chou, Ssu-ch'uan yü tui-jih k'ang-chan, pp. 238-47.

53. In addition to ibid., useful sources on wartime conscription in Szechwan are: Ch'en Hung-chin, "Ts'ung Ssu-ch'uan ping-i wen-t'i lun nung-ts'un cheng-chih te kai-ke" On the Conscription Problem in Szechwan and Rural Political Reform, Chung-kuo nung-ts'un Rural China, Vol. VI, No. 5 (n.d.), pp. 7-10; Li Ch'uan-sheng, Jukei no higeki The Tragedy of Chungking (Shanghai, 1941); Mantetsu chōsabu, Shina kōsenryoku, pp. 112-19; and Kuo-min ts'an-cheng hui, pp. 315-19.

55. Materials on banditry in wartime Szechwan are abundant. See, for example, Kuo-min ts'an-cheng hui.


57. Ibid. For discussions of the revival of other long-standing agricultural practices, including rural fairs, see the same newspapers, August 18, 1978; September 1, 1979; and October 14, 1978.
movement, was borrowed by the Chinese Communist leaders and adapted to meet the demands of realities in China after the failure of their attempts to carry out an urban-oriented revolution. They accepted the soviets as the organizational technique of the "mass-line" style of leadership in the effort to win over mass support and bridge the gap between the party's new policy line and the masses of the people. The concept of the soviets, however, was gradually adapted to the peculiar revolutionary situation of China in the course of shifting the urban-based revolution to a rural-centered revolution and of resolving the structural problems of the party and the government. The soviets were thus developed by such leaders as Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh in their endeavor to resolve the particular problems of the Chinese revolution. These problems were, for example, the creation of a new political order by overthrowing the existing political institutions, the execution of land reform programs by eliminating the oppressive landlord class, and the expansion of the Red Army by recruiting and training the peasant masses. When this framework of a "mass-line" style of political movement became more universally applicable, it served as the foundation for developing governmental institutions based on the Kiangsi soviet. The political institutions developed since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 were inspired by the experiences of institution building during the Kiangsi soviet period. Mao's experiment in the rural base of Chingkangshan in the 1930s provided the foundation on which he was able to extend his political institutions throughout China after his 1949 victory.

NOTES


2. For the text of this resolution, see Pu-erh-sai wei-k'o / Bolshevik/, No. 6 (November 28, 1927), pp. 140-50. This was an official publication of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. Its first issue appeared in Shanghai on October 24, 1927. The Library of Congress in Washington,
D.C., has Nos. 1-19 (incomplete). The party's Central Bureau of the Soviet Area also published a journal with the same title. See Pu-erh-sai-wel-k'o, No. 1 (July 1934), collected in Shih Sou Collection (21 reels of microfilm made available by the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, at Stanford University), Reel 15. Hereafter cited as Shih Sou Collection in Microfilm.


4. Ibid., p. 61.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p. 62.


14. Chang Kuo-t'ao, Ts'ai Ho-sen, and Pien Shih-ch'i were reportedly among the leaders of the fifty-four member delegation. This was the first participation of the Chinese Communist Party in an international conference. See Shina nenkan /China Yearbook/ (Tokyo, 1935), p. 1599.


16. Ibid., p. 228.


18. Victor Kotok, "How the Soviets Function," The Soviet Representative System (Moscow: Progress Pub-


26. For Trotsky's view, see Leon Trotsky, Problems of the Chinese Revolution (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1932). For Stalin's view, see Stalin, "The Prospects of the Revolution in China," pp. 1581-84; and his statement at the tenth session of the eight plenum of the Executive Committee of the Commu-

27. Quoted from Eudin and North, Soviet Russia, p. 369.

28. Ibid.


31. Pu-erh-saiwei-k'o, No. 6 (November 28, 1927). This is a special issue devoted to the enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party in November 1927.

32. Ibid.

33. These ideas emerged from my conversation with Chang Kuo-t'ao in Hong Kong in December 1964. See also his memoirs, "Wo te hui-i" / My Memoirs/, published serially in Ming-pao, a Hong Kong monthly, beginning in March 1966.

34. For the editorials, see "Proclamation of the Publication of Pu-erh-saiwei-k'o," No. 1 (October 24, 1927); "Long Live Bolshevism!" No. 6 (November 28, 1927); "Long Live the Soviet System of Government!" No. 11 (December 26, 1927). For the three important articles signed by Ch'ü Ch'iu-p'ai, see "What Kind of Revolution Is the Chinese Revolution?" No. 5 (November 21, 1927); "The Question of Armed Insurrections," No. 10 (December 19, 1927); and "Democracy and the Soviet System," No. 15 (January 30, 1928).


36. Ibid., p. 308.

37. Ibid., p. 309.


39. Ibid.

40. Ibid., p. 429.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. For the text of this resolution, see Pu-erh-saiwei-k'o, No. 6 (November 28, 1927).

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid. It is interesting to note that during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966-1968 the Chinese Communist leaders once again revived the concept of the revolutionary committee. Under the principle of "the three-way alliance,"
the representatives from the revolutionary mass organizations, the People's Liberation Army, and the revolutionary cadres (of the party and the government) were able to participate in the policy-making process.

46. Ibid.


48. A full text of the resolution, "Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang ti liu-tz'u tai-piao ta-hui chiueh-i-an" / Resolution_of the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party/, is available at the Division of Orientalia, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. It is also included in Shih Sou Collection in Microfilm, Reel 15, Item 34.


50. A slate of candidates presented by Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai to staff the eight other committees was rejected by the congress because the slate excluded the people who either had opposed the policy of the Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai leadership or were suspected of being critical of the policy at various committee meetings. Each of these committees was to draft one resolution on the peasant movement, the land question, the trade union movement, the women's movement, the youth movement, the propaganda work, the organizational questions of the soviet government and the Chinese Communist Party. What Ch'ü apparently wanted to do was to avoid any criticism of his own policy by placing his followers on various draft committees. When Ch'ü failed to get approval of his slate of candidates, he walked out of the congress. See Chang, "Wo te hui-i," p. 97.


52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.
ated areas, successful implementation in recently conquered regions required painstaking attention to local conditions and strong local party leadership. Such conditions were increasingly difficult to meet as the Chinese Communist Party spread throughout a territory three times its original base.

Movement-building needs during the final phase of the civil war were redefined as a general drive toward stability, administrative efficiency, and centralization. The mixed land policy for consolidated and unconsolidated areas stressed attention to stages of agrarian work and concern with developing production. It was to help insure uninterrupted supplies of food to the People's Liberation Army, as well as to the cities it liberated. Geared to the party's attempts to assert control over vast reaches of former enemy territory and urban areas, the agrarian policy set in mid-1948 did not change until after the end of the civil war. Further land reform work took place under Chinese Communist consolidation of the entire mainland, when the People's Republic of China promulgated the Agrarian Reform Law on June 30, 1950.

Although the Communist agrarian reform policies brought uneven results, they helped the Communist movement destroy the old power structure in the countryside and build a new one in its place. Land reform was an important technique for mobilizing manpower and resources to back military efforts. And Communist attempts to equalize wealth and deliver social justice helped undermine Nationalist legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese people. In all these ways the Communist agrarian policies fed into the final confrontation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party.

NOTES


2. It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the evolution of Chinese Communist strategy and organizational techniques concerning the peasant movement. See, for example, Carol Corder Andrew, "The Relationship Between the Chinese Communist Party and the Peasant Movement, 1921-1927: Ideological and Organizational Aspects" (M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1964); Ilpyong J. Kim, The Politics


13. Shantung Provincial Government, "Resolutions on Land Reform in Shantung Province," October 25, 1946; Shensi-Kansu-Ningshia Liberated Area, "Regulations for the Draft Purchase of Landlords' Land," December 1946; Central China Bureau, "On the Resolution on Measures to Solve the Land Problem During Rent and Interest Reduction and Settling Ac-


15. Mao Tse-tung, "A Three Months' Summary," Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1962), Vol. V, p. 116. There is no precise figure on the size of landholdings in the liberated areas. The Chinese Communist Party Central Committee had stated in the "May 4 Directive" that 8 percent of the population in the liberated areas were landlords and rich peasants, with poor, hired, and middle peasants constituting 92 percent. One 1945 study estimated that 62 percent of the population in North China consisted of poor peasants with 27 percent of the land; 25 percent were middle peasants with 33 percent of the land; 8 percent were rich peasants with 28 percent of the land; and 5 percent were landlords with 12 percent of the land. In South China, 71 percent of the population were poor peasants with less than 16 percent of the land; 20 percent were middle peasants with 20 percent of the land; 6 percent were rich peasants with 17 percent of the land; and 3 percent were landlords with 47 percent of the land. See Ch'en Han-seng, The Chinese Peasant (Oxford Panphlets on Indian Affairs, No. 33, 1945), especially the introduction. One recent study questions the degree to which class differences and rural instability permeated the Chinese countryside. The author, however, recognizes that war, inflation, and famine could debilitate large segments of the peasantry. Thus, although assessments of tenancy patterns may differ, it is probable that there emerged a sizable number of peasants in North China during and after the anti-Japanese war for whom agrarian reform had an enormous appeal. See Ramon H. Myers, The Chinese Peasant Economy: Agricultural Development in Hopei and Shantung, 1890-1949 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 285-86. For another evaluation of tenancy in China in relation to the development of Chinese Communist movement, see James Pinckney Harrison, The Long March to Power: A History of Chinese Communist Party, 1921-72 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), pp. 406-407.

16. For various estimates of troop strength, see Jerome Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution (Lon-
About 400,000 of the Chinese Communist forces were not regulars. See United States Department of State, United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), Vol. I, p. 313.


23. This point is emphasized in Belden, China, pp. 233-36, 353, 374. See also Harrison, Long March, p. 393; and United States Relations, Vol. I, p. 314.


26. The Chinese Communist strategy for the second year of the civil war required that the troops operating in enemy territory should seek replenishment from these areas. Initially, 80-90 percent of the captured Kuomintang forces and a small number of junior officers were expected to be recruited. This figure was later shifted down to 60 percent. See Mao, "Strategy for the Second Year," p. 145; and "On the September Meeting -- Circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," Selected Works, Vol. V, p. 272. There were also major recruiting drives in the liberated areas to prepare for the counteroffensive in the second year of the civil war. See John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 63.

29. Crook, Revolution, p. 156.
30. Until the autumn of 1947, the Chinese Communists only considered large landlords the class enemies of the masses. They argued that small landlords, who suffered "feudal" oppression from larger landlords and Kuomintang officials, might be better off as independent farmers under an honest and efficient government. The Nationalists, however, began to restore all landlords' former rights in the areas recovered from the Communists. Since the landlords and rich peasants had not proved as cooperative as anticipated, the line of division in the class struggle assumed the form of poor and middle peasants versus landlords and rich peasants. See Michael Lindsay, Notes on Educational Problems in Communist China, 1941-1947 (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950), p. 31.
34. Belden, China, pp. 166-68; and Hinton, Fanshen, p. 259.
35. P'eng Chen, "P'ing-fen t'u-ti yü cheng-tun tui-wu" / Equally Divide the Land and Reorganize Our Ranks/, in Wei ch'un-chieh tang te tsu-chih, p. 16.
38. Ibid., p. 174. When the Central Committee fled Yenan on March 19, 1947, it split into two main groups. Most of the leaders in the Central Committee Secretariat, including Mao, Chou En-lai, and Jen Pi-shih, wandered throughout the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia liberated area. The other group, called the Working Committee of the Central Committee, was headed by Liu Shao-ch'i and settled at Hsipai-p'o Village, the site of the National Land Conference. See ibid., p. 132. The main Central Committee group was at Chiahsien during the conference and from
that site promulgated the Outline of the Land Law. See Ch'en, Mao, p. 284.


40. As the People's Liberation Army switched to the offensive, its rate of recruitment increased. In the second year of the civil war, it launched a recruitment drive as preparation for its counteroffensive. See Gittings, Role, p. 63. The step-up in military conscription paralleled the intensification of agrarian reform. According to Mao Tse-tung, from July 1946 to September 1948, the People's Liberation Army grew from 1.2 million to 2.8 million men. These gains resulted from 800,000 captured Nationalist soldiers and 1.6 million peasants who obtained land and were mobilized to join the army. See Mao, "On the September Meeting," pp. 269-71.

41. Chung-kuo t'ü-ti fa ta-kang.


43. Lindsay, Notes, p. 150.


46. Mao and his group "zigzagged north to Wangchiaping, east to Tsaolink'ou, then west-northwest to Wangchiawan in April and Hsiaoho in July, turning east-northeast to Suiteh, and north to Chukuanchai in September and Shenchenpo in October, before turning south again to Yangchiak'ou, where they remained from December 1947 to March 1948." They then moved eastward through northwest Shansi into western Hopei to join the other Central Committee members. According to James P. Harrison, "a striking feature of party history during these momentous years was the paucity of high-level meetings." No "full-fledged Cen-
A central Committee meeting took place between mid-1945 and early 1949. The first major party conference after the Seventh Congress was held at Yangchian'ou on December 25-28, 1947 with only Mao's group and some delegates from the Shensi-Kansu-Ningshia and Shansi-Suiyuan liberated areas in attendance. The next important party meeting was that of the Political Bureau in September 1948 after the Central Committee had reunited. See Harrison, Long March, pp. 399-400.


50. See T'ien-ching ta-hsueh, P'ing-shan t'u-kai liien-ho tiao-ch'a-atsu, "Liu Shao-ch'i tsai P'ing-shan t'u-kai chung te tzu-pen chieh-chi fan-tung lu-hsien pi-hsü ch'e-ti p'i-p'an" / We Must Thoroughly Criticize Liu Shao-ch'i's Capitalist Reactionary Line in the P'inghshan Land Reform/, April 7, 1967. This Cultural Revolution document also criticizes P'eng Chen for advancing a "kowtow policy" in land reform and party purification work that led to excessive attacks on cadres.


52. Old liberated areas had been under Chinese Communist influence before 1945. Semiold areas experienced liberation between the end of the anti-Japanese war and August 1947. New liberated areas were those occupied by the Communists since the beginning of their counteroffensive.

53. See the articles on land reform in newly liberated areas in Ch'ün-chung / The Masses/, February 12, 1948; and in Chin-Ch' a-Ch'i jih-pao / Shansi-

54. Chin-Ch'a-Ch' i jih-pao, February 8, 1948.


See also Mao Tse-tung, "Speech at a Conference of Cadres," in Selected Works, Vol. V, pp. 227-39. Perhaps the most moving (and detailed) accounts of the land revolution are Hinton, Fanshen, and Crook, Revolution. Both villages described in these two works had undergone the "antitraitor" and "settling accounts" movements. By the time of the "May 4 Directive," large landholdings had already been redistributed. There was little land left for those still in need, and middle peasants came under attack. Thus, severe "left" deviations occurred months before the Outline of the Land Law was promulgated. In these villages, the Outline of the Land Law was not implemented until early 1948. Although misclassification of peasants continued, implementation consisted mainly of work in party purification and ironing out past mistakes in land redistribution.


60. An explicit statement of the objectives of Chinese Communist agrarian policy in the spring of 1948 can be found in a piece entitled "Questions and Answers on Agrarian Socialism," issued on July 27, 1948. This article reinforced the moderate position, challenging "absolute equalitarianism" in land redistribution. It viewed the land revolution as "neither Communist nor socialist," but as
a means to promote economic development "of a capitalist nature" under "New Democracy." The article defined the objectives of land reform as the elevation of productive power through the elimination of restrictive "feudal" productive relations; boosting incentives to produce and maximizing conditions favorable to agricultural and industrial development. Besides warning against encroachments on industrial property or the holdings of middle or "new rich" peasants, the article went on to state that class divisions would continue in Chinese society after the completion of agrarian reform. It envisioned as an "unavoidable" stage in China's development the continuation of private property and economic competition, but in a "New Democratic" framework that would prepare for the transition to socialism. See "Kuan-yü nung-yeh she-hui-chü-i te wen-ta," July 27, 1948, in Mu-ch'ien hsing-shih ho wo-men te jen-wu, pp. 138-45.


62. By "exploitation," the Chinese Communists meant the profit an individual derived from the labor of another (as in renting out land) or from loaning money at a high rate of interest. The extent to which middle peasants could engage in "exploitation" had been raised from 15 percent during the Kiangsi Soviet period to 25 percent during the civil war. See Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party, "Kuan-yü 1933 liang-ko wen-chien te chüeh-ting," in T'ü-ti cheng-ts'e fa-ling hui-pien, pp. 40-60. The reissued documents on rural classes made it clear that exploitation was the only basis for classification.

63. "New" middle peasants were former poor peasants who had received enough land through agrarian reform to achieve middle peasant status.


The above is my translation of the "note" following Article Six.

68. Work teams were used by the party when a new policy was implemented. Although the teams only dealt with a small percentage of villages, their experiences enabled party leaders to develop policies that could be implemented on a mass scale by local cadres. The latter received their instructions from county leaders or attended county conferences.


73. Hinton describes the situation in Long Bow Village in Lucheng County after the advent of a work team in March 1948. The team overlooked real gains in agrarian reform and hastily concluded that land reform and party purification work were unsuccessful. It then dissolved all mass organizations, suspended all cadres and assembled a League of Poor Peasants, which sat in judgment of local Communist leaders. In terms of class background, the majority of the cadres were former poor or hired peasants, and their abuses of their office did not outweigh their merits. Nevertheless, they were subjected to two separate public investigations and charged with failure in matters beyond their power to remedy. There were not enough resources in the village to make everyone a thriving middle peasant. Instead of gaining confidence from the fact that they were still accepted by the people, the cadres became progressively demoralized by each wave of criticism. Measured against unrealistic standards, the Long Bow party branch was for a time on the verge of disintegration. See Hinton, *Fanshen*, pp. 243-416; and his analysis of the party purification movement in "Hinton Reexamines Fanshen," in *Progressive Labor*, Vol. VI, No. 6 (February 1969).


75. By June 1948, the liberated areas acquired a population of 19 million and 80 cities more than in 1946. Such well-fortified cities as Shihchiachuang, Yuncheng, Szepingchieh, Loyang, Ichuan, Paochi, Weihsien, and Linfeng had fallen to the Chinese Communists. Every day brought closer to the reality that the Chinese Communists would stretch throughout the entire mainland. See Liao, *From Yenan to Peking*, p. 65 and p. 89.

77. The Central Northeast Bureau of the party had issued a "Directive Concerning Land Reform in the New Areas" on November 12, 1948. See T'u-ti cheng-ts'e fa-ling hui-pien, pp. 93-94. Other directives included "Outline for the Reduction of Rent and Interest" (Political Bureau, Kwangtung-Kiangsi-Hunan Border Region Forces, June 1949); "Outline for Reduction of Rent and Interest" (Central China Bureau, October 8, 1949); and "Provisional Regulations for Rent Reduction in the New Areas in East China" (East China Bureau, September 1949). See Chao, Agrarian Policy, pp. 80-81.

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