Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy
Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy

EDITED BY
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Contents

List of Tables and Figures vii

Foreword, Alexander George ix

Preface xi

List of Contributors xiii

List of the Committee on International Conflict and Cooperation xiv

PART I
Perspectives on Learning

1 Introduction, George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock 3

2 Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy: In Search of an Elusive Concept, Philip E. Tetlock 20

3 Collective Learning: Some Theoretical Speculations, Ernst B. Haas 62

4 Why Competitive Politics Inhibits Learning in Soviet Foreign Policy, Richard D. Anderson, Jr. 100

PART II
Case Studies of U.S. Foreign Policy

5 The Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward Arms Control, Robert A. Levine 135

6 Learning in U.S. Policy Toward Europe, Wallace J. Thies 158

7 The Strategic Basis of Learning in U.S. Policy Toward China, 1949–1988, Banning N. Garrett 208

8 Learning in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the Middle East, Steven L. Spiegel 264
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part</th>
<th>Case Studies of Soviet Foreign Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe Since World War II, Jonathan Haslam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Learning in Soviet Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, George W. Breslauer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Peripheral Visions: Brezhnev and Gorbachev Meet the &quot;Reagan Doctrine,&quot; Ted Hopf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Attempted Learning: Soviet Policy Toward the United States in the Brezhnev Era, Franklyn Griffiths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Soviet Learning in the 1980s, Robert Legvold</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part</th>
<th>Conclusions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Learning and the Evolution of Cooperation in U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Nonproliferation Activities, Peter R. Lavoy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Interactive Learning in U.S.–Soviet Arms Control, Steven Weber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>What Have We Learned About Learning? George W. Breslauer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Index 857
Tables and Figures

TABLES

CHAPTER 3
1 The processes of adaptation and learning 72
2 Basic postulates of the decisional paradigms 82
3 Styles of thinking within organizations 83
4 Attributes of adaptation and learning behavior 91

CHAPTER 5
1 1963 values, analyses, and recommendations 152

CHAPTER 9
1 The 10 most frequently used public analogies 304

CHAPTER 19
1 Typology of learning 746
2 Features of U.S. and Soviet nonproliferation strategies 747
3 Summary of strategic shifts as learning outcomes 770
4 Summary of cooperative arrangements as learning outcomes 771

FIGURES

CHAPTER 3
1 Decision-making styles 68
2 National security decision making 84
3 Multiple paths to choice 85
4 Political choice and scientific discovery 89
CHAPTER 9

1 Total number of historical analogies used per quarter, 1961-1966 303
2 The congruence procedure fitted with experimental design 335
3 Using the lessons of Korea to explain the options chosen 338
Foreword

This book addresses an aspect of the theory and practice of foreign policy that has assumed increasing emphasis in the study of international relations in the past decade. It became increasingly obvious to specialists in this field that existing theories of international relations did not lend much help in understanding the role of learning in the conduct of foreign policy. A number of political scientists—among them Lloyd Etheredge and Hugh Heclo—had already called attention to the need for developing a more systematic way of understanding government learning, or the lack thereof, and political learning more generally. And Ernest May and Richard Neustadt, among others, called attention to the risks entailed when, as is often the case, policy makers resort to a very simple type of learning—the use of a particular historical analogy—to diagnose and deal with a current foreign policy problem.

The volume is a distinctive, pioneering study in several respects. It is comparative across both issue areas and countries and hence should be of interest to a variety of scholars. Not only does it provide a comprehensive analytical assessment of the role of learning (and nonlearning) in the development of U.S.-Soviet relations, but it also makes a unique contribution to the development of theoretical and methodological tools for the study of foreign policy change. The volume throws considerable light on the complexity of the relationship between policy-relevant beliefs held by political leaders and the content of their foreign policy. For example, the authors find that a change in beliefs does not necessarily result in a change of policy and that, indeed, policy change often takes place in the absence of a prior change in beliefs. The volume provides an extremely interesting and valuable exploration of the possible relevance of a variety of different concepts of learning. It reveals disagreements among the authors as to which approach to learning is most relevant to particular policy changes and as to why on other occasions policy change did not occur. In the introductory and summary chapters, volume editors Philip Tetlock and George Breslauer provide invaluable dis-
I believe this volume is a valuable and timely contribution to scholarship in the area of international relations.

Alexander George

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Preface

The project that produced this volume began under the sponsorship of the National Research Council’s Committee on International Conflict and Cooperation (formerly called the Committee on the Contributions of the Social and Behavioral Sciences to the Prevention of Nuclear War). Our purpose was to explore the conditions under which foreign policy makers change their beliefs and, as a result, change policy as well. We decided to use as our base of evidence the record of U.S. and Soviet foreign policy evolution in selected issue areas from World War II to the present.

A planning conference of prospective contributors was held at the National Academy of Sciences in Washington, D.C., in April 1987. Draft chapters were discussed at a workshop in Berkeley, California, in November 1988. At each meeting, specialists on U.S. and Soviet foreign policy discussed with international relations theorists and learning theorists the ways in which case studies of foreign policy evolution could illuminate the conditions under which foreign policy makers learn from experience.

One result of those discussions was a paper by Philip Tetlock that presented to the authors a menu of conceptions and types of learning, asking them to specify when, if at all, any or all of these types of belief change take place and result in (or from) changes in policy. In Chapter 1, we discuss the diverse definitions of learning employed in everyday and scholarly discourse. In Chapter 2, Tetlock summarizes some of the findings of the case studies, grouped around diverse types of learning, and focuses on conditions under which each takes place. In Chapter 3, Ernst Haas, one of the leading theorists of learning in international relations, presents an alternative conceptualization that informed the frameworks adopted by several of the contributors (see Chapters 4, 15, 19, and 20).

By giving equal time to studies of both U.S. and Soviet foreign policy and to diverse theories of learning in international relations, we have produced a large volume that will be of interest to several audiences. Students and specialists interested in the concept of learning, its diverse usages, and the distinctive forms it takes in international relations will be especially interested in the theoretical and synthesizing essays grouped
together in Parts I and IV. Students looking for a series of interpretive histories of the foreign policies of the superpowers will be drawn to several of the essays in Parts II and III. Students and specialists interested in analyses that explore correlates of cognitive and policy changes without presenting a narrative history will be drawn to other chapters in Parts II and III. Indeed, a number of these case studies make rich contributions to our thinking about the nature of learning in foreign policy in the course of interpreting the history of a policy realm.

We are grateful to the National Research Council for undertaking this project. For invaluable assistance during all phases of this project, we are immensely grateful to committee staff members Jo Husbands and, especially, Mary Thomas. Our thanks go as well to Christine McShane for copy editing the volume, and to Estelle Miller and Linda Humphrey for composition services. We would also like to thank the Committee on International Conflict and Cooperation for its oversight of the project and for its strong support of our role as editors. We are also grateful to the MacArthur Interdisciplinary Group on International Security Studies of the University of California at Berkeley and to the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation for supplementary financial support during the writing and publication processes. Finally, we are indebted to the many scholars who communicated suggestions for the improvement of the individual chapters, but especially to Alexander George for his characteristically detailed, trenchant, and persistent criticisms.

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xiv
PART I

Perspectives on Learning
Introduction

George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock

Are makers of foreign policy capable of learning? This by no means rhetorical question inspired the research project that produced the present volume. On one hand, it is tempting to conclude that learning must occur. National leaders who fail to adjust policies to changing circumstances will eventually be faced with ineffective policies and, perhaps, loss of personal authority and power. On the other hand, the obstacles to learning look formidable indeed. We would underscore four such obstacles.

First, the international environment is extraordinarily complex. Many causal factors are at work, interacting with each other in ways that make it difficult for anyone to fathom the real causes of events or trends. Even when we sense that one factor or another contributed to outcomes, it is daunting to assign relative weights and to distinguish decisive from contributory-but-not-decisive causes, or to distinguish between necessary and sufficient conditions.

Second, the international environment is highly uncertain. It is difficult to know what would have happened if a policy maker had adopted a different policy. Moreover, leaders of other states often have incentives to misrepresent their intentions and capabilities. And on the home front, accurate perception of international affairs is impeded by the highly partisan nature of controversies over the degree to which values are under threat or need to be promoted.

Third, the international environment is highly labile or changeable. Consider the many sharp and sudden qualitative discontinuities that have emerged in the international scene since World War II: weapons of un-
precedented destructive power; delivery systems of unprecedented speed; dramatic shifts in leadership; startling reversals of international alignments (such as the sudden emergence of the Sino-Soviet-American strategic triangle); and the emergence of an increasingly multipolar economic-technological system. Frequently, by the time observers had finally decided how to characterize the situation, that characterization had become obsolete. Imagine the difficulties facing policy makers under these conditions!

Fourth, policy makers are ultimately human beings—limited-capacity information processors who can cope with only so much information per unit of time. It should not be surprising that they reach out for simplifying rules of thumb or heuristics. This need for simplicity and order is exacerbated by the political context of policy making, the need to appease multiple constituencies, and the time pressures that bear down on policy makers. It is little wonder that Henry Kissinger observed: "It is an illusion to believe that leaders gain in profundity while they gain experience... The convictions that leaders have formed before reaching high office are the intellectual capital they will consume as long as they continue in office."1

In order to determine whether, when, and how often policy makers reevaluate their "intellectual capital," we asked a number of specialists on U.S. and Soviet foreign policy to examine regional and functional realms of policy since World War II. We posed five key questions to these specialists:

(1) Under what conditions do policy makers' beliefs change?
(2) What forms do such changes take? Reevaluation of tactics, strategies, or basic assumptions and goals? Movement toward simplicity or complexity? Reduced or expanded capacity for self-criticism and coping with trade-offs?
(3) When are these cognitive changes translated into policy, overcoming institutional and domestic political impediments?
(4) When do these cognitive and political changes move policy in the direction of a more realistic or efficient matching of means and ends?
(5) When are we more or less justified in making judgments about performance improvement?

As the table of contents indicates, these questions have been addressed in parallel chapters or integrated studies on U.S. and Soviet foreign policy toward arms control, détente, Western Europe, China, the Middle East, Third World intervention, and nuclear nonproliferation. In addition to the case studies, we have included several chapters on approaches to the conceptualization and study of learning in international relations (Chapters
and a theoretical statement about the possible impact of politics on learning in Soviet foreign policy (Chapter 4).

The case studies are a rich source of information about the first three of our questions in particular. They focus principally on how and why prevailing beliefs change, and on how and why this is translated into a collective process of changing policy. The case material also provides some insight into questions four and five, which we draw out further in Parts I and IV of the volume. However, further empirical and philosophical work driven exclusively by the last two questions remains an important agenda for the future.

Efforts to address questions four and five highlight the difficulties involved in applying the concept of learning to the study of international relations. There is a wide range of ways in which the term is used in both everyday language and in various professional subcultures that international relations researchers have occasion to draw on. What's more, there is a tension between the everyday and the professional usages. Everyday usages usually require us to make implicit judgments about the nature of reality that, in the complex, uncertain, and changing context of international relations, would strike many academic observers as highly speculative or tendentious. By contrast, professional usage often avoids this dilemma, but at the price of violating the seemingly commonsense meaning of the term.

THE ORDINARY LANGUAGE CONCEPTION OF LEARNING

In its everyday usage, learning is a deceptively straightforward concept. When a child burns his finger on the stove, and his parent says, "I hope you learned your lesson," the implication is that there was only one clear lesson to be learned: don't touch hot stoves or you will injure yourself. In its simplest usage, then, to learn has a tight connection with the verb, to know. Indeed, learning might simply be thought of as coming to know. The child who "learns his lesson" has come to know that hot stoves burn fingers.

In most of its usages, the meaning of the verb, to know, is distinguishable from the meaning of the verb, to believe. When using the verb, to know, the speaker of the sentence is vouching that the sentence is true. The person who categorizes something as an instance of knowing assumes the validity of the belief in question. Thus, it makes sense to say: "He believes that the stove is hot, but he is wrong." It does not make sense to say: "He knows that the stove is hot, but he is wrong." Similarly with the verb, to learn. If we say, in ordinary usage, that "He learned the stove was hot," we are vouching for the validity of his knowledge that the stove was indeed hot. It would not make sense to say, "He learned
the stove was hot, but he was wrong." To convey that thought, we would use different terminology. We might say, "He drew the conclusion that the stove was hot, but he was wrong." From the point of view of the learner, learning that something is so might be merely a matter of acquiring a belief, but from the point of view of the person who describes the change as an instance of learning, the new belief has to be valid, or true, or justified, or realistic.

At issue in these cases is the observer's judgment about the correspondence between the learner's perception of reality and reality itself. In other cases, we might be dealing with more complex mental operations. That is, we might be faced, not with a situation of learning that, but rather with a situation of learning how. Learning how to do something entails acquiring behavior that succeeds in accomplishing what the actor tries to do. In the simplest, everyday usage, we would then say that the boy learned to avoid burning his finger by improving his understanding of when the stove was hot or by developing ways of avoiding the stove altogether or by wearing special protective garments when using the stove, etc. In these cases, the learner acquires a small or large repertoire of beliefs that he translates into a small or large repertoire of behaviors that adequately services the goal of avoiding getting his finger burned.

Thus, when we, as observers, say that the boy learned to avoid burning his finger, we are vouching for two things: (1) that the boy has not been burned again (or his incidence of being burned has declined) and (2) that such an outcome was a product of his having acquired a set of beliefs and behaviors that improved his performance on this score. It would not make sense to say that the boy learned how to avoid getting burned if the outcome was a product of luck, coincidence, or non-exposure to a hot stove during the period of observation.

Learning how, in this conceptualization, entails a claim on the part of the observer that the actor has improved his performance in relation to the attainment of certain goals, and that this has happened as a result of behavioral change that is preceded and driven by improvement in the actor's understanding of his environment. Presumably, this also means that the actor held the goals that the observer imputes to him.

The hot stove is a useful introduction to the idea of learning because it is so simple and straightforward. There is no ambiguity or dissensus about goals: almost everybody except suicidals and extreme masochists wants to avoid being burned. The causal linkage between the heat of the stove and the impact on the finger is simple and direct. Ways to avoid getting burned are not terribly complicated. It is tempting therefore to assume that everyday usage of the term learning is equally straightforward.

But such is not the case when we think of more complicated cases.
When everyday usage, as reflected in journalism and public discourse, turns to larger issues of social, political, and economic life, the ease of our exercise is undermined by the complexity of those issues, the ambiguities of what constitutes reality, the controversies surrounding how the world really works, and the ease with which normative and theoretical issues become confused. When Bob Dylan asks, "When Will They Ever Learn?" he is really asking: "When will they come to agree with my claim that war is not worth the lives lost in the process?" This is a very complex claim, however simple and appealing it might appear to be. It entails a value judgment about the relative worth of lives lost versus the goals attained by warfare. It further entails an implicitly counterfactual claim about the state of the world that would have obtained in the absence of warfare (or of a given war). That counterfactual claim, in turn, will invariably rest on implicit or explicit theoretical assumptions about cause and effect in international politics.

The point can be clarified by reference to the difference between the Vietnam War and World War II. In the eyes of those alienated by the Vietnam War, Bob Dylan's claims were compelling: the massive loss of life (both Vietnamese and American) was a disproportionate price to pay for containing the spread of communism, even if the war had been won by the United States. Presumably, this conclusion is based on both a value judgment (the worth of human lives) and a theory of cause-effect relations in international politics (the impact on the rest of the world, and on American national security, of an uncontested incorporation of Vietnam into the communist world).

Dylan's claims might be less compelling had they been made in 1945, with reference to World War II. In the eyes of many people, the loss of life was not disproportionate to the goal of defeating German and Japanese fascism. This claim may or may not be based on a lower valuation of human life, or on a higher valuation of communism relative to fascism. It is usually, however, justified on the basis of counterfactual claims about what the world would have looked like had the United States not entered the war, had Hitler defeated England and Russia, and had Japan not been defeated in the Far East. Those claims, in turn, will typically be informed by theories of warfare, political control, even human nature that have greater or lesser plausibility in the eyes of different social scientists.

Thus, when we begin to apply the ordinary usage of learning to the complex world of public affairs, we run up against the limits of our knowledge (we consciously use this last term). If, as observers, we may only use the term learning to describe changes in beliefs that we can vouch to be "more true" than earlier beliefs; or if we can only use the term to describe changes in behavior that we can vouch to be more efficient or effective in
achieving certain ends (be they ours or the actor's), then we will rarely be allowed to use the term. The result would be that a word that is commonly used in day-to-day life falls victim to the limits of social science and is therefore largely purged from use by social scientists.

BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE CONCEPTIONS OF LEARNING

Such has not been the fate of the term. Learning has been employed extensively in the literature of cognitive psychology, organization theory, political science, and international relations. However, this disciplinary diffusion of the term has resulted in great variation in definitions.

Learning theorists in experimental psychology have long relied on a behavioral definition that corresponds in logic to the learning how variant of the hot stove example: a change in the probability of a category of response as a result of experience. For example, did the pigeon learn that a pellet of food would appear with every three pecks of the key when the green light was on? This example is based on clear specification of what reality is, and on whether the pigeon's behavioral repertoire changed in ways likely to increase the probability that it would attain the goals we impute to it (wanting food). And since the experimenter controls the reward contingency, he is in a good position to make strong inferences about the relative efficacy of the behavioral strategies of the pigeon.

Such trial-and-error learning corresponds to one definition of the term that Tetlock discusses in Chapter 2. Even when we exit the experimental situation and deal with the real world of interpersonal or international relations, this approach is not as divorced from everyday usage as it might appear. For it corresponds to a form of learning that previous behaviors (or policies) were not "working" in the given time frame in advancing the goals that drove them. When a policy maker learns in this minimalist sense, he has not necessarily learned anything deeper about how the world works or about how to advance his goals. He has only learned that the previous policy was not "working." Learning, for these purposes, refers to a change in the probability of a response in the face of changing reward contingencies.

Cognitive theorists, in contrast, use a different definition of learning. To them, learning entails increased differentiation and integration of mental structures (schemata). People working in this tradition pay little attention to the underlying external reality, much less to determining whether increased complexity of thought necessarily makes an individual more knowledgeable about the environment. It follows that such a definition also means that the observer is not focusing on whether increased complexity
results in behavioral patterns that improve performance in pursuit of goals held by either the actor or the observer. By the everyday definition suggested at the beginning of this chapter, which related to both learning that and learning how, cognitive theorists are not focusing on learning, but rather on changes in the content and structure of beliefs. This has yielded a huge literature on factors that facilitate, and factors that impede, changes in beliefs. But it has not tackled the more complex issues that arise in judging whether and when changes in beliefs are more or less justified in light of the "true" nature of reality.

When political scientists focus on learning among policy makers at the level of the nation-state, they face analogous problems. They may choose to ask simple descriptive questions: "When do policy makers' beliefs change?" and the subsidiary query, "What forms do these changes take?" They may relate their findings to the literature on cognitive psychology to build inductive theory about what it takes for policy makers to change their minds, challenge their own assumptions, and overcome the cognitive conservatism of the human mind. They may seek to test Henry Kissinger's suggestion, quoted earlier, that policy makers do not have the time or incentive to reevaluate their beliefs on the job; that they must live off the intellectual capital they brought with them into office. When they state the research problem in this way, political scientists follow cognitive psychologists in avoiding judgments about the realism of the beliefs in question.

This approach to learning is divorced from the everyday usage of the term as "coming to know," but it is not at all divorced from a commonsense usage as "coming to believe." Even in everyday language, it is not odd to say, "he learned the wrong lesson" or "he thought he had learned, but he was wrong." When political scientists make broad claims about the mental operations, or behavioral tendencies, of that class of human beings that especially interests them—politicians—they often advance empirical generalizations that do not require the observer to vouch for the correspondence between beliefs and reality, or between behavior and performance. Thus, they may ask: "How do policy makers typically learn?" In this case, the connection is with the verb, to believe. How and why do policy makers typically come to believe what they do? How do they draw lessons? And why do they typically draw the lessons they do? Jervis, for example, explores the impact of many factors (formative experiences, early political socialization, analogical reasoning, and the like) on the ways in which policy makers "learn from history." In these cases, it makes sense, even on the basis of linguistic intuition, to speak of learning propensities or learning tendencies, which are calculated from the observation of how categories of people come to believe what they do. The observer need not vouch for the validity of the beliefs.
Defining the research problem as one of belief system change narrows the focus to a very specific subset of change. That subset is restricted in three senses: to the level of the individual; to changes in cognition (beliefs and preferences), not changes in behavior; and to changes that do not require a judgment about correspondence with reality or improvements of performance (i.e., to believing that, not knowing that or knowing how). These restrictions could be viewed as prudent or imprudent, depending on one's view of the capacity of social science and philosophy to supply grounded theories that we could use to judge whether policy makers have become more or less realistic in their perceptions, and more or less effective in pursuing their (or our) goals.

Yet even this does not exhaust the variety of usages of the term learning. A number of our contributors (Haas, Anderson, Lavoy, and Weber) insist on a distinction between adaptation and learning. They treat the distinction as essentially one of degree: a function of the extent to which core beliefs or goals have changed. Many of the types of learning that Tetlock (Chapter 2) treats as trial-and-error learning or as changes in cognitive content, these contributors refer to as types of adaptation, with the term learning reserved for fundamental changes in understanding of cause-effect relations in international politics or revaluations of goals. In these cases, however, there is not very much at stake in the choice of definition. The differences between these particular contributors are more matters of definitional taste.

A more consequential distinction arises over cases in which there is a disjunction or clash between behavioral and cognitive definitions of learning. Although it is often the case that people learn how as a result of a better understanding of their environment (learning that), these two types of knowledge can be dissociated, both in everyday usage and in the complex, political world of international relations. One can have a good understanding of the physics of riding a bicycle but not know how to do it or, more commonly, one can know how to ride a bike but know nothing about the underlying laws of physics. In security policy, one can improve one's performance as a result of mindlessly or intuitively adapting to an unprecedented rush of events that one understands poorly. More generally, as Larson (Chapter 10) argues, one can change one's behaviors and only later bring one's beliefs into line with the new behavioral patterns. Or, as Anderson argues (Chapter 4), one can change one's behavior as a result of political pressures that constitute one's immediate frame of reference, with little immediate or later change in beliefs. Some of our contributors prefer to define such cases of behavioral change that precedes (or proceeds independently of) understanding as adaptation rather than learning. As long as the reader is clear as to the usage being employed, this strikes us as a defensible approach to differentiating among related phenomena.
The real challenge is to discern empirically when behavioral change is in fact not accompanied or preceded by cognitive restructuring or improved understanding.

A still more substantial epistemological issue is one that preoccupies organization theorists and students of political organization: the problem of aggregating individual cognition and behavior to the level of the policy-making unit as a whole. In analyzing circumstances in which a leader has autocratic authority within an organization or state, and in which implementation of his wishes is not problematic, it might not be necessary to worry about aggregation. We can focus on the cognitive and behavioral dynamics of the individual alone. But when the individual's cognitive dynamics, policy preferences, and political behavior are constrained or shaped by norms, preferences, and powers of other individuals distributed throughout the structure of governance, we must factor these elements into our study of changes in the prevailing beliefs that inform organizational or national policies.

Organization theorists and political scientists seeking to build theories of change will more often be interested in these kinds of redirection of prevailing assumptions and policies. Moreover, they are especially sensitive to the political and social, not just individual-psychological, costs of, and pressures for, redirection. Hence, they will focus their attention on the aggregation of individual learning to the level of the larger unit, anthropomorphizing the institution. Organization theorists will inquire into the conditions for "organizational learning." Political scientists may ask, "Can governments learn?" or may inquire into the conditions for "social learning."

Even though the aggregation of change to the level of organizations, governments, and communities may be justified for the purposes of sociological, economic, and political analysis, it does not at all ease the definitional differences between those who adopt broad versus narrow definitions of learning. Haas (Chapter 3) and Anderson (Chapter 4), for example, focus on collective learning, and distinguish sharply between many types of adaptation and a very narrow phenomenon called learning. Tetlock (Chapter 2), by contrast, distinguishes among many types of learning, at both the individual and the collective level, and absorbs the concept of adaptation into his typology of learning. Nor does the process of aggregation ease the epistemological dilemma of distinguishing between changes in belief, on one hand, and improved understanding or performance, on the other. Collective learning, as with individual learning, may be associated with a collectivity's coming to know that, coming to know how, or coming to believe that.

On this score, however, economists and organization theorists are advantaged in tackling the task of evaluating levels of understanding
and performance by the greater scientific maturity of their disciplines. Much of organization theory is built on observation of the behavior of firms in competitive marketplaces. The imputation of goals to those firms is not problematic: we know that their boards of directors seek to have the firm survive, maintain or expand its market shares, and become increasingly profitable. These objectives are easily quantified. Moreover, we have very large samples of firms to examine to determine which types of strategies did or did not meet these goals. And we can observe whether executives in fact learned from experience and improved their strategies.

What's more, the environment of firms is more learner-friendly than is the environment of international politics. Firms receive more frequent and more unambiguous feedback about their performance levels than do leaders of states. Countries get fewer observations and more ambiguous feedback that does not tell them why things are going wrong. This allows vested interests greater latitude to reinterpret the data in ways consistent with their biases. Leaders of firms see themselves and their competitors as essentially similar in nature or analogous in the tasks they perform and the environments in which they compete. Leaders of states, in contrast, tend to adopt or be constrained by ideologies that emphasize how different they are from their competitors. Hence, leaders of states are less likely than are leaders of firms to learn from the mistakes of their competitors. (Might this explain why the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan despite the U.S. loss in Vietnam?) To be sure, neither organization theory nor economics qualifies as a highly advanced science with high predictive capability. But the development of both inductive and deductive theory in those disciplines that is relevant to the tasks of matching beliefs to reality, and of evaluating performance, is fairly advanced, especially relative to political science and international relations.

Thus, when dealing with governments in the international system, we find that many of the goals pursued by states are not easily quantified as performance indicators. Is the United States more or less secure today than it was 10 years ago? Are the United States and the Soviet Union farther from nuclear war today than they were 10 years ago? Is the United States materially more secure than it was before Reaganomics? Is the Middle East more stable today than it was 10 years ago? Moreover, when seeking to define the nature of reality, we are forced to factor into our counterfactuals a far greater number and array of imponderables than do organization theorists and economists. Our understanding of cause-effect relationships in the international system is underdeveloped relative to the more quantifiable and paradigmatic social science disciplines.

These attributes of international politics compound the dilemmas of scholars seeking to identify learning in U.S. and Soviet foreign policy
making that corresponds to learning as knowledge acquisition (learning that). The task would be simpler (though still difficult, given problems of access to information) were we simply to treat learning as coming to believe: When do policy makers change their minds? In what ways? However, if we choose to use learning in its everyday usage, we are forced to vouch for the greater realism of belief changes we judge to constitute learning. In like manner, when addressing not learning that but learning how (i.e., knowledge-informed performance improvement), we must vouch for our ability to impute the goals being pursued by the policy makers so as to judge whether performance toward the realization of those goals has improved.

Vouching for the greater realism of beliefs or goals is not a hopeless exercise. We are certainly not radical subjectivists who believe that there is no reality beyond that constructed by the human mind. Throughout the case studies in this volume, authors identify changes in belief in Washington and Moscow that they are confident in calling more realistic. Perhaps the best test of this judgment is that these empirical beliefs are no longer highly controversial among a wide range of both liberals and conservatives in this country. Take a most poignant and entertaining example noted in the chapter by Stephen Spiegel: "Americans have come a long way since Truman's ambassador to the United Nations implored Arabs and Jews to 'settle this problem in a true Christian spirit.' Beyond this trivial example, it is safe to say that the top 300 or so leaders of both superpowers, over the past 30 years: (1) have come to a more complex appreciation of the nature of the nuclear revolution in weaponry; (2) have developed a more sophisticated and less stereotyped understanding of the complexity of the adversary's political processes (even though they may remain befuddled by that complexity); (3) have learned that many indigenous processes in the Third World are out of the direct control of either superpower; and (4) have come to understand that the multiplicity of foreign policy goals they hold are often in conflict with one another, that they are often irreconcilable, or that the costs of pursuing them simultaneously may ultimately prove to be prohibitive. Other examples could be cited.

Taken individually or together, these cases of learning correspond to learning that. In and of themselves they do not tell us whether such belief changes have altered policies enacted, or whether policy has become more effective as a result. That is, greater realism along certain dimensions of belief may often be a necessary condition, but is certainly not a sufficient condition, for improved performance (learning how). To see whether leaders have learned how, we must specify the goals by which performance is to be evaluated, determine that changes in belief drove the enactment of new policies, and evaluate the greater or lesser effectiveness of those
policies. This analytical step forces us to rely on cause-effect calculations that are more complex, and judgments that are more far-reaching, about the reciprocal and continuing interaction of policy and the international environments toward which policy is directed. It also forces us to go beyond empirical judgments about the power of weaponry, the intentions of the adversary, and the nature of indigenous forces at work in regional conflicts. We must now draw on theoretical arguments about the long-term and short-term consequences of continuing interaction among multiple states and among economic, political, and social forces at home and abroad.

Our existing bodies of knowledge, both empirical and theoretical, may help us deal with selected questions about short-term causation. We can conduct counterfactual analysis to inquire: What would it have taken to avoid the Korean War, or the October 1973 Middle East war, or the invasion of Afghanistan? We may remain uncertain about many of the facts, but that is more a matter of archival access than logical impossibility. The persuasiveness of short-term counterfactual arguments hinges on three things: (1) the richness of the empirical evidence available; (2) the degree to which one can draw on well-validated theoretical and empirical generalizations in filling in the missing hypothetical data points; and (3) the degree to which one can achieve consensus concerning the nature of the situation to which one is applying the theoretical and empirical generalizations.

On this last point, a great deal depends on the closeness of the “causal calls.” It is easy, for example, to imagine Kennedy’s losing the 1960 election to Nixon if evidence had become public concerning Kennedy’s philandering. It is harder, however, to imagine Johnson’s 1964 election being overturned. When the causal competition is intense, the addition of only a weak theoretical cause may make a critical difference; when the outcome appears already highly overdetermined, the addition of even a moderately strong theoretical causal candidate may not make much of an impression on analysts.

Our existing bodies of knowledge, both empirical and theoretical, may help us deal with selected questions about short-term causation, but the medium-range consequences often become unfathomable and a matter of theoretical or normative faith. The evolution of historical scenarios is often highly contingent on later branchings and decision points. For similar reasons, we usually evaluate leaders in terms of the relatively short-term consequences of their initiatives: did Roosevelt extricate America from the Depression? Did he mobilize the country to prosecute World War II? We do not frequently ask: Did Roosevelt create the preconditions for the imperial presidency that Nixon later abused?

Thus, when asking whether policy makers have learned how, we face a
major intellectual challenge. Even if we knew the goals being pursued by policy makers, the changes in beliefs, and the resultant changes in policy, we would still be faced with the task of defining a time span over which performance will be judged. Firms regularly go out of business; states rarely fail to survive. So mere long-term survival is not a very demanding criterion for performance evaluation. Below that threshold, performance may appear to be effective in the short term, only to be judged ineffective after a few more years have passed. In 1979, Soviet policy in the Third World during the previous five years appeared to be a resounding success. Five years later, in 1984, the opposite verdict was being reached, both by most Soviets leaders and by most outside observers.

Herein lies the irony and the dilemma. We are often better equipped empirically to judge performance over short time periods, yet it may require longer time periods to make meaningful generalizations about the effectiveness of policies driven by certain assumptions. To take another striking case, Pike and Ward have recently argued that the U.S. willingness to fight the Vietnam War for as long as it did, even though it lost the military war, was responsible for the growing prosperity, stability, and unity of Southeast Asia today. What, then, are the appropriate lessons of Angola and Vietnam for Soviet and U.S. policy makers? If we, as observers, deign to define what those lessons should be, we must have a criterion by which to judge whether U.S. and Soviet leaders have drawn the right lessons (i.e., learned, defined as *coming to know that*). But the utility and persuasiveness of that criterion will hinge on the validity of the lessons we, as observers, have drawn. Would a Palestinian state in the Middle East increase or decrease the long-term stability of the region? That happens to have been the issue dividing the superpowers and regional leaders for decades. Which side failed to learn, in this sense of the term? It may be that both U.S. and Soviet policy planners have learned a great deal about the Middle East in recent decades (*learning that*), but that neither of them has learned how to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Some theorists of international politics might argue an opposite case: that we are better able to project the long-term consequences than the short-term results of events and policies. The counterproductivity of Soviet policy in Africa in the 1970s, they might argue, was not evident immediately, but was predictable as a longer-term consequence of the inherent balancing tendencies within world politics. Or another example: reentry of China into a period of relative openness to the outside world will eventually be a matter of economic and strategic necessity. In the coming 30–50 years, it is surely inevitable. But how confident can we be in predicting its eventuation in the next 3–5 years?

Were there substantial consensus within the social science community about the range of applicability of different theories of international relations,
this would be a generalizable and powerful argument. However, most of our theories do not allow us such confidence regarding the prediction of trends; and most of the questions we would like to address, given the threat of nuclear war or ecological disaster, pertain to the coming 10 years or so. Hence, the defensibility of many inferences about learning (defined as knowing that) will be a function of the defensibility of the theoretical framework that has been deployed to generate counterfactual claims.

If we have a well-validated theory that has been carefully applied to widely agreed-on antecedent conditions in the real world, the counterfactual will be persuasive. For example, if the earth were as hot as Venus, life as we know it would never have arisen on our planet. This counterfactual is particularly persuasive, because there is so little controversy over the validity of the underlying theoretical laws and generalizations that are drawn on to fill in the missing data points in the counterfactual world. In short, we have a lot of confidence in the basic laws of biochemistry.

If we have controversy over both the merits of the theory and the antecedent conditions to which it is applied, the counterfactual will probably persuade only its authors and a few close friends. Unfortunately, much theory of international relations that is relevant to Soviet and U.S. security policy (the subject matter of this volume) is inadequately developed and validated to make persuasive the major counterfactuals we would like to deploy. Consider, for example, the following counterfactual claim. Even if the United States had invaded Cuba in 1962 in order to destroy the intermediate-range ballistic missiles there, the conflict would not have escalated into a nuclear war. This counterfactual is quite persuasive to neorealists who believe that Khrushchev would have been constrained by the balance of power prevailing at the time. It is less persuasive to conflict-spiral theorists who believe that there is potential for crises to escalate out of control as a result of the irrationality of human actors, organizational factors, and random accidents. For both policy makers and analysts, then, international relations is a learner-unfriendly environment!

This accounts in part for the differential uses of the concept learning in literature on foreign policy and international relations. This is not the place for a thorough review of that literature, but a few examples will be useful. Nye distinguishes between simple and complex learning, but each is descriptive of a given level of change in beliefs and/or goals, without evaluating whether those changes entailed greater realism or not. Alternatively, Haas (Chapter 3) proposes that application of the term learning be restricted to complex learning that is driven by consensual knowledge developed by an epistemic community, which results in institutionalized changes in both goals and cause-effect relationships, and in a closer matching of ends and means. Haas avoids judging the longer-
term realism or effectiveness of the change, instead suggesting that only centuries of retrospective distance will allow us to make such judgments. Yet he avoids equating learning only with change in fundamental beliefs by demanding that it be driven by a scientific consensus among those who subscribe to a common epistemology. This definition eases the observer's task of reality testing. It also makes it far easier to apply Haas's framework to issues, such as economics, ecology, and other scientific-technical domains, in which a substantial measure of scientific consensus is more easily attained than in the political and security realms of international relations.

Etheredge, in contrast, believes that performance evaluation and reality depiction by the observer are essential to using the term learning in security policy analysis. He compares U.S. policy in Latin America in the early 1950s with that in the late 1950s, early 1960s, and 1980s to see whether policy makers drew the lessons from previous experience that he feels they ought to have drawn. This scholar, in other words, is more confident in his ability to generate and defend counterfactually grounded claims concerning long-term international trends.

This volume is a product of our effort to employ the learning concept in ways that would allow us to explore changes in beliefs and performance levels in superpower relations, without falling into the trap of radical subjectivism, on one hand, or theoretical and normative overconfidence, on the other. These are two opposing categories of errors: the Scylla and Charybdis of learning analysis.

The core problem, as we see it, is this. It is impossible to purge learning from our vocabulary; no history of any era could be written without using the term in one or the other of its everyday usages. But which usage should we employ for purposes of advancing our understanding of governmental decision making? If we work with a highly restrictive conception of learning, we run the risk of having nothing to explain. If we work with an expansive conception of learning, virtually anything qualifies. If we restrict learning to knowledge acquisition, rather than belief change, there emerge as many conceptions of learning as there are distinct political/theoretical viewpoints on the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Any thoughtful observer with a reasonably well-articulated theory of cause and effect in the international realm can then make attributions of learning or nonlearning.

Nor is this simply a matter of political preference or theoretical bias. There may sometimes be a number of equally plausible ways to interpret the evidence, movement toward any of which might constitute learning. If we abandon epistemological monism in favor of pluralism, we can talk (in principle) about learning within different conceptual frameworks. For example, there would then be different types of learning from the perspective
of different variants of deterrence and conflict-spiral interpretations of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Given the deep dissensus in the political science community over what constitutes knowledge of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, this pluralistic conception of learning strikes us as reasonable. It mirrors our image of the level of scientific maturity of the field, and allows us to focus initially on learning as coming to believe, rather than coming to know.

Beyond the epistemological challenge lie empirical challenges as well. The empirical materials were often deficient for specifying policy makers' goals (especially on the Soviet side). Both we and our contributors found it easier to treat belief change as a dependent variable than as an independent variable. That is, it was normally easier to specify when and why beliefs changed than it was to determine the relationship between changes in beliefs, on one hand, and policy change or performance improvement, on the other. For policies and performance may change or improve for reasons other than, or in interaction with, belief change (for example: political coalition building; see Anderson, Chapter 4).

Beyond this empirical question of what caused behavioral change, there was always the danger that individual contributors' different theoretical assumptions drove their conclusions about performance evaluation and realism. This factor almost certainly accounts for some differences in tone, focus, and conclusions among the case studies. Nonetheless, we found the case studies to be sufficiently comparable to permit us to mine them for purposes of documenting instances of certain types of belief change and their circumstantial correlates (see Chapter 2) and for pushing beyond the material in the case studies to expand our thinking about the relationship between learning and cooperation in U.S.-Soviet interaction (see Chapters 20 and 21).

Thus, as it has developed, the volume has expanded to perform several functions: (1) to expose the reader to a wide range of perspectives on the usages of a learning construct for thinking about foreign policy; (2) to present new empirical case studies on parallel aspects of Soviet and U.S. foreign policy that bear on the conditions under which leaders in each capital change their beliefs and policies; and (3) to push beyond the case studies' priority focus on learning as coming to believe that to examine instances of learning as coming to know that and coming to know how: in the latter case, exploring the role of belief-change in Soviet-U.S. learning how to cooperate (see Chapters 20 and 21).

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4. Ibid.


8. Not always, though, because people sometimes do the right thing for the wrong reasons.


10. Etheredge, Can Governments Learn?

11. Radical subjectivism: "given that nobody really knows what would have happened if ______ , one person's opinion must be as good as another's!" Theoretical and normative overconfidence: "from our special epistemic vantage point, we know what would have happened if ______ , or we know what goals policy makers should have pursued in this situation."
of key domestic constituencies will capture important aspects of international reality. If anything, there are reasons for expecting the opposite (Anderson, Chapter 4).

There is, of course, no elegant theoretical formula for integrating these different levels of analysis. If one were simply to sum up—in impressionistic fashion—the grounds for optimism and pessimism, one would have good cause for deep depression. There are far more theoretical impediments to, than facilitators of, learning: the ambiguous nature of the policy feedback that national leaders receive; the cognitive, institutional, and domestic political limits on rationality; and the confusion and time pressure that often surround the policy-making process. Such a summation exercise would lead, however, not only to an artificially precise conclusion, but quite possibly to a prematurely pessimistic one. There are countervailing arguments for guarded optimism. Policy makers may not be as obtuse as they are sometimes depicted in the research literature. When learning becomes especially critical (Haas's trilogy of urgency, desirability, and feasibility), our leaders may often rise to the occasion. Moreover, the world may be more forgiving of slow learners than the harsher variants of neorealism lead one to suppose. If the world is populated largely by other slow learners, our leaders may often be protected from the consequences of their folly. A chess metaphor provides an appropriate closing note: errors of judgment that grand masters would mercilessly exploit frequently go unnoticed by less perceptive players. Slow learners can survive, sometimes even prosper, as long as they play mostly with each other.

NOTES

I am grateful for the detailed and thoughtful comments of George Breslauer, Alexander George, Ernst Haas, Robert Jervis, and Charles McGuire on earlier versions of this chapter. Comments concerning the chapter should be sent to Philip E. Tetlock, Institute of Personality Assessment and Research, Room 2C, 2150 Kittredge Street, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720.


56 Philip E. Tetlock


8. Within the Kennedy administration, many of the ExComm members at the time believed that Khrushchev's gamble was based on his perception of President Kennedy as a young, inexperienced, and weak leader (a perception derived from the summit meeting at Vienna and Kennedy's handling of the Bay of Pigs affair in 1961). Many scholars now believe, however, that Khrushchev's decision to deploy missiles in Cuba was motivated by U.S. strength, not weakness (specifically, the massive advantage in intercontinental ballistic missiles the United States had achieved by 1962). Of course, these hypotheses need not to be mutually exclusive explanations for Khrushchev's behavior. Perceptions of U.S. strength might have generated the perceived need to redress the nuclear balance, while the belief that Kennedy was weak could have led Khrushchev to conclude that the gamble was a safe one, as Kennedy would ultimately accept the Soviet fait accompli. U.S. and Soviet officials and scholars discuss Khrushchev's perceptions and motives in J. Blight and D. Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Noonday Press, 1989).

10. For a recent review of the central role that counterfactual arguments play in comparative politics and international relations, see J. Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," World Politics, in press.


16. K.N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics.


22. Perhaps the most we can realistically hope for is to move from one type of policy mistake to another before the consequences of any given mistake become unbearable. For instance, Philip Stewart argued in 1986 that "Gorbachev, perceiving the Soviet Union as threatened abroad by resurgent 'imperialism' and at home by a stagnant economy, has articulated a defensive, strongly nationalist foreign policy designed to protect the Soviet Union during a lengthy period of domestic rebuilding." He concluded that the reshuffling of the Politburo in 1985 and 1986 had created a fundamental shift in its prevailing outlook. Stewart was not optimistic about the future, however, as he believed that "this shift may be characterized as movement from the moderate, outward, and western orientation of the Brezhnev era to a tough, uncompromising, predominantly inward, nationalist or self-reliant perspective that is reminiscent of the late-Stalin era." P. Stewart, "Gorbachev and Obstacles Toward Détente," Political Science Quarterly, 101 (1986):2.

administrations were so determined to boost U.S. military capabilities and to acquire a wider range of conventional and nuclear options (between doing nothing and all-out nuclear war) that they provided the Europeans with a ready excuse for not increasing their own forces (sowing the seeds for much future discord). The Reagan administration was so motivated to overturn the image of weakness and vacillation from the Carter years that it may have seriously endangered the political unity of NATO through blustery rhetoric about nuclear shots across the bow. Learning, in this view, is a trial-and-error process.


29. O.R. Holsti, "The 'Operational Code' as an Approach to Analysis of Belief Systems" (Final report to the National Science Foundation, Grant SOC 75-15368, Duke University, 1977); A. George, "The Operational Code."


31. The different conclusions that Larson (Chapter 10) and Garrett (Chapter 7) draw concerning the occurrence of learning in the Nixon-Kissinger period are traceable to two distinct analytical sources. Larsen, on one hand, argues that Nixon and Kissinger were cognitively predisposed all along to exploit the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Both individuals were guided by realpolitik assumptions (or in the cognitive psychological terminology employed by Larson, *schemata*). Garrett, on the other hand, is more impressed by the capacity of Nixon and Kissinger to transcend the prevailing wisdom about China in 1969 (a nation "gone mad" during the Cultural Revolution) and to pursue a policy anchored in very different premises. If one limits one's conception of learning to a strictly individual level of analysis, the key question is "What did Nixon and Kissinger know about U.S.-Sino-Soviet relations and when did they know it?" If one broadens one's conception of learning to a governmental level of analysis, the question of what Nixon or Kissinger believed at particular times is of only secondary or biographical interest. The key point is that the individuals who assumed key posts of authority in 1969 had a more complex and perhaps realistic view of the international environment than did their predecessors.


41. R. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics.


48. R. Jervis, Perception and Misperception.
53. J. March, Decisions and Organizations.
55. I.L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink.
57. There are numerous other examples—both in this book and elsewhere—of the difficulty of determining what counts as an institutional impediment to learning. Haas (Chapter 3) provides a good general definition: "Institutional missions become encapsulated in routines that aid the career patterns of officials rather than solve problems." Operationalizing that definition is, however, more troublesome. Is the nuclear triad—the underpinning of U.S. strategic deterrence—an example of prudent redundancy or merely a rationalization that ensures that each of the three major services gets its slice of the budgetary pie? Does the NATO military bureaucracy inflate estimates of Soviet strength because it has a vested interest in doing so (Thies, Chapter 6) or because overestimation is a prudent precaution in the politically fickle democracies of the West? As C. Wright Mills noted, one person's reason is another's rationalization.
59. J.D. Steinbruner, A Cybernetic Theory.
60. Haas's conception of learning overlaps in significant ways with both the cognitive structural and efficiency conceptions sketched here. His conception is, however, identical to neither. For Haas, policy makers learn when they draw on the "consensual knowledge of an epistemic community" to reconceptualize the problems confronting them. Often this consensual knowledge requires thinking about problems in more differentiated and integrated ways—what Haas calls "nested problem sets," which involve placing a problem in a broader systemic frame of reference (e.g., thinking about the nuclear arms race not only in a strategic but also in an economic or ecological framework). Often this consensual knowledge will guide policy in more realistic or adaptive directions (in large part
because most epistemic communities rely on the self-correcting norms of science to weed out deviant or crackpot ideas). Learning in the Haasian sense need not, however, entail movement toward greater complexity of thought (consensual knowledge may consist of simple but powerful generalizations) or movement toward greater efficiency (policy makers may be persuaded to adopt a body of consensual knowledge that turns out in hindsight to have been seriously flawed).


63. F. Griffiths, "Sources of American Conduct"; Chapter 17 in this volume.

64. Thies (Chapter 6) independently advances a political competition model of his own to explain the twists and turns of U.S. policy toward Europe since 1945. He notes that "competition for control of the executive branch encourages ambitious individuals to formulate alternative policies intended to improve on those of the incumbent administration." The new ideas of aspiring U.S. politicians—like those of aspiring Politburo members—need to be distinctive (otherwise why should others support them?), to appeal to important constituencies (otherwise why bother to campaign at all?), and to be plausible (who wants a platform that leads to demonstrably incorrect predictions?). The political stimulus to creativity does not, however, as Thies notes, guarantee learning. Indeed it can inspire demagoguery and, once the challengers gain power, overreactions to the shortcomings of earlier policies.


66. J. March, *Decisions and Organizations*.


more effective problem solving. If virtù wins no final victory, neither does Dame Fortuna. The limitations of habit, real though they are, are often transcended by appropriate behaviors because no political routine is totally frozen. Almost certainly, the social democrat will never walk away with a complete victory; but neither will the classical conservative. They are condemned to interact with each other for a very long time. Therefore, they can be expected to experience interdependence in such a way as to arrive at programs and rules that make them both see their enmeshment as a nearly nondecomposable system.

In that case they are acting out an evolutionary logic. Past events, past mistakes of policy, and past discoveries of science create a dynamic in which all actors, despite the ideological commitments that define their perceived interests, will be forced to consider the other's interests as if they were their own. Not only interests, but the fates of actors become intertwined, not only in the observer's judgment but also in the minds of the actors. The reality of the cognitively evolutionary pattern, in turn, limits and suggests the kinds of theories of organization on which we can draw in considering the deliberate design of organizations that can learn.

The learning mode can never be expected to win a final victory over the adaptive mode. The two will continue to coexist within the same organization and among organizations. Total learning is not within the grasp of the political being because of the drag of habit and the limits of social learning. The creative passion for designing better bureaucracies encounters the inertia of embedded perceptions and interests. Both forces will determine the eventual outcome. Probably this result will fully satisfy nobody, but it will set the pattern for the next round of change just the same.

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Portions of this essay are taken or adapted from the author's *When Knowledge Is Power* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). I gratefully acknowledge the publisher's permission to use the material.


4. There is of course a logical possibility governing decision making that differs from the four we envisage here. Interests need not be informed by knowl-
edge (as here defined) at all. Ideology may be the source of interest, unaided by any notion of technical information, structured or not, consensual or disputed. In such a situation a politician's sense of interest retains its immunity from the truth tests to which epistemic communities are subject. These possibilities do not concern us here. I am elaborating a notion of organizational decision making in which knowledge, consensual or not, shapes and deflects raw interest. I am not here interested in goals based on interests uninformed by knowledge.

I feel justified in taking this position because it is hard to imagine any political issue in modern international relations that is not informed to some extent by experts' claims that command some respect, mixed with a fair amount of ridicule and even contempt. The point is that, even though the knowledge claimed by experts may be partisan knowledge, it still enters the decision-making process. This is the situation covered by the southwest cell on Figure 1.


8. One author defines individual learning as "changes in intelligence and effectiveness" and to operationalize the growth of intelligence as "(1) growth of realism, recognizing the different elements and processes actually operating in the world; (2) growth of intellectual integration in which these different elements and processes are integrated with one another in thought; (3) growth of reflective perspective about the conduct of the first two processes, the conception of the problem, and the results which the decision maker desires to achieve." Lloyd S. Etheredge, Can Governments Learn? (New York: Pergamon, 1985), 66, emphasis in original.

Etheredge's book and his "Government Learning" (in Samuel Long, ed., Handbook of Political Behavior [New York: Plenum, 1981]) are among the first systematic efforts to conceptualize learning by public organizations, even if the lessons learned turn out to be the things the author preferred. The therapeutic component of the theory lies in the emphasis on internal communication, openness, participation, heterodoxy, competition among ideas, and personal creativeness and its rewards. Etheredge explicitly equates government learning with lessons learned by single policy makers. The character of the routines suggested is thought to generalize learning to other decision makers. Abraham Maslow rides high in this approach as in C. Argyris and D.A. Schön, Organizational Learning (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978).


12. Cutler, "The Cybernetic Theory Reconsidered," 60 (Table 2, last line).


15. Figure 2 is adapted from Stein and Tanter, *Rational Decision-Making*, 64 (Fig. 3.1 in the original). The characteristics of the three paradigms with respect to each decisional step are listed on their Table 3.1, p. 65. Figure 3 is adapted from their Fig 3.2, p. 65. I disregard three "paths to choice" as unlikely to be relevant.


17. The logic of this discussion is derived from Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42, 3 (Summer 1988); 427–60. A win-set for any one constituency is "the set of all possible [level 2 and 3] agreements that would 'win'—that is, gain the necessary majority among the constituents—when simply voted up or down." (ibid., 437). Putnam uses the notion of a set as meaning the number of possibly acceptable agreements, without worrying about the content of the agreements in terms of the complexity or type of linked issues in the set. Nor is Putnam responsible for my connecting his logic with my concern with bargaining styles.

18. The source of the vocabulary of decomposability is, of course, Herbert Simon's work. For a recent discussion of these distinctions see Simon, *Reason in Human Affairs* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1983).


sition of the government—organizations can adapt their goals, their images of the world, and their strategies very dramatically, without necessarily learning at all.

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35. Their own and others' findings are collected in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds., Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1982).


40. Gordon F. Pitz, "Subjective Probability Distributions for Imperfectly Known Quantities," in Gregg, ed., Knowledge and Cognition, 37-38; Dennis L. Jennings, Teresa M. Amabile, and Lee Ross, "Informal Covariation Assessment: Data-based Ver-


44. Anderson, *Competitive Politics*.


The Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward Arms Control

Nor is such learning likely to characterize the Bush administration, as it starts into business by pursuing a set of policies that proceed for the most part from those of the last Reagan years and continue well within the Extender/Limiter bounds. The likely changes in U.S. policy will not stem from U.S. learning, nor should they, given the dearth of nuclear evidence from which to learn. In a very real sense, our general policies have been right all along: unilateral pursuit of nuclear control while seeking arms agreements consistent with that control. True, until 1985 the latter was never really tested by Soviet acceptance of the basic principles. That is why the impetus to current changes has come not from Western learning, but from the East.

In 1986, a French analyst wrote: "In the bundle of factors that have, since 1954, determined the evolution of the Franco-German dialogue on matters of security, the Soviet Union has appeared, without doubt, as the only constant." What was true of the Franco-German security dialogue was even more true of the U.S.-Soviet security dialogue on nuclear weapons and stability; it did not change between 1954 (really, since 1948) and 1985, because of the constancy of the Soviet Union. Immediately after that writing, however, Gorbachev changed the Soviet Union's foreign as well as domestic policies. The changes have been radical and visible; whether they are permanent and fundamental remains to be seen. The Reagan adaptations—negotiate seriously but keep your powder dry—were appropriate. They were not based on new learning, however, because the old lessons covered the possibilities.

Gorbachev's own radical changes were undoubtedly based on Soviet interests as he saw them. Their apparent direction was toward stability and away from attempts to achieve a "correlation of forces," in the Soviet phrase, that would gain political advantages vis-à-vis the West. Now, to the extent that this new direction is real as well as apparent, the intriguing question arises of the extent to which the substance of the Soviet moves has been itself based on real learning—from Schelling, Halperin, Kahn, Wohlstetter, and the other U.S. instructors on the subject of the principles of nuclear stability.

But that is the subject of another essay in this volume.

NOTES


2. I was trained as an economist. For the first half of the 1980s, however, I was charged with supervising a group of psychologists who specialized in learning. I learned that I was not going to learn much about learning.

controlled deterrence," but this is a less useful concept, obscuring the essential
difference between the single objective of using nuclear weapons to avoid the use
of nuclear weapons, and all other objectives. Type III terminology (although not
the concept of graduation) has fallen into disuse.


7. Evaluation of individual contributions is not a purpose of this essay. Not
only are the five people listed seminal contributors, but they also represent different
aspects of strategic policy making at crucial times throughout the period. A
fuller list of still-active major participants over a long period of time would have
to include, at a minimum, Morton Halperin, William Kaufmann, George Kennan,
Paul Nitze, and Henry Rowen.

8. The two other major members of the team, Henry Rowen and Fred Hoffman,
have also continued to be active in the debate throughout the entire period, Hoffman
being one of the developers of the strategic implications of President Reagan's
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

1959).


11. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First
Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), Chapter IX.

12. Robert S. McNamara, "Defense Arrangements of the North Atlantic Com-

13. See the many quotes from McNamara in 1962, in William W. Kaufmann,
The McNamara Strategy (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), Ch. 2, "The Search
    for Options." Kaufmann had drafted the Ann Arbor speech and many of the
    others.

14. Robert S. McNamara, "The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy," Department of
    State Bulletin, October 9, 1967, 443–44. The speech was drafted by Morton Halperin,
    then in the Defense Department. Halperin, by then on his way to becoming a
    strong Limiter, shifted to the National Security Council staff in the first year of
    the Nixon administration, where he was so strange an anomaly that his phone
    was tapped by his superiors before he quit.

15. The ABM treaty is sometimes considered part of SALT, sometimes a sepa-
    rate entity.


    and Row, 1957).

    1960).


23. Robert A. Levine, *The Arms Debate* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), Table 1, 212-13, and Table 2, 278.


Poland and the Soviet Union after World War II, the further development of the European Community (EC), the future of the newly democratic governments of Eastern Europe caught between the EC in the West and the Soviet Union to the East—the list of problems on Europe's horizon practically cries out for a renewed attempt to articulate a vision of what Europe should be and its relationship to the United States.

For nearly 40 years NATO in general and U.S. policy in particular have been sustained by the mission of organizing the West's resources to meet and defeat a Warsaw Pact invasion. With the latter in a shambles, Soviet forces withdrawing from Eastern Europe, and a reunited Germany moving toward economic hegemony over the continent, U.S. officials can scarcely avoid any longer the challenge of rethinking what the United States should be attempting to accomplish through its policies toward Europe. Whether the challenge will be met in time remains to be seen, but on balance the record of U.S. policy since the Korean War does not provide much basis for optimism in this regard.

NOTES
10. See, for example, the comments by Secretary of State George C. Marshall,

11. The British embassy in Washington conveyed two notes to this effect to Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson on February 21, 1947. The views of U.S. officials at the time these notes were passed are described in J. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 129–70.

12. L. Adler and T. Paterson, "Red Fascism."


22. Remarks by George Kennan, ibid.


24. This view was argued most cogently in a paper prepared under Kennan's supervision by the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, PPS-13, November 6, 1947, a summary of which was presented to the Cabinet by Marshall on November 7, 1947; *FRUS*, vol. 1, 1947, 770–77.

25. Ibid., 772–73. See also J.L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 57.

26. The administration's policy, as explained by Marshall and affirmed by Truman at a meeting on the defense budget on May 7, 1948, "was based on the assumption that there would not be war and that we should not plunge into war preparations which would bring about the very thing we were taking steps to prevent" (W. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, 432). See also PPS-13, *FRUS*, vol. 1, 1947, 774; *FRUS*, vol. 2, 1948, 70–72; J.L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 38–39; D. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 442; and David McLellan, *Dean Acheson, The State Department Years* (New York: Dodd Mead, 1976), 146–47.
27. The importance of greater political and economic integration in Western Europe in the thinking of U.S. officials is discussed in W. Thies, An Alliance in Crisis, Chapter 3.


29. Remarks by Robert Lovett, ibid., 151 (see also 156, 166). For a detailed account of the negotiations that culminated in the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, see W. Thies, An Alliance in Crisis, Chapter 3. An account that emphasizes heavily the determination of U.S. officials to use the creation of a new security arrangement for Europe to resolve the German question is that of Timothy Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981).

30. See, for example, Kennan’s comments during the July 7, 1948, meeting with the ambassadors of Great Britain, France, Canada, and the Benelux states, FRUS, vol. 3, 1948, 157.

31. See, for example, comments by Charles Bohlen during the meeting on July 7, 1948, ibid.

32. See, for example, James Forrestal’s characterization of U.S. policy as a “calculated risk,” quoted in J.L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 61–62.

33. FRUS, vol. 3, 1948, 157. See also George Kennan to Walter Lippmann, April 6, 1948, quoted in D. Mayers, “Containment,” 142. Truman’s confidence in the ability of the West to meet the Soviet challenge is discussed by H. Feis, From Trust to Terror, 86.

34. See, for example, Truman’s message to Congress of August 1, 1950, quoted in L. Kaplan, A Community of Interests, 105; the account of the September 1950 meetings of the NATO council in D. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 574–75; and the statements by Truman, Acheson, and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, quoted in R. Osgood, The Entangling Alliance, 69–70.


36. L. Ismay, The First Five Years, 40, 102. These totals do not include Greek and Turkish forces, which did not come under NATO command until 1952.


38. The work of the TCC and its executive board is described in more detail in W. Thies, An Alliance in Crisis, Chapter 5; R. Jordan, The NATO International Staff Secretariat, 203–11; and L. Ismay, The First Five Years, 44–48.


40. L. Ismay, The First Five Years, 103.

41. These pressures are discussed more fully in Ronald Ritchie, NATO: The Economics of an Alliance (Toronto, Ont.: The Ryerson Press, 1956), 52–61. See also D. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 902–904.


53. T. White, *Fire in the Ashes*, 293.


62. Most prominently Theodore H. White, Hanson Baldwin, and Edmund Taylor. White’s writings in particular suggest very good connections at SHAPE and elsewhere.


66. The views of Senator Robert Taft and former President Herbert Hoover are summarized in FRUS, vol. 3, 1951, 14; D. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 630–37; D. McLellan, Dean Acheson, 340–45; and L. Kaplan, A Community of Interests, 149–53.

67. White goes further in this regard, arguing that by 1953, the power balance in Central Europe had “shifted from the Russians to the Atlantic forces” (Fire in the Ashes, 296).

68. R. Osgood, The Entangling Alliance, 391, fn. 98.

69. R. Ritchie, The Economics of an Alliance, 56.


71. R. Ritchie, The Economics of an Alliance, 14; see also 52–53.

72. Ibid., 14.


75. Quoted in J.L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 110.

76. See, for example, the remarks by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 5, 1950, quoted in L. Kaplan, A Community of Interests, 86.

77. Ibid., 105.

80. See, for example, the statements by Eisenhower and Ridgway, quoted in R. Osgood, *The Entangling Alliance*, 383–84, fn. 67.
84. T. White, *Fire in the Ashes*, 304.
86. This exchange between Dulles and Eisenhower is described in J.L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 128.
91. Ibid., 160.
92. Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy, quoted in ibid., 141–42.
93. See, for example, the remarks by Dulles, quoted in ibid., 158.
96. Ibid., 197.
103. In particular, the bomber fly-by that accompanied the 1955 May Day parade in Moscow, the successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile during the summer of 1957, and the launching of the first artificial earth satellite (Sputnik) in October 1957.
105. Paul Samuelson, quoted in J.L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 204, suggested the contrast between the economic assumptions of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.

106. Quoted in ibid., 214.

107. Ibid.

108. Ibid., 216.


115. The number of active-duty divisions along the NATO side of the central front increased from 22 in 1960 to 27 in 1963, but this was entirely the result of a long-planned expansion of the West German army from 7 to 12 divisions.


118. Ibid., 220–21.


139. See, for example, former Secretary of State Haig’s comment that the United States would have to triple the size of its armed forces and put its economy on a war footing in order to provide a nonnuclear defense of Western Europe; Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Refuses to Bar Possible First Use of Nuclear Arms,” NYT (April 7, 1982): 1, 6.

141. See, for example, Secretary Haig's comments on the need to retain the option of nuclear first use, in B. Gwertzman, "U.S. Refuses to Bar Possible First-Use," *NYT* (April 7, 1982).


143. See, for example, the comments by Secretary of State Haig, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, and President Reagan, cited in Seyom Brown, *The Faces of Power*, rev. ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 587-88. See also the essay by M. Kahler in K. Oye et al. (eds.), *Eagle Defiant*, 283-86.


145. Ibid. In an October 1983 survey, 73 percent of British respondents said they believed the U.S. promise that Great Britain would have veto power over the firing of the ground-launched cruise missiles based there could not be trusted; Barnaby Feder, "Britons Shying Away From Missiles," *NYT* (October 31, 1983): 9.


149. Between fiscal 1986 and fiscal 1989, Defense Department budget authority in real terms declined at an average annual rate of 2.8 percent; outlays increased by 5.8 percent and 0.4 percent in fiscal 1986 and fiscal 1987, but declined by 0.3 percent and 0.7 percent in fiscal 1988 and fiscal 1989 (S. Cain, Table 1). The figures for fiscal 1989 included in this table represent estimates by the Office of Management and Budget.

150. See, for example, the president's pronouncement during an interview with Soviet journalists published in November 1985 that deployment of his proposed space-based missile defense system would come only after an agreement to eliminate offensive nuclear missiles (David Hoffman, "Reagan Says SDI Deployment Depends on Nuclear-Missile Ban," *Washington Post* (November 5, 1985): A1, A24.

Schlesinger’s article, see “Reykjavik and Revelations: A Turn of the Tide?,” *Foreign Affairs: America and the World, 1986*, (Council on Foreign Relations), 430.


164. This judgment is based on interviews conducted at NATO headquarters in Brussels during the summer of 1989.

165. This point was suggested by R. Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 222.


evident in Bush's decision to violate his stated policy of suspending high-level contacts with China by sending his national security adviser to Beijing secretly in July and openly again in December to seek to restore Sino-American relations. The rapidly changing international environment, including the decommunization of Eastern Europe, the political and economic transformation of the Soviet Union toward a multiparty democracy and a free-market economy, and the evolution of U.S. strategy toward the Soviet Union as the post–World War II Cold War era came to an end, however, created the basis—and the need—for another reassessment of China's role in U.S. strategy. By the beginning of the 1990s, the Bush administration had already concluded that China's strategic importance to the United States as a counter to Soviet power had diminished significantly, thus requiring development of a broader foundation for U.S. policy toward China while also freeing the hand of the president in managing Sino-American relations.

NOTES

1. The author wishes to thank Robert Ross and George Breslauer for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

2. The United States and China did learn tacit crisis management, however, to limit the scope of the Korean War and to avoid direct military conflict in confrontations over Quemoy and Matsu in the 1950s and Indochina in the 1960s.


4. Cited by Gaddis, The Long Peace, 159. Gaddis notes that Titoism in Yugoslavia had developed "quite independently of anything the United States had done," and that "it is not at all clear that it was ever within Washington's power to affect, in any substantial way, the relationship between Moscow and its East European satellites in the first place." Ibid., 160.

5. Ibid., 161.


7. The debates and responses to CCP probes during this period are detailed by Robert M. Blum, Drawing the Line: The Origin of the American Containment Policy in East Asia (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982), 50–79. See also Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, 16–18.

8. Waldo Heinrichs, "American China Policy and the Cold War in Asia: A


11. In the spring of 1949, as the communist armies were rolling toward complete victory on the mainland, China's future premier Zhou Enlai sent a secret message to senior American officials asking for U.S. economic aid and indicating that Zhou's liberal wing of the Communist Party wanted China to steer an independent course with good working relations between China and the United States. Zhou added, according to the report of the consul general, Edmund O. Clubb, that the radicals wanted an alliance with the Soviet Union while liberals, including Zhou, viewed Soviet foreign policy as crazy and a risk of war with the United States. Zhou reportedly said China under the Communists would serve in the international sphere as a mediator between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. Cited by Robert M. Blum, *Drawing the Line*, 56. Blum also details other Chinese Communist probes to the United States in Chapter 4. See Michael Hunt, "Mao Tse-tung and the Issue of Accommodation with the United States, 1948-1950," and Warren I. Cohen, "Acheson, His Advisers, and China, 1949-1950," in *Uncertain Years*, eds. Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs.


14. In September 1950, for example, Secretary of State Dean Acheson insisted publicly that China would be "crazy" to enter the Korean War because it faced the danger of the "great cloud from the north, Russian penetration" aimed at those areas in northern China under Soviet control. Acheson added that "I give the people in Peiping credit for being intelligent enough to see what is happening to them." Cited by Robert Blum, *The United States and China in World Affairs* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966), 113. See also Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, 169, fn.

15. Ibid., 165.


19. Ibid.

20. Robert M. Blum notes that "the policy of encouraging the eventual emergence of a Communist China free of Soviet domination still lacked the appeal to either American military leaders or members of Congress who wanted the United States to do something more active to stop communism in Asia. The State Department also had to take account of the political reality that President Truman, much less Congress, would not allow the proffering of any American aid to the Mao Tse-tung regime unless it drastically and publicly changed its attitude toward the United States." Blum, *Drawing the Line*, 59–60. Whether the United States and the CCP missed a historic opportunity for an accommodation in the late 1940s is still a subject of debate in both the United States and China that is beyond the scope of this paper. See, for example, the papers and discussions in Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs, eds., *Uncertain Years*; Mayers, *Cracking the Monolith*, 163–64; and Michael Schaller, *The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938–1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 303–304.

21. Robert M. Blum notes that there was little inducement in the policies approved in March 1949 toward the CCP, the Nationalists, and Formosa for the Chinese Communists to lean to the side of the West. Other than "controlled trade" with the West and Japan, the policies adopted in the "March 3 package" were "disagreeable" from the CCP perspective, including "continued recognition of the Nationalists; a program of covert aid to pro-Western groups on the mainland; possible future overt support for some anti-Communist force that might rise up against the Communists; and the policy of severing Formosa from the mainland." Many of these policies, Blum contends, "were designed in opposition to the Titoist hypothesis and appeared to rest on the counter-hypothesis that all Communists were in the same camp and should be staunchly opposed by the use of all practical devices." Blum, *Drawing the Line*, 35.


25. See Mayers, *Cracking the Monolith*, 93, and Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, 170. Gaddis notes that Acheson told Winston Churchill in early 1952 that a Sino-Soviet split had seemed a real possibility before the outbreak of the Korean War, but that Chinese intervention "had made this hope seem very distant and impossible of attainment at present. I did not think that over any period of time with which we could now be concerned it was possible to create a divergence between the two communists [sic] groups" (173).
26. Tucker notes that prior to the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, pressure from the China lobby in support of the Nationalist Chinese was not a major factor in U.S. policy toward China. Tucker, *Patterns in the Dust*, 99.

27. Dean Rusk, chief of the Far Eastern Branch of the State Department, told the China Institute in New York on May 18, 1951, that "the Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian government—a Slavic Manchukuo on a larger scale. It is not the government of China. It does not pass the first test. It is not Chinese." Rusk's speech also included a statement implying support for Nationalist Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek's effort to retake control of the mainland: "As the Chinese people move to assert their freedom and to work out their destiny in accordance with their own historical purposes, they can count upon tremendous support from free peoples in other parts of the world." Rusk had not cleared the speech and was taken to task by Acheson, who finally agreed that it did not represent a departure from U.S. policy. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, *Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk in the Truman, Kennedy and Johnson Years* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), 223–24.

28. Robert Blum contends that this policy was set de facto as a result of President Truman's decision June 27, 1950—before China's entry into the Korean War—to send the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Straits despite Truman's declaration in the order that the future status of Taiwan would be determined later. Blum, *The United States and China*, 112. Another (different) scholar, Robert M. Blum, however, uncovered documents demonstrating that in March 1949, before the CCP's consolidation of power on the mainland or the Nationalists' final retreat to Formosa [Taiwan], President Truman agreed to a secret policy aimed at maintaining a pro-U.S. regime on Formosa that was separate from the mainland. Blum, *Drawing the Line*, 37. According to Blum, the United States wanted to gain control of Formosa for strategic and military reasons, whether through the Nationalist occupation or Taiwan independence. Washington wanted especially to prevent Soviet military presence on the island as a result of Communist Chinese occupation. See also Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, 74–75, 80–81; and Tucker, *Patterns in the Dust*, 199–200.


30. For an analysis of U.S. perceptions of Sino-Soviet differences and covert efforts to exploit those differences during the Korean War, see Mayers, *Cracking the Monolith*, 95–107 and 115–25.

31. Gaddis notes that even after Chinese intervention in Korea, the administration continued to believe strongly enough in the possibility of exploiting eventual differences between the Soviet Union and China that in early 1951 the State Department authorized secret contacts with the Chinese, possibly to seek a cease-fire in return for U.S. recognition of the People's Republic of China. The contacts produced no results, however. Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, 170.

32. Ibid., 172. See also Mayers, *Cracking the Monolith*, 102.

33. Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, 172–73. According to Rusk's sympathetic biographer, Thomas J. Schoenbaum, "many years later, Rusk seemed to be genuinely uneasy about this speech, dismissing it either as campaign-style oratory or as an attempt to shame the Chinese into splitting with the Soviets." Schoenbaum,
Waging Peace and War, 223. Tucker notes that speeches by U.S. officials in 1950 repeatedly referred to the CCP as Soviet puppets, hoping to shame Beijing into a demonstration of anti-Russian nationalism. Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, 193.

34. The Truman administration also viewed China as placing an excessive burden on the Soviet Union that could be exacerbated by an economic boycott of China by the West. See Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, 178.

35. Gaddis, The Long Peace, 148. See also Mayers, Cracking the Monolith, 119–120.

36. The existence of this briefing was discovered by Gaddis in 1979 and led to a reconsideration of his previous views not only of Dulles but also of U.S. statements about “monolithic communism” throughout the cold war. See Gaddis, The Long Peace, 147–48. A National Security Council study, NSC 166/1, dated November 3, 1953, outlined the differences between the Soviet Union and China and how they could be exacerbated by U.S. pressure on Beijing. See Mayers, Cracking the Monolith, 121–23 and 149–50.


38. After the Chinese backed down in the Quemoy-Matsu crisis in 1958, Eisenhower privately wondered whether the Soviets did not foresee a future threat from China. Nevertheless, he discussed with Dulles, according to the secretary of state’s notes, the U.S. policy of “holding firm until changes would occur within the Sino-Soviet bloc. He felt these were inevitable but realized that the policy we were following might not be popular. There were some who wanted to give in; others who wanted to attack. The policy that required patience was rarely popular.” Cited by Gaddis, The Long Peace, 187. Interestingly, in his memoirs Eisenhower does not express his views about differences between China and the Soviet Union while reporting without comment private statements to him by both Khrushchev in September 1959 and Nationalist Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek in June 1960 denying the existence of a rift between Moscow and Beijing. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years—Waging Peace, 1956–1961 (New York: Doubleday, 1965), 445, 564. See also Mayers, Cracking the Monolith, 127–50 and 154 on implementation of the wedge-through-pressure strategy during the 1950s.

39. Roger Hilsman notes that, on the basis of this assumption, U.S. policy was “to act and speak as to encourage Chinese overseas and on the mainland to look to the Nationalists on Taiwan as the government of all of China. The policy, moreover, was to abstain ‘from any act to encourage the Communist regime, morally, politically, or materially,’ and this included refusing to extend diplomatic recognition, opposing the seating of Communist China in the UN, putting an embargo on any trade or cultural exchanges, and encouraging our friends and allies to follow suit.” Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 301.


41. “Though American policy was not ultimately responsible for the shattering of Sino-Soviet cooperation, by early 1956 the Dulles-Eisenhower version of containment, of applied pressure, seems to have contributed, as its authors hoped, to the weakening of Russian and Chinese pledges to each other.” Mayers, Cracking the Monolith, 151–57.
42. Ibid., 156.
43. Although the Eisenhower administration did not wholly exclude the possibility of a more conciliatory approach to China, according to Gaddis, it was not prepared to resume the Truman administration's attempt to split the Chinese from the Soviets through accommodation. See Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, 185–86. In 1955, the Eisenhower administration agreed reluctantly, however, to a Chinese offer to open a channel for direct Sino-American discussions—the Ambassadorial Talks—that continued sporadically for the next 15 years. Although the talks did not lead to a Sino-U.S. reconciliation, they did provide a forum for crisis management and for the initial Sino-American contacts under the Nixon administration. For an account of the Warsaw talks, see Kenneth Young, *Negotiating With the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953–1967* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1978).
47. "The taunts and threats" to Khrushchev's leadership from the Chinese, Theodore Sorensen wrote of the Kennedy administration's perception of the Sino-Soviet rift, caused the Soviet premier "to reshuffle his priorities, removing conflict with the West from the top of his agenda. They also required him to prove concretely the value of coexistence and to isolate the more reckless Chinese." Nevertheless, Sorensen noted, President Kennedy "derived little comfort from the Soviet-Chinese dispute, and though, on the contrary, that it might increase the dangers of desperation in Moscow or irresponsibility in Peking." Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 724–26.
49. Foster Rhea Dulles, *American Foreign Policy Toward Communist China* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972), 206. Roger Hilsman reports that in early 1962 U.S. government officials for the first time entertained the notion of a permanent Sino-Soviet split. As director of intelligence at the State Department he gave a public speech in November 1962 that asserted: "we cannot foresee any genuine reconciliation of the dispute," but nevertheless argued against the notion of a complete and final break. "Communist ideology," Hilsman's speech concluded, "with its goal of world revolution, still provides an overall basis for unity between Peiping and Moscow. So long as both partners see the United States as the greatest obstacle to the attainment of this goal, they will try to patch over their differences and unite against a common enemy." Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, 344-345.
52. Raymond Garthoff notes that he was involved in these internal delibera-

53. See Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, 310–20. The Kennedy administration assured the Chinese in the Warsaw talks, however, that Washington would not provide assistance to the Nationalist Chinese for an assault on the mainland.

54. Ibid., 302–303.


59. Schoenbaum writes that Secretary of State Rusk raised the issue of changing China policy privately with Kennedy in May 1961. "He found Kennedy unreceptive to his arguments. The politics of the matter, Kennedy explained, made it impossible to contemplate any change for the time being. . . . It was a question to be deferred to his second term if he received a greater mandate in the 1964 election. Rusk got up to leave, and Kennedy called him back. 'What's more, Mr. Secretary,' he said, 'I don't want to read in the *Washington Post* and *The New York Times* that the State Department is thinking about a change in China policy.'" Schoenbaum, *Waging Peace and War*, 388.

60. The December 13 speech also rejected the public position of Dulles that the Communist regime was a passing phase: "We have no reason to believe that there is a present likelihood that the Communist regime will be overthrown." Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, 351.


63. It is not generally known that the Johnson administration apparently approached the Soviet Union about joint action against the Chinese nuclear weapons program shortly before China exploded its first nuclear bomb on October 16, 1964. A declassified memorandum for the record by President Johnson's national
security adviser McGeorge Bundy, September 15, 1964, said that the president had approved decisions to closely consider "appropriate military actions against Chinese nuclear facilities" if "we should find ourselves in military hostilities at any level with the Chinese Communists." Bundy also said the president had approved exploring with the Soviets the possibility of joint action against Chinese nuclear facilities, including "even a possible agreement to cooperate in preventive military action." Bundy noted that the secretary of state (Dean Rusk) "now intends to consult promptly with the Soviet Ambassador." Memo from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, declassified September 14, 1977, and provided to the author by Ronald J. Bee. In his memoirs, Johnson writes only that he was concerned about the long-run implications of the Chinese nuclear test but that he did not mention it in his discussion with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin later that same day. Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 469.

64. Dulles, *American Foreign Policy Toward Communist China*, 213-14.


66. Nitze also asserted that "we want eventually . . . a China with which the U.S. can live in some degree of mutual accommodation—not one which views much of the rest of the world as a fertile field for revolution and the United States as its implacable enemy." Nitze, "Remarks to National War College."


68. Ibid., 81-83.


70. See Thomson, "On the Making of U.S. China Policy."


74. Franz Schurmann rejects a commonly held view that Henry Kissinger was the primary architect of U.S. foreign policy during the Nixon presidency and
ascribes the key role as "the creator of the grand design and its chief operative" to Richard Nixon. Franz Schurmann, *The Foreign Politics of Richard Nixon: The Grand Design* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1987), 2-3, 22-26. In this paper, I have not sought to establish which man was the primary innovator but rather to discuss the strategic thinking behind the shift in U.S. policy, which was uniquely shared and implemented by the two men.

75. In his discussion of the situation facing the Nixon administration in 1969, Kissinger notes that Americans "never fully understood that while our absolute power was growing, our relative position was bound to decline as the USSR recovered from World War II. Our military and diplomatic position was never more favorable than at the very beginning of the containment policy in the late 1940s." Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 62 (emphasis in original).

76. Paul Kennedy notes that "while the United States was pouring money into Vietnam, the USSR was devoting steadily larger sums to its nuclear forces—so that it achieved a rough strategic parity—and to its navy, which in these years emerged as a major force in global gunboat diplomacy; and this increasing imbalance was worsened by the American electorate's turn against military expenditures for most of the 1970s." Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987), 406-407.


79. Kissinger writes that the United States never had the military capability to implement such a demanding strategy, despite Washington's declaratory policy, and that if a war broke out simultaneously with the Soviet Union and China it would therefore likely lead to use of nuclear weapons. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 222.

80. These assurances were relayed to Chinese leaders in the Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks. See Young, *Negotiating With the Chinese Communists*, 268-75, and Franz Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power* (New York: Pantheon, 1974), 515. Chinese scholar Wang Jisi writes that "the insistence that American forces were sent to Viet Nam because of the 'Chinese Communist expansion' ... made it impossible to break the deadlock in Sino-American relations. In 1965-1967, the principal issue argued between Beijing and Washington in the Warsaw ambassadorial talks was Viet Nam. Although the Johnson Administration tried to convey a message in Warsaw to Beijing that it had no intention of invading China or crushing North Viet Nam, Beijing found it hard to trust such a promise." Wang Jisi, "From Kennedy to Nixon: America's East Asia and China Policy," *Beijing Review* (May 16-22, 1988).

81. A few policy makers may have vaguely perceived the benefits of two-front deterrence of the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Chester Bowles, U.S. representative
to India, wrote to Dulles in February 1953: "With an uncertain China on its Pacific flank the Soviet Union would surely be forced to abandon its present policies of naked threats . . . in Europe and the Middle East and adopt some less explosive tactics." Cited by Mayers, *Cracking the Monolith*, 125.

82. Kissinger comments on this shift in strategy that "what started out as a highly esoteric discussion of military strategy turned into one of our most important signals to the People's Republic of China that we meant to improve our relations with it." The announcement of the shift in U.S. strategy in the president's first *Foreign Policy Report to the Congress* on February 18, 1970, indicated to Beijing that "We would no longer treat a conflict with the USSR as automatically involving the People's Republic. We would treat our two adversaries on the basis of their actions toward us, not their ideology; we publicly acknowledged their differences and the unlikelihood of their cooperation." Kissinger, *White House Years*, 220, 222.

83. Ibid., 164.

84. Ibid., 163.

85. Nixon and Kissinger may have missed an opportunity to begin their own dialogue with China shortly after the new administration took power in January 1969, according to Seymour Hersh (*The Price of Power*, 354–55), who argues that the rapprochement with China could have been achieved much earlier.

86. Soviet defector Arkady Shevchenko reports that the Soviet leadership seriously considered nuclear strikes against China in the summer of 1969. Moscow was dissuaded from an attack in part by indications that the United States would react strongly against the Soviet Union, according to Shevchenko. Arkady Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 164–66.

87. Sutter maintains that Chinese leaders had perceived a growing threat of Soviet attack on China since Moscow's invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and that they realized "they could move closer to the United States in order to readjust Sino-Soviet relations and form a new balance of power in East Asia favorable to Chinese interests." Sutter, *China Watch*, 2.

88. For Kissinger, the Sino-Soviet conflict provided a learning experience after he was in office. He initially tended to take the Soviet point of view on the conflict and see the Chinese as more irrational and likely to attack the Soviet Union, according to Marvin and Bernard Kalb in *Kissinger* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974). But by August 1969, after a briefing by University of Michigan China expert Allen Whiting, Kalb and Kalb say, Kissinger had changed his views (see pp. 226–27). For a catalogue of Soviet threats to China, see Sutter, *China Watch*, 86–89.


90. Moscow's "paranoia" about Sino-American cooperation was impressed on Kissinger from the first days of the Nixon administration. The Soviets expressed their concern to him about the possibility of a Sino-American rapprochement beginning in early 1969, according to his *White House Years* (167–70, 179). Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin warned in October 1969, while discussing the opening of the U.S.–Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), that any attempt to manipulate the Sino-Soviet conflict would undermine efforts to improve relations between Washington and Moscow. Ibid., 187.

92. CIA Director Richard Helms, in an unprecedented background briefing, told a select group of reporters in late August 1969 that the Soviets had approached European Communist leaders about the possibility of a Soviet preemptive strike against Chinese nuclear facilities. Helms indicated that the United States opposed such action. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 184. See also Hyland, *Mortal Rivals*, 25–28. A Chinese official, who was working closely with Premier Zhou Enlai at the time, told me in 1982 that he had been very surprised to discover that the Soviets were considering a preemptive strike against China. The official said Helms's press conference, by showing that the United States opposed such a strike, "was very important and unexpected. It helped pave the way for the rapprochement."

93. Kissinger adds that "it was a major event in American foreign policy when a President declared that we had a strategic interest in the survival of a major Communist country, long an enemy, and with which we had no contact." Kissinger, *White House Years*, 182. Kissinger had initially viewed the Chinese as the more irrational party in the Sino-Soviet dispute and more likely to attack the Soviet Union, according to Marvin and Bernard Kalb. Kalb and Kalb report that Kissinger was dissuaded of this view by Allen Whiting, who in August 1969 convinced the national security adviser of the seriousness of the Soviet military threat to China and urged that the administration seize the opportunity of Chinese leaders' fear of Soviet attack and need for a U.S. counterweight to Soviet power to orchestrate a historic breakthrough in Sino-American relations. See Kalb and Kalb, *Kissinger*, 226–27.


96. They insisted that these steps were both desirable and necessary prerequisites to any improvement in Sino-American relations. Kissinger writes that during the
transition period to the new administration, several distinguished China experts wrote a memorandum urging the United States to make unilateral concessions to Beijing, including severing of U.S. ties to Taiwan and support for China's admission to the United Nations. At the same time, these experts failed to note either China's concern about the Soviet threat to Chinese security and the geopolitical opportunities this presented the United States or the "possibility that the Chinese might have an incentive to move toward us without American concessions because of their need for an American counterweight to the Soviet Union." Kissinger, *White House Years*, 165. Seymour Hersh also reports on this memorandum from eight prominent China scholars from Harvard, Columbia, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the *The Price of Power*, 357n.


98. At a critical point in August 1969 when the Soviet Union was threatening to attack China, critical analysis and advice was provided to Kissinger by University of Michigan China expert Allen Whiting, who had served from 1962 to 1966 as director of the State Department's Office of Research and Analysis for the Far East. Whiting, on the basis of discussions with his former colleagues whose assessments apparently were not reaching the White House, warned Kissinger that the Soviets had been making extraordinary preparations for an attack on China's nuclear facilities with conventional weapons. Whiting reportedly noted his colleagues' concern that the Chinese would believe the United States had tacitly approved such a Soviet attack. He suggested that a private U.S. assurance to Chinese leaders that the United States would not condone a Soviet strike on China's nuclear facilities might improve prospects for Chinese concessions on the major obstacle to a breakthrough in Sino-American relations—Taiwan. Whiting maintained that Taiwan was a secondary concern to Chinese leaders compared with the perceived threat to China from the Soviet Union. Hersh, *The Price of Power*, 357–59. Hersh also reports that Whiting frequently visited Washington in the summer of 1969, where he met with his former intelligence colleagues and learned, he says, that they felt "cut off from the White House. They felt useless and unwanted. Henry wasn't asking any questions, because if he asked, the bureaucracy might know what he was planning." Although Whiting is not credited in Kissinger's memoirs, Kissinger did mention to the Kalb brothers that he had been influenced by Whiting's analysis. Kalb and Kalb, *Kissinger*, 226–27.

99. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 182. Kissinger writes that many Soviet experts "rejected as either absurd or reckless" the argument that better ties with China could actually foster improvement in U.S.–Soviet relations. "Kissinger cites a September 1969 State Department paper asserting that U.S. overtures to China would "introduce irritants" into the U.S.–Soviet relationship and that "if a significant improvement in the Sino-American relationship should come about, the Soviets might well adopt a harder line both at home and in international affairs." Kissinger, *White House Years*, 189.
100. Former Kissinger aide William Hyland, not a disinterested commentator, remarks that Kissinger's secret visit to China in July 1971 was especially successful in gaining leverage over Moscow. "Playing the China card was clearly a success. Within a few weeks, there was a breakthrough in the Berlin talks, the SALT negotiations began to move again and the Soviets agreed to a Nixon summit in Moscow for the following spring." Hyland, Mortal Rivals, 35. See Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 240-42. See also Newhouse, Cold Dawn, 100 and 109-12, on the China factor in detente and the SALT negotiations.

101. Government Soviet experts' concern that any U.S. efforts to improve ties with China might undermine efforts to ease relations with the Soviet Union predate the Nixon administration. James C. Thomson, former assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, reveals similar concerns expressed in the Kennedy administration. He argues that the "China purges of the '50s had produced an unintended result: priority status for Soviet specialists and Soviet-American relations." The senior China specialists had been banished, he writes, and in their absence "U.S. policy was inevitably skewed towards Moscow to an unhealthy degree; indeed, vivid Soviet descriptions of Chinese 'irrationality' began to be accepted and repeated among American policy-makers." Thomson notes that in the 1962-1963 period, from the Cuban missile crisis to the Atmospheric Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, "efforts to undertake small unilateral initiatives towards China—most notably with regard to the travel ban—were regularly rejected on the ground that they might jeopardize the process of Soviet-American rapprochement." Thomson, "On the Making of U.S. China Policy," 228-29.

102. The key event stimulating opposition to détente in the United States was the U.S.-Soviet confrontation during the October 1973 war in the Middle East. See Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 405-8.

103. See Hyland, Mortal Rivals, 98-109, and Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 454-56, on the battles over the Jackson-Vanik and the Stevenson amendments.


105. "Between 1972 and 1974, Kissinger had repeatedly tried to mollify Brezhnev by promising that we would not enter into any military arrangements with China directed against Russia," according to Kissinger aide Hyland, Mortal Rivals, 64.

106. Leslie Gelb, "Washington Senses Loss of Leverage Against Soviets," New York Times, 30 November 1975. The administration official interviewed by Gelb was probably either Kissinger or his deputy Winston Lord. Peter Osnos, writing from Moscow for the Washington Post, 7 December 1975, concluded that the Soviets "apparently believe that relations between China and the United States are essentially stalled," and consequently seem relatively unconcerned about possible Sino-American collusion against them.

107. Kissinger's memoirs for the period of the Ford administration have not been written and there is no other public record of Kissinger's thinking on the issue of U.S.-Chinese military ties in this period. My assessment of Kissinger's views is based on interviews with officials and consultants in Washington as well as on my own judgment of the reasons for his actions on the issue.

108. For a detailed analysis and history of the struggle over U.S. military ties

109. These ideas were proposed by Michael Pillsbury, then a RAND consultant, who wrote the first study exploring the subject in early 1974. Pillsbury went public with his ideas in September 1975 in "U.S.–Chinese Military Ties?" *Foreign Policy* no. 20 (Fall 1975). Publication of his article was encouraged by high-level administration officials. Ironically, these ideas were initially sparked by Soviet claims that the United States was already providing China with arms, thus indicating Soviet sensitivity to such a policy.

110. See Garrett, *The 'China Card' and Its Origins*, 262–63 for a summary of these steps.

111. Vance records his consistent opposition to steps toward developing military and strategic ties with China advocated by Brzezinski for fear of provoking Moscow and damaging United States–Soviet relations. See Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 101–102, 110–19, and 390–91. Like Kissinger, however, Vance viewed U.S.–Chinese relations as contributing to a more favorable balance of power. Vance notes his view at the beginning of the administration that "[a]s long as we maintained a realistic appreciation of the limits of Sino-American cooperation, especially in security matters, and carefully managed the complex interrelationships between China, the Soviet Union, and ourselves, better U.S. relations with China would contribute to strengthening the balance of power both in Asia and globally." Ibid., 45–46.


113. Part I of Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) 24, completed in May 1977, reportedly recommended that the United States meet China’s basic conditions for normalization and warned that U.S.–Chinese relations would stagnate or erode unless forward progress were made toward normalizing relations. The study also warned that failure to make progress in relations with China could lead to improved Sino-Soviet relations while U.S. success in moving forward with Beijing could prompt improvements in U.S.–Soviet relations, as had happened in the 1971–1973 period. According to Brzezinski’s aide Michel Oksenberg, this position was supported by both Vance and Brzezinski. See Michel Oksenberg, “A Decade of Sino-American Relations,” *Foreign Affairs*, 61, no. 1 (Fall 1982): 181–82.


116. Vance notes that “although my views on this issue largely prevailed throughout 1977, we were to debate this issue again during the remainder of my term as secretary of state.” Vance, *Hard Choices*, 78.

117. For Vance’s account of the PRM-24 debate, see *Hard Choices*, 78; for Brzezinski’s account, see *Power and Principle*, 200.

118. See the New York Times 8 July 1977 and 6 January 1978 on the contents of
PRM-10. Brzezinski writes that PRM-10 "reinforced my previous predisposition to push on behalf of American-Chinese accommodation. I saw in such accommodation, together with our own enhanced defense efforts, the best way for creating greater geopolitical and strategic stability." Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 178.

119. The document presenting the hard-line point of view on Soviet intentions and the strategic balance under the Ford administration was the so-called Team B report done for the CIA by a group of conservative outsiders. See the New York Times 26 December 1976 and the Washington Post 2 January 1977.


121. In published articles and private statements over the next several months, the Chinese criticized the United States for underestimating the Soviet threat and pursuing a policy of appeasement. See Garrett, The 'China Card' and Its Origins, 111–13.


123. For details on this period, see Garrett, The 'China Card' and Its Origins, Chapter 4.

124. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 211.

125. Ibid., 207.


129. Vance notes that he sent President Carter a letter outside bureaucratic channels in late May 1978 that asserted, among other recommendations on U.S.-Soviet relations, that "we should be careful how we managed the U.S.-PRC-USSR triangular relationship and should avoid trying to play China off against the Soviets." Vance, Hard Choices, 102.


131. See Garrett and Glaser, "From Nixon to Reagan," 269–79, for a detailed account of this period.


133. For Secretary of State Alexander Haig's account of the negotiations with the Chinese and within the administration that led to the 17 August 1982 joint communiqué on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, see Caveat, 204–17.

134. In his memoirs, Haig writes: "In terms of the strategic interests of the United States and the West in the last quarter of the twentieth century, China may be the most important country in the world." Haig, Caveat, 194.

135. See Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Chinese Estimates of the U.S.-

136. In “New Realities and New Ways of Thinking,” *Foreign Affairs* 63, no. 4 (Spring 1985), George Shultz stressed the growing economic importance of the region to the United States. In a major Asia policy speech, March 5, 1983, to the World Affairs Council of North California in San Francisco, Shultz intentionally deemphasized China’s global role when he noted that the Sino-American relationship “can be a potent force for stability in the future of the region.”


139. From a balance-of-power perspective, cooperation with the Soviet Union against China was unthinkable—success of such a strategy would further weaken and isolate China or even lead China to rejoin forces with the Soviet Union. Such a strategy would thus strengthen the Soviet Union’s position in the global balance of power while weakening that of the United States and its allies.


way to accomplish the goal is to change players. Otherwise, change will in most cases be a painful process.

NOTES

The author would like to thank Alexander George and the editors for their comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript.

4. Foreign Relations of the United States 1947, vol. V (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), 1177–78. In the confusion between 1947 and 1948, the president at times suggested he would accept the participation of Americans in a U.N. “police force or constabulary,” but this was not to include “organized troop units.” He did not have a “military” presence in mind.
8. Author’s interview with Phillip Klutznick.
12. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, 188.
13. Ibid., 312–14.
14. Ibid., 323, 327.
15. Ibid., 395–400.


23. Haig, Caveat, 351.


25. Ibid.


34. Dwight D. Eisenhower Diaries, Conversation with Acting Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., and Robert B. Anderson, Afternoon of March 12, 1956 (Document 110), 1–2; Memorandum from the Secretary of State, 28 March 1956 (Document 1), 1–2.


41. Memorandum of Conference with the President, 30 October 1956; Transcript of phone call from John Foster Dulles to the President, 30 October 1956, 4:54 pm, 5; Memorandum of Conference with the President, 29 October 1956.
42. Memorandum for Mr. MacArthur from J.W. Hanes, Jr., 1 May 1956; Memorandum of Conversation with the President, 13 July 1956, 2–3; Memorandum for the President from Secretary Dulles, 28 September 1956.
43. Memorandum of Conference with the President, 15 July 1958, 11:25 am, 1.
44. Richard Nixon, Public Papers of the President, 5 September 1973, 736.
47. Nixon, Memoirs, 283.
49. Author’s confidential interviews.
52. Diary Papers of Edward Jacobson, 5 May 1950, 12; Kenen, Israel’s Defense Line, 75; “Steering Group on Preparations for Talks Between the President and Prime Minister Churchill,” 4 January 1952, 2.
55. Kissinger, White House Years, 341.
56. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 546–51; author’s confidential interviews.
57. Indyk, Reagan and the Middle East, 124–25.
from Vietnam, former officials, military men, and civilians continue to believe that if Johnson had chosen the harsher options, the United States could have brought North Vietnam to the negotiating table sooner or perhaps even won the war. We will never know if that could have been. What we do know is that the debate is premised on the assumption that which option gets chosen—and let us include George Ball's option of withdrawal here to widen the range of choices—may mean the difference between victory and wisdom and defeat and humiliation. Anything that might be responsible for such variation in policy outcomes deserves to be explained.

NOTES

Unless otherwise noted, all documents cited are located in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.

4. Ibid., 168.
5. Ibid., March 22, 1965, 404.
9. McGeorge Bundy, a less avid user of analogies than most of his colleagues, nevertheless found this lesson of Korea very pertinent. Personal interview with McGeorge Bundy, April 11, 1986.


26. Ibid., 37.

27. Ball called the Vietnam conflict a "civil war" in a July 1, 1965, memorandum to Lyndon Johnson. See Pentagon Papers, IV, 615.


32. Lyndon Johnson, The Vantage Point, 151.

33. Ibid., 115, 117, 131, 152–53.
34. See the following for elite opinion surmising that the Korean War was a victory for the United States: Adlai Stevenson, "Korea in Perspective," Foreign Affairs 30 (April 1952): 352; Averell Harriman, "Leadership in World Affairs," Foreign Affairs 32 (July 1954): 526; Dean Rusk, "The President," Foreign Affairs 38 (April 1960): 363–64. See also Richard Rovere's early assessment that "History will cite Korea . . . as the turning point of the world struggle against Communism and as the scene of a great victory for American arms, one the future will celebrate even though the present does not . . . ," in The Eisenhuwer Years: Affairs of State (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Cudahy, 1956), 145.

35. Johnson, The Vantage Point, 152–53.


37. Ibid.


41. Personal interview with McGeorge Bundy, April 11, 1986.

42. Personal interview with Dean Rusk, August 31, 1986.


44. Lyndon Johnson, The Vantage Point, 125, 140, 149.


47. Ball interview, July 23, 1986.

48. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, 392. Although Johnson formally approved Operation Rolling Thunder on February 13, sustained bombing was not initiated until March 2, 1965. The meeting to discuss Ball's memorandum should be understood in this context. See George T. Kahin's, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1986), 286–305, for a meticulous analysis of Johnson's reluctance to escalate the Vietnam War.


50. Ibid., 664. My account differs slightly from Kahin's. My reading of the document suggests that option C left a little room for the possibility of negotiations; Kahin believes otherwise. See Intervention, 247.


52. Pentagon Papers, III, 687–91.


54. Pentagon Papers, III, 392.

55. Ibid., IV, 609.

56. Ibid., III, 462–73.

57. Johnson, The Vantage Point, 144. These three were not the only questions Johnson asked, but McNamara's memorandum seemed to address two of them intently.

59. See George T. Kahin, Intervention (Copyright © by George T. Kahin. Reprinted by permission of Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.), 370–78. The documents he uses are Meeting on Vietnam, July 21, 1965, Notes (by Jack Valenti), Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, Meeting Notes File and Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisors, July 21, 1965, Memorandum for the Record (by Chester Cooper), Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, Meeting Notes File.

60. What follows is from George T. Kahin, Intervention (Copyright © by George T. Kahin. Reprinted by permission of Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.), 379–85. The document he uses is Meeting on Vietnam, July 22, 1965, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, Meeting Notes File. Larry Berman was probably the first to publish the record of this meeting. See his Planning a Tragedy, 112–19.


63. David Halberstam has observed that McGeorge Bundy’s “Munich lecture was legendary at Harvard. . . . It was done with great verve, Bundy imitating the various participants, his voice cracking with emotion as little Czechoslovakia fell, the German tanks rolling in just as the bells from Memorial Hall sounded. The lesson was of course interventionism, and the wise use of force.” Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, 56.

64. Johnson, The Vantage Point, 47–48.

65. Ibid., 152–53.


68. Ibid., 106.

69. Ibid., 105.

70. Ibid., 111.

71. Ibid., 112.

72. Ibid., 113.


75. Option A or Phase I might have been actually tried for a very brief period, but the point is that by February, Johnson had to decide whether to go beyond this option.

76. Pentagon Papers, III, 685.

77. Cited in Johnson, The Vantage Point, 122.

78. See for example, Dean Rusk’s “Total Victory for Freedom,” wherein Rusk reassures the audience that the “United States intends to avoid the extremes. . . .
we do not intend to strike out rashly into a major war in that area." Department of State Bulletin, October 5, 1964, 466. A few days later, Rusk’s assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs went so far as to say that “[w]e do not aim at overthrowing the Communist regime of North Viet-Nam but rather at inducing it to call off the war it directs and supports in South Viet-Nam.” Department of State Bulletin, October 19, 1964, 537.

82. Cited in Kahin, Intervention, 252.
83. The relative weights of the five lessons of Korea are determined empirically. The first four lessons predisposed policy makers toward military intervention, but the fifth lesson played a major role in preventing the United States from going all out.
84. Pentagon Papers, IV, 620.
85. Personal letter from Robert McNamara to Larry Berman, cited in Berman, Planning a Tragedy, 104.
86. Lyndon Johnson, The Vantage Point, 149. Larry Berman has suggested that another reason why Johnson was reluctant to call up the reserves was that the economic costs would have been so great that it would have undermined Johnson’s Great Society. See Berman, Planning a Tragedy, 145–53.
88. Ibid., esp. 181–200.
91. No claims are being made here about the ability of the Korean analogy or an analogical approach to explain the above "anomalies" that containment is unable to explain; the scope of my approach is narrower and less ambitious than that of the containment thesis.
Even if cognitive change is not essential for policy innovation, it may be that such changes will not endure without a cognitive basis of legitimation. In other words, because Nixon and Kissinger did not explain to the American public that their success resulted from decoupling rather than linkage, the policy of détente ultimately became unraveled as domestic opponents used linkage to influence Soviet domestic politics, contrary to Kissinger's original intentions.

Thus far, available research suggests that leaders change fundamental beliefs about the enemy only when forced by the pressure of circumstances to realign. For example, Harry S Truman did not change his beliefs that the Soviet Union would cooperate with the United States until several months after congressional budget cutting forced him to exaggerate the Soviet threat in the Truman Doctrine speech. But clearly more empirical research needs to be done to determine whether it is possible for leaders to change their assumptions about the adversary incrementally by testing the evidence.

NOTES


15. Ibid., 132–33.
17. Ibid., 200–201.
18. Ibid., 203.


29. Ibid., 487–88.


47. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 129.
53. Ibid., 113.
57. Ibid.


66. In an interview with Seymour M. Hersh, Morton Halperin, then a leading adviser to Kissinger on SALT, recalled that the White House permitted the formal SALT talks to begin in November 1969 only because of Soviet pressure. "We were confronted with it, and it would have been politically disastrous to Nixon and personally harmful to Henry not to go ahead with it." See Seymour M. Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (New York: Summit Books, 1983), 147-48.


72. Kissinger, White House Years, 205.


109. See Hersh, _Price of Power_, 150-56.


111. Greenwood, _Making the MIRV_, 138-39; Hersh, _Price of Power_, 155; Garthoff, _Détenue and Confrontation_, 135; Smith, _Doubletalk_, 119, 161; John Newhouse, _Cold Dawn_, 180-81.


117. Smith, _Doubletalk_, 137, 152.


119. Kissinger, _White House Years_, 408-12, 423-24, 529-34; Hersh, _Price of Power_, 416.

120. What linkage meant in this instance was not trading concessions on SALT, for example, for reciprocal concessions on Berlin. Instead, Kissinger tried to see that negotiations on Berlin and SALT concluded simultaneously. As Kissinger recalled, “the linkage was never made explicit, but it was clearly reflected in the pace of our negotiations” (White House Years, 821-22). Kissinger did not trust the Soviets to cooperate on SALT once they had achieved stabilization of the status quo in Europe. Thus, Kissinger resorted to the device of having Ambassador Rush take a vacation for extended periods.


123. Ibid.


129. Ibid.
131. Ibid.
133. Ibid., 161–62.
134. Ibid., 158.
147. Ibid.
152. Bernard Gwertzman, "Peace and Consumer Gain Stressed at Soviet Parley," *New York Times*, 31 March 1971, 15; Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 42. Brezhnev had not yet completely removed his opponents from the Politburo. Consequently, there were limits to how far he could go in signing trade agreements with the West.


169. For example, on April 19, *New York Times* columnist and editorial board member Harry Schwartz commented that President Nixon could score a major political coup if he toured the People's Republic of China in summer 1972, during the Democratic Party convention. "At the moment," he wrote, "any such ambitious agenda of near-term Chinese-American cooperation is sheer fantasy. There is still too much suspicion and fear between the two powers to expect so rapid an evolution of relations." "Triangular Politics and China," *New York Times*, 19 April 1971, 37.


174. Ibid., 17–18.
177. Ibid., 1134, 1156.
178. Ibid., 1159–60.
188. Ibid.
that each time a concrete need was perceived to deal or negotiate with
the Soviet Union, China, or another communist state, a convenient ratio-
nale was found to justify doing so without imperiling the ideological
edifice. In this sense, ideology and learning may be thought of as recip-
rocals: the stronger the former, the harder it is for the latter.

The balance looks rather different, however, if we posit that true learning
requires intellectual integration of new insights or information into a
broader construct of beliefs. Thus, for instance, Lloyd Etheridge has
proposed three criteria to assess the growth of intelligence:

1. growth of realism, recognizing the different elements and processes
   actually operating in the world;
2. growth of intellectual integration in
   which these different elements and processes are integrated with one another
   in thought;
3. growth of reflective perspective about the conduct of the
   first two processes, the conception of the problem, and the results which
   the decision maker desires to achieve.34

In these terms, a growth of realism is clearly apparent. But it is precisely
the disjunction of policy and belief, resisting intellectual integration, and
the absence of any growth of reflective perspective about these processes
that remain strikingly characteristic of the White House in the 1980s.
Indeed, one might speculate that one of the consequences of this—what
might be called the absence of organizational learning—was the failure
to transmit the operational insights, as a systematic body of thought, to
the successor administration.

NOTES

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chapter; and George W. Breslauer, Gail W. Lapidus, Philip Tetlock, and Stephen
Weber for very helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter.

Scribner's, 1988), 36. We must dismiss as deliberately manipulative, rather than
revealing, the remarks and speeches delivered by the president on public occa-
sions during his brief visit to the Soviet Union in 1988. Carefully massaged with
the assistance of professionals such as Librarian of Congress James Billington,
writer-historian Susan Massie—a friend of the Reagans—and, it was reported,
émigré comedian Yakov Smirnov, these were aimed first and foremost at Soviet
audiences.

2. Remarks at the annual observance of Captive Nations Week, 19 July 1983,
in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan* (1983) (Washington,


The same theme came up several times in the president's on-the-record conversations. In an interview with Walter Cronkite, on March 3, 1981, Reagan remarked, "They have told us that their goal is the Marxian philosophy of world revolution and a single, one-world communist state and that they're dedicated to that." And in an interview with three correspondents of the *Los Angeles Times*, on January 20, 1982, he reiterated, "That religion of theirs, which is Marxism-Leninism, requires them to support world revolution and bring about the one-world communist state. And they've never denied that." *Public Papers of the Presidents* (1981), 1:193; *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan* (1982) (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 64.


10. According to Bob Woodward, the speech was crafted by Anthony R. Dolan, a protégé of CIA chief William J. Casey and William F. Buckley, Jr., and "a true believer in the conservative cause" (Bob Woodward, *Veil* [New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987], 235–36.) This is not to suggest that the president disagreed with it but merely to attribute the initiative for the images used to the particular speechwriter involved.


Western unity was another, subordinate theme introduced in this argument. In the president's commencement address at Eureka College, his alma mater, in
May 1982, his speechwriters introduced this passage: "... Soviet aggressiveness has grown as Soviet military power has increased. To compensate, we must learn from the lessons of the past. When the West has stood united and firm, the Soviet Union has taken heed... Through unity, you'll remember from your modern history courses, the West secured the withdrawal of occupation forces from Austria and the recognition of its rights in Berlin" Public Papers of the Presidents (1982), 600. Others would seriously dispute that there was Western unity in negotiating over Austria.

It is curious that the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 rarely figured among the historical examples of superior strength and political will that worked to deter hostile action—perhaps because that crisis was handled by a Democratic administration with which none of the Reagan team's actors was identified.

19. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat—Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1984); also cited in Mandelbaum and Talbott, Reagan and Gorbachev, 28.
21. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Developments in Europe, Hearings, 24 June 1984, 7–8. It might be said that the same theme was launched by Secretary Shultz in his major statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the previous summer, when he declared (in a text carefully honed by his staff) that while this country had a vision "that inspires America's role in the world," "it does not, however, lead us to regard mutual hostility with the U.S.S.R. as an immutable fact of international life" (Shultz, "U.S.-Soviet Relations," Department of State Bulletin, July 1983, 100).
30. In all probability Reagan had confused it with the statement that there was no noun for privacy in Russian, although there was an adjectival form for private (as in fact is true in several other European languages as well).
33. Balancing those who argue for a greater American effort to "help" Gorbachev, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger are examples of critical skeptics in regard to the "new" Reagan policy. In Kissinger's words, "Even were Gorbachev committed to peace in the Western sense, there is little in the history of either czars or commissars to supply comfort to the Soviet Union's neighbors. . . . [The objectives] that Stalin pursued after the war and that Brezhnev carried out in Afghanistan date back to imperial Russia: Soviet domination of the Balkans and the Dardanelles; a major voice in Poland; and Soviet hegemony over Iran. . . . Twice before the West deluded itself by basing its policies on favorable assessments of Soviet leaders: with Stalin in 1944 and Khrushchev in 1956" (Henry Kissinger, "A Memo to the Next President," Newsweek, 19 September 1988, 34ff.) Similarly, Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, formerly head of the National Security Agency and Army intelligence, found that "little fundamental change has occurred" in Gorbachev's Russia, which remains a one-party state that monopolizes the media and fails to place law above politics ("Has the Soviet Union Really Changed?" U.S. News and World Report, 3 April 1989.)
NOTES

1. I am grateful to W. Philip Ellis, Robert Macray, and Brian Davenport, all of whom provided valuable assistance in the preparation of this analysis.


5. In a speech delivered on March 14, 1958, Krushchev noted that, in addition to the immediate destruction, "the employment of nuclear weapons will poison the atmosphere with radioactive fall-out and this could lead to the annihilation of almost all life, especially in the countries of small territory and high population density. They all will be literally wiped off the face of the earth" (quoted in Herbert S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union, 79). In an interview with a New York Times correspondent 10 months earlier, the Soviet leader had said, ". . . it is not to be excluded that a [nuclear] war can be unleashed as a result of some kind of fatal error, which will lead to untold tragedy for the peoples not only of our two countries, but for the peoples of the whole world" (quoted in Herbert S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union, 85). Krushchev's most famous warning about the terrors of a nuclear war, however, was conveyed in his message to President Kennedy on October 26, 1962, at the height of the Cuban missile crisis, when he cautioned against a further tightening of "the knot of war," which could well result in the "catastrophe of thermonuclear war"; see Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 222.

6. Although analysts may dispute the extent to which Soviet decision makers ever believed in the proposition that a nuclear war could be fought and won, the evidence is compelling that, from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, the country's senior military authorities sought, through both the development of strategy and
the acquisition of forces, a military posture sufficiently robust to enable the Soviet Union to prevail in the event of a general nuclear war. Despite the passage of some 25 years since its initial publication, the best single Soviet source on the implications of the nuclear revolution for the development of doctrine and force capabilities remains V.D. Sokolovsky, *Military Strategy*, esp. Chs. 4 and 7 ("The Nature of Modern War" and "Preparing a Country to Repel Aggression").


The U.S. is vigorously building up its strategic nuclear forces with the aim of giving them the capability to inflict a "disabling" nuclear strike against the U.S.S.R. This is a reckless step. Some 20 years ago the U.S., to some extent, could still count on the possibility of achieving such a result. Today this is pure illusion. . . . In today's conditions, putting one's stakes on a first nuclear strike can only be suicide.

Six months earlier, Ogarkov had advanced much the same argument, although on that occasion he was prepared to say only that "what was possible to achieve with nuclear weapons 20 or 30 years ago is now becoming impossible for an aggressor" without naming the potential aggressor. See Marshal N. Ogarkov, "Victory and the Present Day," *Izvestiia* (9 May 1983).


17. Gorbachev could not have known, of course, that the decision to withdraw some 50,000 Soviet troops from Eastern Europe would constitute but the first installment of a process that is ongoing. In February and March 1990, the Soviets concluded agreements with the reform governments of Czechoslovakia and Hungary mandating the departure of all Soviet forces by mid-1991. As of this writing, the disposition of Soviet troops in the German Democratic Republic is highly uncertain, although it is extremely unlikely that Moscow will be able to station more than a fraction of the 380,000 troops it currently maintains on German soil much beyond the early 1990s.
18. "Speech by M.S. Gorbachev" (see note 13).
23. Considerable confusion surrounds the role of "assured destruction" in U.S. strategic nuclear policy. McNamara and his successors (with the notable exception of Caspar Weinberger) were careful to describe the ability of the United States to inflict an unacceptable level of damage against key military and nonmilitary targets in the Soviet Union in response to any Soviet first strike as the essential bedrock of U.S. strategic nuclear policy; in other words, U.S. assured-destruction capabilities have never been designed to constitute more than one element of the U.S. strategic nuclear posture. U.S. defense officials have always understood that U.S. nuclear forces must be robust enough—with respect to both numbers and capabilities—to perform a wide range of military missions, including those associated with nuclear war fighting and extended deterrence.
24. During the early years of the Reagan administration, an explicit emphasis on defense through damage limitation made a brief reappearance as a central
element of U.S. strategic nuclear policy. In his fiscal 1984 annual report to Congress, Secretary of Defense Weinberger stated that, in the event of war with the Soviet Union, it would be U.S. policy to seek to terminate hostilities at the earliest possible time, with as little damage as possible and "on terms favorable to the United States." This particular formulation, which suggested that a nuclear conflict involving the two superpowers could be waged to a successful conclusion by the United States, was deleted from later reports. See Caspar Weinberger, FY 1984 Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 32-36.

25. Soviet denunciations of the logic of mutual nuclear deterrence were routine during the 1960s and 1970s. Henry Trofimenko, a senior analyst with the Institute of the USA and Canada in Moscow, offered perhaps the best-developed critique of Western-style deterrence theory, as well as its practical implementation, in a 1980 monograph published in the United States. See Henry Trofimenko, Changing Attitudes Toward Deterrence, ACIS Working Paper #25 (Los Angeles: Center for International and Strategic Affairs, 1980).

26. See, for example, Marshal A. Grechko, "In Battle Born," Pravda (23 February 1970); and Col. I. Sidelnikov, "Peaceful Coexistence and the Security of the Peoples," Krasnaia zvezda (14 August 1973). Although the defensive emphasis in Soviet military writings persisted far into the SALT decade, the references to damage limitation grew progressively more oblique as the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms control negotiations became an ongoing feature of the bilateral relationship. The least guarded references to the importance of the strategic defensive mission are to be found during the early to mid-1960s in both the writings of military analysts and the occasional pronouncements of senior Defense Ministry officials. See Marshal R. Malinovskil, "Reliable Guard of the Homeland," Pravda (23 February 1965), in which the minister of defense declared that Soviet air defense forces "have mastered new methods of destroying flying targets when they are still far from the objectives being protected. The Soviet Union has solved the complex and extremely important problem of destroying enemy rockets in flight" [emphasis added]. The same themes are developed at considerably greater length in Col. Ye. Rybkin, "The Essence of a Nuclear Rocket War," Kommunist vooruzhennikh sil (September 1965): 51-57; and Col. S. Maliachikov, "The Nature and Characteristics of Nuclear Missile Warfare," Kommunist vooruzhennikh sil (November 1965): 69-74.


28. Soviet Military Power 1987, 52. Several analyses, including a 1978 study prepared by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, have found the Soviet industrial base and technological infrastructure no more able to withstand the effects of a nuclear war than its U.S. counterpart, despite numerous claims—Western as well


32. See, in particular, Marshal N. Ogarkov, "Soviet Military Science," *Pravda* (19 February 1978); and Marshal S. Sokolov, "Mighty Guard of the Socialist Gains," *Krasnaia zvezda* (22 February 1978). For an unusually frank discussion of Soviet civil defense efforts, see "Campaign of Provocation: On Western Statements About Civil Defense in the USSR," *Literaturnaia gazeta* (19 January 1977). References in the Soviet military press to such concepts as "seizing the [military] initiative" and dealing a "decisive rebuff" to imperialist aggression decrease markedly following Brezhnev's Tula address in January 1977, suggesting a recognition of the need on the part of the senior leadership to bring into closer alignment pronouncements on Soviet military doctrine delivered by ranking political and military officials. A notable exception to this trend toward greater uniformity in expression is Marshal N. Ogarkov, "In the Name of Peace and Progress," *Izvestiia*, 9 May 1982, in which Ogarkov writes that the military-technical aspect of Soviet military doctrine directs that "in the event of aggression our Armed Forces would not simply engage in passive defense, conducting strictly defensive actions, but would decisively rout an aggressor that dared to attack our country, up to and including the complete destruction of the aggressor. . . ."


34. See, for example, George Weickhardt, "Ustinov versus Ogarkov," *Problems of Communism* 34 (January/February 1985): 77–82.


39. Article VI (b) of the ABM treaty stipulates that the parties undertake "not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward." The treaty text is reproduced in Coit D. Blacker and Gloria Duffy, eds.,


46. William Hyland's comments were made in the context of a November 1987 working group discussion, convened under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations (New York), to review the development of Soviet arms control policies from the early 1960s to the mid-1980s. For more on this period, see Colt D. Blacker, "The Soviets and Arms Control," 43–55.

47. Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 228–301.


50. Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 443–44.


52. Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 444–46; Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 1018.


54. Speech, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, "Outstanding Exploit of the Defenders of Tula: Ceremonial Meeting Dedicated to the Presentation of the Gold Star Medal to the City," Pravda (19 January 1977); and "L.I. Brezhnev Answers a Question From a Pravda Correspondent," Pravda (21 October 1981). On the latter occasion, Brezhnev's exact words were "... that only he who had decided to commit suicide can start a nuclear war in the hope of emerging from it as a victor."

55. Although Brezhnev's remarks in Tula constituted an important branch point in the development of his own rhetoric, less exalted members of Soviet officialdom had anticipated key elements of the so-called Tula line by a number of years. In his book Doubletalk, Gerard Smith, the chief U.S. negotiator in SALT I, recounts the opening remarks of Soviet ambassador Vladimir Semenov in November 1969, in which Semenov, in an effort to explain the Kremlin's interest in the negotiations, describes the dangerously destabilizing effects of a nuclear arms race featuring modern strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems and notes the suicidal character of nuclear war. See Gerard Smith, Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1980), 83–84.


58. "Statement by M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee," Pravda (16 January 1986).


64. Ibid.


66. Ibid. See also "Speech by M.S. Gorbachev" (see note 13).

67. See Bill Keller, "Gorbachev Pledges Major Troop Cutback, Then Ends Trip, Citing Vast Soviet Quake," New York Times (8 December 1988); and R. Jeffrey Smith,


75. Ibid.


78. For a representative sample of the military's "spin" on "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive defense," see S. Akhromeev, "The Doctrine of Preventing War and Defending Peace and Socialism," *Problemy mira i sotsializma* (December 1987), esp. 25–27; V. Kulikov, *Doktrina zashchity mira i sotsializma* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988); and D. Yazov, *Na strazhe sotsializma i mira* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987).


Many of these improvements themselves grew out of the attempted changes of the mid-1950s: in this sense without Malenkov (or, indeed, without Khrushchev), no Gorbachev.

Thus, when a leader of Gorbachev's calibre has doubts about the wisdom of past policy with respect to some issue or area of the world, he can find a variety of analyses and conclusions from which to draw; more important perhaps, those actually executing policy are more likely to follow the spirit of the changes and not sabotage them in implementation. It may also mean that, in contrast to the Malenkov phase, the changes made may be far more difficult to reverse should a less enlightened leadership emerge into power. The fact that Molotov's men were still in place when Brezhnev took power made it that much easier to revert to patterns of behavior more reminiscent of an earlier era. Institutional responsiveness to innovation through the recruitment of more knowledgeable mezhdunarodniki would thus seem to be an indispensable precondition to a foreign policy appropriately matched to Soviet interests. Learning that occurs only at the very top is therefore unlikely to have a long-term impact without learning from below. In this respect, greater availability of information on foreign affairs, anticipated under Brezhnev with more detailed and more open discussions of foreign affairs on radio and television from the mid-1970s, a process furthered by the creation of the international information department of the Central Committee in 1978, has also played a critical role.

But for all the progress made in the propagation of international information, we are still largely talking of an educated elite rather than an educated populace. Shevardnadze's expressed wish to see foreign policy debated in public forums such as the Supreme Soviet certainly suggests that the extension of general knowledge of international affairs is an important element in the development and implementation of the new thinking. How much of this will be achieved, and whether Soviet foreign policy will depart from the general European model of court politics rather than public policy, remains a matter of conjecture. But the degree and pace of learning in Soviet foreign policy cannot remain unaffected by the outcome of this uncertain process. Will this retard or hasten the learning process? To answer that, we will have to await future events.

NOTES

2. Fairly conclusive evidence can be found in Foreign Office archives. In February 1927 the Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs was, at a feverish pace, constructing a strategic railroad to facilitate the transfer of troops along the Polish frontier, with April as the deadline for completion. In Leningrad doctors and nurses were being registered for war service. Munitions plants were forced to raise output by six times the norm, and special military commissars were put in charge of them. Suspected counterrevolutionaries were moved from the frontier zones. See Hodgson (Moscow) to Chamberlain (London), 9 February 1927: FO 371/12588 (Public Record Office, London).


5. "All of us in Moscow are getting the impression that Churchill is maintaining a course directed towards the defeat of the USSR in order then to come to terms with the Germany of Hitler or Bruning at the expense of our country." Stalin (Moscow) to Maisky (London), 19 October 1942: Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya vo vremya velikoi otechestvennoi voiny 1941–1945: Dokumenty i Materialy, Vol. 1, 1941–1943 (Moscow 1983) doc. 147.


7. There is considerable evidence for this, not least the testimony that Litvinov could be heard shouting "durak" (fool) at Molotov on the telephone: interview with Litvinov's daughter Tanya.


9. P. Spriano, I communisti europei e Stalin (Turin: Einaudi, 1983); for a sense of the spirit of the time, turn to the reports from the various U.S. embassies in Europe from 1946 to 1948 in the series Foreign Relations of the United States.


18. Ibid.
24. A brief biography of Semenov appears in the memoirs of U.S. negotiator at SALT I, Gerard Smith. He describes him thus: having once worked on a collective farm, Semenov "joined the Foreign Service in 1939 [the Molotov intake], after graduating from the Moscow Institute of History, Philosophy, and Literature. He was counselor in Berlin during the Soviet-German Non-Aggression pact years 1940–1941. He returned to Berlin in May 1945 as a political adviser, then served as high commissioner and finally as Soviet ambassador. . . . He became chief of the Foreign Ministry’s Central European Division in 1954 and Deputy Foreign Minister in March 1955." G. Smith, Doubletalk (London: Doubleday, 1985), 45-46.
26. For example, a full-page article in Tägliche Rundschau of 6 February 1952 on new economic policy, the Soviet Union, and the People’s Democracies: analyzed in Chief of the Eastern Affairs Division, Berlin Element, HICOG (Barnes) to Department of State, 26 July 1952—Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. VII, doc. 704.
27. Ibid, doc. 699.
34. Ibid., doc. 14.
35. Ibid., annex D.
36. Ibid., annex F.
37. Ibid., annex G.
39. Ibid.
49. See note 44.
50. Ibid.
52. Words spoken at a reception on 7 November 1955—Laloy (Moscow) to Pinay (Paris), 8 November 1955: DDF, doc. 351.
53. An interesting assessment of events by the CIA can be found in the minutes of the 305th Meeting of the National Security Council, 30 November 1956; Eisenhower Papers, Ann Whitman File, NSC, 8. All references to inflammatory broadcasts have been deleted from the documents in the archive.
55. Ibid., 247.


63. Pravda, 8 December 1964.

64. Ibid., 22 January 1965. The initiative for the collective security proposals was attributed to the Poles: editorial, "Vo imya mira i bezopasnosti narodov," ibid.

65. Speech on the day of arrival in Moscow for talks. Ulbricht led a massive German delegation: Pravda, 18 September 1965.

66. Ibid., 13 March 1966.

67. Speech at an electoral meeting in Leningrad, 7 June 1966: Pravda, 8 June 1966.

68. See, for example, an article by the historian of the Franco-Russian alliance, Professor A. Manfred, "Traditionnye uzy sotrudnichestva," Pravda, 18 June 1966. Also see the interview with Moscow-based French journalist and writer, Jean Cathala: J. Lacouture and R. Mehl, De Gaulle ou l'éternel défi (Paris: Seuil, 1988), 222.

69. The declaration was signed on 5 July but not published in Pravda until 9 July 1966.

70. Z. Mlynar, Night Frost in Prague (London: Hurst, 1980), 241. Mlynar was present at the encounter.

71. As soon as the new coalition made its intentions known, the Soviets publicly welcomed the change of heart: V. Nekrasov, "Silny sotsializma v nastuplenii," Pravda, 12 October 1969; then came Brezhnev's speech: Pravda, 28 October 1969.

72. Wehner's role is emphasized by Helmut Schmidt: H. Schmidt, Menschen und Mächte (Berlin: Siedler, 1987), 29.

73. Cmnd. 6201, doc. 154.


77. Schmidt, Menschen, 105.


79. Schmidt, Menschen, 126.


87. Ibid., 7 June 1989.
89. Ibid.
91. Interview: Izvestiia, 19 February 1990.
92. Pravda, 8 February 1990.
93. Ibid., 7 February 1990.
94. Izvestiia, 19 February 1990.
Response to a Changing China," *The China Quarterly*, 94 (June 1983): 215-41. While I differ with Rozman’s categorization of "hard liners," taking exception to the inclusion of Kapitsa in this group, his prodigious research has been pathbreaking in the analysis of both Chinese and Soviet specialists in their reciprocal images of the opposite side.

I profited from the critical guidance provided by the editors of this volume, Professors George W. Breslauer and Philip Tetlock, together with the comments by colleagues at the Berkeley conference in December 1988. Dr. Jones also provided comment on a first draft. They are not responsible, however, for the final version.

NOTES


4. For high praise from the long-time foreign minister, see A.A. Gromyko, *Pamiatnoe*, vol. 2 [Memoir](Moscow, Politizdat, 1988), 136-137, referring to Kapitsa’s "high level knowledge of Chinese language, history, and culture."


6. During my travels I have found an inverse relationship between distance from China and hostile imagery. Interviews in Irkutsk and Khabarovsk and with persons from Vladivostok elicited little or no threat imagery in contrast with that advanced by intellectuals in Moscow.


9. Interview with M.S. Kapitsa.
10. Information available to author as special assistant to the director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, November 1961.


13. Interviews with Soviet specialists in China at that time.


15. Nikita Khru­shchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little Brown, 1970), translated and edited by Strobe Talbot, Ch. 18; also Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston: Little Brown, 1974), Ch. 11.


17. Information available to author as director, Office of Research and Analysis, Far East, in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, 1962-1966.


19. This paragraph draws on the author's knowledge as deputy principal officer, American Consulate General, Hong Kong, 1966-1968.

20. Information in this paragraph available to author from U.S. intelligence sources while consultant to the Rand Corporation, July 1969.


22. Ibid., 237-38.


25. The following paragraphs draw on Su, 482 ff., unless otherwise noted.


31. Information from reliable U.S. sources.

32. On Kosygin's flight, see Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente, 210.

34. For the 1963 reference see M.S. Kapitsa, Dva desiatiteiliiia, 286; for the A. Doak Barnett reference see p. 288.

35. Knowledge of the Sino-American ambassadorial talks being bugged emerged during the mid-1960s; information available to the author at the time.

36. Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente, 211.

37. Summaries and quotations for this period are in Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente, 211-12, and Peter Jones and Sian Kevill, eds., China and the Soviet Union, 1949-84 (New York: Facts on File, 1985), 142-43.

38. This figure is offered by both sides; for the Chinese reference see Chi Su, "Soviet Image," 72; for the Soviet one, see Peter Jones and Sian Kevill, China, 148.


41. For relevant excerpts of Brezhnev’s speeches, see Peter Jones and Sian Kevill, China, 97-101.

42. Ibid., 157-60.

43. Ibid., 159.


45. Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente, 715.


49. Peter Jones and Sian Kevill, China, 105.


52. Peter Jones and Sian Kevill, China, 141.

53. For further details see Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente, 1038-41.


59. Peter Jones and Sian Kevill, China, 175-76.

60. Chi Su, "Soviet Image," in his “Conclusion,” 559-71, specifically addresses the question of “learning” in Soviet policy toward China but comes to very different findings.

61. This chronology is based in part on Wen Fu, "The Process of Heading

62. Ibid., 10.
63. Ibid., 9–14.
64. Ibid., 10.

65. The author first met Rogachev in the early 1960s when he was assigned to the Soviet embassy in Washington after having served in Beijing.
ideological structure are being redefined or discarded, while other core beliefs remain intact.

The link among ideology, authority building, and learning, it would seem, is credibility. By the 1980s, the optimism of the ideological heritage that had justified emphases on sectarian activism had lost its credibility in the face of 30 years of experience in the Middle East and the Third World more generally. This loss of credibility did not take place in a linear fashion. Several false starts and several surges of optimistic denial of earlier lessons intervened. This reflected either a universal tendency not to abandon deep-seated beliefs easily; or the distinctive potency of Soviet ideology’s optimistic strand; or the potency of that strand in the thinking of party officials within the Khrushchev-Brezhnev generation that remained in power for 30 years (Boris Ponomarev, for example, remained in charge of the International Department of the Central Committee under both Khrushchev and Brezhnev); or the intervening impact of political succession in the 1960s, which encouraged political competitors to deny earlier lessons. Whatever the mix of these causes, the more fundamental lesson that reliable, exclusive allies are not on the horizon for the foreseeable future, and that the costs or dangers of sectarian competition may outweigh the gains, would not be learned until several false starts had taken place and a generational turnover had brought to power new personnel with very different backgrounds.

Thus, while ambivalence remains about the tension between long-standing normative commitments and some new-found beliefs informing Soviet Middle East policy, the requirements of credibility in the authority-building process today are different from what they were, because of a secular process of “regime learning” that provides the political base for individual learning at the top. While that individual learning may be subject to reversal as a result of shifting politics, personalities, and international pressures, the deeper regime learning, supported by epistemic communities unleashed by glasnost, may have generated more enduring consensual knowledge about the unpredictability and uncontrollability of events in the Middle East. This is not a theory of development; rather, it is a broadly shared belief (held now even by many conservative Soviet academics) in the untenability of previous assumptions that had underpinned the more optimistic and ambitious variants of sectarian activism.

NOTES


2. Galia Golan [The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World (London and Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988)] suggests the term, Soviet Union-first, but she uses it to refer to any policy orientation that seeks to place a higher
priority on domestic development including, for example, the position espoused by Andropov. Her usage, then, is compatible with a conciliatory and nonisolationist foreign policy. In contrast, I use Russia-first to refer to a policy orientation analogous to that followed in Stalin’s last years, connoting a confrontational posture of “fortress Russia.”

3. In “All Gorbachev’s Men,” I characterized these tendencies as radical activism and pragmatic activism. I have since been persuaded by Kenneth Jowitt [“Developmental Stages and Conflict within the Leninist Regime World,” Social Science and Policy Research 10 (1988):2:1-14] that sectarian activism and ecumenical activism better capture the distinction.


6. This was not driven by “consensual knowledge” generated by “epistemic communities,” but that part of Haas’s definition (and theory of causation) appears to be a product of the issue areas and institutions on which Haas focuses his studies of governmental learning. In most modern states, there are well-defined epistemic communities for health, environmental, nuclear and, to a degree, economic issues, but not for the regional and geopolitical issues of the sort discussed in this and other chapters. This point is all the more relevant to the Soviet Union of the 1950s, in which Stalinist dogma had crippled almost all the social sciences.


10. Smolansky, Arab East, 59.
11. Ibid., 94.
12. Ibid., 119.
15. Smolansky, Arab East, 301.
17. The reactive shift that began in 1963-1964, which entailed an upgrading of the military dimension of competitive activism, was at variance with the drift of changes in Soviet Third World policy and thinking more generally. At this time, Khrushchev was seeking to deepen a détente relationship with the United States and was willing to subordinate the competitive impulse to the collaborative to further that cause. He indicated his intention to wash his hands of the commit-
ment to North Vietnam and leftist forces in Laos. He was ready to polemize with Castro. He reduced the level of commitment to North Korea. In sum, Soviet policy toward the Middle East was no longer consonant with general Soviet Third World policy. I have speculated on possible reasons for this in *Soviet Strategy in the Middle East* (London and Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), and in Chapter 1 of this volume.

21. Ibid., 40.
22. Richard Anderson, “Authority Building and Bargaining in the Brezhnev Politburo”; and James Richter, “Action and Reaction Under Khrushchev.” Note, while Anderson’s content analysis [Chs. III, VII–IX] reveals Kosygin to have been a sponsor of collaborative strategies worldwide, and Brezhnev to have been a sponsor of national liberation worldwide, Anderson’s interpretation of Kosygin’s and Brezhnev’s behaviors toward Syria in 1966 is different from my own, as presented in this and subsequent paragraphs. Anderson sees perverse circumstances at the time causing their roles in the Mideast during 1966 to diverge from their ordinary global postures.
25. The summary of policy changes in this section is based on Breslauer, *Soviet Strategy*, Chs. 6, 10, and Afterword.
29. Ibid.
30. At the same time, if the perspectives articulated by Shimon Peres emerge ascendant in Israeli politics, they would be based on a convergence with Soviet perspectives about the undeniability of Palestinian nationalism. Under those circumstances, Washington would presumably go along with a shift in Israeli policy. Learning in the East-West and Arab-Israeli positions would then be based on consensual knowledge about cause–effect relationships in the local environment, which is defined by Haas as a prerequisite for learning, rather than adaptation.
31. I am less persuaded that a political competition framework allows one to understand the evolution of Soviet Middle East policy during nonsuccession periods [see Breslauer, *Soviet Strategy*, Ch. 10]. Rather, after the Soviet leader has attained a position of relative ascendancy within the collective leadership, I would argue that the policy-making process conforms to the specifications of Achen’s “focal actor” model [Christopher H. Achen, “When Is a State With Bureaucratic Politics Representable as a Unitary Rational Actor?” Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, London, England, March 29–April 1, 1989].
détente, was able to develop an alternative foreign policy strategy that takes into account both U.S. public opinion and the effect of Soviet foreign policy behavior on that opinion.

In sum, Brezhnev could not be deterred because of the costs Soviet foreign policy moderation would impose on his tightly structured belief system. Gorbachev was deterred, but not by the costs imposed by U.S. efforts to overthrow Soviet allies in the periphery. Instead, Gorbachev responded to the costs Soviet actions in the Third World had levied on Soviet efforts to continue strategic détente with the United States. And only Gorbachev's beliefs about U.S. public opinion and the role of the Third World in the international arena allowed him to make such a calculation.

NOTES

1. Several of the assumptions held by decision makers were developed by traditional deterrence theorists almost 30 years ago. These include the fear of falling dominoes, bandwagoning allies, and reduced credibility in subsequent conflicts in the Third World as a consequence of a loss in the periphery. Where U.S. decision makers go farther than their theorist counterparts is in worrying that Soviet leaders will make the inferential leap from the periphery to strategic areas of the globe. Except for this latter distinction, I could just as well be testing the postulates of deterrence theory, rather than the assumptions held by U.S. policy makers. I am grateful to Charles Glaser for bringing this difference to my attention. For the assumptions of traditional deterrence theory, see Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966) and Glenn Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961).


3. As a consequence of this reliance on a single source, my citations include only date and page number(s), unless I use another source.

4. From 1976 until his death in November 1982, Brezhnev made 104 speeches in which he touched on foreign policy issues. In 57 of these, or 55 percent of the total, he mentioned one of the five cases considered here.

5. The importance of each of these cases to the formation of Brezhnev's view of U.S. credibility varied widely. In the period 1976-1982, Brezhnev mentioned Mozambique eight times in speeches, but never drew any inferences about U.S. credibility in these addresses. For Zimbabwe, he did so only once in 14 instances. This compares to 3 out of 4 times for Afghanistan, 4 of 9 for Nicaragua, and 9 of 22 for Angola.

6. In 15 of these cases, Brezhnev was addressing a Third World audience, which is not a context that demands a discussion of INF deployments or U.S. relations with China. This stands in stark contrast to the fact that Brezhnev inferred lessons about U.S. credibility from the latter's actions in the Third World.
Brezhnev, Gorbachev, and the Reagan Doctrine

only four times before non-Third World audiences, compared with 13 times before Third World audiences.

7. February 26, 1976, 5. He continued on this theme throughout the rest of his reign. See, for example, his speech at the eighteenth Komsomol congress, April 20, 1978, 2.


11. Address before Central Committee plenum, October 26, 1976, 2.

12. Speech at dinner for Angolan President Neto, September 29, 1977, 1–2. This is a theme maintained throughout by Brezhnev, namely, that the very existence of progressive regimes is sufficient to evoke U.S. resistance. See, for example, his speech at a dinner for Qaddafi, April 28, 1981, 2.


14. Speech at dinner for Syria's President Hafez Assad, February 22, 1978, 2. It is most likely in this instance that Brezhnev was fulminating at the recent loss of Egypt.

15. Greetings to a Tashkent meeting of writers of Afro-Asian countries, October 11, 1978, 1.


18. See, for example, his speech to Qaddafi, April 28, 1981, 2.

19. Even this conclusion may be exaggerating Brezhnev's optimism, as this speech was given while awarding Romesh Chandra, president of the World Peace Council, an Order of Lenin. Since Chandra was in charge of mobilizing public opinion against war, one could expect Brezhnev to at least give him some encouragement about his prospects for success. June 19, 1981, 1.

20. Speech at dinner for Nicaragua's President Daniel Ortega, May 5, 1982, 2. Given the occasion, one could easily argue that even this instance of attention to Nicaragua's plight was an obligatory performance. However, Brezhnev did return to Central America in subsequent speeches before his death. For example, in a speech before a group of Soviet army and navy personnel, October 28, 1982, 1.


22. Speech at dinner for the president of Madagascar, Didier Ratsiraka, June 30, 1978, 2. Brezhnev noted these and other NATO activities in Africa in support of U.S. aims in, for example, his address to the sixteenth trade union congress, March 22, 1977, 2.


24. For Angola's revolutionizing effect on the region, see, for example, his report at twenty-fifth party congress, February 25, 1976, 2. For the South African threat to progressive regimes in southern Africa, see, for example, his speech before Ethiopian President Mengistu, November 18, 1978, 2. For the absence of effects for Nicaragua, see the same congress report, 2.

25. September 29, 1977, 2. Similar such omissions can be found, for example in his message to Angolan President Dos Santos on the fifth anniversary of the PRA, November 11, 1980, 1.
26. To be more accurate, Brezhnev often recognized the role of public opinion in pushing the U.S. ruling classes to conclude arms control agreements—the core of détente in Brezhnev's view—and prevent war, but these views are beyond the scope of this paper.

27. In fact, Brezhnev described the Carter administration in precisely these terms, as an elite caught between the forces of the cold war and détente.


29. From his address before the twenty-fifth party congress, February 25, 1976, to his message to the international conference on sanctions against the RSA, May 20, 1981, 1.


31. Similarly, beginning in the middle of 1980, Brezhnev called for the peaceful settlement of disputes, a line clearly linked to Afghanistan. See, for example, his speech awarding Yemen's prime minister, Ali Nasser Muhammed, an Order of the Friendship of Peoples, May 28, 1980, 1.


34. March 10, 1982, 2.

35. For example, in speech to Ortega himself, May 5, 1982, 2.


37. October 8, 1976, 2.

38. April 6, 1977, 1.


40. In this period, the Soviet Union sent more than 400 T-54/5 main battle tanks, more than 400 armored personnel carriers, close to 200 SAM-2/3 antiaircraft missiles, a dozen Su-17 fighter planes, 32 attack helicopters, and a dozen transport aircraft. All these levels of aid are taken from The Military Balance (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies), for 1979-1980, 1980-1981, 1981-1982 and 1982-1983.

41. The Brezhnev government also gave Mozambique and Angola substantial amounts of military aid in this period. This occurred, however, prior to the resumption of U.S. military aid to UNITA in Angola, so does not constitute fair evidence of a Soviet response to U.S.-imposed costs.

42. This compares with 55 percent for Brezhnev (57 cases in 104 speeches).

43. The figures are Angola-27, Afghanistan-24, Nicaragua-22, Mozambique-8, and Zimbabwe-1.
44. In 1986 Afghanistan and Angola accounted for 47 percent of Gorbachev’s total comments on the five cases; in 1987, this increased to 63 percent and in 1988 to 79 percent.

45. In 108 of his 205 (53 percent) speeches that touch on foreign policy issues, Gorbachev explicitly notes the threat to peace that derives from U.S. military programs of various types.

46. Some representative examples are: speech before Ethiopia’s Mengistu, November 2, 1985, 3; message to Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe as chairman of nonaligned movement, September 1, 1986, 1; speech at dinner for Syria’s Assad, April 25, 1987, 2; and speech at dinner given for him by Indian president, R. Venkataraman, November 19, 1988, 2.

47. This school of thought, at least in Western scholarship, was first formulated to describe Wilhelmine Germany’s imperial policy prior to World War I. See, for example, Volker Berghahn, “Naval Armaments and Social Crisis: Germany Before 1914,” in War, Economics and the Military Mind, eds. Geoffrey Best and Andrew Wheatcroft (London: Croon Helms, 1976), 61–84.


50. Speech in Dnepropetrovsk metallurgical factory, June 27, 1985, 1–2. For a representative example from among many, see his speech at dinner for Mozambique’s President Chissano, August 4, 1987, 2. Gorbachev’s logic here is wanting. Since he admits that the United States is able to keep all Third World countries, even countries of socialist orientation, in the world capitalist economic system by a vast combination of devices, it makes no sense for the United States, if driven by purely economic motives, to try to subvert the progressive countries it is already exploiting.


52. December 17, 1983, 4. See also his speech at a Central Committee plenum, October 16, 1985, 1–2.

53. See, from among many examples, his speech at dinner for Italian Communist Party general secretary Natta, January 29, 1986, 2.

54. See, for example, his answers to the questions of an Algerian journalist, April 3, 1986, 1–2.

55. Interview with Algerian journalist, April 3, 1986.

56. TV address after Reykjavik summit, October 15, 1986, 1–2.

57. Address before a meeting in Moscow “for a nuclear-free world and humanism in international relations,” February 17, 1987, 1–2. He repeated a similar critique of deterrence policies in a dinner for England’s Prime Minister Thatcher, March 31, 1987, 2.

58. He inferred lessons about U.S. credibility from its actions in Nicaragua 16 times, in Angola 11, and Afghanistan 10.


60. This is perhaps the single most frequent theme in Gorbachev’s speeches. From among many examples, see his remarks at a joint press conference with
President Mitterand in Paris, October 5, 1985, 1-2; text of his TV address to the American people on New Year's Day, January 2, 1986, 1; and his speech at eleventh party congress, German Socialist Unity Party, April 19, 1986, 1-2.

61. In a speech at a meeting of international scholars on ending nuclear tests in Moscow, July 15, 1986, 1-2.

62. Gorbachev comments on the relationship between the United States and its Japanese, Western European, and Chinese allies in 33 speeches. He does not once speak of their attitudes toward U.S. adventurism in the Third World or the effect of such adventurism on U.S. security guarantees for these allies.

63. In fully 24 of the 33 speeches in which U.S. allies are discussed, it is their position on U.S. military programs that Gorbachev singles out for attention. For a representative example, see his speech in Sofia on the fortieth anniversary of the Bulgarian revolution, September 9, 1984, 4.

64. October 4, 1985, 4.

65. For example, in his speech at the tenth party congress, Portuguese Communist Party, December 17, 1983, 4.

66. For example, his speech in Sofia, September 9, 1984, 4. One may somewhat discount this speech, as it is given in the context of defending the Soviet suspension of participation in the INF negotiations. For stinging criticisms of Japanese support for U.S. policy, see his speech before general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Le Zuan, June 29, 1985, 2, and his answers to a TASS correspondent, August 14, 1985, 1.


70. Speech in Togliatti, April 9, 1986, 1-3.

71. See his speech to Dos Santos, May 7, 1986, 2.


73. Congratulatory message to Fidel Castro, December 23, 1988, 1.

74. Statement on Afghanistan, February 9, 1988, 1. He repeated these expectations before other audiences as well. For example, see his message to the Chataqua conference meeting in Tbilisi, September 19, 1988, 1.

75. Speech at meeting with U.S.-Soviet commercial-economic council, April 14, 1988, 1.


78. January 29, 1986, 2. For an example from among many, see his speech at the nineteenth party conference, June 29, 1988, 3-4. The only exception to this expansive view of the relevant public is in a speech before the East German leader Honecker at the dedication of a monument to the German Communist, Ernst Thalmann, in which Gorbachev asserts that "the working class, even to this day, occupies a special place" in the antiwar movement. One can probably explain this exception by the context—a speech before one of the more orthodox ideologues of Eastern Europe about a man who oversaw the destruction of the German Communist Party after the rise of Hitler due to his slavish devotion to the Stalinist line of nonalignment with "social fascists."
79. October 23, 1986, 1–2. For another example of Gorbachev arguing that the U.S. ruling elite prevents its people from learning the truth about Soviet foreign policy, see his speech in the Polish parliament, July 12, 1988, 2.

80. February 26, 1987, 1–2. The high level of ideological orthodoxy of this audience gives added power to this admission by Gorbachev.

81. Speech in Murmansk, October 2, 1987, 2–3. In a speech to the Australian prime minister, Robert Hawke, Gorbachev argues that the erosion of the enemy image held by the American people made the INF treaty possible, December 2, 1987, 2. I am not at all implying in this argument that Gorbachev is adopting any domestic reforms in order to influence Western opinions. Instead, Gorbachev simply came to realize that one valuable by-product of such reforms has been its salutary affect on images of the Soviet Union abroad.


83. October 2, 1987, 2–3. See also his speech at a Central Committee plenum, February 19, 1988, 3.


87. July 12, 1988, 2. It is noteworthy here that in the text of this speech, the word free in the phrase “free nations of the West” was not in quotation marks. This is the first time I have ever seen a speech by a Soviet leader in which this qualification is not added.

88. February 9, 1988, 1.

89. In a speech at a dinner with Mitterand in Paris, October 4, 1985, 4. This in itself is a sign of emphasis, as Soviet leaders generally go out of their way to avoid anti-imperialist statements before Western European audiences.

90. November 22, 1985, 1–3. Among many other examples, see his speech at dinner given for him by Reagan in Moscow, June 1, 1988, 2. This is not to say that Gorbachev completely absolves imperialism of responsibility for conflicts in the Third World. He continues to blame the United States for instability in Afghanistan: at a joint press conference with Gandhi in India, November 29, 1986, 1–2, and in his interview with Tom Brokaw, December 2, 1987, 1–2; the latter, however, is the last time he made such an attribution.

91. It is almost as if Gorbachev had read Snyder and Diesing’s work that shows that a state’s behavior in conflicts is driven by its perceived need to protect its credibility, as much as, if not more than, by its material interests in any given conflict. Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 183–89.


93. August 8, 1987, 2. See also his speech on the seventieth anniversary of the revolution in which he proposed that the United States and Soviet Union jointly prepare programs to convert their military industries to civilian uses, November 3, 1987, 4–5. He repeated this offer in his speech before the United Nations, December 8, 1988, 1–2.


96. Report to the twenty-seventh party congress, February 26, 1986, 7–9. For
one among many examples, see his answers to the questions of correspondents from Newsweek and the Washington Post, May 23, 1988, 1-2.

97. Experimental psychologists have found that people tend to handle quantitative data, such as would be available in any assessment of U.S. economic dependence on Third World countries, in a far more rational and rigorous manner than qualitative information. See, for example, Paul Slovic and Douglas MacPhillamy, "Dimensional Commensurability and Cue Utilization in Comparative Judgment," Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 11 (February 1974): 172-94.

98. Indeed, many Soviet scholars have written precisely about this phenomenon for well over a decade, including advisers who are very close to Gorbachev, such as Evgenii Primakov.

99. This is most obvious in his frequent citations of the February 16, 1987, meeting in Moscow with thousands of celebrities (e.g., John Denver) from around the world, as if this meeting were representative of the average American voter. February 26, 1986, 7-9.

100. April 23, 1983, 1-3. Gorbachev argues for the primacy of antinuclear activities over revolutionary aims before audiences that usually demand precisely the opposite emphasis. For example, in a speech to Ethiopia's Mengistu, November 2, 1985, 3; speech before Indian parliament, November 28, 1986, 2; message to meeting of the OAU, May 25, 1988; and at a dinner for the Brazilian president, Jose Sarney, October 19, 1988.

102. April 23, 1983.
104. Out of 205 speeches, Gorbachev advances such support only 12 times. More important, in only three of these cases did the context or audience not call for such expressions of support. In dozens of speeches before Third World audiences, Gorbachev does not express such support.

105. In 27 speeches over the last three and a half years, Gorbachev has called for political settlements for these three conflicts.

106. From 1986 to 1988, the Afghani regime has received more than 100 artillery pieces, more than 400 mortars, 250 antiaircraft guns, 35 Su-22 ground attack fighter planes, 20 Mig-19 fighter interceptors, 30 Mi-25 helicopter gunships, and 25 additional transport planes. In the same period, the Angolan government received 100 T-54/5 main battle tanks, 50 artillery pieces, an indefinite number of multiple rocket launchers and SAM-2/13 missile batteries, 75 antiaircraft guns, 14 Mig-21, 7 Su-22, and 30 Mig-23 ground attack fighters, 19 transport planes, 21 Mi-25 helicopter gunships, and 23 Mi-8/17 transport helicopters. Nicaragua obtained 30 T-54/5 tanks, 22 armored cars, 50 artillery pieces, 12 122mm multiple rocket launchers, over 350 antitank guns, over 400 antiaircraft guns, over 150 SAM-7/14/16s, 5 coastal patrol boats, 35 Mi-8/17 transport helicopters, six Mi-24/5 helicopter gunships, and 6 transport planes. I have omitted Soviet weapons deliveries for 1985, assuming that these were largely ordered prior to that year. This most probably understates the level of arms shipments for which Gorbachev is responsible, as he could have cancelled their delivery. The Military Balance (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), 1986-1987, 1987-1988, 1988-1989.

107. For explicit commitments to regimes under attack, see, for example, his
speech at the Central Committee plenum, April 24, 1985, 1–2, and his interview with Tom Brokaw, December 2, 1987, 1–2.

108. For an example of expressions of the limitations on Soviet ability to provide economic aid and on the need to more efficiently utilize aid that has already been granted, see his speech at the fifth party congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party, March 29, 1982, 4, and his message to the OAU, May 25, 1988, 1.

109. Gorbachev, in 205 speeches, only twice even mentions countries of socialist orientation, let alone identifies them as meriting a special place in Soviet aid commitments.

110. One additional alternative explanation is not so easily tested. It is possible that Soviet military aid is the product of some standard operating procedure in a section of the Defense Ministry. A set package of military hardware and support may be preprogrammed for a five-year period, and the execution of this program may be relatively impervious to any alterations once it is under way. If this is the case, then the levels of Soviet military aid to any given country may not correlate at all with the Soviet leadership’s actual level of commitment to that country. For example, the Soviet government contends that its military advisers in Iraq can come home only after the terms of their contracts expire. I am grateful to Mike Desch for bringing this alternative explanation to my attention.
ated reformist learning were at last met, Gorbachev and his associates proceeded not to invent qualitatively new routines but to act forcibly on the weak tendencies of the Brezhnev and Khrushchev years.

Consensual learning on vital questions of foreign and military policy has thus been a painfully slow historical process for the Soviet Union. So it was under Brezhnev, when learning took the form of truncated, incremental, and substantially reversible adaptations. Though foreign affairs learning under Gorbachev could yet prove reversible, today's explosive search for international accommodation is at once an extraordinary break with history and the expression of historic continuities in Soviet behavior.

NOTES


2. Where leaders are concerned, the data base for this chapter consists of the selected speeches of L.I. Brezhnev, V.V. Grishin, A.N. Kosygin, and M.A. Suslov as compiled in the following volumes: L.I. Brezhnev, Leninskim kursom: Rechi i stat’i, vols. 1–5 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1970–1976), hereafter Brezhnev I–V; V.V. Grishin, Izbrannye rechi i stat’i (Moscow: Politizdat, 1982), hereafter Grishin; A.N. Kosygin, Izbrannye rechi i stat’i (Moscow: Politizdat, 1974), hereafter Kosygin I; A.N. Kosygin, K velikoi tseli, vol. 2 (Moscow: Politizdat 1979) hereafter Kosygin II; M.A. Suslov, Izbrannye rechi i stat’i (Moscow: Politizdat, 1972), hereafter Suslov I; and M.A. Suslov, Na putiakh stroitel’stva kommunizma (Moscow: Politizdat, 1977), hereafter Suslov II. To provide a minimal sense of context, dates are given for each citation throughout the chapter. As to the specialist literature, it has been examined in sufficient detail to identify leading spokesmen for contending schools of thought. A prior analysis of specialist discourse is available in Franklyn Griffiths, "The Sources of American Conduct: Soviet Perspectives and Their Policy Implications," International Security, 9 (Fall 1984): 3–50, which is drawn on liberally here.

3. Ernst B. Haas, "Why Collaborate: Issue-linkage in International Regimes," World Politics, 32 (April 1980):367–68. As elaborated by Haas (Ch. 3), the concept of consensual knowledge has particular meanings that deserve comment. Consisting of socially constructed understandings about cause-and-effect relationships in phenomena of significance to a collectivity, it may be virtually indistinguishable from ideology. Nor must consensus be complete: consensual knowledge may entail understandings that are becoming more, or less, consensual. Consensual
knowledge is, however, to be distinguished from ideology in that its claims to comprehension and counsel are subject to what Haas terms "truth tests" centered on adversary procedures and demonstrated ability to solve problems. The ultimate test of "truth," especially when rival schools of thought are present, is decision by those who make use of knowledge for the collectivity. In these respects there is no great problem in applying the notion of consensual knowledge in the analysis of Soviet behavior. I would add only that, when ideology embraced everything said and done by a line of leaders from Marx to Brezhnev, consensual knowledge is best viewed in the Soviet case as a connective body of understandings that relates currently salient aspects of ideology to current social reality. A problem does, however, arise with Haas's insistence that the originators of consensual knowledge are "epistemic communities." By this he means groups of professionals, usually drawn from a variety of disciplines, who are committed to a given view of causation, share a set of political values, stand by "extra-community reality tests," and whose substantive knowledge draws them to public policy making and decision makers in particular. The problem here is that, aside from the spectrum of dissident groups, during the decade to 1976 no epistemic communities were to be found in a society governed by a regime that sought to regulate all public discourse. Are we therefore to conclude that the Soviet Union in the Brezhnev era was bereft of consensual knowledge? That Haas's conception of consensual knowledge is something of an ideal type? That official intolerance of policy-relevant epistemic communities was a factor in the Soviet inability to learn? More on these matters below.


6. This was a constant theme. See Brezhnev I, 266, 273 (March 29, 1966); Brezhnev II, 108 (November 4, 1967), 243 (July 3, 1968), 369 (June 7, 1969), and 593-94 (April 21, 1970). See also Suslov I, 513 (November 11, 1967); Brezhnev III, 208 (March 30, 1971); Suslov II, 302 (December 21, 1971); Grishin 119 (November 6, 1971); Suslov II, 396 (June 11, 1974); Brezhnev V, 180 (October 11, 1974); Suslov II, 419 (October 22, 1974), 432 and 436 (April 22, 1975); and Brezhnev V, 479 (February 24, 1976). Kosygin, however, proved unwilling, referring not at all to the GCC in the collections under review here.

7. To be precise, leaders made frequent reference to favorable change in the global correlation of forces but did not associate the phenomenon directly with
the GCC. For some specialists, however, change in the correlation to the advantage of socialism was the "essence" of the GCC. Dragilev, "Leninskaya karakteristika," 14. Encouraging leadership assessments of the correlation are to be found in Brezhnev I, 109 (April 8, 1965), 168 (June 20, 1965), 224 (September 29, 1965), 266 (March 29, 1966); and Brezhnev II, 235 (July 4, 1968). See also Suslov I, 414–15 (June 2, 1965), 433–35 (January 26, 1966), 588 (autumn 1969), 603 (June 9, 1970); Brezhnev III, 390 (June 11, 1971); Grishin 156 (March 14, 1972); Suslov II, 360 (July 13, 1973), 394 (June 11, 1974); Brezhnev V, 76–77 (June 14, 1974); Suslov II, 451 (June 9, 1975); Brezhnev V, 317 (June 13, 1975), and 465 (February 24, 1976). Kosygin again proved leery. 8. Brezhnev II, 430 (August 1969). See also Brezhnev II, 108 (November 4, 1967), 236 (July 4, 1968); Kosygin I, 438 (April 23, 1969); Brezhnev II, 369 (June 7, 1969); Suslov I, 603 (June 9, 1970); Brezhnev V, 390 (June 11, 1971); Kosygin I, 438 (April 23, 1969); Brezhnev II, 369 (June 7, 1969); Suslov I, 414–15 (June 2, 1965), 433–35 (January 26, 1966), 588 (autumn 1969), 603 (June 9, 1970); Brezhnev III, 390 (June 11, 1971); Grishin 156 (March 14, 1972); Suslov II, 360 (July 13, 1973), 394 (June 11, 1974); Brezhnev V, 76–77 (June 14, 1974); Suslov II, 451 (June 9, 1975); Brezhnev V, 317 (June 13, 1975), and 465 (February 24, 1976). Kosygin again proved leery. 9. Brezhnev II, 368 (June 7, 1969). 10. F. Burlatskii, Pravda, July 25, 1963. 11. Suslov I, 415 (June 2, 1965), and Brezhnev II, 108 (November 4, 1967). For subsequent leadership comment on imperialist adaptation, see Brezhnev II, 236 (July 4, 1968), 368–69 (June 7, 1969); Brezhnev III, 207–208 (March 30, 1971); Suslov I, 651 (autumn 1971); Grishin 119 (November 6, 1971); Suslov II, 302 (December 21, 1971), 372 (November 23, 1973); and Brezhnev V, 479 (February 24, 1976). As of 1967, the Academy of Sciences' leading institute on these matters, the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, had opted for the "adaptation" formula as against a "two-phase" conception of the imperialist stage. 12. Brezhnev II, 108 (November 4, 1967). 13. Ibid., 368 (June 1969), and 594 (April 21, 1970). 14. Brezhnev I, 273 (March 29, 1966); Brezhnev II, 109 ("partial concessions," "more clever," November 4, 1967), 213 (March 29, 1968), 368 ("anarchy," June 7, 1969), and 593–94 (April 21, 1970). See also Suslov I, 541 (May 5, 1968); Kosygin I, 438 (April 23, 1969); Suslov I, 589 (autumn 1969); and Suslov II, 302 (December 21, 1971). 15. Brezhnev II, 412–13 (June 7, 1969), and 587 (April 21, 1970). See also Brezhnev I, 438 (June 10, 1966), 473 (November 1, 1966); Brezhnev II, 258 (June 8, 1968); Brezhnev III, 56 (June 12, 1970); Brezhnev IV, 249 (August 15, 1973); Suslov II, 372 (November 23, 1973); Brezhnev IV, 377 (November 29, 1973); and Brezhnev V, 84 (June 14, 1974). 16. Brezhnev II, 369 (June 7, 1969). On "maneuvering," see for example Brezhnev I, 261 (January 15, 1966); Brezhnev II, 108 (November 4, 1967); and Suslov I, 651 (autumn 1971). 17. Franklyn Griffiths, "The Soviet Experience of Arms Control," International Journal, 44 (Spring 1989):326–41. On variables that may have entered the Soviet decision, see also Richard Anderson's contribution to this volume at note 2 therein. Speaking in June, 1974, Brezhnev noted that "several years" earlier the correlation of forces had been evaluated to suggest the possibility of a radical turn in the international situation; the "peace programme" announced at the twenty-fourth party congress in 1971 had "generalized" this objective, which seemingly had been established earlier. Brezhnev V, 76–77 (June 14, 1974). As I see it, the decision in principle for détente with the United States was taken in late November or very early December 1969. A key indicator was Soviet readiness to accept the


24. S.I. Tiul'panov, ed., V.I. Lenin i problemy sovremennogo kapitalizma (Leningrad: Izd-vo LGU, 1969). Others had tentatively spoken in favor of a "two-phase" theory. Among them was E.A. Ambartsumov who, in the Gorbachev era, was among the first to float the notion of pan-human values taking precedence over those of any particular class. See "Mezhdunarodnaia konferentsiia marksistov," MEiMO, 6 (June 1967):82, and E. Ambartsumov, Izvestiia, September 6, 1986. For Brezhnev-era comment on "the unity of humanity" and "the general human interest," see F.M. Burlatskii and A.A. Galkin, Sotsiologiia. Politika. Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia (Moscow: "Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia," 1974), 290, 296-98, 304.


29. Tiul'panov, "Istoricheskoe mesto" (October 1973), which depicted change as occurring within, and not beyond, the monopoly stage of capitalism. The details of Tiul'panov’s argument remained intact, but now it was stated in terms of phases within the monopoly stage only. See also S.I. Tiul'panov and S.I. Iakovleva, "Osobennosti eksploatatsii trudiashchikhsia v usloviiakh GMK," Rabochii klass i sovremennyy mir (hereafter RKiSM), 3 (March 1978):54–68.

30. See for example Brezhnev IV, 150 (June 18, 1973); also 26 (November 13, 1972), 79 (December 21, 1972), and 188 ("edifice of peace," July 10, 1973).


32. Brezhnev V, 180 (October 11, 1974).


34. Suslov put it succinctly: the deepening crisis in the West meant that capitalism would not have a "'second wind'." Suslov II, 419 (October 22, 1974). See also ibid., 436 (April 22, 1975), 451 (June 9, 1975), and T.T. Timofeyev, "Rabochee dvizhenie na sovremennom etape obshchego krizisa kapitalizma," RKlSM, 5 (May 1975):21–35.


36. Brief biographical notes are in order here. Dragilev had been slow to reject Stalinist views of the capitalist system in the Khrushchev era, and had come out in favor of a Stalinist perspective once again when an attempt was made to rehabilitate Stalin prior to the twenty-third party congress in 1966. Conversations with specialists at IMEMO in the 1970s suggested that Dragilev was aligned with V.V. Grishin, Politburo member and head of the Moscow party organization. Tiu'l'panov had been a professional military officer and had risen to the rank of general by the time he was demobilized in 1956 at the age of 55. Decorated several times in World War II and mentioned in Zhukov's memoirs, he drew comment in the West as head of the information office of the Soviet military administration in Germany, 1945–1949. From 1956 to 1961 he was prorector of Leningrad University, where he furthered studies of the capitalist system. He is said to have been a personal friend of General A.A. Epishhev, head of the main political administration of the Soviet armed forces. Inozemtsev and Arbatov both graduated from the Institute of International Relations in the class of 1947. Initially an Americanist, Inozemtsev rose through the ranks of IMEMO to become director in 1965 and candidate member of the Central Committee in March 1971. His patrons in the 1970s were said to be Suslov and Kosygin. Arbatov became the founding director of the Institute of the USA (later USA and Canada) in 1967 and entered the Central Committee in 1976. As noted above, his principal patron was Andropov.


38. Ibid. See also Dragilev, "Obshchii krizis" (July 1971), 96–99 and "Gosudarstvenno-monopolisticheskii kapitalizm" (September 1972), 90–91.


40. Dragilev, "Leninskaia kharakteristika" (March 1970), 8–9; Dragilev and Mokhov, Leninskii analiz (1970), 192–248; and Dragilev, GMK (1975), 27 on "strategy."

41. Dragilev, "Leninskaia kharakteristika" (March 1970), 16, suggests that growing Soviet political and military power aggravated the condition of U.S. capitalism by furthering its militarization, military interventions, balance of payments deficits, devaluation, tax increases, reduced real wages, and so on.


44. Tiu'l'panov and Sheinis, Aktual'nye problemy (1973), 64.

45. Ibid., 12–13, 89–90, and Ch. 3 on planning.


48. Ibid., 74–75. On preconditions for socialism, see 240.

49. Ibid., 9.


51. Ibid., 22–23. See also 36.

52. Ibid., 36–49 ("social maneuver," 37).

53. Ibid., 116.


55. Inozemtsev, *Sovremennyi kapitalizm* (1972), 115. See also 125 ("differentiated means, methods, forms of struggle"), 109–10 ("realistic trends"), and 117–18 (all in the service of "reaction"). Economic forms of struggle were a special concern of Kosygin. See esp. Kosygin I, 438 (April 23, 1969).

56. Inozemtsev, *Sovremennyi kapitalizm* (1972), III. See also the acknowledgment of a sharp increase in the significance of economic forms of struggle centered on scientific-technical education and research. Ibid., 110. Similar points were made by Arbatov in Gromyko and Zhurkin, *SShA: NTR* (1974), 18–19 and 34.

57. Arbatov, *War of Ideas* (1970), 240. The words used were: the adversary would prevail "until the working-class and liberation movements in their turn 'adapt' themselves to these modifications in the policies of their class enemy...."


63. Ibid., 225–26, 228–30, 247.

64. Ibid., 227. See also ibid., 225, 230, 232, 241, 254. Adaptation in U.S. foreign and military policies was thus tactical: aims remained as before, but means and methods had been altered.


68. Arbatov, "Administratsiia Niksona" (August 1970):13, on those standing ready to make use of any favorable turn of events.

69. Brezhnev V, 180 (October 11, 1974). Kosygin also ventured to suggest that crisis phenomena, the GCC, and the like did not "ease humanity's task of developing international cooperation." Kosygin II, 319 (November 2, 1974).

70. Brezhnev V, 480 (February 24, 1976).


72. Even for the reformist, the struggle of opposed social systems would lead "to the victory of the most advanced social system, socialism, and to the subsequent reorganization of all international reality in accordance with the laws of life and the development of the new society." Arbatov, War of Ideas (1970), 35.

73. Brezhnev IV, 81 (December 21, 1972).


75. The following passages owe much to Griffiths, "Sources of American Conduct," which, however, depicts Soviet behavior in terms of a varying correlation among four tendencies. To simplify for the moment, I have reduced the set to two.


81. Reliance on Griffiths, "Sources of American Conduct," is again acknowledged.


83. See for example Brezhnev IV, 81 (December 21, 1972).

84. Brezhnev III, 390 (March 30, 1971), and Brezhnev IV, 81 (December 21, 1972). See also Arbatov, War of Ideas (1970), 306–307; and "Sobytie" (August 1972), 7, on "aimless waste" in military spending.


86. Ibid. 412 (June 7, 1969), 587 (April 12, 1970); Brezhnev IV, 377 (November 29, 1973); Brezhnev V, 84 (June 14, 1974), 94 (June 27, 1974), and 180 (October 11, 1974).
89. Brezhnev II, 441 (June 7, 1969).
90. Arbatov, War of Ideas (1970), 275. On force of example, see 304, 313.
93. See for example, Brezhnev IV, 187 (July 10, 1973). At the same time, détente created most favorable conditions for the national liberation struggle. Brezhnev II, 412 (June 7, 1969); Brezhnev V, 52 (April 24, 1974), and 78 (June 14, 1974).
94. Arbatov, War of Ideas (1970), 269 ("complete parity"), and Izvestia, October 1, 1975 (no "guarantee").
95. Brezhnev IV, 81 (December 21, 1972) and, less directly, 227 (July 26, 1973).
97. Arbatov, War of Ideas (1970), 245, 275; Pravda, May 4, 1971 and July 22, 1973. Arbatov, it should be noted, made use of the formula of "combined" operation in the two spheres, but in a manner that gave prominence to interstate relations and was not wholly unlike "two-track" thinking in the West. Izvestia, June 22, 1972, and "O sovetsko-amerikanskikh otnosheniyakh" (February 1973):112. As of September 1975, however, he urged the drawing of a "clear line" between the two spheres. Izvestia, September 4, 1975.
101. For example, "Tens of millions paid with their lives for the policy of 'appeasement'." Brezhnev I, 193 (September 14, 1965). See also ibid., 122 (April 8, 1965), 148 (May 8, 1965), 246 (October 23, 1965), 291 (March 29, 1966); and Brezhnev II, 247 (July 3, 1968).
103. Ibid., 519 (April 13, 1970).
105. Ibid., 76.
106. Ibid., 46-47 citing U.S. authorities; and "O sovetsko-amerikanskikh otnosheniyakh" (February 1973):105.
109. Ibid., 28, 45-46, 47-48, 104.
111. Ibid., 230, 232.
112. Ibid., 233.
115. Ibid., 270, speaks of "complete isolation" of the hawks. See also Brezhnev II, 122 (November 4, 1967): to fight for peace was "to isolate the most militant, aggressive circles, to disrupt their anti-popular plans."
116. Brezhnev IV, 157 (June 21, 1973), 172 (June 24, 1973); V, 54 (April 23, 1974), and 78 (June 14, 1974).
121. For detail, see George W. Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982); Gelman, Brezhnev Politburo; Parrott, Politics and Technology; and also Peter Volten, Brezhnev's Peace Program: A Study of the Soviet Domestic Political Process (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1982). Needless to say, estimates provided by the KGB remain a critical unknown in all Western analyses, the present one included.
126. Gelman, Brezhnev Politburo, 163.
128. Gelman, Brezhnev Politburo, 163–64.
130. Griffiths, "Sources of American Conduct." Inequality is exemplified by the relative ease with which Dragilev, as distinct from Tiul'panov, was able to make his case. The term isolationism signifies not so much a withdrawal from international affairs (though self-isolating behavior was inherent in the Stalinist variant), as a propensity to subordinate foreign to domestic priorities and to fashion an external setting conducive to the realization of domestic purposes above all.
131. Gorbachev reports that a review of Soviet policies had begun prior to the April 1985 Central Committee plenum. Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), esp. 24–27. My argument is not that Gorbachev appeared with a developed plan of action, but that contemporary Soviet reformism is an outgrowth of tendencies present in the Brezhnev and Khrushchev eras.
international environment or in the belief system. These other influences are crucial in orienting choice, but not in defining its fine grain. The fine grain emerges from the pulling and tugging of domestic and bureaucratic politics, and doubtlessly as well from the cognitive devices, shortcuts, and protections at work within each policy maker.

Those who care about understanding the behavior of particular countries, who want this effort to be more systematic without neglecting deep-flowing cultural, historical, and ideological features, and who believe that theorists of international relations have something to teach them (and something to learn from them) are thus left with a stiff challenge. Since explanations at no single level of analysis—indeed, at no two levels of analysis—will suffice, ways must be found of doing justice to influences at all three levels.

The point of this essay has been to argue that there are, indeed, three levels of analysis. Beliefs and the systems they form are an important, independent part of the story. Leave them out and critical links in the explanation are broken, other levels of analysis become weakened abstractions, become car engines without crankshafts. Understanding where beliefs come from and when, how, and why they change, therefore, matters to theorists at whatever level they seek to explain. And understanding where beliefs come from and when, how, and why they change requires formidable tools, which is where the notion of learning has a contribution to make.

NOTES

1. Beyond the two excellent editors of this volume, I want to thank a gifted group of friends and critics for reading my essay and doing what they could to improve it: Alexander George, Stanley Hoffmann, Robert Jervis, Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, and Jack Snyder.

2. The most notable exception is Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), a book in which the authors not only deal with both dimensions evenhandedly, but then attempt a synthesis. Their synthesis, however, explains a particular behavior (namely, crisis behavior) rather than the whole complex of behavior that is foreign policy.

3. This is true even of those who embrace a modified version of "neorealism" but stress the need to include domestic politics as an explanation for things unexplained by the dictates of the international political system. The most sophisticated recent example is Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).


9. I have taken this definition from Lloyd Etheredge, *Can Governments Learn?* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1985), 143, where the first element is stressed, and from Ernst Haas, "Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," *World Politics* (April 1980): 390, where both elements appear. Etheredge’s definition, as Tetlock indicates in Chapter 1, is, in fact, somewhat more elaborate. Learning, he says, is a matter of increased (a) cognitive differentiation, (b) integration of thought, and (c) capacity for self-reflection, terms that Tetlock explains.


17. Ibid., 78.

18. This cybernetic form of learning also resembles what passes for learning in the theory of so-called (structural) realists, those like Kenneth Waltz, who see national leaderships adapting reflexively to the structure of power in the international system in order to survive. Tetlock calls it *stimulus-response covariation*.

19. Ibid., 112.

20. Ibid., 137.

21. The related, although more extreme argument, which I have spared the

23. Ibid., 219.
24. Ibid., 231.
25. For a good summary of this school of thought, called attribution theory, see Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 34–42. Larson, a political scientist, makes interesting use of this theory and several others to analyze the Truman administration’s changing attitude toward the Soviet Union in the immediate postwar period.
27. While my readiness to associate learning with the evolution from “dispositional” to “situational” explanations of the other side’s behavior may not be particularly contentious, the same cannot be said of my parallel proposition concerning the movement from deterrence to interactive or “spiral” theory. My point, however, is not that deterrence theory is always wrong (anymore than dispositional explanations are always inapt); rather that deterrence theory as a general way of thinking is likely to be less compatible with complex generalizations.
29. Ibid., 14.
30. Ibid., 17.
32. See Lev Bezymensky and Valentin Falin, Pravda (August 29, 1988): 6. One should not, they wrote, yield to the “temptation to seek the truth ‘somewhere in the middle’ and to metaphysically divide in two the blame for all prewar and postwar complexities, tribulations and tragedies, let alone to load these sins on Stalin and Stalinism just for the sake of ‘breaking’ with the past.” (Falin, in November 1988, became the new chief of the Central Committee’s international department.)
33. This discussion begs the question whether Dashichev, Trofimenko, and Arbatov have in fact been learning. If these views have been theirs all along, and only now in the era of glasnost have they dared to express them, this would not represent learning. For what it is worth, knowing Arbatov and Trofimenko, I believe they are reaching what for them are new conclusions. Not knowing Dashichev, I cannot say. But the equally important point is that they all are introducing perspectives that represent learning for the foreign policy community at large.
34. This is in his address to a conference of scholars and practitioners in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 25, 1988. It is the single most elaborate and substantial foreign policy speech given by the foreign minister. See “Nauchno-

35. Ibid., 33.
36. Ibid., 31, 32.
37. Ibid., 32.
38. To be absolutely accurate, articulated beliefs have changed. Whether, in fact, these beliefs had shifted earlier, but remained "unpublished," I do not yet know.
39. G. Shakhnazarov, "Vostok—Zapad: K voprosy o deideologizatsii mezhdgosudarstvennykh otnoshenii," Kommunist, 3 (February 1989): 70. Shakhnazarov, an official of the CPSU Central Committee, happens to be an adviser within Gorbachev's personal entourage.
40. Ibid., 72-73.
42. Georgi Shakhnazarov, "Vostok—Zapad," 77.
43. See Kim Tsagolov's contribution to a symposium reported in International Affairs, 12 (December 1988): 146. The symposium was a gathering of journalists, academics, and senior officials from the foreign ministry. Tsagolov, a military officer, is a senior faculty member at the Voroshilov Military Academy. He was among the prominent Soviet voices in the last critical phases of the Afghanistan war, one of the few military people with expertise in the region.
44. G. Diligenskii, "Revolyutsionnaya teorii i sovremennost;" MEMO, 3 (March 1988): 17–18. Diligenskii is the new and innovative editor of MEMO, the Soviet Union's most important academic international affairs journal.
47. Ibid., 13. The question is asked in his November 2, 1987 speech on the anniversary of the revolution.
49. They are not the same as strategy, which in effect is a game plan, a notion of how one gets from A to B, the technical mobilization of means to achieve ends. Strategies may reflect beliefs, but they are not beliefs. Policy concepts are beliefs about the proper relationship of means to ends.


52. A close textual analysis of the speeches of Gorbachev and other prominent foreign policy figures given between 1984 and 1988, done by a group of scholars at Berkeley, bears out this general point. Measured against a standard of "integrative complexity"—by which they mean the degree of nuanced or differentiated causal explanation and the perception of "conceptual connections among differentiated idea-elements"—Gorbachev's ideas, as those of the others, have moved steadily in the direction of increased integrative complexity. (See Philip E. Tetlock, Shari Cohen, and Russell Faeges, "Growing Integrative Complexity of Soviet Views of the International Environment: The Impact of 'New Thinking,'" paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Honolulu, November 1988.)


58. Ibid., 41.

59. Ibid., 42.

60. Were his writings not convincing enough, the many American specialists who know him personally would, I think, agree with this assessment.

61. Neither, however, is as key to the question addressed in this chapter: the nature of learning and its relationship to behavior. One cannot get far with other issues, however—for example, the matter of the durability of the change—without facing them.


64. Andrei Kozyrev and Andrei Shumikhin, "East and West in the Third World," *International Affairs*, 3 (March 1989): 68-69. Kozyrev is deputy chief of the international organization department in the Foreign Ministry; Shumikhin is head of the Middle East sector in the foreign policy department of the Institute of the USA and Canada.

65. V. Spandaryan and N. Shmelev, "Problemy povysheniya effektivnosti vneshneekonomicheskikh svyazei SSSR," *MEMO*, 8 (August 1988): 10. Spandaryan was, at the time, an acting deputy director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, and Shmelev, a well-known economist at the institute.


68. As his foreign minister put it: "Postwar experience has begun to correct substantially the notion of the capabilities of force. Even when superior, force most often does not yield the aggressor's planned result, and sometimes boomerangs against his own positions." (MFA speech July 25, 1988, *Vestnik*, 35.)

69. This and the other quotations are drawn from Chapter 4 of my *The Soviet Union and the Other Superpower: Soviet Policy Toward the United States, 1969-1989*.

70. This has been a theme of his since the twenty-seventh party congress in February 1986, but he first developed it at length in a speech within the Foreign Ministry May 23, 1986. (For a synopsis, see "Vremya Perestroiki," *Vestnik: Ministerstvo inostrannykh del SSSR*, 1 [August 5, 1987]: 4.)


73. See footnote 55.


80. Ibid.

81. See his speech in Murmansk, October 1, in *Pravda* (October 2, 1987): 1-3.

82. "Bleeding wound" is, of course, the phrase used by Gorbachev to describe the Afghan intervention at the twenty-seventh party congress in February 1986.

83. My guess is that this process occurs in every state's foreign policy, only in most instances more slowly than in the current Soviet case. In part, because most foreign policy studies focus on either a specific dimension of policy—say, toward a region of the world or a particular problem—or deal with a relatively limited period of time, they fail to detect the complex learning taking place over an era and across the whole of policy. What, in the narrower context, appears as ration-
alization after the fact or—to use the concepts of this book, increased cognitive, but not evaluative, complexity when judged from greater remove—is likely to be part of this functional relationship between changing belief and behavior. The fair test would be to compare, for example, U.S. foreign policy in the 1980s with U.S. policy in the late 1940s to early 1950s by measuring the degree to which the five qualities I have attributed to behavior reflecting complex learning are more present.

I would be surprised if, in most instances, the attributes of complex learning do not become increasingly prominent. This suspicion rests on the assumption that, over time, all nonpathological regimes gradually, progressively, come to understand the logic and imperatives of a given international order. In short, over time all governments, although not necessarily all leaderships, learn. The international order that we have had since the end of World War II has taken time to comprehend, not the least because, like other historic international orders, it does not stand still.


87. The three instances are Stalin's aggressive policies in the late 1940s, Khrushchev's militancy over Berlin in the late 1950s, and Brezhnev's adventures in the Third World in the mid and late 1970s. (See Chapter 6 "The Soviet Union," in Snyder's book in preparation, *Myths of Empire*.)


89. Another student who has taken Snyder's kind of theory to an extreme, Richard Anderson, refuses even a role for the external environment and beliefs. (See his dissertation, cited in note 21.)

90. He proposes modifying Kenneth Waltz's strict structural realism by adding the variations among issue areas, information levels, and international institutions, and then combining this enhanced systemic theory with the "rich interpretations...of the historically oriented students of domestic structure and foreign policy." (See Robert Keohane, *Neorealism and Its Critics*, 196–97.)

91. Exceptions, however, include the well-argued work of Kenneth Waltz's own students. Barry Posen, for example, in *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), combines two levels of analysis (systems theory and organizational theory) to explain the origins of offensive and defensive national military postures.

92. My notion of the international environment is broader than even the loosest categories used by systems theorists, but most of them, including the "structuralists," would conceive the effect of the international system in the same terms.

ing twice a year ended after the Soviet move into Afghanistan, it re-
sumed in the summer of 1983. The U.S.-Soviet consensus on nonproliferation
is now thorough; the focus, coverage, target, and forum of present super-
power nonproliferation strategies are identical.\textsuperscript{130}

In 1975 the leading suppliers of nuclear technology convened their
first round of discussions in London on how to inhibit the spread of
nuclear weapons without curbing exports of equipment to meet the world's
energy needs.\textsuperscript{131} Debate persisted on this issue until the group reached
the London Suppliers' Agreement in January 1978, thereby indicating
that consensual knowledge had been achieved and institutionalized.

Consensual knowledge has proved to be most elusive at the global
level. Finally reached in 1968, the NPT's major bargains involve a fragmented
rather than substantive linkage of issues. The treaty's formalization de-
pended as much on the superpowers' ability to influence other parties to
accept the pact as on global knowledge. The nonproliferation norm was
not universally shared then, and it is not now. Over 30 states have
refused to sign or ratify the NPT, including two early nuclear powers,
France and China, as well as each country poised on the threshold of
possessing nuclear arms, namely Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Paki-
stan, and South Africa. The willingness of these threshold states and
other nuclear aspirants to refrain from building bombs seems to depend
on the ability of the established nuclear powers, especially the United
States and the U.S.S.R., to widen the consensus and coordinated action
that produced the NPT. That treaty entered force partially because the
superpowers proposed—and the other parties accepted—a redefinition
of the proliferation problem to be solved. Because challenges to the
credibility of the NPT-based regime have mounted, it may now again be
time to reconceptualize the problem, especially as the NPT's extension
comes up for final consideration in 1995.

\textbf{NOTES}

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Weber for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.

University Press, 1974).

2. James C. March and Johan P. Olsen, "Organizational Learning and the
Ambiguity of the Past," in March and Olsen, \textit{Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations}

3. On the problems that paucity, uncertainty, and complexity pose for effi-
cient foreign policy decision making, see John Steinbruner, \textit{The Cybernetic Theory
of Decision}, 15-18; Alexander L. George, \textit{Presidential Decision Making in Foreign
Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice} (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,
Cooperation in Nuclear Nonproliferation Activities


4. For a credible nuclear weapon status, a state must possess (1) fissile material for an explosive charge (plutonium or highly enriched uranium); (2) components to enclose and trigger a device (beryllium, timing instruments, detonators, etc.); and (3) a means to deliver the device to proposed targets. The greatest obstacle involved in going nuclear is obtaining fissile material.

5. For example, India’s 1974 explosion of a nuclear device provided firm evidence that New Delhi can construct nuclear arms. Pakistan has not tested a device, but enough information has leaked out of Islamabad to inform Americans (and Soviets) of the present military potential of Pakistan’s nuclear program. Informative studies of South Asian nuclear programs are Leonard S. Spector, *The Undeclared Bomb* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988); and David Albright and Tom Zamora, “India, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: All the Pieces in Place,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 45 (June 1989).


12. The precise processes by which officials create strategic interests from core
values is not specified in cybernetic models. These models also black-box the
way in which organizations join interests with inferences drawn from history to
set the routines that guide behavior. These omissions inhibit the application of
cybernetic concepts to complete policy processes, but other learning types are no
more thorough in this respect. In fact, the recent interest in learning as a distinct
analytic category derives from our scant knowledge about how leaders draw on
experience to form their conceptions of national interests. It is much easier to
show how experiential inductions push individuals and groups to revise, rather than
create, existing interests.

13. Instrumental learning is identical both to the reward-punishment concept
of learning Tetlock identifies in this volume's introductory chapter and to many
behavioral perspectives on organizational change. For example, Levitt and March
write that "behavior in an organization is based on routines. Action stems from a
logic of appropriateness or legitimacy more than from a logic of consequentiality
or intention. It involves matching procedures to situations more than it does
calculating choices." Barbara Levitt and James G. March, "Organizational Learning,"


15. Political realism has been a dominant intellectual paradigm of global political
studies in the postwar period. The tradition's most sophisticated and widely
cited variant is Waltz's structural realism (neorealism). Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory

16. As Barbara Levitt and James G. March put it: "Competitors are linked
partly through the diffusion of experience, and understanding learning within
competitive communities of organizations involves seeing how experience . . . [is
shared]. Competitors are also linked through the effects of their actions on each
other. One organization's action is another organization's outcome. As a result,
even if learning by an individual organization were entirely internal and direct, it
could be comprehended only by specifying the competitive structure." See "Or-
ganizational Learning," 332.


19. Cybernetic-structural theories about foreign policy generally are too abstract
to permit useful explanations of state behavior. Though Waltz offers a theory of
international politics, not of foreign policy, his substantive assumptions are strong
enough to generate at least these three expectations about U.S. and Soviet
nonproliferation activities.

20. For Kenneth Waltz, "The first concern of states is not to maximize power
but to maintain their positions in the system." Theory of International Politics, 126.
Joseph M. Grieco elaborates: "Driven by an interest in survival, states are acutely
sensitive to any erosion of their relative capabilities, which are the ultimate basis
for their security and independence in an anarchical, self-help international con-
text. Thus, realists feel that the major goal of states in any relationship is not to
attain the best possible individual gain or payoff. Instead the fundamental goal of
states in any relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative
capabilities." "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the


23. This study does not try to explain nuclear proliferation's sources, but if it did, neorealism would provide a useful starting point. Because security and wellbeing are scarce in the present world order, the states that manage to obtain them set behavioral standards for others. Kenneth Waltz writes: "if some do relatively well, others will emulate them or fall by the wayside." Insofar as the United States and the U.S.S.R. are seen as two of the world's greatest powers, and to the extent that nuclear arms figure into images of their success, others are induced to acquire their own nuclear forces. "Contending states imitate the military innovations contrived by the country of greatest capability and ingenuity. And so the weapons of major contenders, and even their strategies, begin to look much the same all over the world." Two conditions restrict the sweep of this argument. Since superpowers can guarantee the defense of some friendly states, the latter do not need to emulate the military practices of their patron. And not all states contend: many countries are neither able nor inclined to acquire the latest military means to defend possessions and pursue gains. So bounded, structural realism provides a powerful account for a state's motivation to go nuclear. *Theory of International Politics*, 118, 127.


26. Useful surveys of these and other cognitive heuristics are provided by P.E. Tetlock and C. McGuire, "Cognitive Perspectives on Foreign Policy"; and Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976). One example of a noncompensatory choice heuristic is the "elimination by aspects rule": people compare choice options according to their single most important value, eliminating the options that do not serve this value, and evaluating remaining options in terms of their second most important value, and so on. See Amos Tversky, "Elimination by Aspects: A Theory of Choice," *Psychological Review* 79 (1972).


29. The boundary separating cybernetic and cognitive processes is highly ambiguous, partly because three diverse approaches demarcate it. First, one may consider the distinction in terms of the timeless debate between free will and determinism. Cybernetic arguments presume that situations structure human action. Cognitive claims stress the human capacity to challenge and reshape existing structures. For discrete reasons, both expect conservative behavior, although proponents of the cognitive tradition perhaps expect habits to be broken more
easily. Second, one may differentiate the pair by their level of analytic abstraction: one approach focuses on the cognition of individuals and the other on the routines of bureaucracies and other substate groups (as in Graham T. Allison's *Essence of Decision* [Boston, Little, Brown, 1971]) or nation-states (as in Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*). Third, one may discuss both cybernetic and cognitive processes at the individual level, treating the former as a subcomponent of the latter (as John Steinbruner usually does in *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision*). The first two approaches demarcate the boundary in this chapter.


36. Though Haas admits that learning does not necessarily produce more elaborate or holistic causal theories, this type seems to join the cognitive structural and the institutional learning conceptions that Tetlock identifies.


38. Ernst B. Haas, "Why Collaborate?" 392–93. John Steinbruner (*The Cybernetic Theory of Decision*, 147) emphasizes that only causal learners bargain for consensus: "If cognitive (and cybernetic) actors are engaged in politics, the natural presumption is that the role of bargaining as traditionally understood will be sharply diminished. Bargaining implies a willingness and capacity on the part of actors to adjust their conflicting objectives in a process of reaching an accommodation—a clear case of value integration. It is natural to suppose, by contrast, that cognitive (and cybernetic) actors will not display the same degree of deliberate accommodation, will act more independently, and will bypass bargains which under analytic assumptions would appear to be obvious."

39. Linking bargaining to learning, institutionalization occurs with "the development of new organs, subunits, and administrative practices that are designed to improve the performance of the organization in the wake of some major disappointment with earlier performance." Institutionalization depends both on the legitimacy and authority of lessons learned (or bargains reached). Ernst B. Haas, *When Knowledge Is Power*, 85–88. The norms of nonproliferation are more fully institutionalized within and between the U.S. and Soviet governments than among the broader coalition of nuclear technology suppliers. Notwithstanding the IAEA and the NPT, these norms are least institutionalized internationally.

40. The nonproliferation regime consists of consensual understandings, voluntary commitments, bilateral agreements, and treaties prohibiting the acquisition of
nuclear explosives that are verified through international inspection conducted chiefly by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The regime rests on four substantive norms: (1) the spread of nuclear weapons is bad, (2) nuclear technology can contribute to national economic development, (3) access to nuclear energy is inevitable and can be facilitated without increasing the risk of proliferation, and (4) nuclear nonproliferation is closely linked to the reduction of nuclear arms by nuclear weapon states. See Lawrence Scheinman, The Nonproliferation Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1985); and Benjamin N. Schiff, International Nuclear Technology Transfer (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984).


45. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival, 47.


48. Truman's remarks at Potsdam on August 9, 1945, are cited by McGeorge Bundy in Danger and Survival, 133.

49. The famous document was a product of compromise between a committee of scientists led by Robert Oppenheimer and chaired by David Lilienthal and a group of political and military officials directed by Dean Acheson. Whereas the scientists advocated immediate delegation of full control over the whole field of atomic energy activities to an Atomic Development Authority, the more conservative politicians and soldiers prevailed in arguing that authority over atomic matters should be relinquished gradually, and only after the compliance of all parties was ensured. U.S. Department of State, A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946).
50. Baruch’s concern with intimate inspection and enforceable punishment may have derived from a belief that the atomic issue could be used to open Soviet society and thus remove a projected source of atomic war. As Senator Arthur Vandenberg noted, “What had begun with the Acheson-Lilienthal study as an attempt to disarm the world of nuclear weapons became instead a nine-year struggle to design a partial system of world order among nation-states fundamentally in disagreement about the nature and future of the world.” Robert L. Beckman, Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Congress and the Control of Peaceful Nuclear Activities (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), 33.


52. This is a classic example of wishful thinking: Washington’s desire to retain an atomic monopoly and its fear of facing novel atomic threats seems to have influenced its expectation that Moscow would not acquire the bomb soon. See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 356–81. Although affect at least partly caused this cognition, thus implying constrained learning, early U.S. nuclear choices are better viewed as instrumental learning outcomes. This case shows that these two learning types are complementary.


56. Ibid., 15.


58. German access to the bomb, soon to become a major Soviet fear, was not then possible; the allies allowed neither Germany to arm even conventionally.


60. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival, 181.

61. Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1980), 168. A Soviet physicist who worked on the original bomb program recently asserted that he and his colleagues were true believers: “We had a supreme task: in the shortest period of time to create weaponry that could defend our country! When the problem was successfully resolved, we felt relief, even happiness—indeed, possessing such weaponry, we were removing the possibility of having it used against the USSR with impunity.” Iulii Khariton, in an interview with V. Gubarev, “Fizika—eto moia zhizn” (Physics is my life), Pravda (20 February 1984).


64. The new U.S. defense doctrine was codified in October 1953 in the highly classified “Basic National Security Policy” (NSC-162/2), the key sentence of which
cooperation in nuclear nonproliferation activities

reads: "in the event of hostilities, the united states will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions." foreign relations of the united states, 1952-54 (2):593.


66. quoted in mcgeorge bundy, danger and survival, 249.

67. president eisenhower's "atoms for peace" address appears in the congressional record, 100 (january 7, 1954):61-63.

68. finally established in 1957, the iaea became the first real institutional expression of washington's interest in channeling nuclear technology globally for peaceful ends. eisenhower's sponsorship of the agency implied that the idea of a supranational control authority invested with a mandate to prohibit all independent nuclear arsenals was now viewed by washington as unobtainable. though a significant body of scientific opinion ran counter to eisenhower's new emphasis, "with atoms for peace," Mitchell Reiss observes, "proposals for international control would henceforth emphasize partial nuclear disarmament." see without the bomb: the politics of nuclear nonproliferation (new york: columbia university press, 1988), 12.

69. there was another important reason for the amendment. after moscow tested its first thermonuclear weapon, washington became extremely concerned about the west's ability to meet the growing soviet threat. the 1954 revision addressed this concern by allowing both the training of nato personnel in the employment of u.s. atomic weapons and the transfer to nato states of information on nuclear defense plans and on the external characteristics of nuclear arms. u.s. fears returned in 1957 with the soviet sputnik success and with the release of the secret gaither report, which argued that a major missile gap had risen between the united states and the u.s.s.r. consequently, the aea was loosened again in 1958 to permit transfers to u.s. allies of fissile material, nuclear equipment, and highly sensitive information. because the powerful u.s. joint committee on atomic energy doubted the reliability of france as a nuclear partner, this legislation actually allowed nuclear sharing only with britain.


73. Glenn T. Seaborg, Stemming the Tide, 73.


75. Defense Secretary McNamara stated the plan's nonproliferation logic to Congress: "with testing limited to the underground environment, the potential cost of a nuclear weapons program would increase sharply for all signatory states. and since testing underground is not only more costly but also more difficult and time-consuming, the proposed treaty would retard progress in weapons de-
velopment in cases where the added cost and other factors were not sufficient to preclude it altogether. One of the great advantages of this treaty is that it will have the effect of retarding the spread of nuclear weapons." Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Hearing, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 88th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), 108. See William B. Bader, The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 55.

76. William B. Bader, The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 46.

77. The Atoms for Peace idea began with a report in which a panel of experts chaired by Robert Oppenheimer recommended a U.S. policy of candor in explaining the gloomy new nuclear realities, thus raising the incentive for meaningful arms control. While Eisenhower told the world that there was no way to defend populations from the bomb’s enormous destructiveness, he offered the illusory hope that peaceful nuclear uses could replace dangerous military stockpiles, thereby solving “the fearful atomic dilemma.” But in the end, “building more weapons remained the top priority, and the stockpiles continued to grow unchecked.” McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival, 287–95.


89. Ibid. The source William Potter cites on this point is Karel Docek, “Czechoslovak Uranium and the USSR,” Radio Liberty Dispatch (July 9, 1974), 3.


100. Dean Rusk said this to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. See Hearings, *Nonproliferation Treaty*, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, 1968, 4.

101. Duncan L. Clarke writes that ACDA's persistence was central to the eventual U.S. backing of the NPT, but that an equally important reason for the treaty's success was that it didn't threaten AEC or DOD budgets. *Politics of Arms Control* (New York: Free Press, 1979), 72-73.


103. The agreement that was finally presented to the United Nations and is now endorsed by 140 states commits nonnuclear-weapon-state signatories not to build nuclear explosives (Article II) and to accept *full-scope* IAEA safeguards on all of their peaceful nuclear activities (Article III). Each party agrees to accept IAEA safeguards on exports of nuclear equipment or material to nonnuclear weapon states (Article III). And nuclear-weapon states pledge not to help nonnuclear weapon states obtain nuclear arms (Article I). The two other substantive terms of the NPT call for the fullest possible global sharing of peaceful nuclear technology (Article IV) and for the nuclear weapon states to conduct nuclear disarmament negotiations in "good faith" (Article VI).

104. See Ernst B. Haas, "Why Collaborate?"; and Benjamin N. Schiff, *International Nuclear Technology Transfer*.

105. At Trombay, India ran an unsafeguarded, locally built reprocessing plant to separate plutonium for use as the fissile material in a Canadian-supplied research reactor, moderated with U.S.-supplied heavy water.

106. The implications of the Indian test are nicely summarized by Michael Brenner: "Most worrisome was that the key critical technology employed, spent-fuel reprocessing, and the key material, plutonium, were on the point of entering the commercial market. If the then-current practice of closing the nuclear fuel cycle by the recycling of plutonium were to continue, a host of countries would move to the nuclear weapons threshold. Although the critical facilities would remain under safeguards so far as U.S.-supplied technology was concerned, other suppliers were less strict. Moreover, safeguards themselves had suffered a blow to their credibility with the explosion in India's Western Desert. In the future
their adequacy for meeting a renewed proliferation threat would be in question."
Michael J. Brenner, *Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation* (New York: Cambridge

107. Ibid., 63.

108. ACDA in fact had been purged by Nixon and Kissinger in December 1972:
they slashed the budget by a third and fired outspoken arms control advocates.


110. Ibid., 123.

111. The Ford/Mitre study was considered Carter's "Bible" on nuclear matters.
Ford Foundation Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group and Mitre Corporation Re-
Wholstetter's report is described by a former ACDA director as the work that "revolutionized
the thinking in the U.S. (and in other countries as well), leading the way to the
radical new departure in U.S. nonproliferation policy." Fred Charles Ikle, "Foreword,"
in Albert Wholstetter, *Swords from Plowshares: The Military Potential of Civilian Nuclear


113. The NNPA also contained an important escape clause that allowed the
president, subject to congressional veto, to waive certain requirements.


115. Horst Mendershausen, *Europe's Changing Energy Relations* (Santa Monica,
Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1976), 45; cited by Gloria Duffy in "The Soviet Union
and Nuclear Drift," 27.

Daily* (24 May 1977): 2; cited by Gloria Duffy in "The Soviet Union and Nuclear
Drift," 35.

117. V. Mikhailov, "Battles Over Deal of the Century," *Pravda* (17 April 1977);

118. *Socialisticheskaya Industria*; cited by Shirin Tahir-Kelly, "Pakistan's Nuclear

Drift," 36.


122. Interview material, New Delhi, December 1988.

123. Management as a nonproliferation approach is discussed by Jed Snyder,


125. "Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy," President's Statement, July 19, 1981,
Department of State Bulletin 81 (September 1981): 60-61.

126. Janne E. Nolan, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: The Limits of

127. Interview material, New Delhi, November 1989.

128. Secretary of State Haig's letter to Senator Percy is cited in *Security and
Development Assistance*, Senate Hearing 100-361, Part 2, 70.
129. Interview material, New Delhi, January 1990.


NOTES


3. Even before the successful test at Alamogordo, Truman had been impressed by James Byrne's belief that "the bomb might well put us in a position to dictate our own terms at the end of the war." Harry Truman, *Year of Decisions* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), 87.

4. Theories about learning typically argue that major changes in belief systems can occur only during a crisis, but crisis is often defined as a period in which major change occurs. This is a tautology. Kuhn's work suffers from a similar problem. He argues that paradigm shifts occur only during crises of normal science, but he offers no consistent and independent definition of what constitutes a crisis. (Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 82-86.) A major goal of this essay is to propose an independent definition of crisis. I argue that learning can occur only when its criteria are fulfilled.


9. David Holloway, *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 28 and 31. There was in fact some reconsideration of doctrine within the military before 1953, but this was effectively squelched by Stalin.


12. For contending historical arguments about Korea, see Roger Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War," and Rosemary Foot, "Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict," *International Security* 13:3 (Winter 1988-89). Dulles's bravado notwithstanding, the evidence that Eisenhower's implicit nuclear threat was instrumental in the Chinese and North Korean decision to stop stalling at the Panmunjom truce talks was and remains extremely weak. On the Soviet side, it is notable that Khrushchev's atomic diplomacy threats were typically made after the
climax of the Suez and Berlin crises, when the shape of the eventual resolution had already become clear. They may have thus been more for the consumption of domestic actors and Communist allies than serious attempts to coerce the West.

13. To repeat: the evidence of the previous decade suggested that while central deterrence might be comparatively robust, extended deterrence in Europe was potentially tenuous. When it came to compellence or coercive diplomacy, nuclear weapons appeared to be strikingly impotent.


15. Thomas Schelling, whose name I will use as a label for the strategic model that this group constructed, was the exemplary member; others included Morton Kaplan, Glenn Snyder, Daniel Ellsberg, and Malcolm Hoag.


17. As is now well known, U.S. nuclear employment policy (i.e., how weapons would actually be used in war) never changed as fully as did declaratory doctrine or policy. Nonetheless, the shift to a declaratory policy that emphasized assured destruction criteria did substantially affect targeting plans, as well as budget and procurement decisions for nuclear forces. For a recent review, see Scott Sagan, *Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 26–39.

18. Deborah Welch Larson, at the author’s conference preceding this volume, made the important point that we must be careful to exclude an alternative explanation based on rationalizing behavior: when situationally induced changes in behavior precede and cause a change in belief systems. This argument would contend that U.S. decision makers, faced with an expanding Soviet arsenal and growing domestic constraints on their ability to expend the resources necessary to maintain a lead in nuclear weapons, created a new set of ideas to rationalize a fated reality, the development of parity. History does not support this alternative explanation. The ideas that made up the new strategic model go back in time to the early 1960s; by 1964 they were the subject of serious debate in circles of government. Parity, however, did not come until the end of the decade or the beginning of the next. While parity was anticipated much earlier than that, it was by no means a predetermined event over which the United States had no control.

19. Both measures would have been expensive and would have required at the very least a substantial redistribution of resources within the federal budget. This would have been politically difficult but hardly impossible. Economic and domestic political constraints on U.S. defense programs, real though they were, were not so inviolable that a determined administration could not have dismantled or bypassed them. Certainly the constraints were at least as great in the late 1970s, but they did not then prevent a concerted and at least partially successful effort by American elites to influence public perceptions of what was necessary and appropriate to do for America’s nuclear security.
20. At least when it came to conflicts or issues involving other nuclear powers.

21. Historians of the crisis disagree on this point, but there is considerable evidence to suggest that Kennedy was apt to continue this course of moderate action even after the weekend of October 27, 1962, despite his warning to Khrushchev that the crisis must be resolved in short order. Even though he reports that members of the executive committee of the National Security Council seemed to fear that events were starting to slip out of their control, McGeorge Bundy agrees with Alexander George's argument that Kennedy would not have ordered an air strike or an invasion early in the next week so long as other options remained open to him. Bundy, Danger and Survival, 426–27; Alexander George, David Hall, and William Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), 128–29.

22. On Saturday evening, Kennedy took Dean Rusk's suggestion that they make use of Andrew Cordier (of Columbia University and a former deputy to U Thant) to propose to the United Nations secretary general that he appeal for an open trade, which the United States would then accept. See Rusk's letter quoted in James G. Blight, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and David A. Welch, "The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited," Foreign Affairs (Fall 1987): 179. The fact that Kennedy laid the foundation for an open trade does not necessarily mean he would have chosen this option had push come to shove, but it is at least as plausible as the other option he had instructed McNamara to prepare—an air strike. For a similar argument, see Bundy, Danger and Survival, 435.


25. See Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chapter 12. I will return to Kuhn and discuss further implications of this model in the Conclusion.

26. This is analogous to Kuhn's argument about the importance of what he calls the scientific aesthetic attached to contending paradigms. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 72–73 and 158.

27. Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, 40.


30. Despite considerable and growing public sentiment against ABMs in the United States, the Soviets could hardly rely on U.S. domestic politics to stop the race.
Interactive Learning in U.S.–Soviet Arms Control


32. Paul Nitze, Dean Acheson, and Albert Wohlstetter, founders of the Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy, were particularly important proponents of the alternative view. There were many others, although this remained a minority viewpoint in Washington in 1972 and for at least several years thereafter. See Robert Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1973), 201.

33. At the Moscow press conference following the treaty signing ceremony in May 1972, Chief U.S. negotiator Gerard Smith claimed "a commitment on [the Soviets'] part not to build any more of these ICBMs that have concerned us," reflecting what he and others believed to be a shared "recognition that the deterrent forces of both sides are not going to be challenged." White House Press Release, 26 May 1972, in Documents on Disarmament 1972, 210 and 212. Smith's optimism reflected a widespread sentiment among U.S. decision makers. See U.S. Senate, Armed Services Committee, Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missiles and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1972.

34. The first explicit indications actually came earlier, in April 1972, when Soviet negotiators told their U.S. counterparts in private conversation that Moscow was about to test a new large ICBM. This was later confirmed by reports by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). See New York Times, 23 April 1972, 1.

35. For details on the experience of the SCC, see Robert W. Buchheim and Philip J. Farley, "The US–Soviet Standing Consultative Commission," in Alexander George, Philip Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds., US–Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons (New York: Oxford, 1988), 254–70; Sidney Graybeal and Michael Krepon, "Making Better Use of the Standing Consultative Commission," International Security (Fall 1985). One of the more important and influential channels for informal communication, the Committee for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC), was set up under the auspices of the two countries' Academies of Science. Many of the prominent scientists who took part in the meetings of this and other groups had good access to top decision makers in Washington. Under Gorbachev, Soviet defense scientists, some of whom have close ties to their Western counterparts, seem to be achieving similar access.


38. This is not to say that if strategic models had changed, they would have necessarily done so in a convergent rather than a divergent direction. In fact, given the continuing low level of interactive learning, divergence seems equally likely.

40. Leonid Brezhnev in particular seems to have found it hard to understand why the Americans were surprised by his ICBM program. He seems to have believed for a time that the rumblings in Washington were the insidious work of incorrigible imperialist warmongers dedicated to overthrowing SALT and détente and intimidating the Soviets. Ted Hopf, "Soviet Decisions to Intervene," Chapter 16 in this volume.

41. Other sources of evidence include significant remodeling of the structure of Soviet decision making for defense. Blacker (Chapter 12 in this volume) points to concrete changes in personnel and in the institutions that make decisions for arms control and defense policy. He also describes the revamping of rhetoric and negotiating behavior that has emerged from the emended system.


43. I assume for the sake of argument here that the model has indeed been finally selected and is well along in the process of being institutionalized. Blacker (Chapter 12 in this volume) shows evidence of changes in personnel and decision-making structures that support this assumption. However, I am not fully convinced that the model has been fully institutionalized or that the Soviets’ critical learning period of the 1980s has come to a close. A crucial test may come if the new strategic model is forced to accommodate adaptations that will have to be made if the United States does not respond as predicted. Washington has so far been recalcitrant in the face of unusual Soviet efforts. After the INF treaty, the two sides have made substantial progress toward a START accord, a bilateral chemical weapons treaty, and a broad agreement to limit conventional forces in Europe under the CFE arrangement. If these agreements do not come to fruition, and if the Soviets are still in the midst of a critical learning period, we might expect to see an alternative strategic model replace the current one in Moscow. If the critical learning period were over and the model fully institutionalized, then adaptation would be the predicted response. In that case, the Soviets would not jettison their general goals, but would instead develop new tactics to try to bring the Americans along.

44. This came as a surprise to Stalin, who seems to have feared that the United States might try to capitalize on its nuclear advantage far more aggressively than it did. Similarly, Herman Kahn and other influential Americans in the 1950s predicted that the Soviets would become far more aggressive as they moved toward and possibly beyond nuclear parity with the United States. A December 1960 review of American security policy prepared for the incoming Kennedy administration, NSC 6013, argued that "as the Soviet nuclear ballistic missile . . . capabilities grow, the element of pressure and threat will probably become more pronounced in communist dealings with the rest of the world. In their continual probing of the strength and determination of the West they will be more aggressive. . . ." Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assis-
tant for National Security Affairs, Special Assistant Series, Presidential Subseries, Box 5.

45. That solution need not be the perfect solution of joint maximization of profits. In fact, except under special conditions that clearly do not hold in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, it will not be. U.S.-Soviet arms control, like most cases of oligopolistic competition, is not then expected to produce an optimal outcome. However, the outcome is expected to tend toward some equilibrium, which Fellner calls qualified joint maximization. See William Fellner, Competition Among the Few: Oligopoly and Similar Market Structures (New York: Knopf, 1949), 33–36.

46. For contending arguments, see Herbert F. York with Ashton B. Carter, Does Strategic Defense Breed Offense? (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1987). For an illustration of how this controversy was played out in Washington under the Reagan administration, see Talbott, Master of the Game, 200–6 and 367.

47. Fellner, Competition Among the Few, 32–33 and 43.

48. I discuss this issue and why it has been so at length in Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control.

49. For those who think of U.S.-Soviet arms control as an international regime, this failure should be particularly troublesome. One of the most important functions of a regime, according to Keohane, is to facilitate states' efforts to develop compatible adaptations or adjustments to changes in the environment. Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), Chapter 6. Although developments in weapons technology have been an important and persistent source of challenges, technology poses new problems for any regime and the U.S.-Soviet arms control regime has been remarkably unsuccessful in this area. Environmental shocks from other aspects of the superpower relationship have also intruded on arms control (the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, for example), but the putative regime has dealt poorly with these as well.

50. Unless one is willing to accept the tautology that what states do is, by definition, to seek power. This begs the question. How do decision makers define power at any given time? What resources are relevant? What is the contribution of nuclear weapons?

51. Conventionalization, as this is sometimes called, has in fact been a remarkably weak trend in thinking about nuclear weapons and arms control.

52. This is an observation based on only two historical cases. There is no logical reason that new ideas and new strategic models could not be built during a critical learning period, except that there may not be time to do so during the heat of crisis. Instead, top decision makers tend to draw on the menu of ideas that others have been working on and thinking through during the interim.

53. Again, I draw this argument from Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, especially Chapters 7, 8, 12.

54. Talbott (Master of the Game, Chapters 11–14) provides a wealth of anecdotes that show that this line of adaptation was already well established in Washington during the second Reagan administration, and that it gained considerable strength from the INF “success.” The Bush administration, at least in its early months, seems to have carried on with a similar approach. An example: after having secured agreement in principle on a 50 percent reduction in Soviet SS-18 deployments, the administration at the urging of national security adviser Brent Scowcroft
aimed to push the Soviet Union toward a total ban on these missiles. *New York Times*, 16 April 1989, 1).

55. This may be particularly important in the Soviet Union, where military institutions appear to have been the most persistent advocates of the old strategic model. Not surprisingly, military thinkers have also been the group involved in arms control most consistently isolated from contact with the West.
But that still leaves us searching for a statement of the requisites of strong institutionalization. Since almost all governmental learning in which we are interested is bound to be incomplete, we want to know how varied leadership strategies and capacities may determine whether instances of incomplete governmental learning are sufficient to sustain and expand support for a strategy of cooperation.

NOTES


5. The distinction between "positive cooperation" that goes beyond "negative cooperation based on shared aversions" is Steven Weber's.


14. One exception noted by Garrett was the U.S.-Soviet discussions of 1963-1964 regarding possible joint action against Chinese nuclear facilities, which were clearly based on limited but intense shared aversions.

What Have We Learned About Learning?


19. To this point, this paragraph is based on a personal communication from my colleague, Steven Weber.

20. Similar qualifications are not required regarding the Asian theatre, where a looser conception of spheres of influence and balancing requirements prevailed within the administration until the Korean War.


22. Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution."


30. Another way to state this point is to argue the possibility for multiple equilibria—a range of possible solutions to the problem of biopoly, many of which could be stable (personal communication from Steven Weber).


32. My thanks to Philip Tetlock (personal communication) for the observations in this paragraph.


34. Alexander L. George, "Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Need for Policy Legitimacy," in *Change in the International System,*

35. Recall that Richard Neustadt [Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), 10] argued that "Presidential power is the power to persuade"; also, that John Kennedy, after learning of Soviet missiles in Cuba, exclaimed, "How could he do that to me!"

36. The distinction between cognitive and normative dimensions of legitimation is from George, "Domestic Constraints on Regime Change."


38. In an unstable authoritarian regime, in which military coups regularly bring to power people with differing perspectives from those they overthrew, it would violate common sense to refer to this as governmental learning. However, the authority-building framework I propose is relevant to U.S. and Soviet politics since Stalin, when in both states a nonautocratic political process has been sufficiently institutionalized that a continuing debate over ideas and principles has taken place. Discrediting of the assumptions underlying the cold war paradigm has therefore required a continuing struggle, not just over interests but also over ideas. Political successions in both countries have provided contexts in which these debates have intensified. And while it is not possible to conclude that debates over foreign policy have decided political successions, they have certainly contributed to deciding the foreign policy agendas of successful insurgent elites.

39. "International Leverage on Soviet Domestic Change," World Politics (October 1989). Snyder argues that the impact of U.S. pressure or conciliation will depend on whether a liberal or an imperial coalition is in power in Moscow. Snyder describes all such coalitions in the post-Stalin era as "weakly institutionalized."