Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Post–Soviet Societies
Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Post–Soviet Societies

An Investigation of Latvia and Kazakhstan

EDITED BY
Pål Kolstø
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Preface

This book is based on the research project "Integration and nation-building in bi-cultural post-Soviet societies, the cases of Latvia and Kazakhstan," which was financed by The Norwegian Research Council, Programme for Eastern Europe, Project no. 110191/730. The team has consisted of two Norwegians, project coordinator Pål Kolstø, University of Oslo, and Jørn Holm-Hansen, the Norwegian Institute of Regional and Urban Research; two Latvians, Aina Antane, Institute of History, Latvian Academy of Sciences, and Boris Tsilevich from the independent research institute Baltic Insight; and one Kazakstani, Irina Malkova from the Giller Institute in Almaty. At a later stage Hans O. Melberg was included in the team.

We present the report as a unified whole, not a collection of papers on related topics. The project was conceived in a fruitful dialogue among the research collaborators and we have all contributed with important inputs to the over-all scheme. The chapters are nevertheless signed by the person(s) who wrote them and we are responsible for each our own parts. The Latvian and Kazakstani contributions have been translated from Russian by the editor.

In compliance with the wishes of Kazakhstan's political authorities we use the official spelling of the republic's name, i.e. Kazakhstan, throughout the book (quotations excepted), rather than the more conventional "Kazakhstan." In line with this, we spell the attendant ethnonym thus: Kazak(s).

The book could never have been written without the invaluable support from our two outstanding project assistants, Solveig Rossebø and Hans Olav Melberg. We also would like to thank the following persons for having taken the time and effort to read and comment upon several chapters, sometimes even the entire book: Aadne Aasland, Shirin Akiner, Olga Brusina, Juris Dreifelds, David Laitin, Hans Olav Melberg, Aleksej Semenov, Graham Smith, Anton Steen and Øyvind Østerud. Many of the comments we received were extremely useful and helped us redo the original manuscript into a more coherent and, we believe, better book. Needless to say, the inconsistencies and shortcomings that remain are entirely our own responsibility.

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Aims and Aspirations

Pål Kolstø

Following the demise of Communism, fifteen new states were established in the former Soviet Union. A "state," however, in the full sense of the word, does not come about simply by political proclamation of independence, still not by international recognition. A modern state must have control of its frontiers, a monopoly of coercive powers on its territory, be able to collect levies and taxes, and so on. To carry out these tasks a modicum of administrative apparatus is needed, as well as a broad consensus in society concerning rules and routines for how the jobs shall be done.

In the fall of 1991 these preconditions were generally not fulfilled in any of the Soviet successor states. The armed forces on their territories and the levers of economic policy were beyond the control of the new state authorities. There were also no border defense systems, indeed, state borders were not even delineated in the terrain.

In this book, we will leave aside the economic and security problems of the new states and instead focus on some crucial political and cultural issues, "nation-building" as distinct from "state-building." In order to keep a state together in the modern world, it is essential that its population have a common identity and a shared feeling of common destiny. The citizens must be bound together by loyalty toward the same institutions, symbols, and values. This does not imply that all inhabitants of the state must partake in the same ethnic identity. National identity may, and in many cases must, be political rather than cultural.

The USSR prided itself on being a "multinational state," indeed, some hundred different ethnic groups were registered as living in its territory. In contrast, with the exception of Russia, all of the successor
states have been proclaimed as "national states" or "nation-states." This basic concept can have (at least) two very different meanings. In the West, the dominant understanding is that of a political and civic entity, in which the nation is delineated on the basis of common territory, common government, and, to some extent, common political history. There exists, however, a rival concept of a nation as a cultural entity, based on common language, traditions, mores, and religion, in short: an ethnic nation.

In a civic nation-building project the authorities will try to secure the political loyalty of all inhabitants without encroaching upon their cultural distinctiveness. Political rights are extended to all inhabitants on an equal footing. Political traditions and symbols common to all ethnic groups are cultivated, or, if necessary, created from scratch. One of the shortcomings of this strategy is the weaker emotive power of supraethnic symbols. They may easily be dismissed as artefacts, which, of course, in a sense they are. Nevertheless, large population groups in multiethnic societies may develop a double set of identities: Politically, they are proud of being citizens of this or that particular state; culturally, they identify strongly with their own ethnic group.

In ethnic nation-building the symbols and traditions of the state are identified with the symbols and traditions of the titular nation. The state authorities try to bring about a maximum correspondence between the ethnic and political nation. The preferred methods are outmigration of the minorities and/or their exclusion from political decision-making. In principle, border revisions transferring minority-inhabited regions to neighboring countries could also lead to greater cultural homogeneity of the state, but few if any nation-builders will gladly countenance a truncation of the state territory.

From a demographic point of view all Soviet successor states, with the exception of Armenia, must be characterized as "multiethnic." In the cases of Latvia and Kazakstan, however, even this description is rather misleading. In these states we do not find one dominant titular nationality surrounded by numerous ethnic minorities but basically two cultures, both of which are held together by a common language of in-group communication: the culture of the indigenous ("titular") group, and the Russophone culture. In both Latvia and Kazakstan the "Russophones" comprise between forty and fifty percent of the total population – depending on the criteria used for definition.

Donald Horowitz distinguishes between two basic types of multi-ethnic states, centralized and dispersed. In dispersed systems, such as Tanzania, there are a number of major ethnic groups, none of which are able to dominate the others. Ethnic conflicts in such states usually take place in the periphery of the system, while the center may be able to
pose as an impartial arbiter, elevated above particular group interests. Ethnic tensions in such societies may be severe, but they do not involve competition for control of the state or threaten its existence. "In such circumstances, the center usually has some flexibility. The demands of one group can sometimes be granted without injuring the interests of others." 1

In centrally focused ethnic systems in Horowitz' typology, on the other hand, basically two cultural groups are confronting each other. Both of them may have a fair chance of securing control of the state apparatus. To the extent that politics are polarized along ethnic lines, pace Horowitz, such states are inherently unstable constructions:

A centrally focused system possesses fewer cleavages than a dispersed system, but those it possesses run through the whole society and are of greater magnitude. When conflict occurs, the center has little latitude to placate some groups without antagonizing others. Conflict is not easily compartmentalized, and problems cannot be dealt with one at a time; they involve the whole state.

The degree to which a system is either dispersed or centralized is a function of group size to state size. For a centralized system, the ratio of 1:2 represents the extreme case.

Horowitz points out that when we determine the size of the various groups we should not be misled by objective indicators of ethnic group identity.

Group size in many cases depends on the ability of subgroups to forge a common identity. This, in turn, depends heavily on perceived similarities among subgroups vis-à-vis other groups they confront. Given the dependence of group identity on felt distance from other groups, it is not surprising that states with large groups relative to state size have often experienced intensely hostile relations among the groups.

Classical examples of states where such an ethnodemographic structure has led to savage bloodshed and even to the total collapse of state order, are Rwanda, Burundi, and Sri Lanka.

The country which perhaps most closely fits Horowitz' typology is India. In fact, this subcontinent might be said to illustrate both of his ideal types in consecutive order, first as a highly volatile centralized system, second as a dispersed system in which ethnic violence has been on the whole containable. On the eve of independence the British crown colony of India was bitterly polarized along religio-cultural lines—Muslim vs. Hindu. The departure of the colonial power

1 Horowitz 1985, 38.
unleashed communal violence of horrendous proportions. After 1949, on the other hand, "rump"-India has been a motley ethnonational mosaic with numerous crosscutting cleavages. There are multiple potential and actual trouble spots, and, while blood has certainly been shed, the violence has never approached the dimensions of the partition turmoil, even remotely. Thus, the higher the number of trouble spots, the less trouble, or so it might seem.

In ethnodemographic, structural terms Latvia and Kazakhstan fit Horowitz' definition of a centrally focused ethnic system. In these states, the Latvians, respectively the Kazaks, were an officially recognized category in the Soviet ethnic taxonomy, and continue to be so today. This is not the case with the other major cultural group in these countries, the Russophones. However, as I will argue in the next chapter, they fulfill Horowitz' criterion of a composite group with a high degree of perceived similarities among subgroups vis-à-vis other groups within the same territory.

As Timothy Sisk has pointed out, dire predictions of a steady slide into anarchy in multinational states have in many cases not been borne out. Since ethnic conflict does not always lead to violence Sisk suggests that we should try to identify the specific circumstances under which it is likely to happen. In particular, he points to three kinds of circumstances that are pertinent to our study. Firstly, he agrees with Horowitz that "dual societies," such as Rwanda or Sri Lanka, in which two ethnic groups compete for power in a zero-sum game, are especially intractable. Second, times of transition (both in the international system and in states) may be particularly perilous: In such periods ethnic relations "can deteriorate into intractable warfare at an unexpectedly precipitous rate."2 Finally, "the expropriation of the symbols, power, and resources of the state to the exclusion of significant components of the population in multiethnic societies is a strong indicator of the likelihood of ethnic violence."3

If this analysis is correct these circumstances should lead us to expect a high level of ethnically motivated violence in both Latvia and Kazakhstan. The rapid collapse of the Soviet state and communist system would seem to be the paradigmatic case of a transition period. Moreover, in both countries the titular group—the Latvians and the Kazaks—have, as we shall soon demonstrate, to a remarkable degree succeeded in appropriating political power for themselves and molding the symbols of the state around their own ethnic traditions and values.

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3 Ibid., 18.
Thus, it would not be amiss to expect a veritable carnage as the most likely outcome of transition politics in both Latvia and Kazakhstan.

Indeed, in both of these countries ethnic issues have played a very important role in politics since independence. At the same time, however, both states have so far, to a remarkably high degree, been spared the communal violence which has erupted in many other Soviet successor states. Unlike most other states with a centrally focused ethnic system and in contrast also to most other post-Communist countries of Eastern Europe, Latvia has faced no ethnic conflicts entailing violence since the very beginning of "Atmoda," the national revival during perestroika.

Similarly, in spite of the riots in Alma-Ata in December 1986, the leaders of Kazakhstan have been able to portray their country as an oasis of stability in the otherwise very volatile Asian part of the former Soviet Union. Official Kazakstani propaganda tries to foster a common supraethnic, civic Kazakstani identity among all citizens. Nevertheless, the tensions between the two major cultural-linguistic groups in both countries remain acute.

Stated very simply, the aim of this book is to explain the failure of "the Horowitz thesis," to name it thus for the sake of brevity, to be borne out—even under "Sisk circumstances" in Latvia and Kazakhstan since independence. This failure—or perhaps it is only an apparent failure—may be explained in different ways: These countries may be the exceptions that prove the rule; they may not yet have reached the point where the dynamics required by the Horowitz thesis are set in motion; or the thesis, as summarized here, may indeed be in need of some modification.

Although we take Horowitz' seminal book as our starting point, we will not necessarily follow its multifaceted methodology in the execution of our task. Instead, we will draw on a wide variety of theoretical and methodological sources concerned with either nation-building and/or ethnic integration. Nation-building and ethnic integration we regard as two separate but interrelated and overlapping aspects of ethnic politics in new multiethnic states.

Rather than "centrally focused systems" we will use the term "bipolar societies" to designate the type of societal structures we find in Latvia and Kazakhstan. This term is preferred also by certain other researchers who have analyzed ethnic politics in societies with a

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4 A detailed Western report recognizes that rivalry between Russians and Kazaks played some role in triggering "the December events," but generally downplays the ethnic aspect. See Conflict in the Soviet Union, 1990, 4.
similar demographic structure. "Bipolar" societies, as we define this concept, is a subcategory, a narrower term than "biculural," another term which may be encountered in the research literature. As used in this book "bipolar societies" have two basic characteristics: First, there are two, clearly distinguishable, major sociocultural groups in society, not more nor less; second, these two groups are demographically of roughly equal size.

The number of states in the world that fall into this category is relatively small. In our opinion, in the former Soviet Union only two states—Latvia and Kazakstan—qualify. Moldova and Estonia, for instance, where the titular nationality makes up approximately two-thirds of the total population, fall outside our purview. By this narrowing down of criteria for "bipolar societies," we believe, we will be testing "the Horowitz thesis" at its strongest point.

To be sure, there are significant differences between Latvia and Kazakstan. While the former is a small country, the size of Ireland, with no more than 2.5 million inhabitants, the latter covers a territory as large as Western Europe, with a population of more than 18 million. In Latvia, the titular nation are Europeans who tend to see the Russians as bearers of a more Eastern, "Asian" culture than themselves. In Kazakstan, by contrast, the Russophones are regularly referred to as "the Europeans." The linguistic preconditions for interethnic intercourse are also very different in the two countries: Russians in Kazakstan are today learning Kazak almost from scratch—0.9 percent claiming fluency in the 1989 census—while in that same census as many as 22 percent of the Russians in Latvia claimed to be fluent in Latvian.

Finally, since Latvia enjoyed political independence in the interwar period, nation-building in this country from the outset enjoys a source of legitimacy which Kazakstan is lacking. The recent statehood also means that in this state ethnic issues have to a large extent been commingled with the citizenship issue and with the need to redress the effects of the Soviet occupation in a way that has no parallel in Kazakstan. However, precisely this combination of important similarities and dissimilarities between the two cases makes, we believe, a comparison of Latvia and Kazakstan a potentially fruitful endeavor.

5 In particular, Milne 1981.
6 They are, however, the subject of a follow-up study to this book which has been ongoing throughout 1997 and 1998, involving two Estonian, two Moldovan and two Norwegian researchers. This new study is also comparative and focuses on the preconditions for ethnic conflict, or the absence thereof, in culturally heterogeneous countries.
7 Data on bilingualism in the Soviet Union are subject to many problems of interpretation. The census-takers asked only about "fluency," (svobodno), while command of the local language on a more modest level was not recorded. See, e.g., Tishkov 1997, 85–98.
In both Latvia and Kazakstan "integration" is a key concept in the official state strategy to eliminate the bipolarization of society and to ease ethnic tensions. This policy is regarded both as a safeguard of domestic stability and as a precondition for the democratic development of the state. However, the conceptual understanding of different varieties of integration—on the level of political leadership and among the populace at large—is far from transparent. The state authorities regularly complain that the Russians resist integration. It is frequently asserted that as members of a "great culture" the Russians consider it demeaning to them to be integrated into such a small culture as the Latvian or into such a young and undeveloped culture as that of the Kazaks. Many Russophones, however, insist that the absence, or slow speed, of integration is primarily due to the obstacles their integration efforts are met with from the side of the state authorities and from the members of the titular group.

Obviously, the key concept of "integration" is implicitly imbued with very different meanings by the protagonists. Vello Pettai has remarked that "For some, it may be a positive agenda for developing ethnic harmony and coexistence. For others it may seem a euphemism for assimilating a vulnerable minority population into a newly-dominant ethnopolitical order." Generally speaking the idea of "integration" seems to be far less popular among the general populace than among the political elite. This is apparently true of titulars and nontitulars alike. An elderly Latvian woman quoted in The Baltic Times in May 1998 claimed that "Integration is a utopian idea," while a speaker at a Russophone rally in Riga in the same month accused the authorities of lying: "When they say integration, what they really mean is assimilation."

Indeed, while the integration of national minorities in states with a clearly dominant culture would seem to be a feasible endeavor, in theory at least, it is far less clear what integration could or should mean in bipolar societies. Does it mean the integration of one culture into the other, or the mutual integration of both cultures? Does it imply cultural integration or primarily integration into social and political structures? To what extent will the Russophones in Latvia/Kazakstan have to distance themselves from the culture / the state of their "historical fatherland" (Russia, Ukraine, etc.) in order to be truly integrated into their present country of residence? Could it be true (as many of the minorities claim), that the retention of strong cultural links to the

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8 For Kazakstan, see, e.g., Nazarbaev 1994; Baitenova 1995a. For Latvia, see Pettai 1996.
9 Pettai 1996, 49.
"historical fatherland" is a precondition for their successful political and social integration? These crucial issues are still covered under thick clouds of rhetoric and conceptual confusion in most of the former Soviet Union.

Anticipating the more detailed and technical discussion below, I will here offer a brief outline of our own understanding of ethnic integration. Drawing upon a typology elaborated by R.A. Schermerhorn we see integration as a process involving, in principle, two actors: a superordinate and a subordinate group. Within the subordinate group some individuals may want to be accepted as full-fledged members of the superordinate (dominant) group and be totally immersed in it, while others may want to hold on to their separate identity, their separate social structure, and, in general, their own traditional way of life.

The sum of individual aspirations within a group Schermerhorn calls its "modal tendency." This tendency may be pointing toward the center of society, toward increased group involvement in the larger society, and/or a gradual eradication of cultural differences in the population. The modal tendency may also be centrifugal, pointing away from the center of society, toward autonomy (cultural and/or political), or, in extreme cases, full separation (secession).

However, it takes two to dance a tango, and the goals of the subordinate group may be frustrated by the actions and attitudes of the dominant group. Integration is brought about when a centripetal modal tendency within the subordinate group is met by acceptance in the dominant group and is facilitated (or at least not impeded) by the nation-building and ethnic policies of the state authorities.

**Levels of Analysis**

The processes of integration and nation-building in Latvia and Kazakhstan are in this book analyzed on two different levels (political integration and social integration), each of which is divided into various sublevels.

**Political Integration**

*Level of Political Discourse.* On this level we analyze official pronouncements outlining the attitudes of the authorities toward ethnic

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11 See p. 52-54.
12 Schermerhorn 1970, 81ff.
Aims and Aspirations

integration and their understanding of this concept. We try to track down the usages of the word "integration" and related key concepts (such as "mono-communal state," odnoobshchinoe gosudarstvo) among the various actors, including the academic community of nationality experts in each country.

Legislative Level. Here, we focus on the passing of legal and sublegal acts (laws, decrees, ordinances, regulations, statutes, etc.) defining and affecting the nontitular ethnic groups. Methodologically it is important to keep 1a and 1b apart since they may (though need not) conflict with each other. In some cases, harsh political rhetoric may be intended for "internal consumption," that is, to show that the authorities are not "soft on minorities," in order to make nationalists among the titular group more willing to accept a reasonably liberal minority legislation. Conversely, liberal political language may be used as a screen to cover a multitude of legislative and administrative misdeeds vis-à-vis the minorities.

Operationally, on this level we are concerned with content analysis of relevant political pronouncements and official texts, as well as with "context analysis" of the same, by examining law-implementation practices and the sociopolitical background of political statements. Our sources are the mass media in both countries (primarily printed media) in addition to official bulletins, parliamentary proceedings, and the like.

Participatory and Representative Levels. A good indicator of actual, as opposed to declared or intended, political integration is the number of representatives from minority groups in parliaments, elected offices, and state administrations. Such representation is the combined result of several factors. On the one hand, it is a product of the political activity/passivity of the minorities themselves. If they decide to remain aloof from politics and do not to make use of the ballot box and other vehicles to promote their candidates, they will most likely have few spokespersons in the corridors of power.

However, the levels of minority representation may also be actively influenced by the state authorities. Even in formally democratic states the authorities may be engaged in deliberate gerrymandering of minority involvement in politics. Such manipulation may in principle take two courses: it may be intended both to boost and to reduce the involvement of the minorities. Open and covert mechanisms may be set in motion to lower the political participation of the minorities, or to make it less effective. The electoral system may be designed in such a way that it deliberately reduces the representation of parties supporting minority interests. Or, as was the case in the Soviet Union, the ethnic minorities may be secured an almost mathematically exact representation in
the putatively highest organs of state power, but these organs are effectively emasculated. The real loci of power are other institutions, over which members of the superordinate group have complete control.

However, the state authorities may instead conclude that it is in their own interest to have the leaders of the minority communities on the inside. They may open up various channels of information from these groups into the government by means of round tables, consultative minority councils, etc. Through cooption minority leaders may also become coresponsible for austerity programs and other unpopular policies.

At the same time, a high political visibility of persons with a minority background may simply be a matter of tokenism. Individuals who do not enjoy the support or even the respect of the ethnic communities they hail from, are hand-picked to unimportant positions at the top. This latter strategy may well be combined with schemes for the deliberate sidelining of popularly acknowledged minority leaders.

The legal preconditions for participatory and representative integration in Kazakhstan and Latvia are very different. While Latvia after independence restricted the citizenship rights of post-World War II immigrants, Kazakhstan adopted the so-called zero option of citizenship, according to which all permanent residents in the territory of the state were recognized as original citizens and officially given full political rights. Thus, the preconditions for political participation in this country, one would think, should be better than in Latvia.

However, the political representation of the non-titular population also in Kazakhstan is considerably lower than their share of the total population. Apparently, the Russians are either uninterested in politics, or they are deliberately and actively excluded from the political structures by informal mechanisms of exclusion. A combination of these two explanations is also possible.

**Social Integration**

Below the levels of legislation and political rhetoric, social processes of integration—or of increased bipolarization—are taking place. These processes are to some extent influenced by political developments, but may also operate by their own dynamics quite independent of them, and, in turn, determine the preconditions of the ethnopolitical discourse. These social processes are complex and sometimes contradictory. In our analysis we isolate two aspects and target them for particular scrutiny.

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13 See the sub-chapter on representative organs in chapter 5.
**Attitudinal Integration.** At this level we have tried to identify typical attitudes of the two cultural groups toward each other as well as their reciprocal stereotype perceptions (hetero-stereotypes). Do they see their relationship as one of dominance/subordination, or as nonhegemonial? What kind of characteristics and qualities do they ascribe to each other? Are the local Russians and other Russophones regarded as different from Russians in Russia, or are they all of the same kind? If the local Russians are considered to possess any characteristic traits, what are these traits?

Furthermore, we tried to find out to what degree the various groups feel emotionally attached to their country of residence. Do they identify with its titular culture? Have they developed any sense of pride in or patriotism toward this new—or newly restored—political creation? Or do they perhaps regard another country as their motherland? In the latter case, their political orientation must be characterized as strongly centrifugal.

We engaged a public opinion research institute in each country to carry out surveys among a large number of respondents. The responses we received indicated that on some issues there are significant and sometimes unexpected (to our team at least) differences in attitudes and stereotype ethnic perceptions between the two countries as well as among the various respective population groups in each of them.

**Linguistic Integration.** Our respondents were questioned not only about their attitudes and opinions but also about their actual life stories. In particular, we were interested to find out if there were any signs of a shift in school choices in the two countries, from Russian schools to schools offering education in the titular language. In order to detect intergenerational shifts we asked first what kind of school the parents had been educated at and then what kind of schools the children were sent to.

In the communist period, Russian was the preferred medium of instruction in the Soviet Union, but during perestroika the language of the titular ethnic group was proclaimed the state language in all Soviet republics. To various degrees this has raised the social prestige of the language. Ambitious students, we expect, will gravitate toward schools offering education in the language that will best promote their career chances.

At the outset, we assumed that a high degree of mutual bilingualism would foster increased integration. Indeed, this is also the official rationale behind the strong pressures put on the Russophones in both countries to learn Latvian/Kazak. Nevertheless, in spite of growing willingness on the side of the minorities to learn Latvian, Russophones have found it hard to gain entrance into Latvian-language schools.
Officially, this is said to be due to financial problems ("these schools are already overcrowded"), but it also seems to reflect widespread fears among Latvians that ethnically mixed schools will sharpen ethnic tensions among the youth. This, it is asserted, was often the result of mixed schooling in the Soviet period. At other times it is claimed that if large numbers of Russian kids are let into Latvian classes, the cultural integration will go in the "wrong" direction: the Latvian pupils will adapt more to the lifestyle of their Russian classmates than the other way around.\(^\text{14}\)

In Kazakhstan, so far, the only group which has shown any inclination to switch from education in Russian to the titular language is the linguistically Russified ethnic Kazaks, and even in this group, as will be shown below, the tendency is weak. To the degree that this tendency will be enhanced in the future and no other groups follow suit, an increase in Kazak-language education will, paradoxically, lead to increased linguistic bipolarization rather than to the creation, or strengthening, of a common cultural space in this country.

In the concluding chapter of the book Latvia and Kazakhstan are compared with each other with regard to the nation-building policies pursued by their respective governments and with regard to the effects these policies have on the population. The course of ethnic politics in these countries is also measured against various conceptual frameworks for analysis of ethnic and civic nation-building. Two of the most common models to be identified by sociologists and political scientists are "consociationalism" and "ethnic democracy." Both of these models are briefly outlined and their applicability to Kazakhstan and Latvia is discussed.

Ethnopolitical relations in Latvia and Kazakhstan are very much in a state of flux. Their resemblance to this or that theoretical model may therefore be of a transient nature. In our study we have tried not to analyze these relations as a fixed and rigid system, but rather isolate and determine important factors influencing the direction in which these relations are developing.

Also, our two cases are compared with ethnopolitical strategies in bipolar states in other parts of the world. In 1981 R.S. Milne published a comparative study of politics in three ethnically bipolar states—Guyana, Malaysia, and Fiji.\(^\text{15}\) In each of these countries there are basically two ethnocultural groups confronting each other, Africans vs. Indians in Guyana, Malays vs. Chinese in Malaysia, and Fijis vs. Indians in Fiji. Of these, the Malays and the Fijis are autochthonous while all

\(^{14}\) Author's interviews in Riga, May 1995.

\(^{15}\) Milne 1981.
the rest are immigrant communities. However, in Guyana the Africans immigrated (or rather, were moved there) earlier than the Indians, and are considered somehow more "settled." In each state the indigenous ethnic group (or in the Guyanian case, the oldest immigrant group) has been able to establish what amounts to a relatively stable political hegemony, in spite of the fact that, at the time when Milne was writing, none of them constituted a numerical majority.

Milne agrees with Horowitz that "in general, ethnically bipolar situations may be likely to produce cleavages which will lead to more intense ethnic competition and result in more undesirable political consequences than those arising from ethnic divisions which are not bipolar, unless appropriate action is taken by political leaders to prevent this." The latter part of the sentence is emphasized in the original and is, of course, an important qualification. As a matter of fact, while both Guyana and Malaysia experienced ethnic violence in the 1960s, and, to a smaller extent in the 1970s, it is generally fair to say that, in all of these three countries, the danger of ethnic turmoil has been contained. Hence, neither do these states offer strong support for the Horowitz thesis.

The typologies of both Horowitz and Schermerhorn are basically structuralist, focusing on demographic and social structures. Such structures are undeniably important and are indeed subjected to detailed analysis also in this book. However, it is important to point out that while such structures place definite constraints on the freedom of action of the elites, structures by themselves do not predetermine actions or political outcomes.

It would be foolhardy to make predictions on the future of stability and democracy in multiethnic states on the basis of their degree of bipolarity alone. William J. Foltz supports the thesis that "in general terms there seems no reason to disagree with the assumption that open conflict between only two parties rigidly divided along multiple lines of cleavage, including the ethnic, is the most likely to be violent, to evoke total emotional commitment, and to produce radical structural change..." However, Foltz also points out that a purely structural analysis will tend to use the same arguments to explain instability as it would do to explain the persistence of stability during the period before the instability broke out.

Thus, an analysis of cultural cleavages can serve only as a starting point. Of crucial importance are the political strategies that the state authorities design to cope with these cultural patterns and how the

16 Ibid., 7-8.
17 Foltz 1974, 108.
population reacts to these policies. Two major chapters in the book give a comprehensive presentation and analysis of the ethnopolitical development in Latvia and Kazakhstan since independence.

We certainly do not believe that our book has "settled" or "solved" the issues of nation-building and integration in either Latvia or Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, we think that it may contribute to a long-needed clarification of these crucial questions which may also be of immediate benefit to the members of these societies. On the theoretical level we believe that our findings may contribute to a better understanding of ethnosocial processes in bipolar societies in general.
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