US Nuclear Weapons Policy after the Cold War

This book offers an in-depth examination of America’s nuclear weapons policy since the end of the Cold War.

Exploring nuclear forces structure, arms control, regional planning and the weapons production complex, the volume identifies competing sets of ideas about nuclear weapons and domestic political constraints on major shifts in policy. It provides a detailed analysis of the complex evolution of policy, the factors affecting policy formulation, competing understandings of the role of nuclear weapons in US national security discourse, and the likely future direction of policy. The book argues that US policy has not proceeded in a linear, rational and internally consistent direction, and that it entered a second post-Cold War phase under President George W. Bush. However, domestic political processes and lack of political and military interest in America’s nuclear forces have constrained major shifts in nuclear weapons policy.

This book will be of much interest to students of US foreign policy, nuclear proliferation, strategic studies and IR in general.

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1 Nuclear Proliferation and International Security
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For Scarlett, a joy.
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Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank his wonderful wife Sally, Professor Paul Rogers for his unswerving support, the Economic and Social Research Council for funding the doctoral research on which this book is based, the many people that facilitated the research, those that took time out of busy schedules to be interviewed, Andrew Humphrys at Taylor & Francis and the extraordinary wealth of knowledge, ideas and support at the Department of Peace Studies at Bradford University.
### Acronyms

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<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACDA</td>
<td>Arms Control and Disarmament Agency</td>
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<td>ACI</td>
<td>Advanced Concepts Initiative</td>
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<td>ACM</td>
<td>Advanced Cruise Missile</td>
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<td>ALCM</td>
<td>Air-Launched Cruise Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATSD(NBC)</td>
<td>Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs</td>
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<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>C4ISR</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance</td>
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<td>CPI</td>
<td>Counterproliferation Initiative</td>
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<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<td>DNA</td>
<td>Defense Nuclear Agency</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DOE</td>
<td>Department of Energy</td>
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<td>DSB</td>
<td>Defense Science Board</td>
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<td>Defense Special Weapons Agency</td>
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<td>Defense Threat Reduction Agency</td>
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<td>GAO</td>
<td>General Accounting Office</td>
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<td>GLCM</td>
<td>Ground Launched Cruise Missile</td>
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<td>GPALS</td>
<td>Global Protection Against Limited Strikes</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDBT</td>
<td>Hard and Deeply Buried Target</td>
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<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>INF</td>
<td>Intermediate Nuclear Forces</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>LANL</td>
<td>Los Alamos National Laboratory</td>
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<td>LLNL</td>
<td>Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIRV</td>
<td>Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicle</td>
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<td>NAS</td>
<td>National Academy of Sciences</td>
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<td>National Missile Defense</td>
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<td>National Nuclear Security Administration</td>
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<td>NPR</td>
<td>Nuclear Posture Review</td>
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<td>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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Acronyms

NSA  Negative Security Assurance
NSPD  National Security Presidential Directive
NSS  National Security Strategy
NWC  Nuclear Weapons Council
OSD  Office of the Secretary of Defense
PDD  Presidential Decision Directive
PLYWD  Precision Low Yield Weapon Design
PNET  Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
PNI  Presidential Nuclear Initiatives
PPBE  Programming Planning Budgeting and Execution system
QDR  Quadrennial Defense Review
RNEP  Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator
SAC  Strategic Air Command
SALT  Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SDI  Strategic Defense Initiative
SIOP  Single Integrated Operations Plan
SLBM  Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
SNDV  Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle
SORT  Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
SSBN  Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear (nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine)
SSP  Stockpile Stewardship Program
START  Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
STRATCOM  Strategic Command
SWPS  Strategic Warfare Planning System
TLAM-N  Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-Nuclear
TMD  Theater Missile Defense
TTBT  Threshold Test Ban Treaty
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction
XON  Air Force Directorate for Nuclear and Counter-proliferation
Introduction

Deep into the post-Cold War era the perceived threats from nuclear weapons continue to dominate international security. Nuclear-fuelled hostility between India and Pakistan, North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons programme, modernisation of nuclear weapons by America, Britain, Russia, France and China, and the potential for acts of catastrophic nuclear terrorism regularly grab the headlines.

In the late 1960s a bargain was struck between the countries that had already acquired nuclear weapons and those that had not and enshrined in the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). At the time the five states that had already developed nuclear weapons (the nuclear weapon states (NWS): the USA, USSR, China, France and Britain), agreed to assist non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) in exploiting civilian uses of nuclear technology. In exchange each NNWS agreed to conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure that any nuclear technology acquired would not be diverted to a military programme and agreed never to acquire nuclear weapons. The NWS agreed not to provide any country with military nuclear technology or actual nuclear weapons and agreed to pursue negotiations to end the Cold War nuclear arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament.

The NPT therefore provided a framework to order the nuclear weapons world and prevent a disorderly and destabilising spread of nuclear weapons. The NPT is the only agreement in which the NWS agree to work towards nuclear disarmament and in which the nearly all the other countries agree not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons of their own. Only Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea remain outside the NPT, all of which possess nuclear weapons. Discussion about nuclear proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the nuclear policies and actions of NWS generally takes place within the context of the NPT and the bargain struck in 1968.

Nuclear weapons in general and America’s nuclear weapons policy in particular evoke passionate responses. For some, nuclear weapons are ethically and morally abhorrent. As nuclear weapons proliferate so too do the risks of a crisis escalating into a devastating nuclear conflict through accident or miscalculation. There is a powerful sense that America is the only state with the military, economic and political power to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in
international security and move the international community towards greater control and reduction of nuclear arsenals. Since America played a lead role in developing the NPT and imposing a degree of order on an increasingly fractious nuclear world it is incumbent upon America to lead the international community towards nuclear disarmament.¹ For others, nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence have brought stability to major power relations by making the costs of large-scale war unthinkably high. They cannot be disinvited and it is essential that America prevent so-called ‘rogue’ states and terrorist organisations from acquiring nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) whilst maintaining its own credible nuclear forces to deter regional ‘rogue’ aggression.

In the early 1990s the prospect of rapid progress towards very low levels of nuclear armaments seemed a realistic goal, but nearly two decades since the end of the Cold War arms race nuclear weapons remain an enduring feature of American national security strategy. As the House of Representatives Republican Policy Committee stated in 2003, ‘nuclear weapons and deterrence remain as relevant today as they were at the height of the Cold War’.²

In the late 1990s and early 2000s a series of events made it clear that American nuclear weapons policy was in transition with no easily discernible long-term sense of direction. The post-Cold War nuclear arms reduction process with Russia ground to a halt in Clinton’s second term and the Republican-controlled Senate refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1999 for party political as well as genuine national security reasons. The Bush administration’s 2001 Nuclear Posture Review appeared to take nuclear weapons policy in a new and potentially destabilising direction and its withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty in 2002 evoked a chorus of disapproval and dire predictions of a new global nuclear arms race from the arms control community. Important questions began to be asked about the long-term direction of nuclear weapons policy, the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy, the continuing relevance of the bargain struck in 1968 and the nuclear arms control process with Russia.

The primary aim of this book is to discern that sense of direction through a detailed examination of America’s nuclear weapons policy since the end of the Cold War from 1990 to 2007. It aims to provide a thorough understanding of the complex evolution of policy, the factors affecting policy formulation, the role and perception of nuclear weapons in American national security discourse, and the likely medium- to long-term direction of policy.

The book is based on a detailed and systematic analysis of official statements and reports and analysis of the wider discourse on nuclear weapons policy. It employs a broad definition of policy to include declaratory nuclear policy, operational nuclear policy, strategic threat perceptions, force structure, the nuclear weapons production complex, and nuclear arms control. Use of a broad definition of nuclear weapons policy is supported by General George Lee Butler who, as head of US Strategic Command, stated in 1993 that nuclear weapons policy should be informed by ‘a rigorous assessment of the complex interaction among force posture, arms control entitlements and constraints, funding requirements
and targeting directives.\textsuperscript{3} It is also supported by Leon Sloss who argued in 2001 that the subjects of nuclear deterrence, missile defence, nuclear weapons, the production complex, and arms control could no longer be considered separately but should be addressed within a framework that examines the ‘total nuclear posture’.\textsuperscript{4}

The research draws on a variety of sources including public statements by a range of senior officials, influential members of Congress and military leaders involved in different aspects of nuclear weapons policy; official reports from a number of government departments and agencies; and academic analysis and opinion from leading journals, books, and reports by independent research organisations. These are complemented by a series of off-the-record interviews conducted in 2005 and 2006 with current or former government officials and independent experts that have been involved in American nuclear weapons policy-making or have studied it in detail for many years. Despite the broad scope of the research it does not examine American policy explicitly covering non-strategic nuclear forces, American nuclear defence commitments to allies, nuclear non-proliferation policy, non-nuclear arms control policies, or missile defence policy and plans. In addition it does not examine in detail the nuclear and WMD policies and programmes of other states.

American nuclear weapons policy has often been explained as a necessary and rational response to the imperatives of an anarchic international political system. This reflects the ‘realist’ school of international political theory that has dominated American academia and policy-making since the Second World War. This book takes a different approach by adopting a critical analytical framework. It argues that both material factors, such as weapons, and non-material factors, such as identities, interests, collectively held beliefs, the meanings assigned to issues and events, and shared understandings of what constitutes appropriate behaviour, must be examined in order to provide as complete an understanding of an issue as possible. It argues that what constitutes the accepted ‘reality’ of an issue is generally a social construction. This ‘reality’ is produced and reproduced through the actions and interpretations of those involved in the issue. In this context the relationship between knowledge and political power is crucial, in particular the power to shape the debate around an issue by including and therefore legitimising particular ideas, concepts, interests, collective understandings and meanings and excluding others.

This approach views ‘normal’ understandings, meanings, and ways of interpreting events and behaving appropriately as generally a function of the political power of a particular set of ideas that has been institutionalised into political power structures. It argues that a full understanding of an issue requires critical questioning of what is often taken for granted as a natural order. In this context the idea of a ‘correct’ nuclear weapons policy as an objective, rational response to an external and objectively knowable international environment is rejected. It is instead something that is constructed and reproduced through collective understandings and practices.\textsuperscript{5}
When examining American nuclear weapons policy it is therefore important to problematise the dominant interpretations of the concepts on which nuclear weapons policy is founded and the meanings of nuclear weapons for policymakers. This requires detailed examination of the nuclear weapons policy discourse and the dominant sets of ideas within that discourse. This involves exploring different interpretations of national security interests and identity in the context of nuclear weapons; understandings of nuclear deterrence, arms control and strategic threats; and the meanings assigned to material factors such as Russia’s nuclear arsenal and the state of the nuclear weapons production complex. It also requires examination of the domestic political context in which the discourse is located by exploring the bureaucratic practices, procedures, and rules that affect nuclear weapons policy.

This book therefore does not attempt to ‘prove’ the validity of one particular version of nuclear weapons policy as the single, correct and rational approach. The aim, instead, is to understand how and why nuclear weapons policy has evolved in the manner that it has and its likely future direction.

Three core propositions emerge from this research. First, policy has not proceeded in a linear, rational and internally consistent direction since the end of the Cold War. It has instead been subject to the relative political power of competing and often contradictory sets of ideas about nuclear weapons policy whose effect on policy is a function of domestic political processes. Second, policy has entered a second post-Cold War phase under President George W. Bush. A series of shifts in different aspects of nuclear weapons policy throughout the 1990s were institutionalised and supplemented under George W. Bush to constitute this new phase. Third, domestic political processes have constrained major shifts in nuclear weapons policy since the end of the Cold War. Bureaucratic politics and organisational processes have deeply affected policy outcomes, the institutionalisation of competing sets of ideas about nuclear weapons policy, and the salience of nuclear weapons policy in American national security strategy as a whole.

The book begins with a concise description of the processes and people involved in making nuclear weapons policy in the Department of Defense, Congress and armed services. The second chapter provides a brief analysis of American nuclear weapons policy as the Cold War drew to a close in the late 1980s.

Chapter 3 examines policy under George H. W. Bush, in particular nuclear arms reductions under the START process and Presidential Nuclear Initiatives; scepticism about Soviet/Russian political and economic reforms and nuclear modernisation; confrontation with Congress on nuclear testing and force modernisation; major problems with the nuclear weapons production complex; and the beginning of a reorientation of nuclear weapons policy away from the Soviet Union/Russia and towards the emerging class of WMD-armed ‘rogue’ states. Chapter 4 examines policy under Bill Clinton, including the considerable problems with the START process, the outcomes of the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, modernisation and consolidation of strategic nuclear forces, the fierce debate over a comprehensive nuclear test ban, nuclear planning for regional
Introduction

WMD-armed adversaries and continuing problems with the production complex. Chapter 5 examines policy under George W. Bush, including the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, a decisive shift towards regional nuclear planning, the 2002 Moscow Treaty and ‘new strategic framework’ with Russia, and the controversial Reliable Replacement Warhead and Complex-2030 programmes to address enduring concerns about the production complex and the massive nuclear warhead life extension programme.

Chapter 6 identifies the key post-Cold War trends that have defined the evolution of policy. Chapter 7 identifies and examines three competing nuclear weapons ‘policies’, or idea sets, within the nuclear weapons policy discourse that reflect key decisions, trends and debates. They are described as: Management – managing the drawdown of Cold War nuclear forces; Restraint – responding to nuclear proliferation through progress in nuclear arms control and steps towards nuclear disarmament; and War-fighting – responding to nuclear proliferation by re-orienting Cold War nuclear weapons policy to a post-Cold War regional war-fighting policy. Chapter 8 places this framework of competing sets of ideas in the context of domestic politics, in particular the constraints on policy change that stem from domestic political factors. These include the absence of a broad political consensus on nuclear weapons policy and a major reduction in senior-level political and military interest in American nuclear weapons over the post-Cold War period. The final chapter presents a number of policy conclusions and discusses what the future is likely to hold for America’s nuclear weapons.
Notes

Introduction

4 Sloss is a national security consultant who spent 20 years as a government official serving in the Bureau of the Budget, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and directed a major study on American nuclear strategy in 1978. He has written frequently on nuclear weapons policy. Sloss, L. (2001), ‘Deterrence, Defenses, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control’, *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 20, no. 5, pp. 435, 439.

1 The policy-making process

Notes


16 Slocombe, *Democratic Control of Nuclear Weapons*, p. 21.


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36 Ibid. p. 176.


2 American nuclear weapons policy at the end of the Cold War


Alarmist estimates claimed the USSR would soon have 2,500 ICBMs and would be able to destroy 95 per cent of the US ICBM fleet in a first-strike. Schwartzman, *Games of Chicken*, p. 111.


In 1984 the Senate refused to appropriate funds for anti-satellite weapons development and passed an amendment calling for the President to attempt to gain ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and to resume negotiations for a CTBT. Powaski, *Return to Armageddon*, pp. 45, 247.


### 3 Nuclear weapons policy under George H. W. Bush


11 Powaski, Return to Armageddon, p. 102.
15 Arbatov, ‘We Could Have Done Better’.
16 Powaski, Return to Armageddon, p. 149.
18 Powaski, Return to Armageddon, p. 124.


Representative Lee Hamilton maintained that ‘the most astonishing aspect of the President’s initiative is his call for a unilateral reduction of U.S. armaments. In one stroke, he scrapped much of the now obsolete nuclear doctrine and Cold War thinking of the past four decades. He has paved the way for a new approach’. Hamilton, L. (1991), ‘The President’s Arms Control Speech’, Congressional Record (Extension of Remarks), 9 October 1991, p. E3331.


Arkin and Norris, ‘Nuclear Notebook’, (December 1991); Frank Miller, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and a career bureaucrat centrally involved in nuclear weapons policy, interviewed in (2005), U.S. Strategic Nuclear
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55 Ball and Toth, ‘Revising the SIOP’, p. 85.


68 Powaski, *Return to Armageddon*, p. 86.


82 Cooper, Testimony of Henry F. Cooper, 7 May 1991.


Albright, Zamora and Lewis, ‘Turn off Rocky Flats’.


4 Nuclear weapons policy under Bill Clinton


38 Perry, \textit{Annual Report to the President and the Congress}.
50 Maintaining nuclear forces at START II levels would require substantial investment to replace ageing strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Moscow’s preference was to move immediately to START III levels of 1,500–2,000 warheads, well below


66 *U.S. Commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, Department of State.


72 *History of the United States Strategic Command*, Strategic Command, p. 49.


78 For an outline of the issues to be negotiated under a START III see Mendelsohn, ‘The Current and Future US-Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agenda’.


Perry, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*.


118 Kaminski, ‘Sustaining the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent in the 21st Century’.


121 Ibid., p. 9.
129 *U.S. Commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, Department of State.
130 Cerniello, ‘Clinton Issues New Guidelines’.


150 By mid-1993 Russia and France had announced testing moratoria and Britain was dependent upon America’s Nevada Test Site.


155 Clinton, ‘The President’s Radio Address, July 3, 1993’.


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Clinton, W. J. (1998), ‘Remarks at Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico, 3 February 1998’, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 34, no. 6, pp. 175–225, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. CTBT safeguards were: continuation of a robust science-based SSP; maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programmes to attract and retain nuclear weapons expertise; maintenance of the basic capability to resume nuclear tests if needed; continuation of a comprehensive programme to improve CTBT monitoring capabilities, operations and intelligence on global nuclear weapons programmes; an annual stockpile certification process embodied in domestic law; and acceptance that the President, in consultation with Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT to conduct whatever testing might be required if a major problem arose with the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type that the Secretaries of Defense and Energy consider to be critical to the nuclear arsenal. Clinton, W. J. (1997), ‘Message to the Senate Transmitting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and Documentation, 22 September 1997’, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 33, no. 39, pp. 1371–1429, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.


193 Smith, *Testimony by Dr. Harold P. Smith*, p. 196.


201 ‘Nuclear Weapons: Key Nuclear Weapons Component Issues are Unresolved’, pp. 2–4.


206 Spence, F. (1994), ‘The Clinton Administration and Nuclear Weapons Policy: Benign Neglect or Erosion by Design?’ *Congressional Record (House of Represent-
See statements by Senators Thurmond and Kempthorne in *Briefing on the Results of the Nuclear Posture Review*, pp. 3–5.


*Notes*

207 See statements by Senators Thurmond and Kempthorne in *Briefing on the Results of the Nuclear Posture Review*, pp. 3–5.


5 Nuclear weapons policy under George W. Bush

1 These issues are explored further in chapter 7.
16 Cartwright, J. (2004), *Advance Questions for Lieutenant General James E. Cartwright for Commander, United States Strategic Command*, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 8 July 2004, Government Printing Office,


18 Rumsfeld, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, chapter 7.


22 *Nuclear Posture Review (Excerpts)*, p. 16.


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30 Rumsfeld, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, chapter 7.
46 Payne, Rationale and Requirements.
47 These include Stephen Hadley, later Deputy National Security Advisor; Robert
Joseph, later Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Proliferation Strategy, Counter-proliferation and Homeland Defense in the National Security Council; Stephen Cambone, later Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense; William Schneider, later chairman of the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board and a member of the State Department’s Defense Trade Advisory Group; and Ambassador Linton Brooks, later Administrator of NNSA and Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security.

49 Crouch, Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review; Nuclear Posture Review (Excerpts), p. 29.
50 ‘National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction’.
51 Myers, R. B. (2003), Posture Statement of General Richard B. Myers, USAF Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Hearing before the House Committee on Armed Services, 5 February 2003, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
56 ‘Joint Doctrine for Nuclear Operations (draft)’, Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. III-2.
60 Ellis, Testimony of Adm. James O. Ellis, 8 April 2003, p. 9.
64 ‘Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Future Strategic Strike Forces’, p. 5.11. See also arguments in favour of conventionally-armed ICBMs in
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83 Sokolsky, ‘Demystifying the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review’.


96 Nuclear Posture Review (Excerpts).


99 Ibid.; Brooks, ‘Beyond the War on Terrorism’.


Brooks, ‘Beyond the War on Terrorism’.


Cartwright, Advance Questions, 8 July 2004.


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Rumsfeld, Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with Finnish Newspaper.


Krepon, Cooperative Threat Reduction, Missile Defense and the Nuclear Future, p. 43.


On the missile threat and the administration’s missile defence programmes see Ibid.


Nuclear Posture Review (Excerpts).


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216 Beckner, Testimony of Dr. Everett Beckner, 10 April 2002.


218 Beckner, Testimony of Dr. Everett Beckner, 10 April 2002.


‘Complex 2030: An Infrastructure Planning’.


(2007), ‘National Security and Nuclear Weapons: Maintaining Deterrence in the


246 Overskei, Testimony of Dr. David O. Overskei, 4 April 2006.


250 Overskei, Testimony of Dr. David O. Overskei, 4 April 2006.


253 ‘Interim report of the Feasibility and Implementation of the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program’, p. 3.


262 Ibid. p. 9.


272 Ibid., pp. 4–5.


281 Ibid., ‘The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program’, p. 32.


285 ‘Interim report of the Feasibility and Implementation of the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program’,

286 Medalia ‘Nuclear Warheads: The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program and the Life Extension Program’, p. 3.


6 Post-Cold War trends in nuclear weapons policy


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17 Lawrence, ‘Strategic Beliefs, Mythology and Imagery’, in Little and Smith, *Belief Systems and International Relations*, p. 143.

18 Ibid., p. 145.


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Garrity ‘The Depreciation of Nuclear Weapons in International Politics’, p. 484.


Bohlen, ‘The Rise and Fall of Arms Control’, p. 28.

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70 Lodal, *The Price of Dominance*, p. 35.


80 Walt, ‘Two Cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Policy’, p. 78.


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87 Payne, *Rationale and Requirements*.


92 Gompert, ‘Rethinking the Role of Nuclear Weapons’, pp. 5–6.


108 Payne, *Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age*, 149.


110 Hurst, ‘Myths of Neo-Conservatism’; Krauthammer, *Democratic Realism*.


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129 Goodby, ‘Can Arms Control Survive Peace?’, p. 100.
130 Lawrence, ‘Strategic Beliefs, Mythology and Imagery’ in Little and Smith, Belief Systems and International Relations, pp. 156–59.
135 Ibid., p. 216.

8 Domestic politics and nuclear weapons policy

5 Ibid., p. 89.
6 Allison, Essence of Decision.
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14 Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory, p. 77.
20 Allison, Essence of Decision; Newmann, Managing National Security Policy, p. 20.
30 Jefferies, ‘Bureaucratic Politics in the Department of Defense’ in Kozak and Keagle, Bureaucratic Politics and National Security, p. 120.
31 Jordan, Mazarr, et al., American National Security, p. 120.
32 Newmann, Managing National Security Policy, p. 53; Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis, p. 91.
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38 Newmann, Managing National Security Policy, p. 22.

39 Ibid., p. 29.


41 Newmann, Managing National Security Policy, p. 156.


46 Ibid., pp. 40, 51.

47 Interview with former DOD official involved in nuclear weapons policy, November 2006.


49 Nolan, An Elusive Consensus, p. 103.


52 See also (2005), U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy: An Oral History (Unclassified DVD), Albuquerque, NM, Sandia National Laboratories, disk 4, chapter 3.


55 This view was shared by a number of interviewees.


58 Interview with academic expert on American nuclear weapons policy, Maryland, September 2006.

59 Interview with senior Department of Energy official in the G. W. Bush administration, September 2006. See also Representative Ellen Tauscher in (2005), ‘Session
61 Interview with senior aide to Representative involved in nuclear weapons policy in Congress, September 2006; interview with senior Department of Defense official in the Clinton administration, October 2006.
63 See Stephen Schwartz in ‘Session on Congress and Nuclear Weapons’.
65 Interview with senior Department of Energy official in the George W. Bush administration, September 2006; interview with independent expert on American nuclear weapons policy, October 2006.
66 Interview with senior Department of Defense official in the Clinton administration, September 2006; interview with former Senator involved in nuclear weapons policy, October 2006.
68 Interview with State department official in the George W. Bush administration, September 2006.
70 Interview with senior Strategic Command official in the Clinton administration, September 2006.
77 Interview with senior Department of Defense official in the Clinton administration, October 2006.

80 Interview with former DOD official involved in nuclear weapons policy, October 2006.


84 Ibid., p. 15.


92 Interview with senior Department of Energy official in the George W. Bush administration, September 2006.

93 Interview with DOD official involved in nuclear weapons policy, October 2006.


99 Ibid., p. 99.


101 Ibid., p. 105.

Conclusion


3 This view was expressed by a number of interviewees. Interview with DOD official involved in nuclear weapons policy, October 2006; interview with independent expert on US nuclear weapons policy, October 2006; telephone interview with independent expert on nuclear weapons policy, October 2006; Interview with senior Department of Energy official in the George W. Bush administration, September 2006.


6 This point was made by Halperin in ibid.

7 Rebecca Johnson, Stephen Pullinger and Nicola Butler make this point in the context of the British government’s decision to renew its Trident nuclear arsenal in Worse than


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