This new volume provides the first thorough examination of the involvement of peace enforcement soldiers in the detention of indicted war criminals.

The book first addresses why peace enforcement missions need to be involved in detaining indicted war criminals. This discussion includes an analysis of how the securing of justice and transitional justice is incorporated into the UN’s approach to peace-building. It also explores IFOR’s, SFOR’s and KFOR’s activities in this regard, before turning to an analysis of how these detentions are incorporated into peace enforcement doctrines, mandates and rules of engagement. The book then outlines the mechanisms that need to be established in order to enable peace enforcers to arrest war criminals effectively in the areas where they are deployed. It concludes with a discussion of the prospects for the involvement of peace enforcement soldiers in the detention of indicted war criminals, and of the lessons future peace enforcement missions can learn from the experience of IFOR, SFOR and KFOR.

This book will be of much interest to students of peace operations, war crimes and humanitarian law, transitional justice and IR/Security Studies in general.

Majbritt Lyck was formerly a lecturer in the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford. She has a PhD in Conflict Resolution from the University of Bradford.
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Peace Operations and International Criminal Justice
Building peace after mass atrocities

Majbritt Lyck
## Contents

*Acknowledgements*  xi  
*List of abbreviations*  xii  

Introduction  1  

### PART I  
**Peace missions, global order and transitional justice**  9  

1 Peace missions and global order  11  
2 Peace missions and transitional justice  22  

### PART II  
**UN peace missions’ involvement in securing justice and transitional justice**  35  

3 UN peace missions, peace-building and justice  37  
4 UN peace missions, peace-building and transitional justice  70  

### PART III  
**The experiences of IFOR, SFOR and KFOR**  93  

5 IFOR and the detention of indicted war criminals  95  
6 SFOR and the detention of indicted war criminals  104  
7 KFOR and the detention of indicted war criminals  119
PART IV
Preparing, authorising and ensuring the detention of indicted war criminals

8 Preparing peace enforcement soldiers for detaining indicted war criminals: incorporating the detention of indicted war criminals into the military doctrines of peace enforcement missions

9 Authorising peace enforcement soldiers to detain indicted war criminals: incorporating the detention of indicted war criminals into the mandate and rules of engagement

10 Ensuring the detention of indicted war criminals: improving the practices of peace enforcement missions aiming at detaining indicted war criminals

PART V
Peace missions and politics

11 Peace missions: peace, justice and politics

PART VI
Assisting peace enforcement missions in the apprehension of indicted war criminals

12 Peace enforcement soldiers cannot do it alone: involving international institutions and organisations and the local population in locating indicted war criminals

13 Peace enforcement soldiers cannot do it alone: involving international and local agencies in apprehending indicted war criminals

Conclusion

Notes
Bibliography
Index
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Abbreviations

AI  Amnesty International
AU  African Union
CIVPOL  civilian police
DDR  disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DPA  Dayton Peace Agreement
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMOG  Military Observer Group of the Economic Community of West African States
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
EU  European Union
EUFOR  European Union Force
EUPM  European Union Police Mission
FRY  Former Republic of Yugoslavia
HQ  headquarters
HRW  Human Rights Watch
ICC  International Criminal Court
ICG  International Crisis Group
ICTR  International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY  International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IFOR  Implementation Force
IPTF  International Police Task Force
ISAF  International Security Assistance Force
KFOR  Kosovo Force
KPS  Kosovo Police Service
MICIVIH  International Civilian Mission in Haiti
MINOPUH  United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
MINUGUA  United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
MINUSTAH  United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MND  multinational division
MNF  multinational force
MONUA  United Nations Observer Mission in Angola
MONUC  United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSU</td>
<td>Multinational Specialised Unit</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NATO SG</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Secretary General</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>ONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Congo</td>
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<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
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<td>ONUSAL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador</td>
</tr>
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<td>SC-SL</td>
<td>Special Court for Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilisation Force</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda</td>
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<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>UNAVEM I</td>
<td>United Nations Angola Verification Mission I</td>
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<td>UNAVEM III</td>
<td>United Nations Angola Verification Mission III</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</td>
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<td>UNMIBH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
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<td>UNMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>UNMISET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor</td>
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<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia II</td>
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<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UNSG</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary General</td>
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<td>UNSMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Support Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAES</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium</td>
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<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
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<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group</td>
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<td>UNTMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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Introduction

In the end of 2007 in her final speech to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) the outgoing Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Carla Del Ponte reiterated her disappointment at not having been able to bring the former political leader Radovan Karadžić and the former military commander Ratko Mladić to justice (Del Ponte 10 December 2007). The ICTY was established in 1993 in order to help ensure accountability for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed during the violent conflict in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia, which was seen as a precondition for establishing sustainable peace in the area. Two years after its establishment Richard Goldstone, who was the Prosecutor of the ICTY at the time, indicted Karadžic and Mladic, accusing them of bearing the main responsibility for some of the worst atrocities committed during the violent conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite being on top of the ICTY’s most wanted list, the two men remain at large twelve years after their indictments were announced and they are far from the only indicted war criminals who have managed to stay at large after indictment by the ICTY. Especially in the beginning, this failure to arrest individuals sought for prosecution seriously threatened the tribunal’s prospects for success. Even ten years after the establishment of the ICTY, sixteen men in addition to Mladic and Karadzic were still at large (President of the ICTY 2003). The failure to arrest Karadžic, Mladic and other indicted war criminals has exposed the Achilles’ heel of international criminal tribunals, namely their current dependence on the cooperation of national and international authorities outside their control to carry out vital tasks such as arrests. In contrast to national courts, the ICTY like other international criminal tribunals, does not have its own police force to carry out the arrest warrants that it issues. Instead the initial idea was that national authorities in the states where the indicted war criminals were residing would be responsible for their arrest and transfer to the ICTY. However, it soon became apparent that not all national authorities were eager to provide that kind of assistance. Whereas the national authorities in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been fairly cooperative, the national authorities in Republika Srpska, the mainly Serb part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, have refused to carry out any requests for arrests despite strong criticism for their inaction on numerous occasions (President of the
ICTY, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004). Hence, it soon became clear that, unless alternative arrangements were made, the areas in which national authorities refused to cooperate would be safe havens for indicted war criminals. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina a possible alternative solution was to request the peace enforcement mission deployed in the country at the time to carry out the arrest warrants. The peace enforcement mission consisted of the UN-led United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH), which was in charge of implementing the civilian parts of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) and the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR), which was responsible for assisting the national authorities in implementing the military parts of the DPA. Thus the Prosecutor of the ICTY began to pass on arrest warrants to IFOR, requesting that the peace enforcement soldiers detain the individuals indicted by the ICTY (President of the ICTY 1996). However, although 60,000 IFOR soldiers were deployed all over Bosnia-Herzegovina, they never managed to detain a single indicted war criminal. IFOR’s successor, the similarly NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR), did eventually manage to detain some indicted war criminals but, throughout SFOR’s mission, others remained at large within SFOR’s area of operation despite the presence of thousands of international soldiers. The lack of detentions led actors such as the Prosecutor of the ICTY and human rights organisations to heavily criticise the peace enforcement missions for not doing enough to detain indicted war criminals on numerous occasions.

In Kosovo soldiers from the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) who had been deployed in 1999 in order to help the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) administrate the province, were also eventually requested to assist the ICTY with detaining the indicted individuals. KFOR soldiers were more successful than their colleagues in Bosnia-Herzegovina since they managed to secure custody of three out of the four individuals that they had been requested to detain. However, the Prosecutor of the ICTY still criticised KFOR for having allowed the fourth indicted war criminal to pass unhindered through an airport that the soldiers guarded before escaping to Slovenia.

Though the lack of detentions of indicted war criminals has been one of the most serious threats to the ICTY’s successful prosecution of these individuals and despite the many controversies surrounding the involvement of IFOR, SFOR and KFOR in such detentions, extensively addressed in the international media, remarkably few studies and analyses have focused on the involvement of peace enforcement missions in this matter. So far only a few studies have focused on the legality of employing peace enforcement soldiers to detain indicted war criminals and a few other studies have analysed and assessed IFOR’s and SFOR’s activities aimed at detentions. This paucity of studies on the question is especially problematic because the International Criminal Court (ICC), established in 2002 in order to ensure accountability for atrocities committed during violent conflict, now faces the same problem. The ICC has issued arrest warrants against individuals who are allegedly responsible for mass atrocities committed in Sudan but so far the Sudanese national authorities have
refused to carry out the detention warrants. Hence, in order to ensure the arrest of these individuals, soldiers from the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) or from the new joint African Union/UN operation in Darfur (UNAMID) may have to detain the fugitives. Similarly, it is also not unlikely that soldiers from the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) will become involved in detaining individuals indicted by the ICC. Hence a thorough analysis of the issue of the involvement of peace enforcement missions in the detention of indicted war criminals is imminent and that is what this book sets out to provide. The book addresses why these missions need to be involved in the detention process. It also analyses the incorporation of measures to ensure justice and transitional justice into the UN’s approach to peace-building. Furthermore it analyses IFOR’s, SFOR’s and KFOR’s activities aimed at detaining indicted war criminals before turning to an analysis of the incorporation of detention operations into peace enforcement doctrines, mandates and rules of engagement. The book also discusses what practices peace enforcement missions should implement and what training the soldiers should receive in order to be able to detain indicted war criminals successfully. In addition it also debates some of the political considerations concerning involving peace enforcement soldiers in these detentions before addressing which actors should assist the soldiers in apprehending indicted war criminals. Finally, the book examines the prospects of the involvement of peace enforcement soldiers in the detention of indicted war criminals and the lessons future peace enforcement missions can learn from the experience of IFOR, SFOR and KFOR.

The book is partly based on interviews with senior military officers from SFOR and KFOR and senior police officers from UNMIK that the author conducted in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2003. In order to ensure the anonymity of the interviewees they will just be referred to as SFOR, KFOR and UNMIK interviews respectively.

**Definition of key concepts**

The key concepts of this book are defined as follows:

**humane law** Serves as a generic term for human rights law and humanitarian law. Mary Kaldor recommends that human rights law be combined with humanitarian law because the distinction between human rights law that is generally applicable in times of peace and humanitarian law that is applicable in times of war is not suitable in the context of contemporary violent conflict, since these conflicts have eradicated the line between peace and war. She also pointed out that violations of humanitarian law are at the same time often violations of human rights. See Kaldor 2001: 116.

**indicted war criminal** Used to refer to an individual who has been indicted by an international criminal tribunal.

**justice** Refers to efforts aiming at securing accountability for crimes committed after the violent conflict has officially ended.
peace enforcement mission  Used to describe a peace mission with a Chapter VII of the UN Charter mandate that allows the mission to employ force not only in strict self-defence but also in order to defend its mandate.

peace mission  Applies generically to all UN authorised missions regardless of whether the missions have been established on the basis of Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

transitional justice  Refers to efforts aimed at addressing mass atrocities committed during the violent conflict including not only prosecution in order to ensure individual accountability but also alternative mechanisms such as truth and reconciliation processes, vetting programmes and reparations.

Structure of the book

Part I: peace missions, global order and transitional justice

The two chapters in Part I focus on the two main reasons why peace missions should be involved in detaining indicted war criminals.

The first reason why international peace missions need to be involved in these detentions is that it will assist in the enforcement of humane law that is an important part of a new cosmopolitan world order (Held 1993, 1995, 1996, Held et al. 1999, Kaldor 2001). It is only within the last five years that the relations between peace missions and global order have seriously entered the peacekeeping research agenda. Contributions to this new debate have come from peacekeeping theorists such as Alex Bellamy and colleagues, David Chandler, Oliver Richmond and Michael Pugh, who have all addressed how peace missions contribute to upholding a current global order that is based on the prevalence of liberal democratic states and that mainly benefits Western states (Bellamy et al. 2004, Chandler 2004, Pugh 2004, Richmond 2004). Chapter 1 briefly presents some of these arguments and contends that the debate needs to include not only what kind of global order peace missions support but also what kind of global order is desirable. The chapter goes on to detail one alternative to the present global order, namely, a cosmopolitan global order and the potential role of peace missions in the transformation of the current world order into a cosmopolitan global order.

The other main reason why international peace missions need to be involved in detaining indicted war criminals is that it will help the implementation of transitional justice, a precondition for the establishment of sustainable peace. There is an increasing consensus both in the academic and political spheres that, if societies are to successfully recover from war or internal violent conflict, then mass atrocities committed during the war or violent conflict need to be addressed, if not earlier, then at least once the violence has ended. However, it is still contentious how societies which have been through conflict or war best address mass violations of humane law. So far the debate has to a high degree focused mainly on two possible solutions, namely, the establishment of a criminal tribunal based on the idea of retributive justice or a truth and reconciliation commission based on the concept of restorative justice. Chapter 2 gives a brief
overview of the debate and argues that, though there is no unanimous support for retributive justice in the form of a criminal trial process, indicators still point towards the importance of at least holding the worst perpetrators accountable for their deeds, if possible in a criminal trial process. It should be underlined that this does not rule out putting individuals who have committed less serious atrocities through a truth and reconciliation process. The chapter then provides a brief overview of the history of international criminal tribunals and the obstacles that they have faced. One of the most serious obstacles recent tribunals have encountered is failure to arrest the individuals facing prosecution. In contrast to national courts, which can normally rely on the local police to arrest individuals, international criminal tribunals have no police force at their disposal to make arrests. Instead they rely mainly on national authorities for arrests. However, in many states recovering from internal violent conflict the national police are often either unable or unwilling to detain indicted war criminals. These individuals are often still in power or boast strong links to influential politicians and hence they are not transferred to the tribunals. Thus, in order for international criminal tribunals to be successful in prosecutions, alternative ways of securing the detention and arrest of indicted war criminals need to be implemented. Some alternatives to reliance on national authorities have already been suggested and these are also briefly presented and discussed in Chapter 2. Finally, the chapter suggests that mandating international peace missions to detain indicted war criminals represents a viable solution.

Part II: UN peace missions’ involvement in securing justice and transitional justice

Chapters 3 and 4 in Part II examine the involvement of UN peace missions in assisting societies recovering from internal violent conflict in securing justice and transitional justice.

Chapter 3 focuses on the inclusion of activities intended to establish justice through securing accountability for crimes committed in the post-conflict phase in the UN’s peace-building approach. First, the chapter examines the kind of activities recent UN peace missions have been authorised to implement and the actions missions have actually carried out to help post-conflict states secure accountability for crimes committed after the signing of the peace agreement. In addition the chapter assesses the results of these efforts and identifies some of the main reasons why the missions have succeeded or failed to build institutions and structures that can ensure accountability for crimes committed after the violent conflict has ended. Furthermore, the chapter examines recent UN debates and reports in order to establish what role they envisage for UN peace missions in the development of institutions and structures aiming at preventing future crimes and securing accountability for crimes committed in the post-conflict period.

Chapter 4 focuses on the inclusion of activities aimed at establishing transitional justice through ensuring individual accountability for atrocities committed during the violent conflict in the UN’s approach to post-conflict peace-building.
First, the chapter examines what transitional justice-related activities recent peace missions have been involved in. It also assesses the efforts of the peace missions and it identifies some of the main reasons why peace missions have failed or succeeded in assisting societies to implement a transitional justice process. Finally, the chapter examines recent UN reports and debates in order to establish their views on the role of peace missions in establishing transitional justice after violent conflicts.

**Part III: The experience of IFOR, SFOR and KFOR**

The Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) that were deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1995 to 2004 and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) that has been deployed in Kosovo since 1999 have all been involved in attempts to detain indicted war criminals. Hence, in Part III, Chapters 5, 6 and 7 focus on the efforts of these three peace missions in this regard.

Chapter 5 looks at how IFOR interpreted its mandate concerning the detention of indicted war criminals and how this influenced its actions. The chapter also discusses why IFOR failed to detain any indicted war criminals. Chapter 6 outlines SFOR’s results concerning the detention of indicted war criminals and discusses SFOR’s failures and successes. The chapter also discusses which factors contributed to SFOR changing its policy and practice concerning these detentions and why it never fully committed to the process. Finally, Chapter 7 outlines KFOR’s results concerning such detentions and discusses KFOR’s response to its involvement in the detention of indicted war criminals and why it chose a reactive rather than a proactive response to detaining indicted war criminals.

**Part IV: Preparing, authorising and ensuring the detention of indicted war criminals**

If peace enforcement soldiers are to successfully detain indicted war criminals, it is important that they are prepared and authorised to carry out the task and that they know what actions are recommended to ensure successful detention. Hence these issues form the focus of Chapters 8, 9 and 10 in Part IV.

If peace enforcement soldiers are to be properly prepared for involvement in detention operations, it is vital that this task is not just included but also thoroughly incorporated into peace enforcement military doctrines. Hence, chapter 8 examines the dominant doctrines to determine if such incorporation has already begun and, if so, how far it has progressed. Based on the experience of IFOR, SFOR and KFOR, the chapter also discusses any further developments needed to fully integrate the detention of indicted war criminals into the doctrines.

It is also important that the task is not only included in the mandates granted to peace enforcement missions but also in their rules of engagement. Therefore, based on the experience of IFOR, SFOR and KFOR, Chapter 9 discusses what the mandates and specific rules of engagement of peace enforcement missions need to include concerning the detention of indicted war criminals.
Finally, if peace enforcement missions are to be successful in this task, the soldiers need to implement some recommended practices. Thus, based on the experience of IFOR, SFOR and KFOR, Chapter 10 identifies and discusses some of these practices.

**Part V: Peace missions and politics**

The experience of the peace missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular, where both IFOR and SFOR were very reluctant to become involved in detaining indicted war criminals, shows that political considerations play an important role in this regard.

Thus Chapter 11 in Part V identifies some of the most significant political considerations that impacted on the involvement of IFOR and SFOR in detentions. The chapter also discusses these considerations in their temporal and territorial as well as in a contemporary context.

**Part VI: Assisting peace enforcement missions in the apprehension of indicted war criminals**

If peace enforcement soldiers are to successfully detain indicted war criminals, they need help from other local as well as international actors. Hence Chapters 12 and 13 in Part VI discuss which actors can provide peace enforcement soldiers with important assistance in the process of apprehending indicted war criminals.

Experience, especially from SFOR, indicates that, just like national police forces, peace enforcement missions can significantly benefit from help from international and local actors who are not a part of the peace mission and not involved in the detention operations but, through living and working in the peace mission’s area of deployment, may potentially have vital information about the whereabouts of the indicted. Thus, based on experience from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chapter 12 discusses which local and international actors can potentially assist the peace enforcement missions in locating indicted war criminals and some of the barriers that can potentially impact negatively on the cooperation between missions and these other actors.

Finally, Chapter 13 discusses which actors other than peace enforcement soldiers should be involved in apprehending indicted war criminals. The chapter also instigates the development of a framework for cooperation between the various actors involved in such apprehensions.

**Conclusion**

The book concludes with a discussion of the prospects for peace missions supporting a more cosmopolitan global order and becoming more involved in transitional justice activities and in detaining indicted war criminals. The lessons future missions can learn from the experience of IFOR, SFOR and KFOR are also examined.
Notes


2 Some of the noteworthy exceptions to this general observation are Michael Pugh, Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham, and Mary Kaldor, who all argue in favour of a more cosmopolitan world order but who only briefly discuss the role of peace missions in the development of this alternative order (Kaldor 2001, Pugh 2004, Woodhouse and Ramsbotham 2005).

3 Lustrations mean that perpetrators are removed from their official positions. See Schwartz 1995.

4 See Boven et al. 1995.

5 These are official indictments. The number of secret indictments is not known.

6 Representing the following countries: Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Korea (South), Latvia, Mali, Samoa, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago and the UK.

7 For more information see: www.ice-cpi.int/cases.html (accessed 27 December 2007).


11 See chapter 4.

12 UNMIBH was first deployed together with the NATO-led IFOR and later with SFOR, which were mandated to help implement the military parts of the Dayton Peace Agreement (see Chapters 5 and 6).


14 Also known under the acronym ONUCI.

15 Simultaneously with the deployment of UNMIBH, NATO troops were also deployed and put in charge of implementing the military parts of the DPA. Chapters 5 and 6 examine the efforts of these troops to detain indicted war criminals and thereby contribute to securing accountability for atrocities committed during the violent conflict.

16 Simultaneously with the deployment of UNMIK, NATO troops were also deployed in Kosovo in order to help implement the military parts of the peace agreement. Chapter 7 examines the efforts of the Kosovo Force to detain indicted war criminals and thereby contribute to securing accountability for atrocities committed during the violent conflict.

17 Since UNMIBH’s international police officers were only authorised to monitor the
national police carrying out policing tasks rather than execute the policing tasks themselves, it was mainly left to IFOR and SFOR to help the ICTY through providing security for ICTY investigators and detaining individuals indicted by the ICTY (President of the ICTY 1997, 1998, 1999).

Initially the ICTY had issued a secret indictment against Slavko Dokmanovic on 3 April 1996 and requested UNTAES to detain him (Arbour 30 June 1997). However, since Dokmanovic was not residing within its area of operation, UNTAES was not able to detain him. In June 1997 a representative from the ICTY, Kevin Curtis, went to visit Dokmanovic in his house in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. Curtis claimed that he could help Dokmanovic get his property in Croatia back. Curtis convinced Dokmanovic to come to Vukovar in UNTAES’s area of operation to meet the head of UNTAES, Jacques Klein. Representatives from the ICTY and UNTAES picked up Dokmanovic on the Serbian side of the border and brought him across the border to UNTAES’s headquarters in Vukovar. Here Dokmanovic was detained and sent to The Hague (Dokmanovic 8 September 1997).

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19 See Wilson 1997.

20 The resolution also demanded that all parties to the violent conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo cooperate in the process of bringing perpetrators to justice (DPKO Democratic Republic of Congo – MONUC: Mandate)


22 For legal analyses of whether or not IFOR was authorised or obliged to detain indicted war criminals, see Gaeta 1998, Kalinauskas 2002, Lamb 2000, Vallières-Roland 2002.


28 For an analysis of the peace and justice dilemma in the context of Kosovo, see Lyck 2007.


31 See also Pouligny 2006, pp. 96–123 for different views of what is expected from a peace enforcement mission.


33 See also Pouligny 2006, pp. 96–141 on the problems caused by vaguely formulated mandates.

34 See also Lyck 2007 for an analysis of the relationship between indicted war criminal Ramush Haradinaj and UNMIK.


37 See President of the ICTY 1996, 1997, 1998 for accounts of when SFOR soldiers could have detained indicted war criminals.

For example, the cooperation between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the Baltic Battalion, see www.mil.ee/index_eng.php?s=kooseesm (accessed 5 January 2008) and the cooperation between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden in NORDCAPS, see: www.nordcaps.org/ (accessed 5 January 2008).


Though KFOR supported the work of the ICTY through detaining three indicted war criminals, the support the peace enforcement mission has offered the ICTY has not been unanimous. The civilian part of the peace enforcement mission, UNMIK, has lately been criticised by the ICTY for its role in supporting and ensuring the provisional release of the former President of Kosovo, Ramush Haradinaj, who is currently on trial in The Hague. See Lyck 2007.


The IPTF was replaced by the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina in January 2003. The EUPM was given the same mandate as the IPTF. See www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=585&lang=EN (accessed 5 January 2008).


For example, the cooperation between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the Baltic Battalion. See: www.mil.ee/index_eng.php?s=kooseesm (accessed 5 January 2008) and the cooperation between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden in NORDCAPS, see: www.nordcaps.org/ (accessed 5 January 2008).


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