

# A HANDBOOK OF GREEK MYTHOLOGY

H. J. ROSE

ROUTLEDGE



Also available as a printed book  
see title verso for ISBN details

# A HANDBOOK OF GREEK MYTHOLOGY

*By the same author*

OUTLINES OF CLASSICAL LITERATURE

A HANDBOOK OF GREEK LITERATURE

A HANDBOOK OF LATIN LITERATURE

GODS AND HEROES OF THE GREEKS

# **A Handbook of Greek Mythology**

**INCLUDING ITS EXTENSION TO ROME**

*H. ROSE*



London and New York

*First published 1928 by Methuen & Co. Ltd*  
*Sixth edition 1958*

*First published as a University Paperback in 1964*

*Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group*  
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005.

“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or  
Routledges’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to  
[www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk](http://www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk).”

*All rights reserved. No part of this book may be  
reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form  
or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means,  
now known or hereafter invented,  
including photocopying and recording,  
or in any information storage or retrieval system,  
without permission in writing from the publishers.*

*British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data  
available*

*Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data  
available*

ISBN 0-203-42176-0 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-42235-X (Adobe e-Reader Format)  
ISBN 0-415-04601-7 (Print Edition)

VIRO DOCTISSIMO

DEQVE HIS STVDIIS OPTIME MERITO

L.R.FARNELL, D.LITT

COLLEGII EXONIENSIS APVD OXONIENSES

RECTORI

AMICITIAE ERGO



# PREFACE

AS a teacher of Classics I have often felt handicapped by the lack of a book of moderate length, containing an accurate account of Greek mythology, in accordance with the results of modern research. This work is an attempt to supply that want. It claims no originality, being frankly a compilation from such standard works as Roscher's *Lexikon*, Preller-Robert, and others named in the Bibliography. I have, however, in all cases examined the original authorities and hope that the references given will be found accurate and to the point; experience of the shortcomings of others in these respects forbids me to hope that they are faultless.

I have had in mind three classes of readers. Firstly, the student, whether of ancient or of modern literature, who wants an outline knowledge of the subject, may content himself with reading the matter set out in large print; he will thus acquaint himself with those stories of gods and heroes which were commonly known and more or less believed in the classical epoch by Greeks. Secondly, those who want more detail will find, in the paragraphs in smaller type, a number of obscure, late, or purely local stories, told perhaps in a single Greek city or district, or appearing for the first time in some Roman author. Thirdly, the notes at the ends of the chapters will give the reader who wishes to embark on a thorough study of mythology a clue to further researches.

The great problem in such a work as this is one of omission. I have tried to solve it by leaving out all those persons who have no story worth telling,—warriors who appear in an epic only to be killed; gods worshipped in some obscure corner, whose myth, if ever they had one, is now lost; heroes who exist but to provide a legendary founder for some city, and the like. Whether I have chosen judiciously is for those versed in the subject to decide, or perhaps rather for those who use this book as a source of information. Criticisms will be welcomed from either.

Finally I must thank, not only those friends who have personally helped me, but the numerous scholars, known to me only through their writings, without whose works a book of this sort would be impossible for anyone not a miracle of patience and erudition to compose.

In the Second Edition some slips of author or printer have been corrected and the Addenda on page 340 enlarged.

H.J.R. ST.ANDREWS

## NOTE TO THIRD EDITION

IN this edition, such limited correction as seemed possible in wartime has been done.

H.J.R.

ST.ANDREWS

## NOTE TO FOURTH EDITION

THIS is substantially identical with the third, a few minor corrections having been made.

H.J.R.

ST.ANDREWS

**NOTE TO FIFTH EDITION**

IT has been found possible in this edition to make somewhat more extensive changes than before; it is hoped that they will be found improvements.

H.J.R.

ST.ANDREWS

**NOTE TO SIXTH EDITION**

I HAVE tried, so far as was practicable, to get rid of residual errors and to bring the notes and bibliography up to date.

H.J.R.

# CONTENTS

I INTRODUCTION: HISTORY OF MYTHOLOGY	1
II THE BEGINNINGS OF THINGS	13
III THE CHILDREN OF KRONOS—I	35
IV THE CHILDREN OF KRONOS—II	64
V THE QUEENS OF HEAVEN	84
VI THE YOUNGER GODS	111
VII LESSER AND FOREIGN DEITIES	137
VIII PART I—THE CYCLES OF SAGA	151
PART II—TROY	191
IX THE LEGENDS OF GREEK LANDS	210
X <i>MÄRCHEN</i> IN GREECE AND ITALY	236
XI ITALIAN PSEUDO-MYTHOLOGY	251
BIBLIOGRAPHY	275
ADDENDA	279
INDEXES	282



# A HANDBOOK OF GREEK MYTHOLOGY

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION: HISTORY OF MYTHOLOGY

WE use the word mythology to signify the study of certain products of the imagination of a people, which take the form of tales. These tales the Greeks called *μῦθοι* or myths, an expression which originally meant simply 'words'. The purpose of this book is to set forth what stories were produced by the active imagination of those peoples whom we collectively know as Greek, and by the narrow and sluggish imagination of the ancient inhabitants of Italy. It is well to begin by inquiring what manner of tales they were; for it is very clear that we cannot take them, as they stand, as historically true, or even as slightly idealized or exaggerated history. Full as they are of impossible events, it needs no argument to prove that they differ widely from Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War, or Hippokrates' discussions of the effect of diet on a patient. We may disbelieve some of Thucydides' statements, and we have come to consider many of Hippokrates' methods erroneous; but obviously both are trying to state facts and draw reasonable conclusions therefrom. What are we to say of the tellers of these quite unbelievable, although picturesque legends, and of those who heard and more or less credited them? It is here that opinions differ most widely, and have differed in the past.<sup>1</sup>

I. *The Allegorical Theory.* One of the most ancient explanations is that these tales of wonder are allegories, concealing some deep and edifying meaning, which the wisdom of primeval sages prompted them to hide in this manner, either to prevent great truths passing into the hands of persons too ignorant or too impious to use them aright, or to attract by stories those who would not listen to a dry and formal discussion. As an example, I will cite the interpretation given of a well-known myth, the Judgment of Paris, by the so-called Sallustius.<sup>2</sup> As he tells the story, the gods were at a banquet, when Eris (Strife, Emulation) cast among them a golden apple, inscribed 'For the Fairest'. Three goddesses, Hera, Athena and Aphrodite, having all claimed it, the decision was referred by Zeus to Paris, son of Priam of Troy. Aphrodite having bribed him with the promise of the loveliest of mortal women as his wife, he decided in her favour. 'Here,' says our author, 'the banquet signifies the supramundane powers of the gods, and that is why they are together; the golden apple signifies the universe, which, as it is made of opposites, is rightly said to be thrown by Strife, and as the various gods give various gifts to the universe they are thought to vie with one another for the possession of the apple; further, the soul that lives in accordance with sense-perception (for that is Paris), seeing beauty alone and not the other powers in the universe, says that the apple is Aphrodite's.'

It needs no great amount of argument to show that such a view as this is wrong. It assumes that these early Greeks among whom the story of Paris originated possessed a systematic philosophy concerning the powers, both visible and invisible, of the universe

verse, and also the moral duties of man. Now we know enough of their early history to be able to say that neither they nor any other people in a similar stage of development ever had any such philosophy, which is the product of ages of civilized thought. Had any system of the kind existed in the days before Homer, we may be very certain that the long series of brilliant intellects to whom the organized thought of Greece, and ultimately of modern Europe, is due, would not have had to begin at the very beginning and discover for themselves the elements of physics, of ethics, and of logic. The myth cannot be an allegory, because its originators had little or nothing to allegorize.

Still, we can see how the idea originated. In the first place, the Greeks, like most peoples, had great respect for their ancestors, and were apt to credit them with much that later generations had produced. Hence came a tendency to try to find deep wisdom in anything they were reported to have said or done. Secondly, allegory is really very old in Greece; we shall find examples in Homer and Hesiod, for instance.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, one of the oldest forms of religious composition, the metrical answers given at oracular shrines, affected a dark and allegorical language. Hence it is no wonder that this theory, although false, gained popularity, was widely used by orthodox pagans to explain away certain features in the stories told of their gods and heroes which seemed inconsistent with a divine or exalted nature, and was in turn eagerly adopted by Jewish and Christian commentators to read sublime meanings into puzzling passages of the Old Testament.

2. *The Symbolic Theory.* After lasting in various forms through the Middle Ages, this view appeared in a modified form as late as the nineteenth century. Friedrich Creuzer (1771–1858), in a very learned but very cloudy and uncritical work,<sup>4</sup> set forth a theory which may be interpreted as follows. The ancestors of the ancient nations whose history we know,—Egyptians, Indians, Greeks, Romans and others,—possessed, not indeed a complete philosophy, but a dim and at the same time grandiose conception of certain fundamental religious truths, and in particular of monotheism. These truths their priests set forth in a series of symbols, which remained much the same for all peoples, but were hopelessly misunderstood in later times. To recover the oldest ideas, according to him, we shall do well to take those myths which seem absurdest, and try to interpret them. For myths are not the result of the artistic activity of poets, but something far older. One specimen of his methods will be enough.<sup>5</sup> Thus, it is stated that Talos' name meant 'sun' in Cretan. His legend, says Creuzer, signifies that the Cretans set forth the beneficent powers of the sunlight under the form of a divine guardian of their island; they also, like the Phoenicians with their Moloch, symbolized his destructive power, perhaps by a human sacrifice by burning; but also they gave a moral aspect to his nature, for is it not stated that Talos was in reality a man, who went about with bronze tablets containing the laws of Minos, whose observance he enforced?

All this is very ingenious, but falls to pieces at a touch of criticism. To begin with, there is the old difficulty which beset the allegorical theory in its cruder form; we have no right to suppose either that the early Cretans had an elaborate solar philosophy or that, if they had had one, they would have expressed it in allegories. Moreover, his account of Talos is a mere jumble, made up of tags from various late or lateish authors, which Creuzer has put together into a composite picture of what never existed in the Cretan imagination or any other, save his own. He goes on to make the jumble worse by adducing further supposed parallels with which the story of Talos has in reality nothing to

do. And if we look at other interpretations of myths scattered up and down his work, or similar works by his followers and predecessors, we shall find many instances of just this uncritical handling of a myth, *i.e.*, this mixture of older and newer forms, combined with absence of any clear recognition of how stories of this sort really do originate.

But for all his absurdities, Creuzer was right on one point. Schiller, to whom he owed much, had said that Art breaks up the white light of Truth into the prismatic colours; and the imagination works in a somewhat similar way, not setting forth facts clearly and sharply, as the reason does, but dealing in pictures. In a sense, myths are symbolic, though not as Creuzer supposed them to be.

Besides this truth which he recognized, and which entitles him to a not dishonourable place in the history of Mythology, there is another and a worse reason why symbolism continues here and there to have a certain popularity, and that is the childish fascination which anything mysterious has for certain minds. A story, or anything else, which is supposed to have a hidden meaning attracts some adults, just as a secret society with pass-words and so forth attracts children; and so there are to this day half-educated persons who read all manner of extraordinary meanings of their own invention into details of pictures by great artists, obscure passages in such documents as the Book of Daniel, or the measurements of ancient monuments, particularly, for some reason, the Great Pyramid of Gizeh. I have even come across one ingenious theorist who had found abstruse secrets hidden in the letter H and in one or two buildings the ground plan of which suggested that letter.

3. *Rationalism.* There is a type of mind, which also existed in antiquity, which is utterly incapable of realizing how simple people think. To such a mind, certain facts of experience are so self-evident that every one except a fool must always have recognized them. It follows therefore that no one who thought at all can ever have believed, for instance, that a monster half-horse and half-man could exist, or that a woman was turned into a stone or a tree. If therefore stories of this sort are told, they must be the result of misunderstanding or trickery. There have come to us from antiquity several treatises which put this theory into operation, for instance a little work *On incredible tales*<sup>6</sup>, which bears the name of Palaiphatos. The author, after proving elaborately that there are no such things as Centaurs, gives the following reconstruction of the legend. When Ixion was King of Thessaly, the country was much plagued by herds of wild cattle. On his offering a reward for their destruction, certain enterprising archers from a village called Nephele went out on horseback and shot them down. Hence arose the tale that Ixion was the father by Nephele (the Cloud) of a race of beings called Kentauroi (prickers of bulls) who were a mixture of man and horse.

One example is enough of this sort of nonsense, which hardly needs to be refuted. It supposes such a state of mind as never existed or will exist in this world. People so blind to facts as to make a tale of wonder out of a commonplace event like the shooting by mounted archers of some wild cattle would have believed easily enough in all sorts of marvels, and freely invented them without any motor to set their imaginations at work. For savages and barbarians (and it is to be remembered that the origins of Greek and

other myths go back to barbarism or savagery)<sup>7</sup> have but a small range of experience, and therefore have generally no standard by which to try whether a tale is incredible or not; and even among civilized men there are to be found plenty who will believe almost any wonder if only it is far enough off in space or in time. But even the lowest savages are not as a rule so densely stupid as to misunderstand what is clearly visible to them, or simple statements in their own tongue about things happening to their neighbours; and Palaiphatos supposes the tale of the shape and parentage of the Centaurs to have arisen from a remark that ‘the Bull-stickers from Nephelē *ἐκ Νεφέλης*; the phrase might be taken to mean “born of the Cloud”) are raiding’, and the supposedly novel sight of horses with men on their backs. Nevertheless, this feeble and irrational ‘rationalism’ still persists.

I have seen a children’s book containing the story of Dick Whittington, which solemnly stated in its introduction that Whittington really laid the foundation of his fortune by a successful venture in a ship called *The Cat*. Among other things, this explanation neglects the fact that in Whittington’s own day the story of the cat was at least two centuries old, for he died in 1423 and the story is to be found in the *Annals* of Albert von Stade, who died in 1264. Who first told it we do not know. Naturally the old story had been attached to the historical Whittington, as such tales often are to a well-known and popular man.

This miserable theory has not even the grain of truth which is to be found in the first two. Such origins of stories as it imagines simply do not exist. The nearest approach to the supposed process is that, as we shall see presently, legendary details are often enough added to historical facts.

4. *Euhemerism*. Somewhat less absurd is the theory called after Euhemeros, a writer who lived not long after Alexander the Great,<sup>8</sup> although it existed in a less systematic form before him. His ideas were couched in the shape of a romance, in which he claimed to have discovered evidence that the gods of popular tradition were simply men deified by those whom they had ruled or benefited. Thus Zeus became an ancient king of Crete, who rebelled against and overthrew his father Kronos, the former king, and similar biographies of the remaining deities were offered. Omitting the absurdities in detail,—for the events in these alleged lives of the gods were arrived at simply by rationalizing the current legends,—we may look for a moment at the kernel of the theory, namely that popular gods are nothing but deified men. Here at least we have a fact alleged as a cause, for there is abundant evidence that some men have been deified, from flattery or gratitude, in Greece and out of it. But to make a dead man into a god, one must believe already in gods of some sort; hence this theory will not do as an explanation of the origin of either religion or mythology. Even in its modified form, that the cult of gods arose from fear of ghosts, a view put forward by Herbert Spencer and others, it is unsatisfactory. However, in a book of this sort we are chiefly concerned to note, first, that it will not explain more than a small fraction of the existing mythical tales; second, that there is an element of truth in it, since no very sharp line of cleavage can be drawn between legends of heroes and myths concerning gods.

In antiquity the theory of Euhemeros had a great vogue. In particular, Christian apologists seized joyfully on a statement coming from pagan sources that the

best-known pagan gods were nothing but men, for by that time the sense of historical reality was grown too faint for the absurdities of Euhemerus to be noticed, and apart from this particular development, numerous writers tried to discover in these venerable tales some reminiscence of early history, a proceeding which, however mistaken in its methods, was not irrational in itself.

5. *Theory of Nature-myths.* We may distinguish here an older and simpler form of the theory from a later and more sophisticated one; but they are fundamentally the same, and both alike possess both truth and falsehood. It is admitted on all sides that the gods of Greek religion and of most if not all others are supposed to be able to control the forces of nature. It seems therefore a suggestion at least worth considering that the gods are these natural forces and nothing else, at least originally. Thus Zeus would be the sky, or the celestial phenomena; Hera, the ancients suggested, using an etymology which was hardly more than a bad pun, was the air, *aer*; Aphrodite was the moist principle in nature, Hephaistos the element of fire, and so forth, while in later times there was a decided tendency to make all gods into personifications of the sun<sup>9</sup>. Into these supposed personifications were read, of course, whatever physical theory the interpreter might happen to hold.

Obviously, the idea that gods are personifications cannot stand, for a personification is a kind of allegory, and therefore open to all the objections urged against the allegorical and symbolic theories. When Spenser personifies the virtue of chastity under the lovely figure of Una, or holiness as the RedCross Knight, he is merely putting into poetical form what he could have expressed in prose, namely a current theory, derived from Aristotle, of the virtues and vices, and adorning it with the flowers of his inexhaustible fancy. Had no ethical doctrine then existed, the *Faerie Queene* could never have been written; and in like manner, personified physical forces are unthinkable among a people who were not to learn for centuries that any such forces existed.

But it remains possible to suppose the gods, or some of them, to be the result, not of allegorizing known and understood physical forces, but of a sort of imaginative speculation about unknown ones. In this sense we may say, for instance, that a river-god (usually imagined, in Greece, under the form of a bull-headed man) is simply the river itself, the noise of whose waters is naïvely accounted for by envisaging it as a powerful, noisy beast. The early Greeks, we might conjecture, observed the apparent daily motion of the sun and were sharp-witted enough to see that it must move very fast, in order to get over so much ground in a day. They therefore fancied it as a charioteer, since a chariot drawn by swift horses was the fastest mode of locomotion they knew. The difficulty is, that there seems no very cogent reason why they should worship forces thus explained, and especially why, as appears on careful investigation of their religion, they gave so little worship to the most impressive of them, as the sun, the moon, earthquakes, thunder and lightning, and so forth. It is far more consistent with what we can see of their thoughts and what we know of the ideas of peoples still in the myth-making stage or very near it to suppose that they worshipped the gods whom they supposed to control these forces,—Zeus, who lived in the sky, and not the sky or its thunder and lightning; Poseidon, who lived in the sea, and not the actual sea-water, and so forth. The problem of how the idea of divine beings really originated is very complex and far from being fully solved as yet;

fortunately it is not necessary to solve it in order to discuss the myths concerning them.

The most famous exponent of the doctrine that mythology springs from imaginative treatment of physical forces is in modern times the great Sanskritist F. Max Müller. His theory was briefly this. Primitive man was filled with a vague feeling of awe and reverence, leading to ideas of divinity, to which, in his hesitating and imperfect speech, he tried to give expression. Of course, his effort to voice the ineffable was hopeless from the first, and the words he used were sadly lacking in precision, ambiguous and metaphorical. Thus, trying to find a name for the divine Being whose existence he dimly conjectured, he hit upon the word 'sky' as the least inadequate he could think of; but some at least of those who heard him could not understand his metaphor, and hence imagined that the literal sky was either the abode of God or God Himself.

Müller further imagined that he had come fairly near to this primitive stage of religion by studying the earliest Sanskrit documents, the Vedas, which undoubtedly are of venerable antiquity. Analysing these and comparing them with what he knew of the mythology of other peoples, he believed that he could trace back a number of names, and consequently the legends containing them, to the sort of primeval metaphors which he postulated. In particular, he held that numerous deities, indeed almost all of them, owed their being originally to the metaphorical use of language concerning the sun. Thus to him Athena, born from the head of Zeus, is the sky's daughter, Dawn, whose birth is helped by the young Sun (Hephaistos). She is called virgin, because her light is pure; golden from its colour; Promachos (Champion) because she does battle with the darkness, and so forth.<sup>10</sup>

It is not necessary to dwell nowadays on the many weak links in this chain, such as the true character of the Indian literature, which although old is very far from primitive, the badness of many of Max Müller's etymologies, his imperfect knowledge of Greek religion and mythology, and so forth. It is enough to remind ourselves that, firstly, Müller's picture of the primitive theologian is about as unlike that practical person, the savage, as possible; that examination of savage traditions and beliefs indicates that savages are but little impressed by such regular phenomena as sunrise, seldom worship the sun, and have not many legends about it; further, that their tales seem to deal with a very wide variety of subjects, which makes it highly unlikely that the ancestors of the Greeks confined themselves to imaginative and metaphorical talk about the weather; and also that the earliest and most primitive languages we know have a large vocabulary but are extremely poor in general terms capable of a confusing variety of senses, which makes it unlikely that the 'disease of language', as it has been unkindly called, postulated by Müller, was ever a reality. In particular, the more we study the different Wiro languages<sup>11</sup>, the more evident it becomes, firstly, that the peoples who speak them have many legends and beliefs which they share with their non-Wiro neighbours, and secondly, that the number of traditions provably common to all Wiros is very small; so that even if Müller's theories were proved up to the hilt for India, they would throw but little light on the state of things in early Greece. Incidentally, it seems now to be recognized by the best students of the subject that the supposed preponderance of sun-myths in the Vedic literature is the result rather of the theories of later commentators than of the true nature of the legends themselves.<sup>12</sup>

6. *Modern methods.* The failure of so many theories may well make us hesitate before

adopting another; and indeed, the best modern mythologists are as a rule none too eager to put forward a complete theory of the origin and primary meaning of any myth. There are, however, four things which we may do:

(a) We begin by carefully examining the source of the tale, and determining its date. This is not so easy as it sounds, for it is not enough to discover, for example, that one form of a story is found in Sophokles and another in Plutarch. We must find out, if we can, where Sophokles and Plutarch got the story, and it may turn out that the earlier writer invented a good deal of what he says, while the later one drew upon some very early source now lost. The first modern writer to lay emphasis, consistently and thoroughly, on this point was the most notable of the opponents of Creuzer, C.A. Lobeck (1781–1860; principal work, *Aglaophamus*, 1829).

(b) We may now try to determine, if we can, to what section of the very mixed population of Greece the story is due, *i.e.*, whether it is Achaian, Dorian, Ionian, or belongs to some other Greek people, or whether it is pre-Greek, or a later importation from Asia or Thrace. A great pioneer in this work was K.O. Müller (1797–1840).

(c) Next we may ask to what class the legend in question belongs, *i.e.*, whether it is myth proper, saga, or *märchen*. This, as will be explained presently, may throw light on its ultimate origin. The distinction cannot be attributed to any one re-searcher, but its existence has become recognized largely through the work of the folklorists and investigators of medieval European and other non-classical legends during the nineteenth century, prominent among whom were the indefatigable brothers, Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm (1785-1863 and 1786-1859).

(d) Lastly, when we have constructed a theory of the origin and continuance of a story, we shall do well to compare it with those tales which we can study in an early and undeveloped form,—the legends of savages and, to a less degree, of peasants. In a word, we may apply the Comparative Method, but with due caution, for nothing is more misleading than a false but plausible analogy. That this method is now part of the equipment of most scholars is due above all (if we leave out of account men still living) to one of the most learned and honest researchers Germany ever produced, J. W. E. Mannhardt, 1831-80, and one of the most brilliant and versatile of British writers, the late Andrew Lang.

7 *Psychological analysis*. Since legends are the work, not of memory (as historical traditions largely are) or of the reason, but of the imagination, it is obvious that all mythologists must wish well to those who study the imagination, that is, to psychologists. Hence it is interesting to note that the school of psychological thought now most in fashion, that associated with the names of Freud and Jung, devotes considerable attention to myths and tries to explain their genesis. Thus far one can approve; but beyond general approval of endeavour in what may be a fruitful field I for one cannot go. Hitherto, even allowing the truth of the main positions taken up by the psycho-analytic school with regard to the composition of the human mind, I have failed to find in its writings a single explanation of any myth, or any detail of any myth, which seemed even remotely possible or capable of accounting for the development of the story as we have it. I therefore content myself with mentioning their

methods, without going into a full account of them.<sup>13</sup>

We may divide legends, in a fashion which by now is almost traditional, into three classes. We have first the myth proper, concerning which a word of explanation is necessary. Man, brought face to face with the world about him, cannot help reacting to his environment in some way. Besides bodily actions, whether practically useful, such as chipping flints, ploughing fields, and making locomotives, or those meant to be practically useful, such as the various operations of magic, he has two mental processes open to him; he may reason about the world and the objects in it, or he may let his imagination play upon them. Speaking very roughly and very broadly, the more civilized he is, the more apt he is either to reason or, if not, at least to realize when he is not reasoning but imagining. Let us take as an example the phenomenon of rain. A man may busy himself collecting rain-water in a cistern or tank: he may construct a rain-gauge and observe the amount of rain that has fallen, and the season of year at which it falls most abundantly, and from these and other observations theorize about the cause of rain. These proceedings we may call applied and pure science respectively. Also, especially if he is a savage, he may work magic intended to make the rain fall abundantly, or to stop altogether. This, being in intention practical, is a sort of bastard sister of applied science. But there is a third set of activities possible. A poet or other artist may let the rain inspire him to production, and so give the world an ode, good or bad, to the rain, a picture such as Turner's *Rain, Steam and Speed*, or a pretty fantasy concerning the refreshment brought to the earth by a shower. But the imagination of the artist has also a half-sister, namely the less controlled but equally lively imagination of the myth-maker. He does not try to reason out the causes of rain, nor is he particularly concerned to make an artistic picture of it; he attempts rather to visualize the whole process, for the imagination of course works in pictures, or, if we like to use a favourite word of psychologists, in symbols. The result of this visualizing may be some such mental picture as of a being, or beings, who pour water out of a reservoir upon the earth. The nature of these beings and of their reservoir will vary enormously, and the myth may be anything from very grotesque and absurd to very beautiful, just as the picture made by the civilized painter might be good or bad; but an imaginative picture of some kind it will certainly be.

But now the myth touches upon science, for it offers a sort of cause for the rain-shower. Asked why it rains, scientist and myth-maker alike can give an answer. The former answers 'Because of such-and-such atmospheric conditions', and can give proofs of his statements, more or less cogent according as he is a better or a worse scientist. The myth-maker can reply, 'Because Zeus is pouring down water out of heaven', 'because Yahweh has opened the windows in the firmament', 'because the angels have poured water into a great tub in the sky which has holes in its bottom'. To any one who has dealt with inquisitive children it must be obvious that in many cases this kind of answer would be satisfactory; it gives *a* reason, and the hearers' minds are not developed enough for them to inquire whether it is *the* reason.

We see therefore that myths, in the proper sense, are a somewhat primitive form of those mental processes which, further developed, give us both art and science. Of the two sides, the more active is what we may term the artistic or imaginative and visualizing process. This consideration enables us largely to dispose of a question which often arises,

namely, Did the myth-makers, in Greece for instance, believe in their myths ? The absurdity of this will be evident if we transfer it to a higher sphere and ask, Did Michael Angelo believe in his Moses, or Swinburne in his *Atalanta in Calydon* ? No doubt Michael Angelo believed that there had been a man called Moses, who had done the things recorded of him in the Pentateuch; Swinburne doubtless believed that one of the districts of classical Greece was called Kalydon, and probably did not believe that there had ever been a virgin huntress called Atalanta; but these are intellectual processes, and had nothing to do with the statue or the poem. So with the man who first thought of thunder and lightning as caused by Zeus hurling a celestial dart; it probably would be far truer to say that he imagined it than that he either believed or disbelieved it. It is, however, no doubt true that many people accepted his imagination as a sufficient reason for thunder-storms, while others in time grew doubtful, that is, set their reason, as well as their imagination, to work, perceived that there were other possible causes, and found grounds for preferring one or another of them.<sup>14</sup>

We may then define a myth proper as *the result of the working of naive imagination upon the facts of experience*. As a large proportion of these facts are natural phenomena, it follows that the nature-myth is a common kind; and as the imagination is commonly set going by an object which appears wonderful or puzzling, it follows that a very large proportion indeed of myths is of the kind known as *aetiological*, concerned, that is, with the causes of all manner of things from the apparent movement of the heavenly bodies to the shape of a neighbouring hill or the origin of a local custom. In the last case, the myth often tells what purports to be a history, and this brings us to the next form of legend.

The name *saga* (in origin, simply the Scandinavian word for ‘tale, story’) is commonly given to those legends which deal with historical events. To take common instances from the modern countryside: if a folk-tale attributes the formation of a peculiarly-shaped hill to the devil, that is myth pure and simple; but if an ancient earthwork is said to have been built by Julius Caesar, that, if not due to some local antiquary, is rather *saga*. and may contain a germ of historical fact. That is, the earthwork may really be part of a Roman camp, and we have but to substitute for ‘Julius Caesar’ the words ‘some unknown Roman officer’. Excavation may enable us to find, if not the name of the officer and his force, at least their date, and so we pass from *saga* into history. There are instances of fragments of real history being preserved for an extraordinary length of time in legends of the peasantry.<sup>15</sup>

Few are so well-trained as to be able to see any event quite as it is without reading into it something which exists only in their own fancy; and this applies much more strongly to events which are not seen but remembered, and most strongly of all to those which are not remembered but told by another. A story handed down from father to son is rapidly altered in two ways; real details are forgotten and unreal ones are added. These additions, being imaginary, are almost invariably of a picturesque kind, attractive to the teller or the hearer, or both; and the omissions are especially of details which teller and hearer alike find dry, such as dates, geographical minutiae (except those of a well-known locality, which are generally found interesting), exact figures of all kinds, economic facts, and the doings and sayings of commonplace people. The Homeric account of the Trojan War is one of the best possible examples. The war was a perfectly real one, very likely caused by trade rivalries; it seems to have consisted in a blockade by the Achaians of the fortress of

Ilion, be it Hissarlik or not, interrupting the Trojan communications with the neighbouring country; and it was apparently decided by the exhaustion, economic and military, of the Trojans, which led to the subjugation of the cities allied with them and at last to the fall of Ilion itself. In Homer, the cause of the war is the abduction of Helen by Paris, and the decisive factors are the personal intervention of various gods, together with the surpassing prowess of numerous heroic chieftains, the most prominent of whom is Achilles. Of trade jealousy we hear nothing at all, of the wearing down of the Trojan resources only a few casual remarks, and of the details of the tactics and strategy of both armies practically nothing whatsoever. The result is, at some cost to history, the greatest and most fascinating epic poem ever written, the *Iliad*, which is the product of a first-class genius finding a good saga ready to his hand.

There remains one form of legend, the *märchen*. This German word fits it better than the nearest English equivalent, 'fairytale', because it does not always deal with fairies or supernatural beings of any kind. It differs from the last two in an important particular. They both are intended to command, if not exactly belief, at least imaginative assent, and their aim is often to find or record a truth: but the *märchen* aims rather at amusement. It accounts for the cause of nothing, it records no historical or semi-historical event, it need not fit the hearers' notions of probability. It is a story pure and simple, and makes no pretence to being anything else.

This brief outline of the classification of legends must suffice. It is, however, to be noted that any given story may well combine two of these forms, or even all three. For instance, the tale of Herakles probably started as a saga, an imaginative telling of the adventures of a real man. But it combined at an early date with elements of aetiological myth; thus, the presence of certain hot springs was explained by the myth that they had sprung from the ground to provide Herakles with a hot bath after some of his labours, and a certain ancient sacrifice on Mt. Oite was declared to commemorate the death of the hero. Also, an element of *märchen* intruded here and there; for instance Herakles, like many other adventurers, goes forth to look for the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow, represented in his case by the golden apples of the Hesperides.

Another and a more important point to be remembered in the case of Greek myths is the way in which they reflect the national character. The Greeks at their best were sane, high-spirited, clear-headed, beauty-loving optimists, and not in the least other-worldly. Hence their legends are almost without exception free from the cloudiness, the wild grotesques, and the horrible features which beset the popular traditions of less gifted and happy peoples. Even their monsters are not very ugly or uncouth, nor their ghosts and demons paralytically dreadful. Their heroes, as a rule, may sorrow, but are not broken-hearted; on occasion they are struck down by adverse fate, but not weakly overwhelmed; they meet with extraordinary adventures, but there is a certain tone of reasonableness running through their most improbable exploits. As for the gods and other supernatural characters, they are glorified men and women, who remain extremely human, and on the whole neither irrational nor grossly unfair in their dealings. Such tales as contain savage and repulsive elements tend to drop into the background or be modified. In short, the handling of the myths, even, it would appear, by unlettered Greeks, shows the spirit expressed in two famous sayings of famous poets:

'Winsomeness, by which are wrought all lovely things for mankind, lends its lustre to

make even the incredible seem credible full often.’

‘If I deal in falsehood, let it be such as may persuade the ears of the listener.’<sup>16</sup>

## NOTES ON CHAPTER I

(For the full titles of books cited, see General Bibliography.)

- 1 See, for a history of the subject from the end of antiquity to the year 1913, Gruppe 1921, and Nilsson, *GgR*, i<sup>2</sup>, 3 *sqq.*
- 2 Nock 1926, pp. 6, 7; Murray 1925, p. 245. See Chapter V, p. 106.
- 3 *Iliad*, XIX, 91 foll.—a passage very likely interpolated into the original poem by a later hand, but nevertheless old—may serve as an example.
- 4 See General Bibliography.
- 5 *Symbolik*, I, p. 37 foll. For Talos, see Chapter VIII, p. 204.
- 6 *De incredibilibus*, I. The work we have is not that of Palaiphatos himself, who lived in the time of Aristotle, but a later epitome.
- 7 I have discussed the problem how much of their savage ancestry the historical Greeks retained in *Primitive Culture in Greece*.
- 8 For Euhemeros, see Jacoby in Pauly-Wissowa VI, col. 952 foll.
- 9 The Stoics were particularly fond of explanations of this kind, see, for instance, *R.P.* 8, 503, but it was by no means confined to them, see, for example, Plato, *Cratylus*, 397 C, and for many such explanations, Athenagoras, *legat. pro Christ.* 22. For the theory that all gods were in some way the sun, see Macrobius, *Saturn.*, I, 17, 2 foll. See, in general, Frazer, *W.N.*, J. Tate in *C.Q.*, xxiii, 41–5; 142–54; xxviii, 105–14.
- 10 See *Lectures on the Origin of Religion* (1882), Lecture IV; *Introduction to the Science of Religion* (new edition, 1882), pp. 49, 197.
- 11 By Wiro I mean the group of languages otherwise called Aryan, Indo-European, or Indo-Germanic, to which Latin, Greek, Sanskrit, etc., belong. By Wiros I mean the people or peoples who spoke the language from which all these tongues are supposedly derived. The word in the latter sense is due to Dr. P. Giles.
- 12 See Sten Konow in Chantepie de la Saussaye,<sup>4</sup> II, p. 23 foll.
- 13 See, for instance, Jung, *Psychology of the Unconscious* (trans. B.M. Hinkle, London, 1922), Chapter VI.
- 14 For a deliciously funny sketch of the type of mind which is hungry for a reason and content with whatever is offered it, see Aristophanes, *Clouds*, 366 foll.
- 15 Excellent examples are given by van Gennep, 1910, p. 155 foll.
- 16 Pindar, *Olymp.*, I, 32; Kallimachos, *Hymn.*, I, 65.

## ADDITIONAL NOTE

For full accounts of the ancient authors quoted, the reader is referred to the many good manuals of Greek literature in English, French and German. It may, however, be mentioned that our sources in Greek **are** firstly the poets, of all dates from Homer and Hesiod down; and of these, especially those up to and including the great Attic dramatists

of the fifth century B.C. Next in importance to these are the Alexandrian poets, such as Kallimachos, from the fourth century onwards, who often give us curious information not to be had elsewhere, but who must be used with caution, as they often of set purpose confine themselves to very out-of-the-way stories, not forming part of what may be called the normal mythology of Greece; moreover, they not infrequently re-shape the legends or invent new ones, to suit their own purposes, a fault, from the modern mythologist's point of view, of which the older writers also are sometimes guilty. Next come the earlier historical writers, such as Pherekydes, who unfortunately are known to us only in fragments and excerpts; these, in dealing with early history, treated also of legends, which were indeed often their only source for events of other than recent date, and later compilers, such as Diodoros of Sicily, drew freely upon them. Finally, a great deal is due to the mythological handbooks, for these contain much of the learning of the Alexandrian critics, although in an epitomized form. Of these, one of the best is the so-called Apollodoros, whose work (first century A.D. ?) contains much good old material. With these may be reckoned the scholiasts, or ancient commentators on classical authors, such as Pindar and above all Homer, and on Alexandrian poets such as Apollonios of Rhodes. As regards the Latins, even their earliest poets draw upon the Alexandrians, and may for our purposes be counted as late Greek authors. Here again, notably in the case of Ovid, the writers' own fancy is the source of not a little. Roman scholarship also is often of value; we have, for example, the so-called Hyginus, whose *fabulae*, although but an epitomized, mutilated, and very ill-copied treatise, yet often preserves in a not too garbled form some story otherwise lost, as told in a vanished work of Euripides or some other classical writer. Much can also be gleaned from Latin scholiasts, notably that commentator on Vergil who is conventionally called Servius. But there is hardly a writer in either language who does not somewhere mention a myth or saga, and on whom therefore we cannot now and then draw for information. This applies to the Christian writers, for they often, in order to show what absurd and immoral stories the pagans told, relate these stories at considerable length, thus preserving for us the erudition of sundry mythologists whose works have not come down, or of poets now lost.

# BIBLIOGRAPHY

## A. CLASSICAL AUTHORS

*A few editions and abbreviations are given here; the remaining quotations are self-explanatory*

A. See Servius.

Abel. See Orphica.

Aesop. *Aesopi fabulae*, recensuit Aemilius Chambry. Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1925 (only complete edition).

Apollod. *Apollodori Bibliotheca*, edidit Richardus Wagner (Mythographi Graeci, Vol. I). Lipsiae (Teubner), 1894. Cited by the continuous sections, not by chapter, section and sub-section.

Hyginus. *Hygini Fabulae*, ed. H.J. Rose, Lugduni Bataurorum apud A.W. Sijthoff, n.d.

Jacoby. *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*. Von Felix Jacoby. Berlin, 1923.

Jordan M. *Catonis praeter librum de re rustica quae exstant*. Henricus Jordan recensuit et prolegomena scripsit. Lipsiae, 1860.

Kern. See Orphica.

Kock. *Comicorum Atticorum fragmenta*, edidit Theodorus Kock. Leipzig, 1880–8 (3 vols.).

MI, M2, M3. *Scriptores rerum mythicarum Latini tres, Romae nuper reperti... .*

Integriores edidit... . Dr. Georgius Henricus Bode. Cellis, 1834 (2 vols.).

Macan, 1895. *Herodotus, the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Books*. R.W. Macan. London, 1895.

N<sup>2</sup>. *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*. Recensuit Augustus Nauck. Editio secunda, Leipzig, Teubner, 1889.

Orphica. *Orphica*; recensuit Eugenius Abel. Accedunt Procli Hymni, Hymni magici, Hymnus in Isim alique eius modi carmina. Lipsiae et Pragae, 1885 ('Abel').

*Orphicorum Fragmenta*, collegit Otto Kern. Berolini, 1922 ('Kern 'or' Kern, 1922').

P. *The Fragments of Sophocles*; edited with additional notes from the papers of Sir R.C.Jebb and Dr. W.G.Headlam by A.C. Pearson. Cambridge, 1917; 3 vols.

Peter. *Historicorum Romanorum fragmenta*. Collegit disposuit recensuit Hermannus Peter. Lipsiae, 1883.

Ph. See Servius.

Powell. *Collectanea Alexandrina: reliquiae minores Poetarum Graecorum aetatis Ptolemaicae*. Edidit Iohannes U. Powell. Oxonii, 1925.

Pr. See Servius.

RP<sup>8</sup>. *Historia Philosophiae Graecae*. Testimonia auctorum conlegerunt notisque instruxerunt H. Ritter et L. Preller. Editio octava, quam curavit Eduardus Wellmann. Gothae, 1898.

Rzach. *Hesiodi carmina*: recensuit Aloisius Rzach: editio tertia. Teubner, 1913 (editio minor).

Servius. *Seruii Grammatici qui feruntur in Vergilii carmina commentarii*. Recensuerunt Georgius Thilo et Hermannus Hagen. Lipsiae in aedibus B.G.Teubneri. Vol. I, 1881;

Vol. II, 1884; Vol. III, i, 1887; ii (by Hagen alone), *Appendix Seruiana*, ceteros praeter Seruium et scholia Bernensia Vergilii commentatores continens, 1902.  
 Cited thus: A(nonymi brevis expositio); Ph(ilargyrii grammatici explanatio); Pr(obi qui dicitur commentarius); S(eruius); Sd, Seruius Danielis, or Seruius auctus; V(eronensia scholia); followed in all cases by A(eneid), B(ucolics), or G(eorgics), and the number of the line.  
 V. See Servius.

## B. MODERN WORKS

*The following is a list of books which the author found particularly useful. Some recently published works have been added since the author's death.*

- Allen 1921. T.W. Allen, *The Homeric Catalogue of Ships*. Oxford 1921.  
 Berger 1904. Prof. Dr. E.H. Berger, *Mythische Kosmographie der Griechen*, Supplement zu Roschers Lexikon. Leipzig, 1904.  
 Bonney. T.H. Bonney, *Volcanoes*. London, 1912.  
 Bouché-Leclercq. A. Bouché-Leclercq, *Histoire de la Divination dans l'antiquité*. Paris, 1879–82 (4 vols.).  
 Buchmann. G. Buchmann, *De Numae regis Romanorum fabula*. Dissertatio inauguralis, Lipsiae, 1912.  
 Carcopino. J. Carcopino, *La louve du Capitole*. Paris, 1925.  
 Chantepie de la Saussaye. *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte, begründet von Chantepie de la Saussaye*. Vierte, vollständig neubearbeitete Auflage ... herausgegeben von Alfred Bertholet und Edvard Lehmann. Tübingen, 1925 (2 vols.).  
 Cook. Arthur Bernard Cook, *Zeus: a Study in Ancient Religion*. Cambridge, Vol. I, 1914; Vol. II, 1925; Vol. III, 1940.  
 Cosquin 1886. Emanuel Cosquin, *Contes populaires de Lorraine*. Paris, n.d. (preface dated 1886), 2 vols.  
 Cosquin 1922. Emanuel Cosquin, *Les Contes indiens et l'Occident*. Paris, 1922.  
 Cosquin, E.F. Emanuel Cosquin, *Etudes folkloriques*. Paris, 1922.  
 Daremberg-Saglio. *Dictionnaire des antiquités grecques et romaines, d'après les textes et les monuments ... ouvrage rédigé ... sous la direction de MM. Ch. Daremberg et Edm. Saglio*. Paris, 1877–1919.  
 Dawkins. R.M. Dawkins, *Modern Greek in Asia Minor ... with a chapter on the subject-matter of the folk-tales*, by W.R. Halliday. Cambridge, 1916.  
 Decharme. P. Decharme, *Mythologie de la Grèce antique*. Cinquième édition; Paris, n.d. (a reprint of the revised edition of 1884).  
 Farnell, C.G.S. Lewis Richard Farnell, *The Cults of the Greek States*. Oxford, 1896–1909 (5 vols.).  
 Farnell, *Hero-Cults*. Lewis Richard Farnell, *Greek Hero-Cults and Ideas of Immortality*. The Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of St. Andrews in the year 1920. Oxford, 1921.  
 Fontenrose. Joseph E. Fontenrose, *Python; a study of Delphic Myth*. Berkeley and London, 1959  
 Frazer, T.E. Sir J.G. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy; a Treatise on certain early forms of Superstition and Society*, London, 1909 (4 vols.).  
 Frazer, G.B.3. Sir J.G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough; a Study in Magic and Religion*.

- London, 1911–15 (12 vols.).
- Frazer, *F.O.T.* Sir J.G. Frazer, *Folk-Lore in the Old Testament; Studies in Comparative Religion, Legend and Law*. London, 1919 (3 vols.).
- Frazer, *Belief*. Sir J.G. Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality and the Worship of the Dead*. London, Vol. I, 1913; Vol. II, 1922; Vol. III, 1924.
- Frazer, *W.N.* Sir J.G. Frazer, *The Worship of Nature*. Vol. I, London, 1926.
- van Gennep 1910. A. van Gennep, *La Formation des Legendes*. Paris, 1910.
- Gianelli. Giulio Gianelli, *Culti e miti della magna Grecia*. Firenze, 1924.
- Grant. Michael Grant; *Myths of the Greeks and Romans*. [London] 1962.
- Grote. George Grote, *A History of Greece from the Earliest Period to the close of the generation contemporary with Alexander the Great*. New edition, London, 1903 (10 vols.). The first part of this work deals principally with the myths and sagas.
- Gruppe, *G.M.R.* Otto Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte*. Munich, 1906 (2 vols.=I. Müller, *Handbuch der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, V, 2, i and ii).
- Gruppe 1921. Otto Gruppe, *Geschichte der klassischen Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte*. Supplement zu Roschers Lexikon. Leipzig, 1921.
- Guthrie. William K.C. Guthrie: *The Religion and Mythology of the Greeks* (Cambridge Ancient History, 2nd ed. Vol. II, Ch. XL, 1961).
- Harrison, *Proleg.* Jane Ellen Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*. Cambridge, 1903.
- Harrison, *Themis*. Jane Ellen Harrison, *Themis: a Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion*. Second edition revised. Cambridge, 1927.
- Herter. Hans Herter, *De dis Atticis Priapi similibus*. Bonnae, 1926.
- Homo. Leon Homo, *Primitive Italy and the Beginnings of Roman Imperialism*. London, 1927.
- Kern, 1926. Vol. I of Otto Kern, *Die Religion der Griechen*, 3 vols. Berlin, 1926–38.
- Latte. Kurt Latte: *Römische Religionsgeschichte* (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft). München, 1960.
- MacCulloch. J.A. MacCulloch, *The Childhood of Fiction: a Study of Folk Tales and Primitive Thought*. London, 1905.
- A. Mommsen. August Mommsen, *Feste der Stadt Athen im Altertum*: Umbearbeitung der 1864 erschienenen Heortologie. Leipzig, 1898.
- Murray 1925. Gilbert A. Murray, *Five Stages of Greek Religion*. Oxford, 1925.
- Nilsson, *Feste*. M.P. Nilsson, *Griechische Feste von religiöser Bedeutung, mit Ausschluss der attischen*. Leipzig, 1906.
- Nilsson, *Hist. Gk. Rel.* M.P. Nilsson, *A History of Greek Religion*. Translated from the Swedish by F.J. Fielden, with a preface by Sir James G. Frazer. Oxford, 1925.
- Nilsson, *M.M.R.*<sup>2</sup> M.P. Nilsson, *The Minoan-Mycenaean Religion and its Survival in Greek Religion*. Ed. 2, Lund, 1950.
- Nilsson, *GgR.* M.P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, 2 vols. Munich, 1955 (ed. 2, I<sup>2</sup>), 1955.
- Nilsson, *O.S.* M.P. Nilsson, *Opuscula Selecta*, 2 vols., Lund, 1951, 1952.
- Nock 1926. *Sallustius, Concerning the Gods and the Universe*. Edited with Prolegomena and Translation by Arthur Darby Nock. Cambridge, 1926.
- Pais 1906. Ettore Pais, *Ancient Legends of Roman History*. London, 1906.
- Pais 1913. Ettore Pais, *Storia critica di Roma durante i primi cinque secoli*. Vol. I, parte prima: Le Fonte, l'età mitica. Rome, 1913.
- Pais 1926. Ettore Pais, *Histoire romaine*. Tome premier, fasc. i. Paris, 1926.

- Page. Denys L. Page, *History and the Homeric Iliad*. 1960.
- Parkes. Henry B. Parkes, *Gods and Men*. London, 1960.
- Pauly-Wissowa. *Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*. Neue Bearbeitung begonnen von Georg Wissowa (etc.). Stuttgart, 1894
- Pfister. Friedrich Pfister: *Greek Gods and Heroes*. London, 1961.
- Preller-Jordan. L. Preller, *Römische Mythologie*. Dritte Auflage, von H. Jordan. Berlin, 1881–3 (2 vols.).
- Preller-Robert. L. Preller, *Griechische Mythologie*. Vierte Auflage bearbeitet von Carl Robert. Berlin, 1894—
- Reinach, C.M.R. S. Reinach, *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*. Paris, 1908–23 (5 vols.; first ed. of Vol. I in 1905).
- Rohde. Erwin Rohde, *Psyche: Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen*. Vierte Auflage. Tübingen, 1907 (2 vols.).
- Roscher. *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie ...* herausgegeben von W.H. Roscher. Leipzig, 1884–1937.
- Rose, Rom. Quest. H.J. Rose, *The Roman Questions of Plutarch*. A new translation with introductory essays and a running commentary. Oxford, 1924.
- Rose, P.C.G. H.J. Rose, *Primitive Culture in Greece*. London (Methuen), 1925.
- Rose, P.C.I. H.J. Rose, *Primitive Culture in Italy*. London (Methuen), 1926.
- Roszbach. August Roszbach, *Untersuchungen über die römische Ehe*. Stuttgart, 1853.
- Schwegler. A. Schwegler, *Römische Geschichte*. Vol. I, Römische Geschichte im Zeitalter der Könige. Tübingen, 1853.
- de Waele. F.J. M. de Waele, *The Magic Staff or Rod in GraecoItalian Antiquity*. The Hague, 1927.
- Walde. Alois Walde, *Lateinischs etymologisches Wörterbuch*. Heidelberg, 1906.
- Warde Fowler 1908. W. Warde Fowler, *Roman Festivals of the Republic*. London, 1908.
- Warde Fowler 1911. W. Warde Fowler, *The Religious Experience of the Roman People*. London, 1911.
- Warde Fowler 1916. W. Warde Fowler, *Virgil's Gathering of the Clans*. Oxford, 1916.
- Warde Fowler 1918. W. Warde Fowler, *Aeneas at the Site of Rome*. Oxford, 1918.
- Warde Fowler 1919. W. Warde Fowler, *The Death of Turnus*. Oxford, 1918.
- Warde Fowler 1920. W. Warde Fowler, *Roman Essays and Interpretations*. Oxford, 1920.
- Wide-Nilsson. A. Gercke and E. Norden, *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft*, II, 4: *Griechische und römische Religion*, von S. Wide und M.P. Nilsson. Leipzig und Berlin, 1922.
- Wissowa, R.K.R. Georg Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*. Zweite Auflage. München, 1912. (=Müller, *Handbuch*, V, 4, 2<sup>c</sup> Auflage).
- Wissowa, Ges. Abh. Georg Wissowa, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur römischen Religions- und Stadtgeschichte*. München, 1904.