CITIZENSHIP & WARS
France in turmoil 1870–1871
BERTRAND TAITHE

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The early years of democracy in France were those of a society divided by civil war, class war and violent conflict. *Citizenship and Wars* explores the concept of citizenship in a time of social and political upheaval, and considers what the conflict meant for citizen-soldiers, women, children and the elderly. This highly original argument based on primary research brings new life to debates about the making of French identity in the nineteenth century.

Putting the latest theoretical thinking into empirical use, the author assesses how the function of the state and its citizens changed during the Paris Commune and the Franco-Prussian War. The study considers fresh issues such as:

- how the people coped with the collapse of their government
- what the upheaval meant for the provinces of France
- how religious identities affected the issue of citizenship
- the differences between colonial Algeria and metropolitan France

This seminal study will appeal to students of history at undergraduate and post-graduate level. It is also an invaluable insight into the political and sociological aspects of the period.

CITIZENSHIP AND WARS

France in turmoil 1870–1871

Bertrand Taithe
I dedicate this book to Vicky, to my children Louis and, Emily, and to the memory of my father, forever in these pages
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ABBREVIATIONS

AAP  Archives de l’assistance publique de Paris
ADC  Archives départementales de la Corrèze
ADCr Archives départementales de la Creuze
ADH  Archives départementales de l’Hérault
ADHV Archives départementales de la Haute-Vienne
ADR  Archives départementales du Rhône
AEP  Archives épiscopales de la ville de Paris
AGOF Archives du Grand Orient de France
AIT  Association Internationale des Travailleurs
AML  Archives municipales de la ville de Lyon
AMM  Archives municipales de la ville de Montpellier
AN   Archives nationales
AOM  Archives nationales d’Outre Mer (Aix-en-Provence)
APdP Archives de la préfecture de Police de Paris
ASSAT Archives du service de santé des armées de Terre
AVdP Archives du département de la Seine et de la Ville de Paris
BAIM  Bulletin de l’Académie Impériale de médecine
BAVP Bibliothèque administrative de la ville de Paris
BHVP Bibliothèque historique de la ville de Paris
GMP  La Gazette médicale de Paris
JORC Journal Officiel de la République, édition de la Commune
Red Cross Société de secours aux blessés des armées de terre et de mer, & Société de secours dite de la Presse (unless otherwise stated, the two organisations are merged under one collective label)
SAT  Service historique de l’Armée de Terre de Vincennes
INTRODUCTION
Citizenship, wars and revolutions

Citizenship

The concept of citizenship, particularly French citizenship, has been overshadowed by one overwhelming but misconceived metaphor: that citizenship is akin to education.¹ To put it another way, the political investment of the Third Republic, continuing into the modern age, in the teaching of citizenship through schools or through the Ligue de l’enseignement or any such pressure group, has paid historiographical dividends.² This assimilation of citizenship to education, developed in all central texts on citizenship in nineteenth-century Europe and America, makes a number of comforting, if flawed, assumptions.

The first one is that citizenship is liberating knowledge which can be learned. By implication, citizenship can be taught. Teachers of citizenship therefore belong to the ranks of those who have come to master this knowledge, usually from their formal, liberal education at school—the gymnasium, the lycée—or through a convoluted political career in opposition to oppressive political practices.³ Central to this are the intellectuals, the politicians who manage to claim to be simultaneously the voice of the silent masses and the leaders at the vanguard of the citizenship revolution. Instrumental in the propagation of this scholarly truth are the school system, the voluntary associations and the republican or liberal political formations that they dominated and still control.⁴ Citizenship thus becomes a practice of exclusion of past immaturity and dependence.⁵ In a sense, it is therefore the achievement of strong individuals who obtain and maintain their freedom through their will and the practice of legally or ethically defined rights. It becomes the domain of a liberal vanguard which, in the course of time, shaped our modern society. Looking at its salient features, citizenship is no more than the old concept of civilisation revisited. It fits roughly with Comtian utilitarianism⁶ and could even be reconciled with a middle-of-the-road reading of Marx’s views on emancipation.

The second assumption, which follows from the first, is that citizenship is a stage in the history of mankind reached after long and convoluted travels in the darkness of subjection. Since citizenship can be taught, until citizens achieve political maturity, the whole nineteenth century can be depicted as the pubescent age of citizenship. Entire periods of mixed political identities, such as the French Second Empire, serve as necessary stages on the road to emancipatory democracy. This emphasis on education became, in the years following 1871, a fervent ‘démopédie’, to use Rosanvallon’s phrase,⁷ a mixture of democracy and pedagogy which attempted to create electors worthy of their own political system.⁸ As in puberty crises, revolutions appear as untimely manifestations of future identity, petulant outbursts of suppressed passion or as necessary rites of passage.
Another related metaphor, which has a less lofty tone, is that of apprenticeship. The apprentice learns a trade at the side of the master, which can either be defined in individualistic terms—Garibaldi, Mazzini—or in a more abstract way, as in the romantic notion of the silent but inspiring ‘People’ in the work of Michelet. In 1870 Jules Vallès, a debased, petit-bourgeois intellectual sunken in poverty and grim bohemia, described his apprenticeship as a series of encounters with the people, while stressing his hard-earned education. He thus maintained the leadership of the intellectual who alone could make text out of unspoken popular aspirations. One of the key tensions in Vallès’ work is precisely the knowledge that his scholarly learning should not give him the power others recognised in him. He therefore regularly denounces the sterile and aged scholarship of education. ‘It will take a gun to destroy the cardboard schools as well as the stones of the Tuileries [palace].’ His entire literary effort, with its deliberate use of vernacular and broken-down sentences, aims to express this frustration with being a reluctant author, witness and leader of an unfinished revolution.

Many other radicals did not harbour such self-doubt and were only fleetingly aware that they were merely spectators and not leaders. The Commune of Paris on 4 May 1871 set examinations for its aspiring officers, with questions on recent history, including the analysis of the defeat of 1848, the role of the National Guard, and the meaning of social questions. The jury pontificated on the value of these intellects while the revolution they lived in approached its end. Some of the radical literature on citizenship may attribute different values to the concept, but on the whole it respects the positivist assumptions which shaped the historiography of citizenship. Anarchists such as Bakunin might disagree with Marx or, later, Lenin on the necessity of a leadership of vanguard teachers, but instead put the emphasis on self-learning processes, following invisible guidelines set up by historical conditions of a more abstract kind.

Emphasising education comes naturally to historians who tend to be practitioners of education and who feel, rightly or foolishly, that they deliver a public service in producing the citizens of today and the subjects and leaders of tomorrow. This is a fundamental ‘mission statement’ and it seems almost cruel to question it, yet it is obvious that the whole narration of citizenship constructed since Rousseau has stuck with dated educational thinking and with positivist teleology. The type of education implicit in this view of citizenship is not developed from the western practice of pedagogy over the last two hundred years: instead, it harks back to the rhetorical tropes of Émile and modern inventions of the educated self.

If we accept that this particular construct of citizenship is false or merely not terribly useful, we can consider different forms of narratives of the self, collective and individual. We can then reconcile what we know of our own practice of citizenship with the more abstract rights and duties delineated in our written or implicit constitutions. Starting with the view that citizenship is not necessarily what shaped individual identities, or that this shaping is not the result of gentle character-forming, bending and bonding over the formative years, we might accept that citizenship might ‘erupt’ as a central part of one’s being. We might consider that practices and micro-practices, as pointed out by Michel de Certeau, are more important than electoral propaganda and political speeches. A more existential approach accepts that events also shape identity, and allows for sudden re-inventions, self-assertion and rediscovery. This approach also implies that the narrative of citizenship, individually and collectively, is not linear and progressive, but staccato and replete with discontinuities. In other words, one could re-introduce the experimental register of citizenship. Yet this does not mean that all experiments in citizenship are necessarily treasured, understood and accumulated as knowledge that can be passed on. In fact, these experiments are not necessarily acceptable memories or practices cherished by the temporary citizens. The writings of Veuillot, a fiercely Ultramontane Catholic opposed to any revolutionary heritage, contain some strange uses of the term ‘citizenship’ and an unprecedented willingness to entertain more inclusive political futures for France. Many of the respectable republicans and moderate bourgeois who had suddenly discovered in them me stuff
of a Danton or even a Robespierre reverted to more sober identities after 1870–1. France, currently led by me
1968 generation, can only wonder at the chasm between current neo-liberal political leaders, politicians and
bank managers and their hairy Maoist former selves. They may have cherished the 1968 experience, but it
had a much-mellowed impact on their later development. Their vision of active citizenship and of militancy
is now a faded historical construct. There is no betrayal; it is their understanding of citizenship that has
changed.

Citizenship, being part of a collective and individual narrative of the self, is necessarily integrated and
made logical, just like other elements of any autobiographical account. The same is true of many people in
the France of 1870.

Citizenship thus exists on two related planes, one constitutional and defined by the recorded laws of the
nation, and the other the practice of the rights and duties associated with the title of citizen which make
citizenship more than a paper identity. This particular dimension is found in the work of T.H.Marshall,
whose concept of welfare citizenship divides the substance of citizenship into three parts, civil, political and
social. While this concept is particularly apt in societies which have reshaped their ideal of a social
contract to provide a safety net for the poorest, it also exists in nineteenth-century societies, albeit as
aspiration or through more convoluted channels of exchanges and philanthropy.

In cultural and ideological terms the duties and rights compete, so that historians, philosophers,
sociologists, historians of law and anthropologists tend to talk at cross-purposes on the subject of
citizenship. This book is not intended to rescue any orthodoxy or master narrative from any historical
false consciousness. However, the central theme of this book is citizenship not only as it was theorised in a
centralist state, but as it was practised in the city, the village, the hamlet. Citizenship is not simply a
conceptual right: it is or it is not in the detail of its practice. Recent sociological work on citizenship and
nationality, often inspired by Elias, shows in some depth that the citizen is defined by his interrelation
with other citizens within the remits of a state—in French, concitoyen. The work on the ordinariness of
citizenship (and by implication the ordinariness of the state) points to the central importance of the
experience of citizenship and its ritual and codified practices, as well as the more spontaneous recognition
of implicit rights and duties of other citizens. The experience of citizenship during the Franco-Prussian war
and the Commune period was certainly more intense than anything lived hitherto or since, but its individual
and collective impact needs some reassessment. In 1870 we do not start from a tabula rasa: the Second
Empire had a complex and rich definition of citizenship, with a definition of how citizens and state
interacted which varied in time.

Citizenship also varied in space: the rights of a small city-dweller were infinitely more developed than those of an inhabitant of Lyons or Paris, even though the latter received more attention and paternalistic handouts than the former. Providing the state exists ordinarily, so does
citizenship. But what happens when the government collapses, when the territory is invaded and when the
nature of the state itself is in question, as it was in 1870–1?

How the French renegotiated their citizenship in relation to a state in chaos is the thematic backbone of
the whole book and will recur throughout each chapter. The central argument of this book is that citizenship
proved itself to be flexible and was represented as a set of practices and exchanges. The National Guard,
whose role has become central to most recent explorations of the period, was the crucial institution of the 4
September republic regime and the Communard movement, precisely because it codified exchanges based
on handouts, gifts and sacrifice. At the heart of this exchange was the concept of honour, both national and
individual. The rituals of death, funerals and processions, which inscribed the national guardsmen within
the civic tradition, had a tremendous importance.

The aim of this book is not, therefore, to narrate the history of the war and Commune in strictly
sequential order: the war and then the Commune, Paris and then the provinces. This will not do, precisely
because this narrative is flawed, however appealing its simplicity. Only a thematic approach will allow us to reflect simultaneously on different places and people, on social, gender and political issues. In Appendix 1, a chronology will help the reader to follow some of the great dates and episodes. The fact that this story has previously been told from the Parisian viewpoint is not only a reflection on the centralisation of scholarship: the politics of Paris, its sufferings during the siege and its strategic importance dominated all nationwide discussions of how the war should be fought and, to some extent, how France should be redefined after the empire. Paris attracted much attention; in its tragic phase of the Commune, many of the people who had been active revolutionaries in the provinces went to Paris, where the Commune of Paris resembled an alternative state.

Many of the other political experiments that had taken place earlier in the provinces did not present the same bombastic decorum or claim sovereignty. When policies are looked at, however, it must be recognised that revolutionary aspirations were expressed and acted upon in many great urban centres of France, to an extent unknown in Paris and with consequences that went deeper into the meshing of the subsequent political fabric.

This wide-angled approach is not meant to minimise the importance of 1870 and 1871 in French history. On the contrary, it posits this period as a watershed in the political and social thinking which contributed to the making of modern France.

**Historiography**

Historiographical developments since 1870 are intimately intertwined with the making of a canonical chronology, and this section will recall the great ‘dates’ of 1870–1, introducing vital elements of the historical narrative and the debates to which they gave rise.

The first debate concerns the origins of the Franco-Prussian war. This issue is crucial because by determining Napoleon III’s guilt it fundamentally undermined Bonapartist ideology and forced the French to think their society afresh.

Since July 1870, when the war started, historians have been attempting to explain what appeared a very confused crisis. The French government of the Third Republic after 1871 heaped the blame on the Second Empire regime and its adventurer leader, Napoleon III. On the material available, its bona fide historians apportioned the responsibility for the conflict equally between Bismarck’s Machiavellian plans and Napoleon III’s incompetence.\(^{32}\) At a popular level, the entire blame fell upon Napoleon III for agreeing to a war planned by his foreign and reactionary wife. Lurking behind the empress were the authoritarian ex-ministers Persigny and Rouher.\(^{33}\) A more scholarly approach stressed the deterioration of Napoleonic diplomacy, which since 1849 had attempted to restore France’s *grandeur* and international prestige while acquiring land and wealth.\(^{34}\) The many wars of the imperial regime had made a joke of the phrase ‘empire is peace’, declared in Bordeaux in the first year of the dictatorship. There had been the wars in the Crimea, in Italy to help unite Italy and then to preserve the Papal State,\(^{35}\) in Lebanon (1860), in China (1862–3), in the Far East ostensibly to protect Catholic missionaries, and in Algeria to increase French colonial interests. More damagingly, the expedition in Mexico, initially launched to recover debts,\(^{36}\) eventually established a straw empire for Maximillian of Habsburg (1863–6), and had in the long run exhausted the French army and undermined the credibility of the French diplomacy.\(^{37}\)

This trigger-happy diplomacy, mixing gun-boats, financial speculation and grand designs, had dispelled the chance of any alliance the French had attempted to establish. Napoleon III’s calls for a new European order, a new congress of the nations, remained unanswered.\(^{38}\) By 1865 the Second Empire also began to run out of steam: the Mexican adventure proved costly and pointless, the defence of the Papal State had
alienated the Piedmontese government, and the European order appeared more threatened than protected by the French. In 1864 France and Britain had been unwilling to respect their 1720 convention to defend Denmark against the Austrian and Prussian armies coming to the rescue of Schleswig-Holstein German subjects of the Danish crown. This local and rapid war of the Duchies saw the rapid demise of Denmark and the creation of an exclusive German sphere divided between Austria, the old power, and Prussia, the rising force of Germany.

The crisis which followed in 1866 between Prussia and Austria witnessed a similarly passive attitude from the French, who attempted to negotiate territorial gains with Prussia in exchange for their neutrality. The battle of Sadowa ended these secret negotiations, and left French diplomats stranded while Prussia achieved almost complete supremacy over the German-speaking world. The events of 1866 were perceived as a major defeat for the French European order, which had always played on the balance of power in Germany to prevent political unification and the reconstruction of a solid German empire. Albert Sorel and Benedetti, writing immediately after the war of 1870, saw in Sadowa the first step towards a major Franco-German conflict.

Culturally, Sadowa cast Prussia in a new light. The French press and public figures such as Edgar Quinet denounced the romantic myths of the Germans as a peace-loving people of dreamy poets and confused philosophers. This imagery, which had prevailed in France since the writings of Madame de Staël, gradually disappeared, to be replaced with a militarised Prussian stereotype. In other words, the French began to perceive the German unification as a cultural and political danger. The striking German victories had also been a great surprise. Baron Stoffel, writing just before the war from the French embassy in Berlin, had accumulated reports on the efficiency drive which had turned an outmoded army into a new model army based on conscription and territorial reserves (Landwehr). His very alarmist reports were ignored, and this later served as an indictment of the regime when they were published in 1871. The tone of these reports undermined their credibility, and the French reacted to Sadowa by mimicking German reforms in the Loi promoted by Marshal Niel in 1868.

This law was never fully implemented or given the financial muscle it required. It does matter, however, for the later developments of 1870, as this half-baked reform created the military and political tool at the disposal of the 4 September republic. Originally, Niel wanted to complement the long military service nucleus of the French army with a reserve of territorial soldiers called the garde mobile, composed of ex-soldiers and young men who had been fortunate enough to avoid conscription in the first place. French conscription since 1818 had been based literally on a lottery: the picking of a wrong number could mean a seven-year spell in uniform or the expense of paying for a substitute. The latter practice meant that the middle class and the wealthier farmers could save for this eventuality and avoid military service. The Niel reform thus confronted a long tradition of non-participation in the defence of the nation. Furthermore, France had not been threatened since 1815, and many remembered the appalling human cost of the revolutionary and imperial wars of 1792–1815. Historians are now familiar with estimates approaching the losses of the First World War, but contemporaries usually thought that conscription had cost them a million men. Statisticians and demographers were already concerned at the low French birth rate, which made France a slow-growing anomaly in Europe by 1870. Niel’s reform, postulating a long and a short military service, thus faced some very serious local opposition to the costs incurred and the political danger implied. The Second Empire had originated in the military coup of 1851, and the army remained a pillar of the regime, while rural votes gave it huge majorities in frequent elections and thus the appearance of democratic legitimacy.

The third central debate was on the nature of the caesarean polity towards the end of the Second Empire. By 1868 the Second Empire was in a phase of remarkable political and social reforms leading to the short-lived liberal empire. Napoleon III gradually granted debate rights to the chamber of deputies and strike and temporary association rights to workers; he made his ministers individually accountable and began to move
towards his Orleanist and republican opponents in shifting the regime more to the middle ground of French politics. This evolution startled the more intransigent Bonapartists and the more reactionary supporters of the muscular first incarnation of the regime. It was the fruit of Napoleon III’s own personal ‘social reveries’ and of his advancing physical decline. By 1868 the empire had to evolve sufficiently to make the transition to Napoleon IV possible, and thus it needed to find real constitutional stability. The constitutional role of the ruler had to diminish to enable this transition to take place.

Because of this evolution the government found itself no longer able to push through any major piece of legislation. The Niel reform was cut to size and opposed by many Bonapartist rural deputies unwilling to lose their support and by most urban opposition deputies fearing a new militarisation of the regime. The cost of modernising the army and the price of a million new standard needle rifles had already horrified the deputies; the idea of civilians in arms terrified the reactionaries and exasperated many professional soldiers. After Niel’s untimely death, the French reforms were starved of cash and political will. The price of a new artillery could not be supported by normal budgets, and the French who saw the new steel Krupp guns at their own Universal Exhibition of 1867 could neither afford to purchase them nor imitate their breech-loading design.

All these questions on social and military reforms later fed the debate on the causes of the French defeat of 1870. In July 1870 the Spanish crisis brought the French government to war against Prussia. Spain, in an intense political crisis, lacked a head of state, and the dictator Prim sought to appoint Leopold von Hohenzollern to the throne. The French emperor, although closely related to Leopold, could not accept this candidature for the fear that it might recreate the sixteenth-century encirclement of France. Although this historical thinking was largely obsolete by 1870, the implication that a branch of the house of Bourbon would lose its throne in Spain shortly after the fall of the Sicilian Bourbon monarchy could have revived internal royalist opposition to the empire. To cut a convoluted story short, Leopold withdrew at French insistence, and the French attempted to obtain Prussian assurances that the house of Hohenzollern would not entertain any further design on Spain. In many ways this was a terribly old-fashioned crisis, reflecting the dynastic diplomacy that ruled Europe even in the last few decades of the nineteenth century. The French liberal Émile Ollivier, who was recently rallied to the emperor and whose government represented the new face of the regime, was already facing much opposition from the chamber at the time of the crisis. Ollivier needed to assert himself nationally and internationally. This may seem surprising, as the reforms had obtained a massive electoral approval in the plebiscite of May 1870 and the empire looked stronger than ever. In the chamber of deputies, however, the government was weak and could rely on neither left nor right. The political dynamics behind the crisis were thus very diverse: the liberal government wanted war to assert itself, the reactionary Bonapartists wanted glory to re-establish a conservative regime, and the republicans feared it might consolidate the regime. A few, like Adolphe Thiers, warned against the war.

On the Prussian side, Bismarck probably exaggerated his Machiavellian role, but his Ems telegram, with its insulting description of the last encounter between the French ambassador Benedetti and King Wilhelm, made the war inevitable. Prussian military high command was also eager to face the French before they could reform their armies.

Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau has shown that for the ordinary Frenchman and woman the war came as a great surprise after a short crisis. In a sense, the complexity of the political crisis remained a challenge for historians. Much was made for a while of street opinion in favour of war. Newspapers in Paris might have given that impression at first glance, but there was little enthusiasm in many quarters of the nation’s public opinion and scenes of enthusiasm were limited to Paris. Throughout the country the idea of a war slowly sank in as the gardes mobiles, barely trained, if at all, were called to arms and the army gathered at the border. Another body of men, Gardes Nationaux, originally recruited among bourgeois sections of the
population, formed a reserve of armed men who later played a considerable role when the units began to recruit more widely.\textsuperscript{50}

The fourth great historiographical debate—great in terms of volume of writing, perhaps, rather than interest—concerns the causes of the defeat of the imperial army in July and August 1870. On paper the French army seemed comparable with its German counterparts; in reality, however, recent studies have demonstrated that French confusion between the concentration and mobilisation phases of the war had disastrous consequences, preventing any rapid attack. It meant that French soldiers were first sent to one site to be equipped and then went for their regiment, sometimes in the greatest confusion.\textsuperscript{51} The scale and nature of war was markedly different from anything the French had fought since 1854.

The Franco-Prussian war was a conflict of masses of infantry, in which the heavy cavalry lost its battlefield relevance while reconnaissance missions became more crucial. The French gathered by the Rhine, invaded Saarbrücken, retreated and were defeated in a series of murderous battles where officers showed conclusively that they had not fully comprehended the consequences of me new fire-power. Needle rifles, lethal up to a mile away, new guns firing further and more rapidly than before, and French mitrailleuses (a bullet gun) could kill and maim more effectively than before and favoured defensive positions. The first victims of changes in the nature of warfare were the cavalry squadrons. Many historians of the war, notably Michael Howard in Britain, have stressed the violence of the first month of the war. Casualties were extremely high on both sides. Split in two, the French armies moved to Sedan and to Metz, where they were captured and besieged respectively. Sedan and Napoleon III, so cruelly depicted in Zola’s \textit{La Débâcle}, surrendered on 2 September.

When the news reached the rest of France, the regime collapsed and the republic was proclaimed on 4 September simultaneously in Lyons and Paris.\textsuperscript{52} Debates arose here again as to the nature of the regime proclaimed in Paris. Trochu, the head of the government, was a token Catholic, vaguely Orleanist officer; he owed his sudden promotion to a pessimistic book of 1867 on the French army, which had achieved sudden prophetic status, and to his recent promotion as governor of Paris.\textsuperscript{53} All the other members of the government were deputies of Paris and popular names, such as the radical journalist Rochefort. The 4 September revolution in Paris proclaimed the republic, and could be considered to be the founding act of the Third Republic, even though it opened a period of constitutional uncertainty which only ended five years later.\textsuperscript{54} This government of national defence attempted to be as inclusive as possible to compensate for the fact that it was undoubtedly the representation of a minority in the country as a whole.

There is something deeply puzzling in the sudden melting away of the Bonapartist support. Even within the army, protests against any imperial restoration were issued from Germany in 1871 by officers of the captive French army.\textsuperscript{55} After twelve months the threat of an imperial restoration had all but vanished. Was Bonapartism an aberration in French politics?

Many historians have silenced their doubts about this in stressing the lack of cohesion of the Bonapartist majority,\textsuperscript{56} while the recent historiography contradicts this by stressing the enduring peculiarities of its politics. The Bonapartist myth of a country rejecting parties to favour national unity certainly had enduring qualities which have led some, like René Rémond, to consider Gaullism a direct avatar of this tradition.\textsuperscript{57}

In 1870, however, the myth of Napoleon I suffered an immense blow in the hands of his militarily incompetent nephew. The only military myth that remained in the face of an invasion was the revolutionary ideal of Valmy and the great victories of the French Revolution. To revive 1792 became the propaganda goal of all republicans and Bonapartists, while the more cautious monarchist factions supporting the competing Bourbon dynasties had to join in for a while to avoid being branded as defeatist. ‘We will support the government of 4 September because in the current circumstances we have to unite for the public salvation,’ stated a Legitimist provincial sheet.\textsuperscript{58}
The French Revolution had acquired almost mythical status through the works of a number of historians, from Thiers to Michelet, who had developed the notion of a nation in arms as a great founding moment of French citizenship. The popular incarnation of patriotic feelings was the popular poetry of Béranger, which had contributed powerfully to xenophobic definitions of the foreigners against whom the nation in arms existed. In 1870, this myth of the nation in arms was given new vigour through the contested work of a young and charismatic politician, Léon Gambetta. Sadly, re-enactment and parody are closely related, and the heroic prism through which the Revolution was magnified proved to have fatal consequences as it highlighted enthusiasm over preparation, improvisation over training. The anxieties voiced in Laon in early September, when the local people refused to defend their city in spite of the prefect’s bombastic calls to patriotism, could also be found in many a sleepy provincial town. When a Prussian army approached, heroics seemed of little relevance in the face of overwhelming danger.

The government in Paris soon became nothing much more than the government of Paris. The siege of Paris, which started around 16–19 September 1870 only to end on 28 January 1871, isolated the capital city from the provinces and left Gambetta republican dictator of most of France. Gambetta’s efforts from Tours, where he settled after 8 October, have been belittled by the conservative historiography and defended by a now largely defunct Third Republic hagiography, yet they were considerable. A total of 635,838 men were recruited and equipped to serve in the many armies of the republic as Gardes Nationaux mobilisés, while 250,000 were still in training camps at the time of the armistice.

Figure 1.1 clearly illustrates the scale of the debacle and the rapid advance of the enemy in France. Were this map put against another map illustrating the wealth of the nation, it would become even more obvious that much of the modern, productive and wealthier part of France had fallen under the German onslaught.

In the face of immense difficulties, Gambetta managed to keep the country together behind the war effort in spite of secessionist aspirations. The historiography thus focused on Paris on two accounts. The capital city had a revolutionary tradition which was most active during and after the siege and on which Marxist and neo-Marxist analytical theories could be anchored, and Paris became the obsession of the French and Germans who knew that its fall would lead to peace. Much of what happened in Paris during the siege then became part of a separate historiographical tradition, which will be discussed later. What took place in the country was critically analysed at different periods.

A post-war parliamentary inquiry into the acts of the government of national defence attempted to judge its action through a series of very leading questionnaires aimed at discrediting the 4 September republic. The questionnaire was so partisan and so leading that even conservative ministers chose to ‘withdraw a number of questions to which I could not provide answers that could be made public’ and the prefects only answered ‘the questions which could not involve the responsibility of the administration’. The Catholic and royalist media criticised the mayhem of major cities where local municipalities were allowed to legislate and enforce radical reforms and anti-clerical politics. France in 1870 suffered from a real power vacuum which decentralist forces, discussed in Sudhir Hazareesingh’s recent work, sought to fill. Much of this rich eruption of local politics has been neglected by historians or has been complacently described as ‘sister movements of the great Commune of Paris’. As the following chapters will show, the vital and lively forms of debate that took place almost everywhere in France owed nothing to the specifically Parisian political developments and followed a different political, cultural and social agenda.

In the provinces the war took many non-governmental forms. The most mythical, perhaps, in the sense that we do not have a clear notion of the numbers involved or of their efficiency, were the francs-tireurs, private armies which had been recruited by their self-appointed officers and had received authorisation. These irregular troops specialised in ambushes and guerrilla warfare. They usually wore a uniform and were not really civilians in arms, yet the occupying forces developed a deep anxiety about civilians and reacted with
great brutality in reprisal. These irregulars allowed for different and often competing forms of nationalistic feelings, and enabled anti-clerical and Catholic elements of the political landscape to fight the common enemy under their respective flags.\textsuperscript{68} Another novelty of the war was the intervention of an international brigade led by Giuseppe Garibaldi. International private armies had existed in the past, in Greece for instance, but this particular army came to the rescue not of France but of the republic, and played an important political role in the Rhône valley, which it defended. Historiographically, the role of this force is much more contested, although it did capture the only enemy flag won by a French army.\textsuperscript{69} This book argues that this volunteering played an important role in reshaping the idea of modern war and the relationship between French people and their state.

Further controversy is linked to the behaviour of the French officers during the republican phase of the war. In Metz, Marshal Bazaine, a powerful representative of a new officer caste owing everything to Napoleon III, surrendered at the end of October without so much as a real fight. In Paris, the left criticised the generals who seemed unwilling to use the 400,000 men at their disposal to their full potential.\textsuperscript{70} That hastily equipped civilians were not good soldiers seemed to be the case in the earlier skirmishes, but in the
later battles they showed a willingness to fight which was not matched by their superiors. In all places incompetent, routine-prone and defeatist minds limited the effectiveness of the war effort. Few names survived this war (for military reasons), save, perhaps, that of Chanzy.\footnote{71}

Within Paris the siege proved to be an untenable position for the government. Hunger led the political agenda, and the government was hostage to the population that had acclaimed it in September. The news of military defeats could only trickle into the capital, which had to survive on an impoverished diet of third-hand news and rumours. While street publications flourished in considerable numbers, they had little of importance to say. In this climate of deep anxiety, the tension was increased by the news that the government had attempted to negotiate peace in vain and had postponed elections, both municipal and national, to a later date. The news of the surrender of Metz led to a failed insurrection in Paris on 31 October, when radical forces led by Blanqui attempted to seize the town hall, a traditional centre of revolutionary sovereignty. This first insurrection ended in farce as government forces literally crowded into the building. Another insurrection attempt on 22 January ended in a bloodbath. These two insurrections have received far more attention than the ones that took place in Lyons in September or December because their protagonists were prominent later during the Commune of Paris.

The Commune of Paris, which dominates the historiography of the period, has many deep roots in French history. As a political movement, the term ‘commune’ had many different meanings, ranging from municipalism to communism, and the term was strongly reminiscent of the 1793 Commune which enabled the most radical revolutionaries to control the capital city during the Terror. All these meanings were juxtaposed in the political language of 1870, and the contradictions of the term were rarely openly addressed. The Commune of Paris as a political movement started in August 1870 with the raid on the fire station of La Villette; it was called for in Paris for many weeks during the siege and became a political alternative only after the sudden armistice of January 1871. At the end of January 1871, the food reserves of Paris ran short and the besieged government, without informing Gambetta or enquiring into the provincial situation, decided to sign an armistice for the whole of France. The signed armistice thus excluded the east of France (marked on the map in Figure 1.1) where an army led by Bourbaki attempted to cut German supply lines.

This omission created much confusion and contributed to the destruction of the last operational French forces. To establish a vote between peace and continuation of the war, elections to a national assembly were called for 8 February. After a seven-day campaign, fought almost exclusively on a peace-versus-war platform, the elections returned a solidly conservative and even monarchist majority, which chose the veteran politician Adolphe Thiers as chief of the executive.\footnote{72} The list system used for the elections meant that the political leaning of one list or the other was not always clear.\footnote{73} The conservative list of the Salut Public in Lyons, ostensibly in favour of peace, was thus led by Trochu, Jules Favre, Le Royer (procureur général), Bérenger (judge), Morel (previous mayor of Villefranche-sur-Saône) and a number of conservative figures, while the pro-war list of the National Guard contained precisely the same names with the addition of Garibaldi, Chanzy, Hénon (mayor of Lyons), Dolphus (mayor of Mulhouse) and Gambetta.\footnote{74} In other words, the substance of a list was often in the minor names which, following the multiple nomination system, were the ones most likely to take the seats. Eventually the conservative Thiers could thus be elected in twenty-six departments, while the ‘republican dictator’ Gambetta only made it in nine departments (Figure 1.2) and was thus the third most popular politician.

This system gave a degree of presidential legitimacy to the most frequently elected character. The newspapers thus calculated that 1,664,612 Frenchmen had elected Thiers while only 464,605 voters had chosen the nearest republican rival.\footnote{75} As they could accept only one seat, the others were made vacant and later enabled less well-known figures to enter the political fray. This confusing system allowed for a
number of established names to be elected by virtue of their local notoriety. Ancient names had a field day, and February 1871 represents the last electoral victory of the notables. One of the paradoxes of the list vote was that it was meant to elect representatives who were not directly accountable to constituents but only to the nation as a whole. It was meant as an assembly of representatives of the nation, and not of regional or local interests.

Some republicans, like Gambetta, remained attached to this principle throughout their careers because they objected to local control.

The elections seem to prove that the French did not embrace the warmongering republic and, indeed, left the door open for a restoration of the constitutional monarchy. Meeting first in Bordeaux, the assembly refused to return to Paris, and Parisians felt to a greater extent than before the divide between urban minority and rural majority. A series of blunders by the new government, which contained only a handful of known republicans, created the political situation of the Commune insurrection. The end of a moratorium on rent and trade debts suddenly threatened many with bankruptcy. The humiliation of a German parade in Paris and the harsh terms of the peace settlement, condemning the French to five thousand million francs reparation, a long occupation of the north of France and the loss of Alsace and German-speaking Lorraine, added to the Parisian furore. In Bordeaux, me assembly produced a succession of provocative moves such as refusing a seat to Garibaldi (elected four times), laughing at Victor Hugo, and attacking Gambetta in his absence. The 18 March 1871 insurrection was the response to the last provocation, when the army attempted to remove the guns paid for by Paris from the camps of the Gardes Nationaux. While the rest of

Figure 1.2 Thiers and Gambetta, two popular portraits
this book will consider the Commune at length, it is worth stressing the general lines taken by the recent historiography which are relevant here.

Traditionally the Commune has been perceived as the culmination of an insurrection campaign led by vanguard groups such as the Blanquists. This theory roughly fitted within the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. Also important to this historiography was the role of a handful of members of the Workers’ International, far fewer in proportion than in the making of the Lyons Commune in September 1870. A second generation of historical writing, concentrated in terms of publication dates around 1968–71, stressed the anarchistic traditions of the Parisian people and made the Commune a halfway house between old-style revolutionary impulses and new class-consciousness and anti-state politics. Those who attempted to find some left-wing common ground about the Commune questioned its value as a Kuhnian ‘paradigm for revolution’. Since the 1980s, a revival of interest in the forms taken by the Commune has stressed its importance as a republican moment, as Philip Nord would describe it—a moment during which the conciliatory forces attempting to bridge the differences between radicals and conservatives were denied their legitimate role. Others, more traditional in a sense, stressed the continuity of political associationism in Paris since the beginning of the 1860s. Dalotel et al. emphasised this long story of republican and Utopian socialist underground work. While they may have exaggerated the very Thompsonian undertones of their story of the making of the French working class and its secret nature, they rightly emphasised the vitality of associations before and after the insurrection. Martin Johnson devoted his entire study to the associationist component of the Commune and to the club culture that stirred and developed the revolutionary theories of the Paris Commune. This renewal of emphasis on associations oddly revives the conspiracy historiography of the socialist school or of the reactionary historians who saw in the Commune a Masonic and Internationalist plot.

Historical sociologists such as Harvey or Gould paid more attention to the neighbourhood dimension of the revolutionary movement, and argued that the relative Communard silence on class issues reflected the fact that the Parisians rebelled against the new urban order of Prefect Haussmann. They reacted against the extreme pressures on housing and working-class neighbourhoods inflicted by the prefect’s slum-clearing and boulevard-opening schemes. When they rebelled, they fought within the framework of established local sociability which was rarely exclusively work-centred. The National Guard, which established the Commune and remained its principal source of legitimacy, cut through class and professional forms of associations to recompose itself along local lines.

These studies present a rich reassessment of some of the forms of political communalism; it seems less certain that they can be defended as the only sources of the Commune. For the other movements in France which will be studied in this book, the scholarship is old and roughly follows Lissagaray’s study. Louis Greenberg’s *Sisters of Liberty* is certainly the work that paid most attention to the depth of other Communard movements but, like Jeanne Gaillard’s *Commune de province, Commune de Paris*, it centres its narrative too narrowly on the propagation of the Parisian experience. This myopia is obvious when one considers the fact that major figures such as Cluseret or Lissagaray had begun their revolutionary career in the provinces. There was cross-fertilisation and an exchange of people and ideas between Paris and me provinces.

The nature of the Commune of Paris’s programme is the final great controversy of the historiography to interest us. Some elements of it, such as the greater transgression of gender boundaries, have been rescued from oblivion as pointing towards a modernity of sorts. The women of the Commune, who later had to walk to Versailles under a shower of stones and spittle, were deemed emblematic of its freedom and dangers. Yet in many ways the Paris Commune fell well short of a socialist agenda. It explicitly referred to notions of right to work and did not innovate in terms of income tax; it promoted healthy economic management
rather than redistribution. It used old scapegoats instead of denouncing class inequality. Lyonese leaders went much further: the programme of the Commune of Lyons, as enacted between September 1870 and May 1871, showed a much deeper concern with socialist issues than the Parisians had the time or inclination to display. The final element of this story concerns the civil war, so masterfully studied by Robert Tombs in *The War Against Paris*. The final massacres of May 1871, which killed up to 25,000 Parisians and signalled the beginnings of an era of systematic political violence, led to a polarisation in French politics, later accentuated by the Dreyfus affair, which took over a hundred years to fade.

One of the great ‘lessons’ of this year of conflicts is undoubtedly the brutalisation of warfare and of French politics. Even though the story has been told many times, there are still many gaps to be filled and many ways, perhaps, of subverting war narratives and revolutionary myths.

### Citizenship and wars, 1870–1

This book comprises nine chapters, this introduction included, which develop the themes sketched out above. Because the intention is to deal with more than Paris, the book focuses on specific areas of France which are not often more ‘representative’ of anything but themselves but which can still be regarded as interesting exemplars or highly suggestive instances of what took place in France. Another approach, using prefectoral reports such as that of Audoin-Rouzeau, might have been used, but the generalities established from administrative reports are not necessarily representative of anything more than the survival of administrative practices. The departments that have interested me belong to very different social and political arenas. Paris and the Seine were long at the heart of my research, and much of the material for this book originates from the capital city. Lyons, for reasons that will be explained later, became central to much of my narrative. The Hérault gave an interesting instance of a political region which no longer supported the empire but remained in many ways a traditional agricultural department. The three other departments, Creuse, Corrèze, and Haute-Vienne, which form the modern region of Limousin, represent three traditionally supportive regions of the empire where agriculture, migratory workforces and small-scale industry meant that some of the social conflicts were intensely developed while some of the social bonding of the *ancien régime* survived. Moreover, the works of John Merriman and Alain Corbin have made the historiography all the richer.

Appendix 1 gives a chronology of the Franco-Prussian war, while Chapter 2 tackles the recent debates on ‘total war’ which tend to have been applied principally to the American Civil War and the First World War. As a concept, ‘total war’ is flawed because the application of war to the totality of a nation is impossible; as an ideal, of a Kantian type, total war has enabled strategists and historians to reflect on the creation of what Daniel Pick labelled a ‘war machine’. This war machine has obvious implications in the way modern citizenship has been conceived as a fully and voluntarily integrated cog in a military structure. Total war thus represents the expression of full modernity. Before total war, it is argued, societies at war can be deeply involved in a conflict and yet not be fully mobilised towards the war effort, so that its industrial, commercial and exchange structures are not, in the longer run, affected by the conflict. The year 1870 presents a complex case. France was invaded and many areas of normal life were severely disturbed, much industry was redirected to provide for the war effort and much tax pressure was applied to the French to enable them to import foreign weapons or machinery. In literary terms the war effort was intense, and the proliferation of newspapers and books during the conflict reflects not only an internal propaganda war but also the deep involvement of many literary figures. This involvement was perhaps proportionately greater than in the First World War. Many traditional historians have been reluctant to accept the label, quoting as counterfactual the lack of popular support for the revolutionary wars or the military reluctance to employ
the masses of men in arms at their disposal. That the French army was reluctant is not in doubt; that many rural areas saw with dismay the crop of 1871 compromised and the exchange of goods thwarted is also not in question. Yet the war went further than many realised even then.

The war of 1870 saw the rise of a humanitarian consciousness throughout Europe\(^\text{94}\) which enabled French women and children to take part in the conflict. The trains of wounded and sick soldiers crossing France brought home the realities of modern war. Even the support for ‘war to the last’ was not really questioned until defeat after defeat had eroded the French reserves. In theoretical terms, ‘war to the last’, stating absolute gains as a priority objective, demonstrated a neo-Clausewitzian rejection of negotiated settlements.\(^\text{95}\) The modernity of this war was recognised in the immediate post-war period, especially as it highlighted political violence arising from the proletarianisation of France, and had deep cultural and social implications which substantially shaped the making of modern France.

Chapters 3 and 4 follow from this first assessment to consider the ways in which citizenship was structured to face the challenge of the invading armies. The myth of the revolutionary wars of 1792 stirred some deep passions and debates. The whole call-to-arms campaign of Gambetta restated the exchange between citizen and state, and this propaganda campaign backfired in the sense that me revolutionary debates became integral to a contest of the state. François Furet used some of this material to justify his views that the Revolution ended in this period of maturation.\(^\text{96}\) The great debates—such as decentralisation—of the late empire were obviously at the heart of this collective rethinking of citizenship. La sociale, the general term that encompasses the whole social aspirations of the new working-class and old artisan communities, also had particular echoes in 1870. The war effort supported by Paris or Lyons, for instance, was largely justified by the social gains established through a new compact between patriotic citizens and the nation in danger.\(^\text{97}\) Law and order measures and repressive policies could only be cast in this light. Ultimately, there was a breakdown of this new compact largely because it remained tacit and unexplained.

The new compact did not find its best expression at the state level. It was on the municipal scale that these issues arose, and the devotion to the ‘commune’ in its simplest meaning cannot be justified solely as an instinctive reaction against centralisation. What took place in Lyons, Montpellier, or any city one cares to look at, was a fuller debate on citizenship in relation to local democracy. The politics of care developed by municipalities for the poor or the families of the soldiers, and the development of often secularist education policies, demonstrated the maturation of local politics. Moreover, the decentralist label, applied to all provincial movements by Louis Greenberg, could be challenged on many instances of heavily centralist discourse originating from emancipated communes.

Chapter 5 develops this appraisal but on a smaller scale, by looking at individual identities and how religion could or could not be integrated into discourse on citizenship. Since the Revolution, French definitions of citizenship tended in theory to dissociate citizenship and religious identities from one another. In practice, however, the French had behaved consistently in contradiction with their ideals. The North African territories of Algeria were thus ruled through religious definitions of citizenship and subjection. The Jews, Muslims and ‘non-natives’ were treated differently by the military and civilian authorities which enjoyed condominium over the territories. The 1870 Crémieux decree gave full, officially non-religious citizenship to the North African Jewry while it confirmed the subjection of the Arabs and submitted the ‘Muslim’ community to the ‘non-native’ civilian authorities. The end result was that the militantly racist and proselytising French people of North Africa saw their citizenship reinforced and gained sovereignty over second-class Muslim citizens/subjects. This conundrum, which was not resolved until the Algerian uprising of 1956, led directly to a major insurrection in Algeria in 1870–1. The Jews of France had, through Adolphe Crémieux’s decree, gained fuller control over their brethren of North Africa, whom they regarded with some colonialist dismay, but as a religious community they also took part in the revival of the republic.
Philip Nord has shown how this minority and the Protestant minority embraced republicanism. Freemasons, themselves in the midst of a deep doctrinal controversy on theism, also allied themselves vigorously to the revolutionary impulse of 1870.

The real religious question in the republic of 1870 was thus the Catholic question. Chapter 5 looks at the ways in which the Church moved to negotiate with the republic, and how it retreated over the Commune uprising to its traditional monarchist allies and a generation-long opposition to the republic.

Chapters 6 and 7 examine the tensions that led to such breakdowns of communication and to the brutalisation of French politics. By looking at the enemy within, Chapter 6 considers how gender and age were discussed in relation to citizenship. The situation in radical cities gave rise to many debates on the military or paramilitary role of women in the war effort. Women of the Commune have thus received much critical attention, from Lissagaray to Gay Gullickson. Children of the Commune or of the siege of Paris did not become as central in French thinking on gender, but the way they were treated reflects on the social contextualisation of childhood in France. Ageism was also contested, and legions of volunteers, civilian brigades uniting children and old men or women, were ways in which significant numbers of individuals reasserted their social value and their active citizenship during the war and Commune. On the other hand, the conflicts which led to the exclusions of a number of individuals or enemies within also deserve some attention as to their social mechanics. Traitors and spies were universally denounced throughout the war and Commune. When a rural baker was sentenced to death for spying on behalf of distant enemies, when a German immigrant father of two French soldiers had to flee his neighbourhood, or when a Communard crowd murdered one of their own on the grounds of treason, a whole process of exclusion and inclusion was taking place which defined citizenship. This process led to the murder of ‘innocent’ people, precisely because their identity and their citizenship seemed in contradiction with each other. The number of priests arrested for spying also reflects this tension between their marginal, professional, confessional or other identity and French citizenship.

Chapter 7 investigates a number of incidents of internecine violence that led to the greater brutalisation of French politics. The three instances looked at here are also good examples of a patchy but tragic evolution leading to the breakdown of civility and the end of a civil order. The murder of Hautefaye, studied in detail by Alain Corbin in the light of the longue durée, in its more contemporary context led to a reflection on civilisation, rurality and barbarity. In this instance, a Bonapartist mob slaughtered a young royalist like a pig and roasted the corpse on a spit. In spite of its atrocity, this murder fitted within a whole tradition of rural violence. The murder by his own men of Commandant Arnaud, officer of the Garde Nationale, also fitted with urban violence, except that it targeted a well-liked working man, Freemason and radical. Arnaud’s death and the rites that followed his burial, as well as the trial of his murderers, led directly to the reciprocal and calculated violence of the Commune of Paris. While most insurrections of 1870–1 had ended in a negotiated settlement, as in Narbonne or even in Paris on 31 October 1870, the insurrection of 18 March 1871 used violence and was repressed in a calculated way, making murder the ultimate argument on both sides and creating a political chasm that the Third Republic never managed to bridge.

The following two chapters attempt to pull together the experience of the war and Commune and to assess their impact on the making of modern France. Chapter 8 reflects on the Eugen Weber hypothesis and on the fragility and strength of French national identity. By looking at the French state more broadly—that is, looking beyond the state-paid administration—one can attempt to analyse some of the elements of a desire for centralisation. Throughout the war the republic had to use and attempt to modify an administration that was not shaped by its ideals; after the war it negotiated with this civil service, while it also found some of its stronger support in elected magistrates, professions and other organised groups. The conclusion deals with the political and social constraints on the development of a post-war regime.
Odile Rudelle and Claude Nicolet have seriously begun an in-depth revision of the Third Republic, but their work alone has not changed the prevailing negative opinion. Yet the Third Republic was the longest lasting form of government enjoyed by the French since 1789. How the political regime that divided the French least became the strongest, while constantly in crisis, remains a difficult issue to address. The war and Commune experience provided the matrix of post-war developments and froze some of the possible political developments of France. The religious question, which first focused on the Catholics and then on the Jews, the hunt for the enemy within which found much expression in medicine and culture, the conflicting aspirations to a mystical or materialistic national regeneration, and the dream of a unifying saviour, all became embedded issues of the new regime. On the other hand, practical concerns, including the social issues or even innovations of the war such as the capital gains tax and income tax promoted in Lyons, were not brought to the fore of French politics for many years. In conclusion, this book will consider how the experience, practice and memory of citizenship at war contributed to the making of that most odd regime called the Third Republic.
Archival, newspaper and manuscript sources

I have used many archives to write this book, and newspapers and journals have added to the wealth of material. The major archival deposits of Paris have been used, and in particular the following cotes:

Archives nationales: Dossiers des Commissaires de Police, les émigrés Polonais et l’Internationale, AN F7 12708; Ministère de l’Intérieur Janvier-Juin 1871, AN FIC1 131; Communards Amnistés et Libérés, AN F7 12713 bis. Archives de l’Assistance Publique, where all the archives relating to the war and the Commune have been classified in 1991 under the register 542 Foss which goes from 542 Foss 1 to 125; Archives du Service de Santé des Armées de Terre et de Mer, where again all the archives have been collated in a series of ‘boxes’ 62, 63, 64, 65, 65bis, 66. The archives at the Vincennes Service Historique des Armées de Terre are also well organised and mostly under the label La 1–78, Lb 1–78, Lc 1–5, Ld 1–34, Le 1–59, Lf 1–14, Lg 1–7, Lh 1–13, Li 1–129, Lj 1–8, Lk 1–3, Ll 1–4, Lm 1–48, Ln 1–17, Lo 1–79, Lhs 1–28, Lq 1–17, Lr 1–11, Lt 1–29, Lu 1–151, Lv 1–28, Lw 1–35, Lx 1–103. Another more detailed inventory exists for the Commune, previously Ly 1–26. The Archives de la Préfecture de Police de Paris suffered in the fires of May 1871 but still contain important quantities of material, mostly listed in the series Ba, Db and Da. The archives of Paris also suffered greatly in the fires, but enormous files are still accessible at the Archives de la Ville de Paris in the series of material deposited by arrondissement town halls ranging from VD6 715 to VD6 2696, deposited from 1860 onwards. The Archives Episcopales of the archbishopric of Paris are not so well organised but contain the files of Mgr Darboy and the elements relating to his death; other interesting files are the reports to the bishop from many army chaplains. The Archives of the Grand Orient de France are now mostly available at the Bibliothèque Nationale; an inventory exists.

I have also used some regional archives, notably the Archives départementales du Rhône, Lyons, de la Creuse, Guéret, de la Haute-Vienne, Limoges, de la Corrèze, Tulle, de l’Hérault, Montpellier. In all these regional archives the files studied belonged mainly to the M and R series. I also used the Montpellier Archives Municipales and the Lyons Archives Municipales. The archives relating to overseas territories and colonies are kept in the wonderful archives of Aix-en-Provence, Archives d’Outre Mer, which contain numerous gems classified by territory and following the conventions of the Archives nationales.

Bibliography

This is a relatively short bibliography which should be used together with the one I have provided in Defeated Flesh, published in 1999. Readers should not be surprised if some rather obvious titles are not listed here; it is often because they were not central to my argument that I have chosen not to list them. All French and English titles are published in Paris and London respectively unless otherwise specified. Obviously redundant publication details such as Oxford, Oxford University Press, have been simplified thus: ‘Oxford University Press’.
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